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Preface
This volume contains papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2019, the Fourth Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, held during October 1-4, 2019,
in Bregenz, Austria. It resulted from the merging of EVOTE and Vote-ID and
counting up to 15 years since the first E-Vote conference in Austria. Since the
first conference in 2004, over 1000 experts have attended the venue, including
scholars, practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors and PhD Stu-
dents. The conference collected the most relevant debates on the development
of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to
practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, so-
cial or political aspects, amongst others; turning out to be an important global
referent in relation to this issue.
Also, this year, the conference consisted of:
– Security, Usability and Technical Issues Track
– Administrative, Legal, Political and Social Issues Track
– Election and Practical Experiences Track
– PhD Colloquium, Poster and Demo Session on the day before the conference
E-VOTE-ID 2019 received 45 submissions, being, each of them, reviewed
by 3 to 5 program committee members, using a double blind-review process.
As a result, 23 papers were accepted for this volume, representing 51% of the
submitted proposals. The selected papers cover a wide range of topics connected
with electronic voting, including experiences and revisions of the real uses of
E-voting systems and corresponding processes in elections.
We would also like to thank the German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft fu¨r
Informatik) with its ECOM working group and KASTEL for their partnership
over many years. Further we would like to thank the Swiss Federal Chancellery
for their kind support. Special thanks go to the members of the international
program committee for their hard work in reviewing, discussing, and shepherding
papers. They ensured the high quality of these proceedings with their knowledge
and experience.
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Introductory paper 
E-Voting – an overview of the development in the past 15
years and current discussions 
Robert Krimmer1 [0000-0002-0873-539X], Melanie Volkamer 2 [0000-0003-2674-4043]  and David 
Duenas-Cid1,3 [0000-0002-0451-4514]
1 Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 3, 12618 Tallinn, Estonia 
robert.krimmer,david.duenas@taltech.ee 
2 Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Kaiserstr. 89, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany 
melanie.volkamer@kit.edu 
3 Kozminski University, Jagiellonska 57/59, 03-301 Warsaw, Poland 
Abstract. This opening article introduces the Fourth International Joint Confer-
ence on Electronic Voting and, on the occasion of the 15 years since the first E-
Vote conference in Austria, presents an analysis of the network of co-authorships 
based on the books published by the Electronic Voting Conference Series. The 
goal of the analysis is to provide an overview of the development of the network 
of authors involved in the conference and to give some insights on the internal 
dynamics of collaboration within the field. Its comprehension sheds light on the 
creation of influence, internal norms and performance of the publications, enlarg-
ing the knowledge on the field and highlighting the contribution of the confer-
ences on its development.  
Keywords: E-Vote-ID Conference Series, Network of co-authorships, Social 
Network Analysis 
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1 Looking back in time: a network analysis 
On the occasion of celebrating the first 15 years since starting the Electronic Voting 
Conference Series, we introduce an opening chapter to conduct a retrospective analysis 
of evolution of the Conference with regards to its impact on creating a community of 
scholars interested in this field. After these years elapsing, the network of scholars 
working on it has increased, but are no more certain of its extent than the personal 
perceptions derived from interactions between colleagues. In our humble opinion, one 
of the main successes of these 15 years of conferences on electronic voting has been 
the contribution to the consolidation of a field of research and to the creation of a regular 
meeting point for the researchers interested in the topic. We assume that these meetings 
helped to create new connections that consolidated in common projects and publica-
tions. In order to shed some light on the impact of the conference, we conducted an 
analysis of the network of scholars created amongst the participants in the conference, 
based on their collaborative work. As Cugmas et al. [6] cite, there are different ways to 
collaborate scientifically [25], but most are invisible [26]: collaboration involving a 
division of labor, service collaboration, providing access to research equipment, the 
transmission of know-how, mutual stimulation, and trusted assessment. Amongst the 
“visible” and formal ones, the same authors [5] reference six indicators of collaborative 
relationships between scientists [12]: co-authorship; shared editing of publications; 
joint supervision of PhD projects; writing research proposals together; participation in 
formal research programs; and jointly organizing scientific conferences.  
In this analysis we will focus on one particular type of collaboration, the network re-
sulting from the collaboration in common published papers. Networks of co-author-
ships have been analyzed in diverse fields such as digital libraries [29], organizational 
studies [2] or healthcare [7], and they normally share a common background sustained 
by the idea that collaboration is a basic element of academic life as it increases the 
productivity of the researcher [27] and impact of his/her research [10], helping to in-
crease the citation rate for publications [31] and the overall quality of research [15]. 
This process helps to weave a wider network of interconnected researchers together, 
contributes to sharing resources that are relevant in the field, such as information, com-
mon understanding and knowledge [28], and serves as a way of introduce new members 
(PhD students, for example) to the field of research [1].  
On the other hand, analyzing social networks helps us describe and understand the un-
derlying processes in social relations. As Fitzhugh and Butts [9] describe, the structural 
influence of countless social processes rarely occur in isolation, but in relation to the 
social network in which they are inserted. Networks allow us to understand, for exam-
ple, how interaction processes are influenced by the homophilic tendency to relate to 
people whom we are similar to [30], how networks expand and create relational clusters 
[35] or how weak connections can bring new opportunities for existing relationships
[11]. In this case, formalization of informal relations (as a co-authored publication) may
be considered a representation of a common set of interests and goals, crystalizing in a
common joint project (a research or a publication), fostering the exchange of infor-
mation and the improving the resulting work. The accumulative process of creating and
developing networks of collaboration helps to create internal dynamics and implicit
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rules in a given environment. Every organizational environment (field) is defined by a 
non-written set of standards and norms, behavioral patterns and dynamics and certain 
forms of capital that help us navigate within it, and to understand how the environment 
works when you are submerged in it [8]. Following this approach, a field must be con-
ceptualized as a configuration of relationships between nodes represented in a network 
and the positions that those nodes happen to occupy [8]. The use and analysis of net-
works helps reveal the internal dynamics of a given field, and to understand the differ-
ent symbolic positions and strategies followed by their components. Assuming that the 
Electronic Voting Conference Series is a representation of the electronic voting com-
munity, and understanding the network of co-authorships as a representation of internal 
dynamics in this field of research, analyzing the resulting network gives us clues for 
detecting how this particular field of knowledge works and to celebrate the contribution 
of the conference series to the creation, development and consolidation of this field. 
2 Methodology 
We analyze the network of co-authorships on books resulting from the E-Vote, Vote-
ID and E-Vote-ID Conference series in this paper. The data regarding publications, co-
authorships and citations has been extracted from the profile in Google Scholar which 
compiles all the information on the Electronic Voting Conference Series1. The data was 
extracted using the Harzing Publish or Perish (version 6)2 software, a program for look-
ing up scholarly citations and calculating impact metrics. The data was analyzed using 
Gephi (Version 0.9.2)3, a program for manipulating and visualizing network graphs.  
The data presented here consists of an exploratory analysis of evolution of the net-
work of co-authorships4 as an indicator for creating a structure of scholars around (and 
thanks to) the electronic voting conference series and its insights. The relations between 
nodes (edges) are considered as undirected (two nodes are related, being irrelevant the 
direction of the relation), and the analysis (Number of nodes connected, Betweenness, 
PageRank, Detection of hubs) is done taking the cumulative network (2004-2018) as 
an analytical frame. 
3 Analysis 
A total of 14 books has been published resulting from the presentations held in the 
conference [3, 13, 14, 16–24, 32, 33], including a total of 228 articles and 628 collabo-
rators, between authors and editors, since 2004. These publications have been cited up 
1  scholar.google.com/citations?user=KsBkbjkAAAAJ&hl=en (Last Access, 7 May 2019) 
2  Available at: harzing.com/resources/publish-or-perish?source=pop_6.46.6370.7005 (Last 
Access, 7 May 2019) 
3  Available at: gephi.org/ (Last Access, 7 May 2019) 
4  Co-Editions are included as Co-Authorships.  
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to 2.764 times, an average of 184,3 times per year and 12,1times per article5. Co-au-
thoring articles seems to be the most common practice in the conference series, since 
just 20% of the articles published are by a single author.  
Fig. 1. Evolution in the number of citations 
To create the co-authorship network, we identified every author and publication as a 
node in the network and every collaboration as an edge connecting the different nodes 
involved: authors and publications. As a result, we have a network composed of 616 
nodes and 1.518 edges6. The process creating the network (see Fig. 2) was gradual, up 
until the current configuration of the network. The nodes are of different sizes depend-
ing on their degree (the number of nodes they are connected to), highlighting those 
nodes that are more “popular” in terms of shared publications. The ten most popular 
nodes are those which had been more active in publishing, co-authoring and involved 
in co-editing some of the conference proceedings (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Nodes with higher degree in the network 
5  Last Update of citations, April 2019, Publish or Perish 
6  Note that the total number of nodes does not correspond to the sum of authors and publica-
tions, due to the fact many researchers published more than one text, and, therefore, they are 
counted just once. 
Author Nodes
M Volkamer 87
R Krimmer 58
V Teague 44
PYA Ryan 41
P Vora 33
C Schürmann 27
S Schneider 25
R Goré 22
A Essex 21
S Popoveniuc 21
Year
Citations per 
Year
Aggregate 
Citations
2005 15 15
2006 42 57
2007 78 135
2008 133 268
2009 131 399
2010 153 552
2011 181 733
2012 218 951
2013 182 1.133
2014 317 1.450
2015 208 1.658
2016 445 2.103
2017 317 2.420
2018 278 2.698
4
Fig. 2. Cumulative evolution of the network of co-authorships 2004-20187 
The degree is considered as a measure of centrality, as it allows to identify relevant 
nodes in a network according to their “popularity”. Even so, centrality in a network is 
not only about being connected to many nodes, but also being connected to relevant 
nodes. The relevance of connections is analyzed using the betweenness centrality meas-
ure, which collects information on how often a node appears on the shortest path be-
tween different networks or, in other words, which are the nodes that are better placed 
in a network. The position occupied is directly connected to the amount of information 
that one node can accumulate in the network and is directly related with holding sym-
bolic power within the field. There is a tendency to correlate between having more 
nodes and being placed in the center of the network, but there is also a dependency on 
the nodes to which one is connected. For example, a strategic connection with well-
connected nodes gives you a more central position than a large number of poorly con-
nected nodes. In the case we are analyzing, shared publications with relevant nodes can 
influence the position in the network (see Fig. 3). 
7  Every network corresponds to one Edition of the Electronic Voting Conference Series. The 
nodes are weighted according to the number of nodes they are connected to, the larger the 
number, the greater the number of contacts. 
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Fig. 3. Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness allows us to determine which is the symbolic center of the network, and 
it relates to the capacity to influence other nodes in the network. Another estimate of 
the capacity for influencing is given by the PageRank measure, which estimates the 
relevance of one node in relation with the nodes with whom it is connected, giving a 
wider approach of the capacity to influence a node and being used, for example, for 
detecting  priorities in networks [34]. Having high values of PageRank in a network 
represents a combined indicator of the position of a certain node in the network in re-
lation to the capacity of the node to create a hub around it.  
Table 2. PageRank Distribution 
The measures presented allowed us to detect the most relevant individual nodes within 
the network. In the case analyzed, the most relevant nodes are researchers who partici-
pated in the Conference Series in many times and managed to gather people around 
them with whom they shared publications. But networks extend beyond the individual 
position of nodes by including internal dynamics of group behavior.  Combining related 
nodes with dense relationships with themselves create hubs of interrelated nodes, and 
detecting these hubs is particularly relevant for understanding the internal standards and 
norms for a network. In the case analyzed here, using the Modularity algorithm pro-
vided by Gephi, we detected a set of nodes that create hubs or clusters of interrelated 
nodes due to their greater interconnectedness with themselves than with the rest of the 
network [4], meaning, in this case, a greater collaboration in co-authoring papers (see 
Node PageRank
M Volkamer 0,013
R Krimmer 0,010
C Schürmann 0,007
PYA Ryan 0,005
V Teague 0,005
P Vora 0,004
J Willemson 0,004
RM Alvarez 0,004
L Loeber 0,004
J Puiggalí 0,004
Author Betweenness
M Volkamer 251.578
R Krimmer 18.892
C Schürmann 9.710
V Teague 8.330
PYA Ryan 8.240
P Vora 6.278
J Benaloh 4.978
R Goré 4.485
J Barrat 4.340
J Helbach 3.516
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Fig. 4). Not all the hubs have been colored to avoid interference in visualizing the net-
work, choosing just those that represented larger numbers of scholars. The singular 
analysis of each hub provides interesting results but, in order to make the analysis eas-
ier, only the most paradigmatic typologies will be presented.  
Fig. 4. Division of the network into hubs 
Depending on the internal data of each hub detected, we could find some patterns of 
similarity in the features and outcomes of different hubs. The main element of similarity 
and difference relates to the typology of members composing the hub. Two different 
types of hub are detected in this regard, those which are created based on a diverse 
group of researchers interacting due to common interests and a second group of hubs 
that are created based on similarity of the origin of their members. Amongst the first 
group of hubs, the differences amongst them arise from the position they occupy in the 
network and the internal patterns of functioning. Amongst the second one, the differ-
ence is based on the country/environment of origin of their members. Therefore, four 
main geographically based groups were detected: An Estonian hub, a Swiss one, an 
Australian one and one based on their relation with the private vendor Scytl. The first 
three (Estonian, Swiss and Australian) are composed of scholars who are researching 
the countries where internet voting systems are deployed, showing the research attrac-
tiveness of pioneering examples. The Scytl hub is created around the publications done 
by researchers link to a private vendor that offers its services worldwide. Their publi-
cations, therefore, are generally connected to the places where they deliver their ser-
vices.  
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Table 3. Main clusters detected in the network 
A group of three hubs has been defined as central hubs (I, II and III). The reason is that 
they all share a high degree of betweenness as a common salient feature. They gather a 
relevant number of researchers who occupy the centrality of the network, but they differ 
in the internal structure of the hub. While central hubs I and III display a clear priority 
(Melanie Volkamer and Robert Krimmer for Central hub I -see Fig. 5- and Carsten 
Schürmann and Jordi Barrat for Central hub III -Fig. 7), Central hub II (Fig. 6) presents 
a softer and more horizontal distribution, with a higher average interconnectedness 
(represented by a higher average and median degree). The second central hub also 
joined the Conference Series, on average, at a later stage, when some internal dynamics 
had already been created and this might also help create a different relational structure 
based on commonality of interests8.   
8  For reading the forthcoming figures: in order to ease the comprehension and comparison of 
data, average values for all the network have been calculated (Index 1). The data for each hub 
is presented in comparison with the average value.  
Central hub I Central  hub II Horizontal hub Central hub III Peripheral  hub
Number of members 47 34 28 18 16
Average Degree 8,43 11,09 11,70 6,61 5,63
Median Degree 4 8 12 6 5
Density 0,07 0,14 0,24 0,13 0,16
Average Betweenness 1.114 840 354 862 38
Average Closeness 0,31 0,30 0,25 0,30 0,42
Average Year of first publication 2.010 2.013 2.011 2.012 2.009
Number of Publications 28 19 12 13 12
Average cites per year 1,44 2,32 0,98 0,73 1,76
Average number of authors 3,18 3,89 4,22 2,38 2,50
Estonian hub Australian hub Swiss hub Scytl hub Total
Number of members 14 10 9 9 392
Average Degree 6,14 7,30 9,11 6,56 6,24
Median Degree 4 5 7 5 4
Density 0,19 0,34 0,26 0,29 0,01
Average Betweenness 264 449 465 477 342
Average Closeness 0,26 0,23 0,27 0,26 0,35
Average Year of first publication 2.014 2.016 2.012 2.012 2.011
Number of Publications 10 7 12 8 222
Average cites per year 3,86 1,18 1,86 1,99 1,51
Average number of authors 2,80 3,14 2,92 2,88 2,81
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Fig. 5. Values for Central Hub I9 
Fig. 6. Values for Central Hub II 
Fig. 7. Values for Central Hub III 
Regarding the other two non-geographically based hubs, named as peripheral and hor-
izontal hubs, these portray a different perception. The peripheral hub (Fig. 8) was more 
active in the past and now only some of their members still attend the conference and, 
probably, they will jump across to a different hub in the future if their publishing activ-
ity continues with active members of the community. This “lethargy” moved the posi-
tion of this hub to a non-central space (low betweeness) but with adequate proximity 
9  Note that the scale for Fig. 5 is different 
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Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Central hub I
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
M Volkamer 87 25.158 0,013
R Krimmer 58 18.892 0,010
R Grimm 20 908 0,004
S Neumann 19 805 0,003
J Helbach 12 3.516 0,002
K Reinhard 11 1.314 0,003
N Meissner 10 987 0,002
C Feier 9 200 0,001
M Traxl 9 145 0,001
A Prosser 8 4 0,001
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Central hub II
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
V Teague 44 8.330 0,005
PYA Ryan 41 8.240 0,005
S Schneider 25 1.951 0,002
R Wen 19 694 0,002
Z Xia 19 200 0,002
J Heather 17 78 0,002
J Benaloh 16 4.978 0,002
C Culnane 15 257 0,002
JA Halderman 14 1.026 0,002
D Demirel 13 304 0,002
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
C Schürmann 27 9.710 0,007
J Barrat 17 4.340 0,004
O Pereira 11 1.458 0,003
B Goldsmith 6 0 0,001
D Jandura 6 0 0,001
J Turner 6 0 0,001
M Chevallier 6 0 0,001
N Kersting 6 0 0,001
NB Binder 6 0 0,001
R Sharma 6 0 0,001
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Central hub III
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and impact on the overall network. The horizontal hub (Fig. 9) follows the pattern pre-
sented for the Central hub II, representing a group of scholars with intense internal 
dynamics and mutual interconnectedness (higher degree and average number of au-
thors) which might take on more central positions in the future. We would like to re-
mind the reader that networks are live and change, and that this description is just a 
fixed snapshot in time of a temporary reality that will evolve in years to come.  
Fig. 8. Values for Peripheral Hub 
Fig. 9. Values for Horizontal Hub 
Finally, the geographically based hubs (Estonia -Error! Reference source not found.-
, Switzerland -Fig. 11-, Australia -Fig. 12- and Scytl -Fig. 13-) tend to have smaller 
numbers of researchers and are structured around the link to a certain environment re-
lating to use or research on Electronic Voting. In the Estonian, Swiss and Australian 
cases, the connection is based on implementation of Electronic Voting in their electoral 
systems, with many publications connected to the observation of use and development, 
impact, improvements or conditions, amongst others. In the Estonian case, the perfor-
mance in terms of citations per publication works clearly better than average, showing 
the general interest of the community by the application of Internet Voting in a real 
context.  
For the other case, the hub relates more to creating a cluster of expertise around their 
professional practice and the experiences and research carried out using the cases where 
Scytl offers its services.  
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
RM Alvarez 13 210 0,004
J Pomares 9 22 0,003
T Hall 8 191 0,003
G Katz 7 11 0,002
L Loeber 7 98 0,004
T Ovejero 6 34 0,002
E Calvo 5 5 0,002
G Lopez 5 3 0,002
I Levin 5 3 0,002
M Escolar 5 5 0,002
0
0,5
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Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Peripheral hub
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Horizontal hub
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
P Vora 33 6.278 0,004
A Essex 21 223 0,003
S Popoveniuc 21 1.658 0,003
R Rivest 20 232 0,003
R Carback 19 56 0,002
D Chaum 18 27 0,002
F Zagorski 18 41 0,002
J Clark 15 640 0,002
A Florescu 14 8 0,002
J Rubio 14 8 0,002
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Fig. 10. Values for the Estonian Hub 
Fig. 11. Values for the Swiss Hub 
Fig. 12. Values for the Australian Hub 
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average cites per year
average number of
authors
Estonian hub
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
J Willemson 19 2.301 0,004
S Heiberg 17 541 0,003
P Vinkel 9 84 0,002
T Martens 6 656 0,002
A Koitmae 5 37 0,001
D Duenas-Cid 5 37 0,001
I Krivonosova 5 37 0,001
A Parsovs 3 0 0,001
I Kubjas 3 0 0,001
K Krips 3 0 0,001
0
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Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Swiss hub
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
R Haenni 19 718 0,003
RE Koenig 19 2.481 0,003
O Spycher 12 274 0,003
E Dubuis 9 12 0,002
P Locher 7 43 0,001
A Driza-Maurer 6 657 0,002
A Weber 4 0 0,001
G Taglioni 4 0 0,001
M Schlapfer 2 0 0,001
0
0,5
1
1,5
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2,5
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Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Australian hub
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
R Goré 22 4.485 0,003
D Pattinson 12 4 0,001
M Tiwari 9 2 0,001
MK Ghale 7 1 0,001
LB Moses 5 0 0,001
R Levy 5 0 0,001
T Meumann 5 1 0,001
B Beckert 3 0 0,001
JE Dawson 3 0 0,001
E Lebedeva 2 0 0,001
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Fig. 13. Values for the Scytl Hub 
4 Conclusions 
This analysis allowed a better understanding of internal patterns of functioning for the 
field created regarding the Electronic Voting Conference Series. Every field or research 
creates a set of internal and or written standards and norms, by standardizing behaviors 
and activities which in turn become accepted in the community. In this case, starting 
with the assumption that the network of co-authorships represents a formal representa-
tion of the real network of relationships in the field, through analyzing it, we were able 
to detect which are the more central nodes (researchers) in the field and the priorities 
being created at the same time. A common publication can be understood to be an in-
dicator of social capital and symbolic power, as it means a common interest in publish-
ing together (social capital) and a form of academic respect of the researcher’s poten-
tials (symbolic power). The maximization and dispersion of co-authored publications 
involves a greater centrality in the network and, in practical terms, increasing the au-
thority on the topic in the research field.   
Detecting hubs helps visualize the existence of different relational environments and 
secondary centralities within the same network. The presence of smaller but closely 
interrelated networks within the network shows the existence of partial priorities and 
differentiated publishing strategies or patterns of collaboration. Based on the results, 
the hubs detected present different results in relation with to position, interconnection 
and performance, increasing the knowledge available on the field and its dynamics.  
These results, finally, open some new possibilities for future research on meta-anal-
ysis of the Electronic Voting field, by questioning which is the best possible strategy 
for making an impact in the community. Centrality seems to work well for gaining 
authority in the field, but the singularity of certain cases and experiences performs very 
well in terms of academic impact or citations. This research could be widened in soon 
by expanding analysis to the citation network, deepening the impact of certain pieces 
for creating and consolidating of the field and, by extension, the knowledge of 
Electronic Voting.  
0
0,5
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1,5
2
2,5
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Av degree
Median degree
Av betweenness
Av Closeness
average cites per year
average number of
authors
Scytl hub
Name Degree Betweenness PageRank
J Puiggalí 17 2.750 0,004
S Guasch 11 799 0,002
J Cucurull 7 631 0,002
A Fornós 5 1 0,001
J Lladós 5 1 0,001
JI Toledo 5 1 0,001
D Galindo 3 0 0,001
M Soriano 3 109 0,001
V Morales-Rocha 3 1 0,001
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Abstract. Computer-based voting as a field of research and societal debate 
emerged in the early 2000s. Starting in the ‘old democracies’ in Europe and 
North America, it has spread to other parts of the world. The question is wheth-
er research and the academic debate on electronic voting is related to the socio-
political context in which it takes place. In order to examine this, we retrieved 
from the Scopus database all papers that relate to internet voting to answer the 
following research questions: Is there an increased scientific interest for e-
voting in emerging democracies? Is the approach towards e-voting different be-
tween ‘old’ and ‘emerging’ democracies (i.e. technical, political, economical, 
social) and in terms of evaluation of e-voting (i.e. positive, negative)? We find 
that developed democracies have a more balanced approach in terms of disci-
plinary attention and in terms of evaluation of e-voting than the emerging de-
mocracies and the hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Africa deviates from this, 
with comparable substantial social science research being conducted on e-
voting. 
Keywords: Electronic Voting, Computer Voting, Risks, Benefits, Level of 
Democracy, Research System, Academic Discourse, Linguistic Analysis. 
1 Introduction 
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) estab-
lished in 1991, provides support, assistance, and expertise to promote democracy, rule 
of law, and human rights. One of its most important tasks is to observe elections to 
ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or an equivalent free voting procedure, and 
that they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public. 
“While holding an election does not equate to instant democracy, genuine and period-
ic elections that permit fair competition are fundamental to the democratic process” 
[28]. The ODIHR office initially concentrated on countries in transition, i.e. those 
countries that are emerging from a non-democratic past. But increasingly there have 
been invitations from longer-standing democracies to observe their elections as they 
face new electoral challenges: “For example, the introduction of new voting technol-
ogies poses potential challenges for transparency and accountability in any country 
where such technologies are being used or considered” [28]. Examples of such new 
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voting technologies are ballot-scanning technology, direct recording electronic voting 
systems (DRE), and remote electronic voting, also known as internet voting [29]. 
In the early years after the introduction of electronic voting, there was a clear ten-
dency by politicians and civil servants to see the new technology mainly as a panacea 
to problems related to voting in democratic countries. E-voting was introduced as a 
means to reduce costs, increase voter turnout (especially amongst the young), poten-
tially renew interest in the political system, and speed up the counting process as no 
more ballots needed to be counted manually. The benefits for voters were seen as a 
more efficient and user-friendly way to cast a ballot, with increased accessibility if the 
e-voting could be done remotely. It also made it more unlikely that people would
accidentally spoil their ballot by for instance ticking two candidates instead of one.
 According to a recent article by the BBC around 33 countries use some form of 
electronic voting [5]. The integrity of the machines has been questioned in some of 
them [37]. It was noted early on by computer-security experts that e-voting technolo-
gies are not as secure, accurate, reliable, or intuitive as suppliers promised [35, 20]. 
Furthermore, there are also concerns about the complexity of the processes (far from 
the comprehension of common voters), the actual effects on turnout rates (there is 
very little evidence of an increase), and higher costs [30]. Finally, there is a funda-
mental conflict between verification and keeping votes anonymous.  
One of the most recent discussions about the security and accuracy of electronic 
voting machines is being held in the USA. For the past 17 years, many states and 
counties have conducted elections on machines that have been repeatedly shown to be 
vulnerable to hacking, errors, and breakdowns. Due to the suspicion over Russian 
interference in the 2016 Presidential election, there is a drive to replace the old out-
dated machines with new ballot-marking devices (BMD) that provide a paper trail in 
order to make the 2020 elections more secure and verifiable. But the new equipment 
built by the same companies is under scrutiny and there are concerns with the integri-
ty of the paper trail [37]. Even in a country like Switzerland, where the government 
has always championed the use of e-voting to aid direct democracy and where citizens 
have been broadly in favour of e-voting, there are now opposition campaigners high-
lighting the vulnerabilities of the technology [30]. 
While currently the majority of e-voting countries use DRE voting machines, there 
is an increased interest in remote electronic voting offering people the chance to cast 
their vote online from a computer or mobile device. Compared to electronic voting 
machines used in the controlled environment of polling stations, the opportunity for 
attacks on the internet is much broader. As long as there have been high-stakes elec-
tions, there has been an interest to influence their outcome, be it in a legal manner 
through campaign contributions, advertising, or using political consultants, or in an 
illegal manner through ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, or bribery. The people in-
terested in controlling the outcome of an election “could include political zealots or 
campaigns, but they might also include organised crime or even other countries with 
huge resources” [40]. Computer scientist David Dill points out that “there are many 
other threats, including voters who are not experts in computer security and may be 
easily fooled, and potential for corrupt insiders at companies that produce the internet 
voting software” [40]. Remote voting also increases the possibilities of coercion and 
vote buying. 
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Not only long-standing full democracies have adopted electronic voting. Newer, 
less established democracies and even authoritarian states are using or considering e-
voting. For instance, the five major emerging national BRICS economies have all 
shown interest in e-voting, with Brazil and India leading the way for Russia, China, 
and South Africa, having both used e-voting for two decades. A growing trend to-
wards electronic voting in developing democracies has previously been noted [1, 2] 
with some researchers arguing that the speed of implementation has been higher in the 
developing world than in established democracies, “especially in Latin America, with 
several countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador implementing e-
voting methods” [33]. Different motivations can underpin the introduction of e-voting 
in emerging democracies. Some governments see it as a way to significantly reduce 
electoral fraud, human error, or a general lack of confidence in the electoral process, 
while others aim to increase turnout, reduce costs, or address the problematic distribu-
tion of electoral materials in more difficult to access rural areas. In authoritarian re-
gimes (with often high levels of corruption), e-voting could possibly and relatively 
easily be used to reinforce control by the ruling party.  
With the global adoption of e-voting technologies in countries with vastly differ-
ent political systems and levels of democracy, we are interested in the question 
whether research and the academic debate on electronic voting is related to the politi-
cal and social context in which it takes place. In order to examine this, we retrieved 
from Scopus all papers that relate to internet voting to answer the following research 
questions: Is there an increased scientific interest for e-voting in emerging democra-
cies? And is the approach towards e-voting different between ‘old’ and ‘emerging’ 
democracies in terms of topics addressed (i.e. technical, political, economic, so-
cial) and in terms of evaluation of e-voting (i.e. positive, negative)? We will investi-
gate whether there is a balanced research agenda into the benefits and risks of elec-
tronic voting in emerging democracies and more authoritarian regimes. 
2 Background 
2.1 E-voting in Old Democracies 
A good example of a critical approach towards electronic voting was observed in the 
Netherlands. The country was one of the first to introduce electronic voting in polling 
stations in the late 1980s without much public debate. By the turn of the century al-
most the entire population used voting computers to cast their ballots in polling sta-
tions. Although at times, a few citizens, scholars, and politicians posed critical ques-
tions about the security, transparency, and verifiability of the e-voting systems, the 
government always dismissed these concerns.  
This changed in 2006 when concerned citizens organized themselves and started a 
grassroots campaign named Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet (We do not trust vot-
ing computers). The core group of activists grew over the course of 18 months from 4 
to 13 members, with different skills and backgrounds (e.g. software engineers, a so-
cial scientist, ICT consultants, hackers, a Freedom of Information specialist). The goal 
of the campaign was to promote, defend, and examine verifiable and transparent elec-
tions, with particular emphasis on the obstacles posed by electronic voting.  
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After hacking and examining the two electronic voting systems in use in the Neth-
erlands and finding many security and other flaws the activists decided that one of 
their main objectives was to have the government abandon these unverifiable e-voting 
systems [16]. In order to accomplish this objective the group needed to convince both 
the general public and Members of Parliament of the shortcomings of the e-voting 
computers in use. They developed a new media and traditional media strategy to 
change public attitude towards e-voting systems and to influence public policy [26]. 
Within weeks of setting up the campaign the activists had put the security and verifi-
cation problems of e-elections firmly on the political agenda, ultimately leading to the 
decertification of all voting computers in the Netherlands in 2007 [27]. In May 2008, 
the Dutch government decided that future elections in the Netherlands would only use 
paper ballots and red pencils, but software has since been used to count votes elec-
tronically. However, in 2017 the Netherlands also renounced the use of electronic 
ballot counting software due to an elevated threat of foreign interference [10]. 
The work done by the activists helped to create awareness in many other European 
countries (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Italy). This resulted in heated political and 
public debate about the use of e-voting systems (in polling stations and remote) and 
led in some cases to the abolishment of voting computers and changes in electoral 
law. Not only in Europe could critical voices be heard more strongly. In the US schol-
arly work was conducted that similarly pointed out that the voting basics of ensuring 
one vote per voter, maintaining voter anonymity, accuracy of the vote, security of the 
system, and prevention of fraud could not all be maintained in an electronic voting 
system. In America, where voting machines were introduced some 15 years ago (with 
approximately 35,000 of them in use) there have been concerns over machines with-
out a back-up paper trail (VVAT) misreading the vote. Machines used to tally results 
and programme voting machines were found to be carrying software allowing remote 
access to system administrators; a massive security breach [39]. 
Despite persisting concerns, the possible introduction of e-voting is a recurring 
theme, even in countries that have decided against it over a decade ago. For instance, 
in January 2015 the desirability of e-voting was put back on the British political 
agenda when the Speaker of the House of Commons published a report on digital 
democracy, which concluded that “online voting has the potential greatly to increase 
the convenience and accessibility of voting” [13, 18]. The report stated that in the 
2020 general election, secure online voting should be an option for all voters. It is 
clear that with technological change taking place at a rapid pace, some will argue that 
new developments such as biometric verification methods, stronger encryption, or 
blockchain technology make e-voting a more viable option.      
2.2 E-voting in Emerging Democracies 
While stable democracies started to become more reluctant in using e-voting, many 
incipient democracies have shown an increased interest in e-voting technologies. Es-
pecially ‘Third Wave Democracies’ have embraced e-voting, with either systems 
already implemented (e.g. Estonia, Nigeria) or being piloted on a smaller scale (Jor-
dan, Venezuela). The third wave of democratization describes the global trend that 
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has seen more than 60 countries throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
undergo some form of democratic transitions since Portugal's "Carnation Revolution" 
in 1974. Sometimes these democratic transitions are little more than transitions to 
semi-authoritarian rule. 
These fairly ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ democracies often witness(ed) electoral malprac-
tice and manipulation (ballot stuffing, fabrication of results), voter intimidation, and 
violence at polling stations. Many elections from around the world have been charac-
terised by cases of rigging and fraud. Vote rigging is the process of interfering with 
the elections either to win as a candidate or to make an opponent lose. According to 
[6] “democracy has established itself as the dominant political system on the African
continent; and as an integral part of this process, multi-party elections have emerged
as the most legitimate route to political office. Yet, in recent years violence has in-
creased in such elections”. A recent study by Kewir and Gabriel (2018) using data
from more than 50 African elections from 2011 to 2017, showed that almost all these
elections had cases of electoral violence at some stage of the election [6]. Bjarnesen
and Söderberg Kovacs point out that electoral violence is not limited to general and
national elections: “In Sierra Leone, for example, several parliamentary by-elections
at constituency level have generated high levels of violence, intimidation and insecu-
rity” [6]. Other examples are elections in Uganda, which are often characterised by
controversies with the government accused of intimidating opposition leaders and
their supporters, including arrests and detention [8], and the 2008 elections in Kenya
where systematic electoral fraud including vote-rigging in a third of all constituencies,
stuffed ballot boxes (leading to a turnout of 115%), and election officials changing
results had a decisive impact on the outcome of the elections. Immediately after the
results were announced, violence broke out, which evolved into ethnic clashes leaving
more than 1300 people dead and 600,000 displaced [7]. But electoral misconduct or
violence can be seen all over the world. Romanian elections have been characterized
by allegations of electoral bribes using food. In 2016 an MP went to prison for two
years for bribing voters with 60 tons of roasted chicken [11]. In 2014, food was dis-
tributed to more than 6.5 million people during campaigns. In 2015 a senior Romani-
an minister was convicted of electoral fraud over a 2012 attempt to use bribes and
forged ballot papers to swing a vote [19]. At the 2014 Iraqi parliamentary election, six
different polling stations were hit by suicide bombers, leading to at least 27 deaths.
Insurgent group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria threatened violence against Sunni
Muslims who vote in the election [3]. In Turkey in 2015, President Erdoğan, was
accused of planning to commit election fraud and several irregularities. According to
the OSCE an increase in violence with physical attacks on party members, particular-
ly in the southeast, "restricted some contestants' ability to campaign freely"[4].
People are bribed at polling stations with money, seeds, or medicine. Voter intim-
idation in Africa is also widespread, with 44% of those surveyed saying they are 
sometimes, often or always threatened with violence when voting [31]. Penar ex-
plains: "This makes people afraid of going to the polls and expressing an autonomous 
and personal choice of who they want to win" [23].  
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Fig. 1. Fear during elections. Source: Afrobarometer/CNN, 2016 
Due to the high levels of violence, intimidation, and fraud, the turnout at elections is 
often low. E-voting systems are thought to provide a solution to these defective elec-
tions. However, the same inherent problems currently experienced in these repressive 
or corrupt regimes still remain with e-voting, such as the difficult-to-realise funda-
mental security requirements of privacy, verifiability, accountability, transparency, 
and coercion-resistance [22]. There have been plenty of real-life instances where there 
were concerns about the e-voting technologies in use. For instance, machines used in 
the 2017 elections in Venezuela allegedly inflated the actual turnout by at least a mil-
lion votes, a claim rejected by the government [21]. Furthermore, in 2018 Iraq’s elec-
tion commission ignored an anti-corruption body’s warnings about the credibility of 
electronic vote-counting machines used in the countries’ parliamentary election. 
Fraud allegations led to a manual partial recount of the ballots. “Concerns about the 
election count focus on discrepancies in the tallying of votes by the voting machines, 
mainly in the Kurdish province of Sulaimaniya and the ethnically-mixed province of 
Kirkuk, and on suggestions that the devices could have been tampered with or hacked 
into to skew the result” [34].  
Another example of e-voting concerns are the machines used in India. For decades 
traditional voting in India had been blighted by the stuffing of ballot boxes by mobs 
hired by political parties. This changed with the introduction of electronic voting ma-
chines at the turn of the century [5]. Data from state elections show that e-voting ma-
chines used in polling stations had significantly reduced electoral fraud, had helped 
the poor and the weak to come out and vote, and made elections more competitive 
resulting in a decline of the winning margin and the vote share of the winning party 
[12]. However, not all analysis of the Indian voting system are positive. In 2010 a 
group of international researchers conducted the first independent, rigorous assess-
ment of the security risks associated with Indian electronic voting machines and they 
found many vulnerabilities that the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) “Technical 
Experts Committee” had failed to pick up on [38]. As a final example we address the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, which used e-voting machines for the first time in 
2018. These voting machines quickly became a source of contention in the Presiden-
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tial election amid reports that they had not been thoroughly tested with a potential for 
misuse and serious security vulnerabilities [15]. 
Introducing e-voting in ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ democracies could have an additional 
barrier as the populations of these countries often have very low trust in their political 
and administrative systems. While “in most cases, established democracies have well-
tested electoral practices that enjoy the overall confidence of their electorates, as well 
as pluralistic media that identify electoral shortcomings for public debate, independ-
ent judicial organs, and a generally robust civil society” this is different for emerging 
democracies [28]. Alvarez et al. [2] note that in many countries in Latin America 
public trust in elections and electoral authorities is very low: “the percentage of Latin 
Americans reporting that elections are free and fair in their countries is only 41 per-
cent”. Similarly, a 2016 Afrobarometer study showed that in many African countries, 
corruption and a lack of transparency of election monitoring bodies all influence peo-
ple's trust in the system. Many citizens are afraid when casting their vote. And 38% of 
Africans believe that votes are only sometimes, or even never counted [31]. Accord-
ing to Caarls [9] this will influence the implementation of e-voting systems. She ar-
gues that an e-voting system cannot be successfully adopted unless citizens trust their 
current (paper-based) political and administrative systems. In contrast to this, Penar 
[31] argues that electronic voting systems might actually be the way to increase trust
in current political and administrative systems. He found that between 2011 and 2015
some African countries observed increased levels of trust in national electoral com-
missions, which according to him might have been a reflection of the reforms and
technological advances in these countries. Namibia (the first African country to use e-
voting), for example, introduced electronic voting in its 2014 general elections and a
survey completed in the run-up to these elections showed a period marked by opti-
mism about the implementation of electronic voting machines [31]. “In Namibia, the
new electronic voting system appears to have boosted voters' trust, [..] with trust in
their election commission at 74% [23]. This is in line with findings by Alvarez et al.
[1] in Columbia where the proportion of respondents who declared to trust electronic
voting was unusually high when compared to other international experiences. The
authors explained that this “is probably related to the comparatively low degree of
public confidence in elections in many countries in Latin America”.
Nevertheless, trust is a complicated concept and voters often base their trust in 
elections on perceived instead of provable security, privacy, and verifiability [25]. 
Küsters and Müller [22] argue: ”In addition to the provable security a system pro-
vides, the level of security perceived by regular voters might be just as important and 
even more important for a system to be accepted”. We have pointed out in previous 
work that because of transparent election procedures, traditional paper-based voting in 
democratic countries satisfies security, privacy, and verifiability requirements, and are 
trusted by citizens [25]. We argued that: “In contrast, electronic voting systems are 
not transparent for the user, as the steps in the processing of the information cannot be 
observed. With electronic voting systems, public confidence in the election relies on 
trust in the organisers of the ballot, and in the technology (and technical experts) in-
stead of on a transparent procedure”. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Hu-
man Rights [28] similarly noted that electronic voting technologies may pose per-
ceived or real challenges to the transparency and accountability of an election process. 
Furthermore, they may influence perceptions of the security of the vote, with a poten-
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tial impact on voter confidence. The level of trust may influence the decision to use e-
voting systems and is therefore a crucial factor for e-voting to be successful. Küsters 
and Müller recommend keeping e-voting systems simple and comprehensible. 
But while new digital tools can make it harder to tamper with votes, they can also 
create problems as they require electricity and technical know-how, something not to 
be taken for granted in rural areas throughout developing nations. This would possibly 
exclude certain groups within a given population from having their voices heard, an 
issue also emphasized by Caarls [9]. And while election processes could be improved 
by storing and counting votes digitally, issues with corruption may remain. "The serv-
ers on which the results data is stored may be owned by a friend of the president or a 
relative of an election commission. That happens" [23]. 
3 Methodology 
We aim at comparing the reception of e-voting in relation to the level of democracy: 
do new and old democracies discuss it in different ways? As a proxy for this, we use 
the scholarly literature about e-voting, and with hindsight this is feasible: most papers 
are only nationally co-authored, implying that we do have national academic dis-
courses on e-voting.  
In order to do a meaningful comparison, we need to classify countries in homoge-
neous groups. A first attempt is using the Democracy Index compiled by the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit (EIU), which uses a set of variables to produce a democracy 
ranking for 167 countries [14]. The Democracy Index is based on the following five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of govern-
ment; political participation; and democratic political culture. Based on its scores on 
60 different indicators within these categories, each country is then itself classified as 
one of four regime types: ‘full democracy’, ‘flawed democracy’, ‘hybrid regime’ and 
‘authoritarian regime’ (Table 1).  
Table 1. The Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
Type of regime 
Democracy 
score 
Number of 
countries 
% of 
countries 
% of world 
population 
Full democracies 8 < s 20 12 4.5 
Flawed democracies 6 < s ≤ 8 55 32.9 43.2 
Hybrid regimes 4 < s ≤ 6 39 23.4 16.7 
Authoritarian regimes s ≤ 4 53 31.7 35.6 
Several problems emerge, especially the fact that the boundaries between the types 
are rather arbitrary: countries with scores that differ only marginally are classified in 
different groups. For example, South Korea counts as full democracy with a score of 
8.00, while Japan is a flawed democracy with a score of 7.99. The EIU acknowledges 
this, as it also uses a geographical classification (Table 2). The disadvantage of the 
geographical approach is that it may include countries of very different levels of de-
mocracy. As an example, the ‘flawed democracies’ include the USA as well as the 
Philippines and Mexico, which intuitively do not fit well in one class.  
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Table 2. Geographical classification. (Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU)
Rank Region Countries 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
1 N Am  2 8.64 8.64 8.63 8.59 8.59 8.59 8.59 8.56 8.56 8.56 8.56 
2 W EU 21 8.6 8.61 8.45 8.4 8.44 8.41 8.41 8.42 8.4 8.38 8.35 
3 Lat Am 24 6.37 6.43 6.37 6.35 6.36 6.38 6.36 6.37 6.33 6.26 6.24 
4 Asia 28 5.44 5.58 5.53 5.51 5.56 5.61 5.7 5.74 5.74 5.63 5.67 
5 C-E EU 28 5.76 5.67 5.55 5.5 5.51 5.53 5.58 5.55 5.43 5.4 5.42 
6 SSA 44 4.24 4.28 4.23 4.32 4.33 4.36 4.34 4.38 4.37 4.36 4.36 
7 MENA 20 3.54 3.48 3.52 3.62 3.73 3.68 3.65 3.58 3.56 3.54 3.54 
World 167 5.52 5.55 5.46 5.49 5.52 5.53 5.55 5.55 5.52 5.48 5.48 
N Am = North America; W EU = Western Europe; Lat Am = Latin America & the Caribbean; Asia = Asia & 
Australasia; C-E EU = Central & Eastern Europe; SSA =Sub-Saharan Africa; MENA = Middle East & North 
Africa
We combine both approaches: the democracy score and the regional score. This leads 
to (geographical) groupings, which are relatively homogeneous in terms of their de-
mocracy score. Table 3 gives the country groupings, their average democracy score, 
and the variation of scores within the group. The Coefficient of Variation is about 0.2 
in most of the groups. Some outliers were not included in the calculation, also be-
cause they had only a very low number of e-voting publications over the almost 20 
year period. 
Table 3. Country grouping 
# papers share Democracy score 
Average Variation 
EU (North, West, South) 1352 50.6% 8.62 0.09 
USA 517 19.4% 8.15 - 
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, S Korea 252 9.4% 7.70 0.04 
China 249 9.3% 3.51 - 
India & Pakistan 209 7.8% 4.68 0.22 
Middle East and North Africa 186 7.0% 3.81 0.27 
Australia, N.Z., Canada 178 6.7% 9.17 0.24 
East EU and East Europe 137 4.9% 6.16 0.15 
South America (excl. Chile) 104 3.9% 5.13 0.20 
Indonesia & SE Asia 69 2.6% 5.02 0.19 
Sub-Saharan Africa 53 2.0% 4.65 0.33 
Russia 14 0.5% 3.55 0.19 
The relevant publications were collected through a set of search terms: electronic 
voting, e-voting/evoting, e-vote, remote electronic voting, internet voting, online vot-
ing, voting online, electronic elections, internet elections, online elections, electronic 
ballots, digital ballot, direct-recording electronic voting machine, voting machine. 
This set was used to retrieve from the Scopus database all journal articles, conference 
proceedings, and book chapters that have one of these search terms in the title, ab-
stract, or keyword list. We found a total of 2928 relevant publications, mostly pub-
lished after 2000. We then used the author affiliation addresses to classify the re-
trieved documents in terms of the country groupings described above. The following 
analyses were conducted: 
25
1. The growth of papers on e-voting in each of the country-groupings was calculated:
what is the relative share of each group of countries, and which are the fast and
slow growing groups?
2. What disciplines are involved in e-voting research? In other words, what kind of
issues are addressed (technical, political, economic, social, legal)?
3. What is the attitude and sentiment towards e-voting: what is the relative frequency
of positive and negative evaluation words, and what is the relative frequency of
positive and negative emotion words? This analysis is based on the abstracts of the
retrieved papers.
The first two questions can be answered by counting the publications, and by classify-
ing them in subject areas. For this, standard Scopus tools were used. Somewhat more 
complex is the approach for the third question. The Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LIWC) software was used to analyse the abstracts of the papers [32]. LIWC 
contains dictionaries that linguistically classify words. Many linguistic categories are 
available, and for each a list of words is provided that cover that linguistic category. 
For the categories we use, we give some example words below. 
For our analysis we use the following linguistic categories: positive emotions, neg-
ative emotions, superlatives, and negation words (all for measuring the general atti-
tude towards e-voting), positive evaluation words and negative evaluation words 
(both for measuring the way e-voting is evaluated). Details about these categories that 
partly come from LIWC and were extended by us can be found in [36]. The asterisk 
(*) after a word means that this is a stem word, and the linguistic category includes all 
variants of that stem. 
• Positive emotions: words such as agreeable*, benefit, helpful (LIWC).
• Negative emotions: words such as abuse*, bitter*, bad*.
• Superlatives: words such as outstanding, exceptional*, groundbreaking, great po-
tential, high gain.
• Negating words such as hasn’t, don’t, can’t.
• Negative evaluation: words such as naïve, defect*, lack*.
• Positive evaluation: words like intriguing, compelling, commit*.
After describing the relative share of the different regions in the scholarly e-voting 
literature, we restrict the other analyses to the country groupings with more than a 5% 
share in the total e-voting papers, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (2% of 
total publications) as we have some special interest in it.  
4 Results 
4.1 Growth of e-voting research by region 
Overall, e-voting research started with the new century, and the output has increased 
over the years (Fig. 2 and 3). The EU15+ region is responsible for the largest part, and 
its output has steadily increased. The US showed a small increase in the beginning, 
but has stabilized over the last decade. 
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Fig. 2. Number of publications by year and region (selected regions). 
Fig. 3. Number of publications by year and region (selected regions). 
In China we also see a small and more or less constant output, but one should be 
aware that this only covers the output in journals indexed in Scopus, so there may be 
an unobserved local output in the Chinese language. In India we see an emerging and 
growing activity. The other regions have a small output, that in most cases show an 
increase. 
4.2 Distribution of papers over disciplines: regional differences? 
Probably more interesting than the size of e-voting research may be the topical distri-
bution of the research. For this, the field of the publications is a useful indicator. Fig-
ure 5 shows the distribution of papers over subject areas (disciplines). Computer Sci-
ence is the largest, with 42.6%, followed by Mathematics with 15.3% and Engineer-
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ing with 14.5%, and together they cover almost three quarters of all publications. This 
is in line with a study by [17] who systematically examined sixty-seven articles on e-
voting in developing countries and found that the literature focused mainly on how to 
practically put the technology into effect. 
There is also a set of Medical papers (2.2%), and inspecting those in more detail 
shows that they describe the use of e-voting technologies in for example consultation 
meetings on medical issues, where reaching a consensus is the aim. So these medical 
papers are in fact of a social science nature. The other social science related papers 
are Business and Management (3.0%) and Decision Sciences (3.6%). Overall, Social 
Sciences are good for 19.6% of the papers.  
Fig. 4. Worldwide e-voting research by subject area 2009-2018. (Source: Scopus) 
The regions clearly differ in the disciplinary (and related topical) emphasis. Overall, 
Computer Science, Mathematics, and Engineering cover 72.4% of e-voting research, 
but that differs between the regions. 
Table 4.  Percentage of e-voting publications by discipline (2009-2018).
EU
 
U
SA
 
A
/N
/C
 
M
EN
A
 
Japan 
C
hina 
India 
SSA
 
Computer Science 43.1 40.2 38.1 42.1 49.4 42.5 42.6 40 
Mathematics 18.5 14.6 20.5 8.9 14.4 12.7 9.4 4 
Engineering 10.2 12.1 11.2 18.6 18.7 23.9 24.3 19 
Physics 2.1 5.9 3.9 
Subtotal 71.8 66.9 69.8 71.7 82.5 85 80.2 63 
Social Sciences 12.1 16 11.2 7.5 5.2 3.9 3.4 17 
Management 3.5 2.7 4.3 2.3 2.2 6 
Decision Sciences 3.7 3.1 4.3 3.5 2.4 2.6 6 
Medicine  2.7 4 9.3 3.2 2.3 2 
Subtotal 22 25.8 20.5 19.3 13.3 8.5 6 31 
Other 6.3 7.4 9.7 8.9 4.2 6.4 13.6 7 
EU = North, West, South EU; A/N/C = Australia, New Zealand, Canada;  
MENA = Middle East & North Africa; Japan = incl. Singapore, Taiwan, S Korea; 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa   
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As Table 4 shows, India (80.2%), Japan (82.5%) and China (85%) are at the higher 
end, whereas Europe (71.8%), Canada & Australia (69.8), and the USA (66.9%), but 
also the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are at the lower end (71.7%). The 
latter region is dominated by Iran. The opposite is the case for social research. MENA 
(19.3%), the EU (22%), Canada & Australasia (20.5%), and especially the USA 
(25.8%) have a relatively large share of their research on e-voting within the Social 
Sciences, while this is much smaller in India (6%), China (8.5%), and Japan (13.3%). 
We added Sub-Saharan Africa, and interestingly, in terms of disciplinary distribution 
it seems to be similar to the full democracies, with its relatively small share of Com-
puter Science, Mathematics and Engineering papers, and a large share of Social Sci-
ence related papers. 
4.3 Perception and evaluation of e-voting 
We use the abstract of the papers for a linguistic analysis. We are especially interested 
in whether e-voting is positively or negatively perceived and evaluated. As mentioned 
in the methodology section, we measure this through positive and negative emotion 
words, through negation words and superlatives, and through positive and negative 
evaluation words.  
If the discourse about electronic voting is generally positive in a country, one 
would expect more positive evaluation words, more positive emotion words, and 
more superlatives, whereas in a negative discourse the opposite would be expected. In 
the next Table 5, we compare the full democracies with the hybrid and authoritarian 
regimes. As we discussed in the background section, Africa may be an interesting 
case, and therefore we added to this analysis also Sub-Saharan Africa. As the number 
of papers is small, the results should be interpreted with care.  
Table 5. Results linguistic analysis 
Democracy 
Positive 
emotions 
Positive 
evaluation 
Negative 
evaluation 
Australia, NZ, Canada 9.17 3.05 2.28 0.83 
North, West, South EU 8.62 2.95 2.08 0.74 
USA 8.15 2.79 2.14 0.80 
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, S Korea 7.70 3.13 1.58 0.84 
India 4.68 3.35 1.79 0.59 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.65 2.70 1.99 0.57 
Middle East & North Africa 3.81 3.16 1.93 0.68 
China 3.51 4.13 1.84 0.64 
Several linguistic categories (negative emotions, superlatives) did not show much 
difference between the regions hence we exclude them here. Table 5 shows that the 
full democracies have a higher percentage of both positive and negative evaluation 
words than the hybrid and authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the latter group 
has higher scores on positive emotion words. Together this suggests a somewhat more 
neutral (smaller role for emotions) and balanced (in terms of pro and con voices) aca-
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demic debate on e-voting technologies in the full democracies. Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and South Korea are in between in terms of the development of democracy, 
and score similar to hybrid/authoritarian regimes on positive emotions and positive 
evaluations but similar to the full democracies on negative evaluation. Finally, Sub-
Saharan Africa is in positive emotions (and to a lesser extent in positive evaluation) 
similar to the full democracies, and scores for negative evaluation similar to the hy-
brid democracies/authoritarian regimes group. Despite its low score on democracy, it 
has an in between position for the linguistic variables. 
5 Discussion and conclusions. 
The decision to implement electronic voting depends on many different factors, and 
governments and civil society have to weigh up the opportunities and risks involved. 
Several old democracies have concluded that e-voting systems are too insecure and 
that they need an election system that is resilient to both insider and outsider threats. 
For many this means sticking with, or returning to, paper. Election meddling – inter-
nal or external – is a big worry for those concerned with the integrity of democracies. 
As we have seen, election fraud scenarios are not impossible under paper-based prac-
tices, but e-voting would put them on an infinitely wider scale. While there are clear 
possible benefits and drawbacks of e-voting in well-established democracies, the situ-
ation in emerging democracies is more complex. Inadequate transparent mechanisms 
are a problem of many existing voting systems in new democracies, with a danger of 
being prone to human error and deliberate manipulations. We wanted to investigate 
whether the different political contexts in countries lead to different national discours-
es on computer-based voting. 
First of all, we see an increased activity related to e-voting research in emerging 
democracies. This research mainly takes place in the fields of Computer Science, 
Mathematics, and Engineering indicating an emphasis on technological issues. We 
calculated the share in Social Sciences and Humanities research within e-voting. The 
regional differences are significant (Table 4) with the old democracies including the 
USA showing a large share of SSH research, whereas it is almost absent in the up-
coming e-voting research areas (with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa and to a 
lesser extent in North Africa and the Middle East). When looking at the linguistic 
analysis of the publications we also find that long-standing democracies have a more 
neutral and balanced academic debate on e-voting technologies, addressing both the 
advantages and disadvantages, followed by Africa and the Middle East. 
In the last 15 years there has been an increasing awareness that the implementa-
tion of e-voting could present a number of social, political, legal, and economic chal-
lenges, and these aspects should be considered thoroughly. Nonetheless, emerging 
democracies seem less critical about e-voting with overall fewer national academic 
debates taking place related to these vulnerabilities and challenges. In the cases where 
vulnerabilities do get addressed it is often by international researchers, as we have 
shown for India [38]. 
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Why is it that we can mainly detect a substantial share of papers focusing on soci-
etal context in old democracies? Partly it can be explained by the scientific specialisa-
tion of countries. In Western democracies the share of Social Sciences and Humani-
ties in the total academic output is much higher than in most other regions. For exam-
ple, in the US it is about 20%, in the Netherlands about 22%, and in India and China 
only around 4%. Interestingly, the high score of social science papers on e-voting 
(and the related evaluation and emotion scores for e-voting) in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
in this perspective not unexpected. For example, in South Africa, the share of Social 
Sciences and Humanities in total research output is higher than in the USA and the 
Netherlands: 23%. This suggests that the structure of the academic system itself is 
critical for a balanced assessment of the pros and cons of e-voting technologies.  
But there may be other factors. Do the often-troubled elections in newly emerged 
democracies instigate a less critical view as they can bring important benefits to a 
country and its people? In other words, does the context of elections justify the differ-
ent approaches and assessment of e-voting systems? Do the benefits outweigh the 
negatives in some countries? As Alvarez et al. [1] note: “In countries where there is 
widespread disbelief in the freeness and fairness of elections and where the complexi-
ty of voting procedures can actually prevent important segments of the electorate 
from exercising their right to vote, the introduction of e-voting systems poses both a 
difficult challenge and an interesting opportunity”. 
When we started our e-voting research back in 2002, we piloted computer-based 
voting in 4 different European countries and we found that there is a correlation be-
tween the location (country) of the respondents and their trust in the verifiability and 
security of the system. We saw that the respondents from Italy, which was then under 
the rule of Berlusconi - a Prime Minister surrounded by many controversies (e.g. eco-
nomic conflicts of interest, media control, alleged links to the Mafia) - had a lower 
trust in the verifiability of the system than the Finnish respondents [24]. This suggest-
ed that people judged the appropriateness of the implementation of e-voting technolo-
gy on how democratic they considered a country to be. Our respondents felt that while 
it was okay to adopt electronic voting in full stable democracies, it was inconceivable 
to them to use it in emerging democracies or authoritarian states with high levels of 
corruption. 
One could however argue that while there is a danger that electronic voting sys-
tems can be used as a controlling mechanism in regimes where elections are integrally 
tied to the regime’s legitimacy (i.e. primarily one-party regimes), it can also be used 
to combat electoral fraud and violence in a corrupt system. It could be reasoned that 
while accepting that e-voting security is a concern, the challenges are outweighed by 
the benefits. Systematic irregularities and violations, such as ballot box stuffing, voter 
intimidation, violence, dishonest counting of votes, or insecure transport of ballots 
after the vote could be avoided by the implementation of e-voting. Adopting electron-
ic voting systems has the potential to enhance the quality of electoral processes in less 
developed democracies [1]. According to [17] “The shortcomings experienced during 
previous democratic practices might have resulted in technological determinism 
shown by countries such as Nigeria and India”. Many countries are accustomed to 
much more old-fashioned kinds of manipulation and corruption and therefore the 
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adoption of electronic voting systems has helped strengthen public confidence in the 
legitimacy of elections in many places, and has perhaps created a reluctance to con-
duct research on the negative implications of this technology. 
This paper contributes to the analysis of how electronic voting is received, and 
whether there are differences related to region and level of democracy. In a follow-up 
paper, we plan to go more in detail and we will analyze the academic discourse at a 
more fine-grained topical level: what technical questions are discussed, and what 
political questions. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to study the benefits and risks 
in those countries where e-voting is practiced. Are the benefits really worth the risks? 
And how do ethical and political decisions about e-voting reflect this? Is there evi-
dence that the new electoral procedure does more good than harm, and does that de-
pend on the level of democracy in the countries that deploy e-voting? In this context, 
one has to be critical on the motives behind the introduction of e-voting [17]. 
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Abstract. Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) used in the 2019 Gen-
eral Elections in India were fitted with printers to produce Voter-Verifiable
Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs). VVPATs allow voters to check whether
their votes were recorded as they intended. However, confidence in elec-
tion results requires more: VVPATs must be preserved inviolate and then
actually used to check the reported election result in a trustworthy way
that the public can verify. A full manual tally from the VVPATs could
be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming; moreover, it is difficult
for the public to determine whether a full hand count was conducted
accurately. We show how Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) can provide high
confidence in Indian election results. Compared to full hand recounts,
RLAs typically require manually inspecting far fewer VVPATs when the
outcome is correct, and are much easier for the electorate to observe in
adequate detail to determine whether the result is trustworthy.
We show how to apply two RLA strategies, ballot-level comparison and
ballot polling, to General Elections in India. Our main result is a novel
method for combining RLAs in constituencies to obtain an RLA of the
overall parliamentary election result.
Keywords: Risk-Limiting Audit, Ballot-Polling Audit, Ballot-Level Compar-
ison Audit, Transitive Audit, Multi-level Election Audit, Fisher’s Combining
Function
1 Introduction
Since Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) were introduced in India in the 1999
elections, there have been concerns about their transparency and trustworthi-
ness; a number of security vulnerabilities have been documented [19]. In 2013, the
Indian Supreme Court ruled that all EVMs in Indian General Elections must be
equipped with printers providing Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs,
[17]). The Election Commission of India used VVPAT-equipped EVMs in the
2019 General Elections in all constituencies across the nation.
VVPATs allow each voter to verify that his or her intended selections are
correctly printed on a paper record, collected in a separate container called the
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VVPAT box. VVPATs provide a way to check and correct election results, for
instance, if there is a legal demand by a candidate, or for routine checks of
election tabulation accuracy—audits. VVPATs could be manually recounted to
check the electronic results, but that is labor-intensive and time-consuming. We
show how auditing a random sample of VVPAT records can justify confidence in
election results without a full manual tally. Auditing a VVPAT means manually
inspecting the paper record to see the voter preferences it shows.
The Election Commission (EC) of India is increasing the transparency of the
Indian elections. In a recent report,4 the EC decided to tally the paper trail slips
and compare them with the electronic result provided by the EVMs in 5% of
the booths in each Assembly seat district, selected randomly. This effort, while
well-intentioned, does not suffice to give strong evidence that election results are
correct. In this paper, we show rigorous ways of attaining well-defined confidence
levels.
Suitable post-election audits may justify confidence of voters, candidates,
and parties that election results are correct. One type of post-election audit is
a Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA), which either develops strong statistical evidence
that the reported outcome is correct, or corrects the results (by conducting a
full manual tally of a reliable paper trail). Here, “outcome” means the set of
reported winners of the contests, not the exact vote tallies. To ensure that the
tallies are correct to the last vote is prohibitively expensive, if not impossible;
conversely, to ensure that the reported winners really won seems like the lowest
reasonable standard for accuracy.
Before an RLA commences, the risk limit α must be chosen; ideally, it is
set in legislation or regulation, so that auditors cannot manipulate the level of
scrutiny a contest gets by adjusting the risk limit. The risk limit is the maximum
probability that the audit will fail to correct the reported election outcome, on
the assumption that the reported outcome is wrong. The risk limit is a worst-case
probability that makes no assumption about why the outcome is wrong, e.g., it
could be because of accidental error, procedural lapse, bugs, misconfiguration,
or malicious hacking by a strategic adversary who knows how the audit will
be conducted. RLAs assume that the paper ballots reflect the correct outcome,
i.e. that a full manual tally of the paper trail would show who really won. An
RLA of an unreliable paper trail is “security theater.” Hence, there need to be
procedures (called compliance audits by [2,6,16,14]) to ensure that the paper
trail is complete and intact before the RLA begins.
This paper shows how two types of RLAs can be used with Indian elections:
transitive ballot-level comparison audits and ballot-polling audits. Ballot-level
comparison audits are more efficient in the sense that they generally involve
inspecting fewer ballots to attain the same risk limit when the reported outcome
is correct. However, they require more setup. As discussed in Section 3, they may
require a voting system that can export its interpretation of individual ballots in
a way that can be matched to the corresponding paper, or may require sorting
4 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ec-to-tally-paper-trail-slips-with-evms-in-
5-pc-booths-in-each-assembly-seat-4737936/
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the physical ballots or VVPATs before the audit, according to the votes they
(reportedly) show.
Our main contribution is to develop RLAs for a new social choice function—
Indian parliamentary majorities—with procedures suited to the logistics of In-
dian elections. To verify the overall election outcome we need to verify that
the party/coalition reported to have been elected to form the government ac-
tually won. That generally requires less auditing than confirming the winner
in every constituency. The method we develop splits the responsibility of the
auditing among various constituencies in a way that the combined result gives
higher confidence in the correctness of the overall parliamentary outcome than
each constituency would have in its results alone. This procedure is discussed in
Section 4. Our methods apply to any parliamentary democracy, but the compu-
tations are particularly simple when all constituencies have equal weight.
2 Background
RLAs are procedures that guarantee a minimum chance of conducting a full
manual tally of the voter-verifiable records when the result of that tally would
belie the reported outcome. They amount to a statistical test of the null hypoth-
esis that the election outcome is wrong, at significance level α, the risk limit.
An RLA continues to examine more ballots until the null hypothesis is rejected
at significance level α, or until there has been a complete manual tally to set
the record straight. The risk limit is the largest chance that the audit will not
require a full manual tally of the paper records if the electoral outcome according
that tally would differ from the reported electoral outcome.
2.1 Indian Elections
Indian General elections are held Quinquennially to elect the Lok Sabha (Lower
House of the Parliament). The country is divided into 543 constituencies, each
represented by one person elected to the Lok Sabha. Elections at the constituency
level are plurality contests: the person who gets the most votes wins. Candidates
at the constituency level typically belong to some political party, but can be
unaffiliated with any party. At the parliamentary level, the party that gets the
majority (at least 272) of the seats forms the government. If no party has a
majority, parties may form coalitions to attain a majority. Coalitions can be
formed before or after elections, although before is more common. Elections are
conducted in phases spread over a month. Each phase consists of single-day
elections in a subset of constituencies, typically grouped by geography.
2.2 Related work on Election Auditing
RLAs were introduced by [11], but were not so named until [12]. The first RLAs
were conducted in California in 2008 [4]. RLAs have been conducted in Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia,
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and Denmark. RLAs have been developed for a variety of social choice functions,
a variety of sampling strategies (unstratified sampling of individual ballots or
batches, with or without replacement, with or without weights; stratified sam-
pling with and without replacement and with and without weights, Bernoulli
sampling, weighted random sampling) and auditing strategies (batch-level com-
parisons, ballot-level comparisons, ballot polling, and mixtures of those strate-
gies).
Ballot-polling audits [7,6,8] do not require knowing how the system inter-
preted individual ballots nor how it tallied the votes on subsets of ballots. They
directly check whether the reported winner(s) received more votes than the re-
ported loser(s) by sampling and manually interpreting individual ballots. To
draw a random sample of ballots typically involves a ballot manifest, which de-
scribes how the physical ballots are organized: the number of bundles, the labels
of the bundles, and the number of ballots in each bundle (However, see [8]).
The BRAVO ballot-polling method [7] uses Wald’s sequential probability
ratio test [18] to test the hypotheses that any loser in fact tied or beat any winner.
The audit stops short of a full hand count if and only if there is sufficiently strong
evidence that every winner beat every loser.
Comparison audits involve manually checking the voting system’s interpre-
tation of the votes on physically identifiable subsets of ballots. They require the
voting system to export vote tallies for physically identifiable subsets of ballots,
so that the votes on those ballots can be tallied by hand and compared to the
voting system’s tallies. They also require checking that the reported subtotals
yield the reported contest results, and that the subtotals account for all ballots
cast in the contest. They generally also require ballot manifests.
A comparison audit that checks the voting system’s interpretation of indi-
vidual ballots is a ballot-level comparison RLA. Ballot-level comparison RLAs
are more efficient than batch-level comparison RLAs and ballot-polling RLAs in
that they generally require examining fewer ballots when the reported outcome
is correct. However, they have higher set-up costs and require more data export
from the voting system: they need a cast vote record or CVR for each physical
ballot, a way to locate the CVR for each physical ballot, and vice versa. (A CVR
is the voting system’s interpretation of voter intent for a given ballot.) Relying
on more general results in [12] for batch-level comparison audits, [13] developed
a sequential ballot-level comparison RLA method that results in particularly
simple calculations.
Hybrid audits combine different approaches to using audit data in different
strata, for instance, ballot-polling in some strata and ballot-level comparisons in
other strata; See [9].
Transitive audits [3,6] involve auditing an unofficial system. If that system
reports the same winner(s) as the official system, an audit that provides strong
evidence that the unofficial system found the correct winner(s) transitively pro-
vides strong evidence that the official system did also; and if the audit of the
unofficial system leads to a full manual tally, the outcome of that tally can be
used to correct the official result. A transitive audit does not confirm that the
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official system tallied votes correctly: the two systems might disagree about the
interpretation of every ballot, but still agree who won.
Indian EVMs do not create CVRs, but organizing VVPATs appropriately
makes it possible to audit EVMs using a transitive ballot-level comparison audit.
CVRs can be constructed for EVMs by sorting the VVPATs into bundles that
(purportedly) show the same voter preferences, counting the number of VVPATs
in each batch, and labeling each bundle with the number of ballots and the voter
preferences it purports to contain. A report of the bundle labels, the number
of VVPATs in each bundle, and the reported voter preference for the bundle
amounts to a CVR for every VVPAT. Such a report in effect combines a ballot
manifest [6] and a commitment to a cast vote record for every ballot, implied by
the label of the bundle the ballot is in. We shall call such a report a preference
manifest.
If ballots are sufficiently simple—e.g., if each contains only one contest, as
in India—sorting ballots by voter preference can be practical. Indeed, this is
how ballots are tallied in Denmark: on election night, ballots are sorted within
polling places according to the voter’s party preference. The following day, bal-
lots are sorted further according to the voter’s candidate preference, to produce
homogeneous bundles of ballots, each labeled with the number of ballots and the
voters’ preference.
Such sorting-based CVRs were the basis of an RLA in Denmark [10]. The
sorting might be manual, as it is in Denmark, but it could be automated partly
or entirely. (Sorting may also increase vote anonymity by breaking any link
between voter and ballot.) When the official tallying process itself is based on
creating and counting the homogeneous bundles, as it is in Denmark, the audit is
a direct audit of the voting system. If the sorting is conducted independently of
the tabulation, as it would be if India were to sort the paper ballots to produce
a preference manifest, the resulting audit is a transitive audit.
The first step of a ballot-level comparison RLA is to verify that the CVRs
produce the reported results: that applying the social choice function to the
vote subtotals implied by the sizes of the bundles and the votes they purport
to contain produces the same set of winners. If the preference manifest does not
produce the reported set of winners, the audit should not continue: there is a
serious problem. The audit should also check that the number of CVRs for each
contest does not exceed the number of ballots cast in the contest, which should be
determined without reliance on the voting system [1]. If the preference manifest
passes these checks, the audit can check the accuracy of the CVRs implied by
the preference manifest against a manual reading of voter intent from randomly
selected paper ballots.
Kroll et al. [5] present a method for reducing the workload in auditing multi-
level elections, inspired by the US Electoral College. They show that to achieve
an overall confidence that a party or coalition secured the majority of seats, the
individual constituencies can sometimes be audited to lower confidence levels.
They provide a constrained optimization program describing the set of feasible
solutions (i.e. those that constitute a sufficient audit) and a number of methods
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for finding the optimal solution. In India’s electoral system, as in many other
parliamentary democracies, every constituency has equal weight.
3 Auditing Individual Constituencies using Extant
Methods
This section discusses how existing methods for RLAs apply to Indian elections.
We consider auditing individual constituencies rather than the entire election;
Section 4 shows how to combine audits of constituencies to audit an entire con-
test.
India’s voting system currently does not support ballot-level comparison au-
dits, but, as described above, if procedures were added to sort the paper bal-
lots and produce a preference manifest, transitive ballot-level comparison audits
would be possible. Because ballots in India are simple—a single selection in a
single contest—such sorting is feasible.
Ballot-polling audits could be used in India without sorting the ballots or
modifying the voting system, if ballot manifests were available (see section 3.2).
The calculations for BRAVO [7] and the ballot-polling method in [6] are simple
enough to do with a pencil and paper or hand calculator, and are implemented
in open-source online tools by Stark.5
When the election outcome is correct, ballot-level comparison audits gener-
ally require inspecting fewer ballots than ballot-polling audits. (Because they
are RLAs, when the outcome is incorrect, both have a large chance of requiring
a full manual tally.) The advantage grows as the margin shrinks: as a rule of
thumb, workload increases inversely with the reported margin for ballot-level
comparison audits, and increases inversely with the square of the actual margin
for ballot-polling audits. However, preparing for a ballot-level comparison audit
is harder, because it requires CVRs linked to the corresponding physical ballots.
The simplicity of ballot-polling audits may offset the work of examining more
paper ballots, unless the margin is very small.
3.1 Transitive Ballot-Level Comparison RLA
Ballot-level comparison RLAs were introduced by [13] who provides online tools
at the link 6; see also [6]. Ballot-level comparison audits require a way to find the
CVR corresponding to each paper ballot, and vice versa. The EVMs currently
used in India do not provide CVRs at all.
However, as shown by [10], sorting ballots into groups according to the vote
(if any) that they are reported to show in effect provides a CVR for each ballot
through a preference manifest that lists the bundles of ballots, the number of
ballots in each bundle, and the (single) preference that every ballot in the bundle
is supposed to show. In Denmark, ballots are manually sorted into bundles with
5 https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼stark/Vote/ballotPollTools.htm
6 https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/∼stark/Vote/auditTools.htm
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homogeneous voter intent, but sorting could be automated with relatively simple
equipment, possibly something similar to the system used in South Korea.
Whether it is worth the effort to sort the ballots depends on the margin:
if the margin is wide, it will be less expensive to use ballot polling, but if the
margin is very narrow, the cost of sorting—whether manual or automated—may
reduce the sample size required to confirm the outcome by orders of magnitude.
Classifying CVR Errors Stark [12] reviews a number of methods to test
the hypothesis that any loser received more votes than any winner by compar-
ing hand counts of votes in randomly selected batches of ballots to the ma-
chine counts of the votes on the same ballots. The methods apply to arbitrarily
small batches, including batches consisting of a single ballot; that is, to ballot-
level comparison audits. [13] elaborated one of those methods, which relies on
the Kaplan-Markov inequality. By introducing a taxonomy of discrepancies, the
arithmetic can be simplified to the point that a pencil and paper suffice, while
rigorously controlling the risk. That “super-simple simultaneous single-ballot”
method was further simplified by [6], and is the basis of pilot audits in Den-
mark, California, Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Virginia, and of the statutory risk-limiting audits in most Colorado counties.
Stark and Teague [15] presented a ballot-level comparison RLA method based
on the Kaplan-Wald inequality, which has some advantages over the Kaplan-
Markov inequality. In this paper, we use the method of [6], because it has been
used more widely. We shall refer to it as the LSKM method. It is straightforward
to modify the procedures below to use the method of [15] or any other ballot-
comparison RLA method instead.
The LSKM method is sequential : it examines more and more ballots selected
at random until either there is strong evidence that the reported winners really
won, or until there has been a full hand count and the correct outcome is known.
Conceptually, after examining one or more ballots, one calculates a sequentially
valid7 P -value of the hypothesis that the outcome is wrong. If that P -value is
less than or equal to the risk limit α, the audit stops; otherwise, more ballots
are audited and the sequential P -value is updated. The method presented in
section 4 to check the overall electoral outcome involves combining the P -values
for individual constituencies.
If the audit does lead to a full hand tally in a constituency, the reported
results are replaced by the results according to that full hand tabulation. Election
officials may elect to terminate the audit and conduct a full hand count at any
time, for instance, if they estimate that the cost of additional sampling will
exceed the cost of a full manual tally.
7 Sequentially valid means that the chance that the infimum of the P -value over all
sample sizes is less than or equal to α is itself less than or equal to α if the null
hypothesis is true. In contrast, standard hypothesis tests are designed for sample
sizes that are fixed ahead of time: expanding the sample and re-calculating the P -
value for such tests generally produces type I error rates far larger than the nominal
significance level, because it does not account for multiplicity.
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The LSKM method involves classifying discrepancies between the CVR and
a manual reading of voter intent from the paper ballot:
– If correcting the CVR would reduce the margin between any (reported)
winner and any (reported) loser by two votes, the discrepancy is a 2-vote
overstatement (the number of 2-vote overstatements is denoted o2).
– If not, but if correcting the CVR would reduce the margin between any
winner and any loser by one vote, the discrepancy is a 1-vote overstatement
(the number of 1-vote overstatements is denoted o1).
– If not, but if correcting the CVR would not increase the margin between
every winner and every loser, the discrepancy is a neutral error. (Neutral
errors do not enter the stopping rule explicitly.)
– If not, but if correcting the CVR would increase the margin between every
winner and every loser by at least one vote, and increase the margin between
some winner and some loser by exactly one vote, the discrepancy is a 1-vote
understatement (the number of 1-vote understatements is denoted u1).
– If correcting the CVR would increase the margin between every winner and
every loser by two votes, it is a 2-vote understatement (the number of 2-vote
understatements is denoted u2).
Two-vote overstatements should be rare if the voting system is working cor-
rectly: they involve mistaking a vote for a loser as a vote for a winner. Two-vote
understatements should be even rarer—and are typically mathematically im-
possible. For instance, in a plurality, vote-for-one contest with three or more
candidates, two-vote understatements are impossible, because they would re-
quire having mistaken a valid vote for the winner as a valid vote for every losing
candidate.
We assume that there is a trustworthy upper bound on the total number of
ballots cast, for instance, from pollbooks or from information about the number
of eligible voters. A preliminary check should ensure that the preference manifest
does not list more ballots than that upper bound: if there are more ballots listed
than can exist, there is a serious problem that the audit cannot address by itself.8
In the sorted-ballot method described above,
– a 2-vote overstatement occurs if we find a vote for a reported loser in the
reported winner’s pile;
– a 1-vote overstatement occurs if we find a vote for a different reported loser
in a reported loser’s pile;
– neutral errors don’t occur;9
8 Prof. Sandeep Shukla of IIT Kanpur has pointed out that the current Indian VVPAT
design does not protect against the EVM adding electronic votes and corresponding
VVPATs when voters are not looking, because there is no publicly observable mech-
anism to ensure that at most one VVPAT is inserted into the box per voter. This
needs to be addressed by improving the physical design in a way that is beyond the
scope of this paper.
9 Indian EVMs (as far as we know) do not produce blank votes. However, if they
did they could be accommodated easily. A 1-vote overstatement occurs if we find
44
– a 1-vote understatement occurs when there are at least three candidates and
we find a vote for the reported winner in a reported loser’s pile;
– a 2-vote understatement occurs only when there are exactly two candidates,
and we find a vote for the reported winner in the reported loser’s pile;
– if a pile turns out to be smaller than reported, the discrepancy can be
addressed using the “phantom to zombie” approach of [1].
– if a pile turns out to be larger than reported, then some other pile must be
smaller than reported, and the “phantom to zombie” approach of [1] will
still ensure that the risk is controlled conservatively.
There are sharper ways to treat discrepancies than to use these categories
(in particular, keeping track of which margins are affected by each discrepancy
can reduce the number of ballots the audit inspects; see [13]). However, the
bookkeeping is more complex. Categorizing discrepancies this way makes the
calculations simple enough to do with a pencil and paper (aside from calculating
5 constants involving logarithms, which can be done once and for all and verified
by anyone).
Calculations Let n denote the current sample size and α the risk limit. Fix
γ ≥ 1. The LSKM method stops auditing (and concludes that the reported
winners really won) if
(1)
n > 2γ
µ
(
o1 log
(
1
1− 12γ
)
+ o2 log
(
1
1− 1γ
)
− u1 log
(
1 +
1
2γ
)
− u2 log
(
1 +
1
γ
)
− log(α)
)
In this expression, µ is the diluted margin, the smallest difference in votes between
any winner and any loser, divided by the total number of ballots in the population
from which the sample is to be drawn, including ballots with invalid votes.
The constant γ ≥ 1 is the error inflation factor, which controls the operating
characteristics of the LSKM method: the larger γ is, the fewer additional ballots
need to be audited if a 2-vote overstatement is observed, but the smaller γ is,
the fewer ballots need to be audited if no 2-vote overstatements are observed.
Because two-vote overstatements should be rare, taking γ slightly larger than
1 should suffice. For γ exactly equal to 1, then if the audit finds even one 2-
vote overstatement, the audit will not terminate without a full hand count. [6]
suggest using γ = 1.03905, which makes the “cost” of a 2-vote overstatement 5
times larger than the “cost” of a 1-vote overstatement, where “cost” means the
number of additional ballots that must be audited to attain the risk limit. Any
value of γ ≥ 1 gives a risk-limiting audit, but γ must be chosen before inspecting
any ballots.
a blank vote in the reported winner’s pile. A neutral error would occur when there
were at least three candidates and we found a blank vote in a reported loser’s pile. A
one-vote understatement would occur when there were exactly two candidates and
we found a blank vote in the reported loser’s pile.
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3.2 Ballot-Polling RLA using BRAVO
The BRAVO ballot-polling RLA by [7] can be applied immediately to constituen-
cies in India. In the Indian scenario, we have only one winner per constituency
and one candidate per ballot. For each loser `, the null hypothesis H0w` states
that w did not get more votes than `, that is, that ` actually tied or beat w.
BRAVO uses the Sequential Probability Ratio Test by [18] to test all the null
hypotheses simultaneously.
The audit begins by choosing the risk limit α. It also requires the reported
vote totals for each candidate,10 but no other data from the voting system.
For every apparent loser `, define the conditional vote share sw`
sw` ≡ vw
vw + v`
(2)
Here, vw and v` are the reported vote totals for the winner w and the loser
` respectively. If the reported vote tally is correct, the chance that a randomly
selected ballot shows a vote for w, given that it shows a vote for either w or `,
is sw`.
BRAVO maintains a test statistic Tw` for each reported (winner, loser) pair.
In Indian elections, there is only one reported winner w per constituency, so this
amounts to a test statistic for each reported loser `. Null hypothesis H0w` is
rejected if
Tw` >
1
α
. (3)
If the null hypotheses {H0w`} for all apparent losers ` ∈ L are rejected, the audit
stops and the reported outcome becomes final.
At any time, for example if the audit is expected to take more time than sim-
ply counting the ballots, auditors can stop sampling and perform a full manual
recount. The algorithm runs as follows:
10 There are other ballot-polling methods that do not use the reported results at all.
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Algorithm 1 BRAVO with protection against manifest errors.
This is a simplified version of BRAVO that assumes the contest has only one
winner, and that there can be at most one valid vote per ballot. It incorporates
the “phantom to zombie” method of [1] for dealing with errors in the ballot
manifest.
Input: Risk Limit α; ballot manifest, announced winner w, losers set L and corre-
sponding weighted vote shares sw` for each ` ∈ L. Upper bound N on the number
of ballots, where N is at least as large as the number of ballots listed in the manifest.
Work threshold K ≤ N .
1: Initialize probability ratios: ∀` ∈ L : Tw` ← 1
2: Number of audited ballots: n← 0
3: L ← L
4: while L 6= ∅ do
5: Generate a random number i between 1 and N
6: Look up the ith ballot in the ballot manifest and (attempt to) retrieve it
7: if Ballot i is not in the ballot manifest or cannot be found then
8: For every ` ∈ L, Tw` ← Tw` ∗ 2(1− sw`)
9: else if Ballot i shows a vote for the winner w then
10: For each ` ∈ L, Tw` ← Tw` ∗ 2sw`
11: else if Ballot i shows a vote for loser ` ∈ L then
12: Tw` ← Tw` ∗ 2(1− sw`)
13: if Tw` > 1α for any loser ` ∈ L then
14: L ← L \ {`}
15: if the number of ballots inspected exceeds K, or optionally at any time then
16: STOP the audit and perform a full manual recount.
17: Declare election outcome correct—since all null hypotheses have been rejected.
At any stage, P = max`∈L 1/Tw` is a conservative sequential P -value for the
hypothesis that the reported winner w did not actually win the constituency.
Number of votes to be audited Consider an example of a 3-candidate contest
with a single plurality winner. The candidates are Ram, Shyam and Janani. Their
respective shares are recorded in the following table:
Ram Shyam Janani
20, 000 30, 000 50, 000
In this case, the winner is Janani. Let us denote the winner-loser pairs as
(j, r) for Janani and Ram and (j, s) for Janani and Shyam. The weighted vote
shares are:
sjr =
vj
vj + vr
=
50000
50000 + 20000
= 0.714
sjs =
vj
vj + vs
=
50000
50000 + 30000
= 0.625
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We set the risk limit α at 5%. Every time the audit selects a ballot that shows
a vote for Janani we multiply Tjr by
0.714
0.5 = 1.428 and Tjs by
0.625
0.5 = 1.25.
Therefore, the minimum sample size n to attain a risk limit α = 0.05 satisfies
1.428n ≥ 20
and
1.25n ≥ 20
The smallest such n is n = 14. Hence, we need to audit at least 14 ballots—if
they all show up votes for Janani, BRAVO will confirm the election outcome at
risk limit 5%.
If the reported election results were accurate, on average we would see 50%
of ballots for Janani, 30% for Shyam and 20% for Ram. [7] describe how to find
the Average sample number (ASN), the expected sample size necessary to reject
all the null hypotheses, assuming the reported results are indeed correct. Stark’s
online ballot-polling tool shows an ASN of 123 for this example. There have been
numerous improvements to the efficiency of Risk-Limiting Audits, any of which
could easily apply to India’s simple electoral system.11
The next section explains how to audit the overall parliamentary winner by
an efficient combination of single-constituency audits. It requires independent,
sequentially valid P -values {Pi} for the hypotheses that the reported outcome in
constituency i is incorrect. It does not require the P -values to be obtained using
the same method. For instance, some constituencies could use ballot polling and
others could use transitive ballot-level comparison audits.
4 Auditing the Overall Parliamentary Winner
A party or a coalition needs a majority of the seats in the Lower House of
Parliament to form a new government. The total number of seats is 543, so to
win, a party or coalition needs at least 272 seats. The audit needs to confirm
that the reported winning party or coalition truly won at least 272 seats. (The
particular seats the reported winner won is immaterial to whether they won
overall.) If party w supposedly won M ≥ 272 constituencies, then for a different
party to have won in fact, the reported outcome must be wrong in at least
m = M − 271 of the constituencies that w supposedly won. This condition is
necessary but not sufficient for the parliamentary outcome to be wrong: if w in
fact won some constituencies it was reported to have lost, the outcome could be
wrong in m constituencies w supposedly won and yet w could still be the overall
winner.
Let W denote the set of constituencies w reportedly won. Then |W |≥ 272
and m = |W |−271, where |W | denotes the cardinality of the set W . If there is
11 See for example https://github.com/pbstark/S157F17/blob/master/
kaplanWald.ipynb and https://github.com/pbstark/S157F17/blob/master/
pSPRTnoReplacement.ipynb.
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no set of constituencies C ⊂W with |C|= m for which w lost in every c ⊂ C, w
must have won overall.
Let α denote the overall risk limit, and let Pc denote a P -value for the
hypothesis that the reported outcome in constituency c is wrong. We suppose
that the audits in different constituencies rely on independently selected random
samples of ballots, so the P -values {Pc} are independent random variables. If the
reported outcome in constituency c is incorrect, the probability distribution of Pc
is stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. That is, Pr{Pc ≤ p} ≤ p
if the reported outcome in constituency c is wrong.
Let C denote a set of constituencies. Fisher’s combining function for a set of
P -values {Pc}c∈C is
χ2(C) ≡ −2
∑
c∈C
lnPc. (4)
If the P -values {Pc} are independent and all the null hypotheses are true, the
probability distribution of χ2(C) is stochastically smaller than a chi-square dis-
tribution with 2|C| degrees of freedom.12 That is, if the reported outcome in
every constituency c ∈ C is wrong,
Pr{χ2(C) ≥ χ22|C|(1− α)} ≤ α, (5)
where χ22|C|(1− α) is the 1− α quantile of the chi-square distribution with 2|C|
degrees of freedom.
Let W denote the set of constituencies the reported winning party allegedly
won, and let m ≡ |W |−271. Then m is the parliamentary “margin in con-
stituencies: the reported winner really won overall unless there are at least m
constituencies where the overall winner reportedly won, but in fact lost. For any
set C of constituencies, let Cm denote the set of all subsets of C with cardinal-
ity m. The overall auditing strategy is to test whether there is any subset of
m constituencies in W where the reported parliamentary winner actually lost.
If there is no such subset, the reported winner must actually have won overall.
We test that hypothesis by examining all such subsets. For each such subset,
we use the separate audits of the constituencies to construct, via Fishers com-
bining function, a test of the hypothesis that the reported winner lost in all m
constituencies.
If the audit of some constituency c leads to a full hand count that confirms
the result, then all subsets of size m that contain c can be eliminated from further
consideration: the reported winner cannot have lost in all m constituencies in
such a subset, because it actually won in c.
For any collection U of sets of constituencies, define U(c) ≡ {U ∈ U : U 3 c},
all sets of constituencies in U that contain c. (These will be the collections
eliminated from further consideration if a full count of c confirms the result in
c.)
With these definitions, our audit procedure is as follows:
12 See, e.g., [9].
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1. Select an overall risk limit α for the parliamentary outcome and select an
auditing method for each constituency c ∈W , e.g., BRAVO or LSKM.
2. Perform the following audit.
Algorithm 2 Audit of overall election result.
Input: W , the constituencies reportedly won by w; α, the risk limit; a sequential
auditing method for each c ∈W
1: Set U =Wm, the collection of all subsets of W of cardinality m = |W |−271.
2: while U 6= ∅ do
3: Augment the sample in one or more constituencies c13
4: Find the constituency-level P -values {Pc} using the auditing method pre-
specified for each c
5: if ∃C ∈ U such that ∀c ∈ C a full hand count revealed a different winner then
6: Perform a full hand count of the entire election; report the resulting outcome,
and stop.
7: for all constituencies c ∈ ∪U do
8: if c has been fully counted by hand, and the count confirmed the reported
outcome in c then
9: U ← U \ U(c)
10: U ← U \ {C ∈ U : χ2(C) ≥ χ22|C|(1− α)}
3. If the loop terminates with U = ∅, the audit has confirmed the parliamentary
outcome at risk limit α.
Proof that the algorithm above is a RLA of the parliamentary out-
come. We show that if the parliamentary outcome is wrong, the chance that the
13 BRAVO and LSKM produce sequentially valid P -values. That is, the chance that
the infimum of the P -value for constituency c over all sample sizes is less than or
equal to p is itself less than or equal to p, if the outcome is incorrect in constituency
c. For that reason, every rule for increasing sample sizes in constituency c results in
a valid P -value for constituency c. Because the samples are selected independently
in different constituencies (although sample sizes are dependent), the composite P -
value from Fishers combining function remains valid. Thus, the rule for increasing
sample sizes when the risk limit has not been attained could be as simple as “in-
crease every nc by 1 ballot, or it could be designed to minimize the expected total
amount of auditing required, for instance, by preferentially increasing the sample size
in constituencies with large margins and taking into account differences in auditing
methods in different jurisdictions (ballot polling versus transitive ballot-level com-
parison). All else equal, when the outcome is correct, auditing an additional ballot
is expected to decrease the P -value more, the larger the true margin is. Similarly,
all else equal, auditing an additional ballot in a jurisdiction conducting a transitive
ballot-level comparison RLA is expected to decrease the P -value more than auditing
an additional ballot in a jurisdiction conducting a ballot-polling RLA. It is always
permissible to perform a full hand count in any constituency rather than increase the
sample size incrementally: anything that increases the chance of a full count cannot
increase the risk.
50
audit stops without a full manual tally of every constituency is at most α. If the
parliamentary outcome is wrong, the reported winner is wrong in every c ∈ C
for some C ∈ Wm. Suppose there is such a C. If the audit leads to hand counting
every c ∈ C, step (5) ensures that there will be a full manual tally of the entire
election. Therefore, there will be a full manual tally unless C is removed from U .
There are two places that sets of constituencies can be removed from U : step (9)
and step (10). Step (9) cannot remove C from U , because, by assumption, hand-
counting any c ∈ C would belie the reported outcome in c. Therefore, the chance
that C is not fully hand counted is at most the chance that step (10) removes
C from U . But, by construction (through Fisher’s combining function applied to
the independent constituency-level P -values), that chance is not larger than α.
If there is more than one C ∈ Wm for which every reported outcome is wrong,
the audit must erroneously remove all of them at step (10). But the chance of
erroneously removing all of them cannot be larger than chance of removing any
one of them individually, which is in turn at most α.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented an approach to conduct risk-limiting audits of the national
outcome of Indian elections by combining audits conducted in different con-
stituencies using independent samples. Within a given constituency, the audit
could use ballot polling, or—with an initial step of sorting VVPATs—transitive
ballot-level comparisons. The sets of constituencies are constructed in such a
way that for the reported parliamentary outcome to be wrong, the reported out-
come must be wrong in every constituency in at least one of the sets. If there is
strong statistical evidence that there is no set of constituencies in the collection
for which every reported outcome is wrong, that confirms the national parlia-
mentary outcome. In future research we will address how to schedule increases
in sample sizes in different constituencies to minimize the total expected work-
load, taking into account the reported margins in different constituencies and
the auditing methods used in different constituencies.
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Abstract. Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been
proposed, but even the most carefully designed systems necessarily leak
information via the announced result. In corner cases, this may be prob-
lematic. For example, if all the votes go to one candidate then all vote
privacy evaporates. The mere possibility of candidates getting no or few
votes could have implications for security in practice: if a coercer demands
that a voter cast a vote for such an unpopular candidate, then the voter
may feel obliged to obey, even if she is confident that the voting system
satisfies the standard coercion resistance definitions. With complex ballots,
there may also be a danger of “Italian” style (aka “signature”) attacks:
the coercer demands the voter cast a ballot with a specific, identifying
pattern.
Here we propose an approach to tallying end-to-end verifiable schemes
that avoids revealing all the votes but still achieves whatever confidence
level in the announced result is desired. Now a coerced voter can claim
that the required vote must be amongst those that remained shrouded.
Our approach is based on the well-established notion of Risk-Limiting
Audits, but here applied to the tally rather than to the audit. We show
that this approach counters coercion threats arising in extreme tallies
and “Italian” attacks. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the
Selene scheme, and we extend the approach to Risk-Limiting Verification,
where not all vote trackers are revealed, thereby enhancing the coercion
mitigation properties of Selene.
Keywords: End-to-end verifiability, risk-limiting audits, plausible deni-
ability, coercion resistance.
1 Introduction
Many verifiable voting schemes have been proposed that are designed to give a
high level of resistance against coercion or vote buying [4,12,8,20,22]. However,
it is typically assumed that little can be done about coercion threats in case
of extreme outcomes, e.g., no or few votes for some candidates. Unfortunately,
such situations do happen in real elections. If there is a (perceived) risk that
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candidate X will get no votes, and the coercer tells the voter to vote for X,
then the voter may feel obliged to comply even if the voting scheme satisfies the
standard definitions of coercion resistance. The possibility is more dangerous
than it seems at the first glance. True, coercing for the low support candidate X
is unlikely to get him or her win. However, the coercer can use X to construct
what is effectively an abstention attack, and take away the votes from the main
opponent of his preferred candidate. If the coercer prefers candidate A, he can
help him win by coercing supporters of B to vote for X.
Another difficulty that may arise is that of so-called “Italian”-style attacks,
also known as “signature” attacks: if the voting method allows for a large number
of distinct ways of filling out the ballot, a coercer may require the voter to fill
out the ballot with a distinctive pattern allowing it to be uniquely identified with
high probability in the final tally. This is especially an issue with long, complex
ballots and with preferential voting schemes. It can be countered by, for example,
using homomorphic tallying techniques to compute the overall result without
revealing the individual ballots, but this is computationally intensive and even
then may leak some critical information [27].
Here, we show that risk-limiting audit techniques [16] can be adapted to
achieve whatever level of confidence in the outcome is required while ensuring
that a proportion of the ballots remain shrouded. This allows us to significantly
enhance the coercion resistance of verifiable schemes. The Risk Limiting Tally
(RLT) approach that we present here provides a simple way to guarantee voters
plausible deniability against the above attacks: a coerced voter, who did not cast
the ballot the way the coercer had demanded, can simply claim that the required
ballot is amongst those unrevealed.
We also present a variant of the idea, Risk Limiting Verification (RLV), where
we ensure that a proportion of verification tokens remain unrevealed. The basic
version of the Selene scheme [20] has the drawback that the the coercer can
claim that the fake tracker provided by a voter is his own. We describe how RLV
mitigates this.
A possible objection to RLT is that it is “undemocractic” not to count all
votes. However, the method allows the electoral outcome (i.e. the winner or
winners) to be ascertained to any desired level of statistical certainty. Moreover,
the sample of ballots will be drawn in such a way that every cast vote has an
equal chance of being in the revealed sample, so there is no lack of fairness. RLTs
are related to random sample voting (RSV), due to Chaum [7], except that there
the sample is drawn from the set of eligible voters, rather than from the cast
votes. If anything, RLTs seem to be more democratic in that in RSV voters who
are not chosen might well feel excluded. Furthermore, in RLTs we are able to
adjust the sample size after voting to achieve the desired confidence level. We
note also that some tally algorithms, e.g. some forms of STV, intrinsically involve
a probabilistic element.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss coercion-resistant
and verifiable voting schemes in general, and Selene in particular. Section 3 briefly
recalls Risk-Limiting Audits, and Section 4 introduces the techniques for RLTs.
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We present the actual protocol in Section 5, and a brief security discussion
in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the risk-limiting verification. Related work is
presented in Section 8, and we conclude in Section 9.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper we present several contributions:
1. The use of using risk-limiting techniques to shroud a proportion of votes,
improving coercion resistance while achieving whatever confidence level is
required.
2. A novel extension of Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) techniques to handle the
situation in which we do not have an initial null hypothesis (reported out-
come).
3. A new test statistic for RLAs with operating characteristics that do not
depend on the reported votes, only on the reported winner(s).
4. Protocols to enable RLT for most end-to-end verifiable schemes, including
strategies to ensure plausible deniability whatever the vote distribution is.
5. Extension of the approach to Risk-Limiting Verification: the shrouding of a
randomly selected subset of verification tokens to improve coercion resistance,
in particular for the Selene scheme.
2 Coercion-Resistant and Verifiable Voting
We set the scene by recalling the concepts of End-to-End Verifiability [21] and
coercion-resistance [4,12], and showing an example scheme designed to balance
the two requirements.
2.1 An Outline of End-to-End Verifiable Voting
The use of digital technologies to record and process votes might provide efficiency
and convenience, but it can also bring serious new threats, in particular, virtually
undetectable ways to manipulate votes on a large scale. These concerns motivated
the development of End-to-End Verifiable (E2E V) voting schemes. Such schemes
provide the voters with means to confirm that their vote is accurately included
in the tally, without opening up possibilities of coercion or vote-buying. This is
usually accomplished by creating an encryption of the vote at the time of casting,
and posting this to a public Bulletin Board (BB). Voters can then confirm that
their “receipt,” i.e., the encrypted vote, appears correctly on the BB.
Once we have consensus on the correct set of encrypted votes, these can be
processed in a verifiable fashion to calculate the outcome in a way that does not
compromise the privacy of the votes. For instance, the encrypted votes might
be put through a sequence of verifiable re-encryption mixes and then verifiably
decrypted, allowing anyone to compute the result. Alternatively, the encrypted
votes might be tallied under encryption, exploiting the homomorphic properties
of the encryption algorithm, and the final result decrypted. To complete the
assurance argument we need some additional ingredients:
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– The voter needs to be confident that her intended vote is correctly encrypted
in her receipt.
– We need to prevent ballot stuffing, i.e., we need to ensure that only legitimately
cast votes appear in the list of receipts on the BB, and only one per voter.
– We need to know that “enough” voters check that their intended votes are
correctly encrypted, and that their encrypted votes appear on BB.
– We need dispute-resolution mechanisms in place to ensure that if voters detect
(or claim to detect) problems, the culprit can be identified and appropriate
action taken.
Typically the first point is addressed by some form of cut-and-chose protocol,
e.g. Benaloh Challenge [5], or a more sophisticated approach such as Neff’s
MarkPledge scheme [2]. Ballot stuffing is usually countered either by procedural
measures in the polling station, or by requiring that receipts be digitally signed
by the voters. The former does not provide universal eligibility verifiability while
the latter can but requires infrastructure to equip voters with signing keys.
We will not delve deeper into how the various E2E V schemes work but rather
assume that the correct set of encrypted votes is posted to the Bulletin Board.
2.2 Ballot Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion Resistance
Ballot privacy is often defined using anonymity style definitions as originally
proposed in [23]. Informally, consider two instances of the system, one in which
A votes for X and B for Y , and the other in which the votes are swapped. If the
attacker is unable to distinguish these two instances then the system is deemed to
satisfy ballot privacy. More formal definitions can be found, for example, in [10].
Note that even in extreme cases, for example when all voters vote for X, such a
system will satisfy the above definition, even though in that case the attacker
knows precisely how each voter voted.
It was later realised that simple notions of ballot privacy in the presence of a
passive attacker are not enough. For E2E V schemes we have to worry about ways
that the voter might be able to prove her vote to a third party. This motivates
the requirement for receipt-freeness [4]: the voter cannot acquire evidence that
would enable her to construct a proof to a third party as to how she voted.
In the face of a yet more active attacker who might interact with the voter
before, during and after voting, potentially issuing detailed instructions and
requiring the voter to reveal credentials, ephemeral random values etc, we need
even stronger notions. This threat model motivates the property of coercion
resistance for which many different definitions have been proposed [12], reflecting
various subtle distinctions. We will adopt the following definition, informally
stated:
A voting system S is coercion resistant if, for all c ∈ C there exists a
voter strategy ψ such that for all attacker strategies φ, the voter can cast
her intended vote c and the attacker cannot tell that she did not obey
his instructions.
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Such a style of definition appears to be the most powerful in that it cap-
tures the privacy failure in the case of unanimous votes, forced abstention and
randomisation attacks.
2.3 Selene
We now give a sketch of how voter-verification is achieved in the Selene voting
protocol. Full details can be found in [20]. In Selene, the verification is much more
direct and intuitive than is the case for conventional E2E V systems: rather than
checking for the presence of her encrypted vote on the BB, the voter checks her
vote in cleartext in the tally on the BB identified by a secret, deniable tracker.
During the setup phase the set of distinct trackers are posted on the BB,
verifiably encrypted and mixed and then assigned to the voters according the
resulting secret permutation. This ensures that each voter is assigned a unique,
secret tracker.
For each encrypted tracker, a trapdoor commitment is created for which the
voter holds the secret trapdoor key. In essence this is the “β” term of an El Gamal
encryption of the tracker, where the “α” term is kept secret for the moment.
Voting is as usual: an encryption of the vote is created, and sent to the
server for posting to the BB against the voter (pseudo)Id. Once we are happy
that we have the correct set of validly cast, encrypted votes, we can proceed to
tabulation: the (encrypted vote, tracker) pairs are put through verifiable, parallel
re-encryption mixes and decrypted, revealing the vote/tracker pairs in plaintext.
Later, the α terms are sent via an untappable channel to the voters to enable
them to open the commitment using their secret, trapdoor key. If coerced, the
voter can generate a fake α that will open her commitment to an alternative
tracker pointing to the coercer’s choice. With the trapdoor, creating such a fake
α is computationally straightforward. On the other hand, computing a fake α
that will open the commitment to a given, valid tracker is intractable without
the trapdoor. Thus, assuming that the voter’s trapdoor is not compromised, the
α term is implicitly authenticated by the fact that it opens to a valid tracker.
3 Risk-Limiting Audits
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) [16] of a reported election outcome is any procedure
that has a known minimum chance of correcting the reported outcome if the
outcome is wrong (and that cannot render a correct outcome incorrect). In
this case, the outcome means the winner or winners, not the precise tally. The
reported outcome is correct if it is the outcome that an accurate manual tally of
the underlying voter-verified records would show.4 The maximal chance that the
procedure will fail to correct an outcome that is wrong is the risk limit.
4 The trustworthiness of the underlying records should be assessed by a compliance
audit [25]. A RLA that relies on an untrustworthy record cannot reliably assess
whether outcomes reflect how voters voted.
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RLAs generally pose auditing as a sequential test of the hypothesis that the
reported outcome is incorrect. The audit continues to examine more ballots until
either the hypothesis is rejected or the audit has conducted a full manual tally.
The use of sequential tests enables RLAs to stop as soon as there is convincing
evidence that the reported outcome is correct, reducing the number of ballots
the audit inspects.
RLAs check reported outcomes while RLTs determine what outcomes to
report. However, similar sequential testing methods can allow RLTs to stop the
tally (of a random permutation of the ballots) as soon as there is convincing
statistical evidence of the electoral outcome, which the RLT then reports. A
RLT declares “either this is the correct outcome, or an event occurred that had
probability no larger than α,” where α ∈ (0, 1) is any pre-specified risk limit.
Minimizing the number of ballots that must be tallied maximizes the number of
ballots kept shrouded, improving privacy and coercion-resistance.
There are two general strategies for RLAs: ballot-polling and comparison.
Ballot-polling manually examines randomly selected ballots for evidence of who
won. A comparison audit has three steps: first, the voting system must commit to
its interpretation of physically identifiable individual ballots or groups of ballots
comprising all ballots validly cast in the election. Second, auditors check that
the exported data reproduces the reported results. Third, auditors compare the
manual interpretation of a random sample of ballots or groups of ballots to the
voting system’s interpretation. Further, “hybrid” methods combine ballot-polling
for some groups of ballots and comparisons for other groups; see [18].
Comparison audits require auditors to know how the equipment interpreted
the ballots, so they are not suitable for RLTs, where we seek evidence about
who won just from a subset of the shrouded votes. Below, we show how a new
procedure for ballot-polling RLAs can be adapted for RLTs.
4 Risk-Limiting Tallies
We propose a simple modification of the way that votes are tallied to address the
issues outlined in the introduction. Rather than tallying all votes straight-off, the
election authority reveals the votes for a random sequence of encrypted ballots,
continuing until the sample gives the acceptable level of risk in the outcome (i.e.,
who won). If the true margin of victory is not too small, the outcome can be
determined with high confidence (i.e., low risk) while leaving a substantial number
of ballots unopened, thus allowing a voter to claim that they cast the ballot
required by the coercer even if such a ballot was not revealed during the partial
tally. The approach is thus inspired by the idea of Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs),
[24,16], but here we apply the approach to determining the correct outcome
rather than checking whether a reported outcome is correct. That difference
turns out to have surprising statistical implications; in particular, larger sample
sizes are generally required to control the risk to the same level.
RLAs test the null hypothesis that the reported winner(s) did not actually
win, rather than determine the correct outcome ab initio. Moreover, the operating
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characteristics of existing RLAs depend on the reported results. For instance,
comparison audits test whether the reported margin overstated the true margin
by enough to cause the reported winners to be incorrect. Previous methods for
ballot-polling audits, such as BRAVO [15] test the hypothesis that the reported
outcome is wrong against the alternative that the reported vote shares are nearly
correct.
For RLTs, we do not have reported results to leverage, so we need a new
approach. Section 4.1 presents a probability inequality; Section 4.2 applies it
to produce a new sequential ballot-polling test, the engine for the RLT scheme
presented in Section 5 based on the Selene E2E V protocol.
4.1 Tests for the Mean of a Non-Negative Population
Extant methods for RLAs generally involve the reported results in some way.
Here, we present a new sequential method to determine with high confidence
who won, without specifying a particular alternative hypothesis. The method
applies to plurality (including vote-for-k), majority, and super-majority social
choice functions, but we present the method in detail only for plurality contests.
Our RLT method is based on tests about the mean of a non-negative pop-
ulation. Consider a population of N items, each labeled with a non-negative
number.5 Let xi ≥ 0 be the label of item i, i = 1, . . . , N . Let µ ≡ 1N
∑N
i=1 xi
be the mean of the labels. Moreover, let t denote the hypothesized value of the
population mean µ.
We sample items at random, sequentially, without replacement, such that the
(conditional) probability that item k is selected in the jth draw is 1N−j+1 , given
that item k was not selected before the jth draw. Xj denotes the number on the
label of the item selected on the jth draw. Define Sj ≡
∑j
k=1Xk, S˜j ≡ Sj/N ,
and j˜ ≡ 1− (j − 1)/N . Let
Yn ≡
∫ 1
0
n∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ. (1)
It has been shown in [11] that if µ = t (i.e., if the null hypothesis is true), then
(Yj)
N
j=1 is a nonnegative closed martingale with expected value 1. Kolmogorov’s
inequality then implies that for any J ∈ {1, . . . , N} and any p ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
(
max
1≤j≤J
Yj(t) > 1/p
)
≤ p.
This can be used as the basis of a ballot-polling RLA that does not require a
reference tally, as we show below. The same result holds for sequential sampling
with replacement, re-defining S˜j ≡ 0 and j˜ ≡ 1 (the limit of the finite-population
result as N → ∞). We also note that [11] provides a recursive algorithm for
computing the integral (1).
5 In our case, the items will be ballots, and their labels will represent votes; see
Section 4.2.
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4.2 Risk-Limiting Tallies
Consider plurality contests that allow each voter to vote for k ≥ 1 of C candidates.
The winner(s) are the k candidates who receive the most votes. We ignore the
possibility of ties; they are an easy extension. Majority and super-majority are
straightforward generalizations; see [24].
Candidate w is one of the winners if w received more votes than at least C−k
other candidates. In general, some ballots will have invalid votes or votes for
other candidates. Consider a single pair of candidates, w and `. Let Nw denote
the number of ballots in the population that show a vote for w but not for `; let
N` denote the number of ballots in the population that show a vote for ` but not
for w, and let Nu ≡ N −Nw −N` denote the number of ballots that show a vote
for neither w nor ` or show votes for both w and `.
Let Wj be the number of items labeled with w selected on or before draw j;
and define Lj analogously. The probability distributions of those variables depend
on Nw, N`, and Nu, even though we only care about one parameter, Nw −N`.
Now Nw ≤ N` if and only if Nw + Nu/2 ≤ N` + Nu/2. Since N` + Nu/2 =
N − (Nw +Nu/2), we have Nw +Nu/2 ≤ N − (Nw +Nu/2). We can now divide
by N to obtain Nw+Nu/2N ≤ 1− Nw+Nu/2N from which we get
Nw +Nu/2
N
≤ 1
2
. (2)
Let
µw` ≡
1×Nw + 12 ×Nu + 0×N`
N
.
This is the mean of a population derived from re-labeling each vote for w as 1,
each vote for ` as 0, and the rest as 1/2. The mean of this population is greater
than 1/2 iff w received more votes than `. We can test the hypothesis µw` ≤ 1/2
(i.e., w did not beat `) using the martingale-based test above by simply treating
the sampled ballots that way: every ballot with a vote for w (but not `) counts as
1, every ballot with a vote for ` (but not for w) counts as 0, and invalid ballots,
ballots with votes for other candidates, and ballots with votes for both w and `
count as 1/2.
To determine the set of winners, we sequentially test the collection of C(C−1)
hypotheses
{Hw` : µw` ≤ 1/2, w = 1, . . . , C; ` = 1, . . . , C;w 6= `}, (3)
stopping when either
– there is a set W of cardinality k such that we have rejected the hypothesis
µw` ≤ 1/2 for every (w, `) with w ∈ W and ` /∈ W, or
– we have examined a too high percentage of votes from the privacy point of
view, in which case the sampling strategy is abandoned and different means
are used to determine with certainty who won, see Section 5.1 for details.
Proposition 1. If every hypothesis is tested at level α, the probability that this
algorithm misidentifies the set of winner(s) is at most k(C − k)α.
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Proof. The approach misidentifies one or more winners iff it terminates in the
first branch, but W is not the set of winners: ∃w ∈ W, ` /∈ W s.t. µw` ≤ 1/2. In
a RLA, a wrong outcome can only be confirmed if every true null hypothesis is
erroneously rejected. In contrast, in a RLT, a wrong outcome can be confirmed
if just one particular true null hypothesis is rejected: the hypothesis that the
candidate with the k + 1st highest vote share got fewer votes than the candidate
with the kth highest vote share.
There are C(C−1) hypotheses {Hw,`} in all, of which C(C−1)/2 are true. Of
the true null hypotheses, those whose erroneous rejection would make the reported
outcome wrong are the k(C − k) that compare the vote share of a candidate in
W to the vote share of a candidate in Wc: if none of those is erroneously rejected,
the set of winners is correct. Observe that if we used the logical implications of
the statistical rejections to entail rejections of other hypotheses—for instance,
Hw` ∩H`k → Hwk—this would not be true. Therefore, a Bonferroni multiplicity
adjustment of k(C − k) certainly suffices. Note that this may be conservative as
an estimate, because there are logical dependencies among the hypotheses. uunionsq
The aim of the sampling is to test the hypothesis “µw` ≤ 1/2.” Rejecting
µw` ≤ 1/2 means proving with risk at most α that w won the pairwise contest
with `.
Proposition 2. If we reject µw` ≤ 1/2 at significance level α and reject µ`m ≤
1/2 at significance level α, then we reject µwm ≤ 1/2 at significance level α.
Proof (sketch). This transitivity property follows from the monotonicity of the
P -values in the number of votes for each candidate, at each sample size j. uunionsq
4.3 Sample sizes
Because the underlying statistical test is sequential, the audit can start by looking
at a single ballot selected at random, calculate the p-values for all not-yet-rejected
null hypotheses, and continue to increase the sample one ballot at a time until
the risk limit has been met. However, depending on the desired risk limit, the
RLT will not be able to terminate until some minimum number of ballots has
been tallied.
The minimum sample sizes required to identify the winner with a maximum
error rate of α are given in Table 1, for sampling without replacement, for a
plurality contest with 2 candidates and a plurality contest with 10 candidates.
The sample sizes listed are exactly those that would be required if the votes were
unanimously for one candidate; if more than one candidate receives votes, the
sample size becomes random and becomes stochastically larger.
Similarly, if a fraction u of ballots do not have a valid vote for any candidate,
the sample size will also be random, and the expected sample size will grow by a
factor of 1/(1−u). For instance, if 10% of ballots have no vote and 90% of ballots
have a vote for candidate A in a 10-candidate plurality election, the expected
sample size to identify the winner with risk limit 0.1% is 17/0.9 = 18.9 ballots.
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The closer the vote is to unanimous, the fewer ballots need to be revealed
(the distribution is stochastically smaller the more nearly unanimous the vote).
I.e., the protection a RLT offers is greatest when the risk is greatest.
For a two-candidate plurality election, only one of the two null hypotheses
µ`m ≤ 1/2 can be true; thus, no multiplicity adjustment is needed. (This is
consistent with the formula k(C − k) = 1 × (2 − 1) = 1.) For a 10-candidate
plurality election, the Bonferroni adjustment factor is 1× (10− 1) = 9. As the
table shows, if the vote is (nearly) unanimous, the number of ballots required to
identify the winner with negligible error probability is small: 35 suffices to have
an error probability less than 10−9 for a two-candidate contest, and 38 suffices
for a 10-candidate contest. Because the risk drops by an order of magnitude with
an increase in sample size of about 4 ballots when the vote is (nearly) unanimous,
the penalty for multiplicity is low in absolute terms. If the RLT sample is drawn
without replacement, the expected sample sizes required to attain a given risk
are smaller—but not by much unless the total number of ballots is small.
candidates α
10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−6 10−7 10−8 10−9
2 5 9 13 17 21 24 28 31 35
10 9 13 17 20 24 27 31 34 38
Table 1. Minimum sample sizes to identify the winner of a two-candidate plurality con-
test and a 10-candidate plurality contest at risk limit α, for sampling with replacement.
Actual sample sizes approach these minima (with high probability) as voter preferences
approach unanimity.
5 Incorporating RLT in E2E V Voting Protocols
RLTs can be used in a straightforward way with any E2E V scheme in which
the set of encrypted votes appears on a Bulletin Board (BB) and is applicable
to either remote or in-person voting. The encryption should be homomorphic
and probabilistic: for instance, ElGamal can be used. Helios [1], Preˆt a` Voter [8],
Selene [20], etc., would all be amenable.
Conceptually, we can start with a random permutations of the encrypted
votes and take samples from left to right, opening more ballots as required. The
verifiable shuﬄes used in many schemes naturally give us a random permutation.
However, we must be careful about simply taking the permutation output of the
underlying scheme’s shuﬄes, as there may be opportunities to manipulate this
and bias the sampling. The sampling must be truly random and demonstrably
outwith the control of any entity. This brings us to the challenge of certifiable
randomness, which arises in many contexts: lotteries, voting, auctions, public
ledgers etc. A number of approaches have been proposed, for example using a
seed derived from a hash of prices of previously agreed stock market options at
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an agreed future time. Alternative approaches involve combining random values
previously committed by a number of independent entities. Algorand [17] adopts
such an approach combined with the use of verifiable random functions. Another
possibility is to derive the seed from a cryptographic hash of suitable data posted
to the BB. RLAs have employed seeds generated in a public ceremony of dice
rolling. We might rely on a trusted third party such as the NIST random beacon
service. For the purposes of this paper do not specify a particular approach but
leave it for the stakeholders to select.
Sampling with replacement can be implemented straightforwardly by per-
forming further mixes between samplings.
5.1 Guaranteeing Plausible Deniability
For most elections, the RLT approach will naturally leave a good proportion of
unrevealed votes. However, there will be cases where the winning margins are
narrow, and thus the RLT might result in all or almost all votes being revealed.
It is not enough for a system to be (objectively) coercion resistant, it must also
be seen as coercion resistant. Thus, for the RLT approach to be effective, we
must ensure that the voters will never be, nor expect to be, in a situation in
which plausible deniability fails. In this section we identify such situations, and
describe some strategies to deal with the potential vulnerability.
Of course, a close run referendum will not be a problem, but a problematic
scenario is a close margin between candidates X and Y , along with a low-support
candidate Z. This could result in a full count where the low score Z opens up the
possibility of coercion. We have already indicated that coercion for Z is possibly
harmful for the outcome of the election, as it can be used to decrease the number
of votes that either X or Y gets. Note also, again, that this kind of coercion is
feasible not only when the voter knows (e.g., from polls) the a close run will
occur. In many cases, it suffices that the voter thinks it might happen to get
her worried and vulnerable to threats. We propose that, in such circumstances,
the system should switch to a fallback strategy that works in all cases. Example
fallback strategies are sketched below.
PET testing. In the event of a close race between X and Y , start Plaintext
Equivalence Testing of randomly selected, unrevealed ballots against {X}PK and
{Y }PK , until we reach the required confidence for the winner.
Tally hiding. One can also fall back to computationally heavy methods e.g.
MPC for only disclosing the winner, see e.g. [9,26,6,27]. Note that the revealed
votes and reduced number of possible winners will make these methods more
efficient than if used from the onset.
A possibility is to have the tellers perform a secret computation of the tally,
and announce the winner(s), but not the numerical tally, on which to base a
null hypothesis. This allows the RLT to be computed much more efficiently, and
the secretly computed tallies can guide the appropriate strategy to adopt in the
event of narrow margins.
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6 Security Assumptions
In this section we briefly state the security guarantees and give some arguments
for their validity. For the exposition below, we introduce the following three
authorities besides the voters: The Tally Tellers TT holding the secret election
key in a threshold manner, the Mixnet Tellers MT mixing the encrypted votes
before doing the risk-limiting tally, and a random sampling authority RSA
organising the random sampling of votes for the tally.
For simplicity let us also assume that the underlying voting scheme that
we build on is mixnet-based, i.e., the main difference between the RLT version
and the original version is that not all ciphertexts output from the mixnet are
decrypted, but only a proportion of them.
In general, if RSA is acting honestly, or bound to do so e.g. via a verifiable
proof based on a computational assumption, then the security reduces to that of
the underlying scheme. For privacy, we normally have to trust that a threshold set
of TT is not colluding and at least one server in MT is honest. For verifiability
most schemes will not impose verifiable trust in TT or MT but might rely on
computational assumptions and the RO-model or a CRS setup.
Verifiability. When random sampling procedure is corrupted, the adversary
could possibly adjust the outcome in his favour. However, note that in this situa-
tion we can still achieve verifiability by having RSA committing to the sampling
order before mixing, and assuming the last mix node is honest (or assuming one
arbitrary mix node is honest and no threshold set of TT is corrupted). This will
ensure that the final sampling is random.
Ballot-Privacy. Obviously, a necessary assumption for ballot-privacy is that a
threshold set of TT are not colluding, and at least one mix node is honest. If the
random sampling is also honest, we get strictly less information from the tally
than in the original scheme, and we thus achieve better privacy in an information
theoretic sense. When using standard ballot-privacy definitions on the scheme
it should also be possible to reduce the ballot-privacy to that of the underlying
scheme, the only subtlety being that tally functions differ in the two schemes.
It might seem that a corruption of the random sampling procedure should not
influence ballot-privacy. However, there is one assumption to make: the random
sampling should, in the computational view of the adversary, be uncorrelated
with the cast votes. Having input from the voters to the random sampling could
indeed make sense from a verifiability viewpoint, like in Demos [13], but should
not depend on the vote choice unless this is computationally hidden.
Coercion-Resistance and Vote-Buying Resistance. As we have discussed
above, the RLT protocol in general improves the coercion-resistance especially
when candidates are expected to have a low vote count. It would be interesting
to relate this to the coercion-resistance level δ in Kusters et al. [14]. On the other
hand, the security against vote-buying is not increased in the same way since the
voter here has an intent to obtain a receipt. The vote buyer could indeed follow
the Italian attack method and the marked ballot would often appear.
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The above is reminiscent of a distinguishing example between vote-buying and
coercion resistance due to Rivest:6 the system chooses at random whether or not
to provide the voter with a plaintext receipt. Such a system is, arguably, coercion
resistant (the voter can claim to have received no receipt) but is vulnerable to
vote buying (the voter might comply in the hope of getting the pay-off).
7 Risk-Limiting Verification
The idea of using risk-limiting techniques to improve coercion resistance can also
be applied to verification of votes. Here, we apply the idea to Selene, allowing us
to ensure that a proportion of the trackers remain unrevealed. In consequence, the
coerced voter can always claim that her tracker was amongst those that remained
shrouded. Some subtleties have to be handled in the case of an obnoxious coercer
who demands the voter divulge their tracker; we describe those below. Indeed,
these consideration require some modifications of the way Selene works.
7.1 Risk-Limiting Verification in Selene
A drawback of Selene, as noted in the original paper, is that when a coerced voter
claims a fake tracker, the coercer (who is also a voter) could maintain that this
is in fact his tracker. By construction, the coercer cannot prove this to the voter,
but the voter is now in a difficult position: she knows that the claim might be
true. Elaborations of the basic scheme are proposed, but they complicate things
and render the verification less transparent: the final tally contains dummy votes
that must be subtracted out to get the true result.
The RLT idea can be extended to avoiding revealing all the trackers in a run
of a Selene election. The natural step is to apply the RLT mechanisms described
above to reveal as many votes as necessary and then reveal the corresponding
trackers. There would seem to be little point in revealing trackers for which the
corresponding vote has not been revealed. There may, however, be some merit in
revealing a subset of the trackers for which the votes have been revealed, as we
discuss below.
Risk Limiting Verification (RLV), as applied to Selene, can ensure that not
all trackers are revealed, thus allowing a coerced voter to simply claim that their
tracker did not appear. There is still a problem, however, if we use Selene in its
original form: the full set of trackers is published, so the coercer could require
the voter to reveal her tracker anyway, and still claim that it is his.
We can fix this fairly easily: one purpose of revealing all the trackers in the
setup phase is to demonstrate that they are all distinct, so the EA could publish
a list of encrypted trackers for which the trustees run pairwise PETs to show
that all the plaintexts differ. This would be computationally heavy and does not
scale well, but is no worse than, e.g., JCJ [12]. Moreover, we can use some of the
approaches to linearising the JCJ-style checks, for example by raising the tracker
ciphertexts to the same, secret exponent and then verifiably decrypting.
6 private communication
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We note that we get a form of partial random checking anyway when we
reveal a random sample of the trackers: if all the revealed trackers in say a 90%
random sample are distinct then we have very high confidence that they all
are distinct. The drawback of this approach is that if the EA has cheated and
included collisions then we will not discover this until rather late. Note, however,
that we could reveal the trackers first, before revealing the votes. Now, if we find
collisions, we can abort the election before any tally results have been revealed.
Still, one problem remains: another reason to publish the set of trackers is to
allow voters to confirm that the α term sent to them is authentic: it opens the
commitment to a valid tracker, i.e., a member the published set. If we do not
publish the set of trackers then we need another mechanism for voters to confirm
that their notified tracker is “valid.” We can achieve this by requiring that valid
trackers are drawn from a negligible subset of the full space, e.g., numbers with
say six digits. Now it is still intractable to produce fake α terms that will open
a given commitment to a member of this set, but, by adjusting the number of
digits we can ensure that the chance that a fake tracker will collide with the
coercer’s is greatly reduced, so improving the plausible deniability.
If this reduced probability of tracker collision is deemed unacceptable, then
we could allow the voter to request a fake tracker from the Notification Authority.
This authority knows which valid trackers have not been assigned and so can
provide an unassigned tracker to the coerced voter. This requires a level of trust
in this entity, to keep tracker-related information secret but such trust is needed
anyway.
There remains the question of whether all the voters should be notified of their
tracker, even when their tracker has not been revealed on the BB. The immediate
thought is not to notify unrevealed trackers, but this introduces possibilities of
the authorities exploiting this: leading many voters to think that their tracker
was not revealed and so denying them the possibility to verify their vote. It is
not clear how we could verify that all the voters whose trackers are revealed are
notified, so it seems wiser to notify each voter of their tracker.
8 Related Work
A number of papers [9,26,6,27] try to achieve tally hiding, either by only calculat-
ing the winner(s), or via multi-party computation and other cryptographic means.
An idea closer to RLTs is that of Random Sample Voting (RSV) by Chaum [7].
A scheme that seeks to implement RSV in a fully verifiable fashion is Alethea [3].
RSV typically samples a small and predetermined number of voters, regardless
of the margins. In contrast, RLTs adjust the sample size to obtain the desired
level of confidence in the reported outcome.
The idea of Risk-Limiting Verification is somewhat analogous to Rivest’s
ThreeBallot protocol [19]. Recall that, in ThreeBallot, each voter can verify a
random 1/3 of her cast ballot. Thus, RLV gives “vote handles” to a fraction of
voters, whereas in ThreeBallot each voter gets a handle to a fraction of her vote.
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9 Conclusions
This paper presents two simple methods, RLT and RLV, for reducing the amount
of information provided in the tally and verification stages. In consequence, we
enhance the coercion-resistance by giving coerced voters plausible deniability,
while achieving whatever confidence level in the outcome is required. An important
future step will be to understand how well this method protects coerced voters
in practice. It would be good also to understand better the trade-off between
confidence in the outcome and plausible deniability levels.
There exist other methods that leak less information in the tally process, e.g.,
by using multi-party computation to only reveal the winner of the election. Such
methods might be better suited to avoid strategic voting in runoff elections, and
may provide somewhat better deniability. However, those methods require more
elaborate and computationally expensive cryptography; arguably, our methods
are more efficient and transparent.
The novel Risk-Limiting techniques introduced here should be of independent
interest and have applications beyond the RLTs and RLVs described here.
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Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can provide strong evidence that
reported election outcomes are correct, on the assumption that the pa-
per trail of voter-verified ballots is trustworthy. Ballot-comparison RLAs
involve comparing a human reading of voter intent from the paper bal-
lot to the voting system’s electronic representation of voter intent for
that ballot, the cast-vote record (CVR). Ballot-comparison RLAs first
check that the full list of CVRs reproduces the reported results, then
compare manual readings to CVRs for randomly selected ballots. For a
ballot-comparison RLA to deserve public trust, the public must be able
to validate those two steps. The easiest way to do that is to publish
the entire list of CVRs. However, if every CVR is published, “Italian
attacks” via pattern voting can be used to coerce voters or to facilitate
selling votes.
Keywords: risk-limiting audit · homomorphic encryption · elections
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, risk-limiting audits (RLAs) [19,12] have gained traction as
a method for verifying whether reported election outcomes4 accurately reflect
the underlying paper trail. A recent report of the National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine [16] advocates RLAs. They are performed routinely in
Colorado, and are mandated by law now in Colorado, Rhode Island, Virginia, and
Texas. There have been about 40 pilot audits in California, Colorado, Indiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia and in Denmark.
RLAs involve manually examining random samples of paper ballots. If and
when the sample provides adequately strong evidence that the reported outcome
is correct, the audit stops; otherwise, it progresses to a full manual tally to set
the record straight.
* Authors listed alphabetically.
4 Outcome means the political outcome—the candidate(s) or position(s) that won—
not the exact vote counts.
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However, auditing using rigorous statistical criteria is not enough to justify
public confidence in election outcomes. An audit should not only allow insid-
ers or approved auditors to check the results, it should also provide the public
with enough information to verify that the audit was conducted properly and
did not stop prematurely. At the same time, the public information should not
compromise voter privacy. When RLAs are considered as a public verification
process, their requirements closely resemble the public verifiability property of
end-to-end verifiable elections.
The most eﬀicient kinds of RLAs require a commitment to the interpretation
of each ballot in advance of the audit. Traditionally, this commitment is made
by producing a complete, plaintext statement of the contents of each ballot.
Unfortunately, this can introduce a privacy problem for some election types. In
this paper we show how a cryptographic commitment can be used as the basis of
an RLA with essentially the same public verifiability as a traditional plaintext
statement, but much better protection of individual vote privacy.
The methods are immediately useful in California, Colorado, Rhode Island
(USA) and New South Wales (Australia).
We first describe how ballot-comparison risk-limiting audits work, then ex-
plain the privacy problem we are solving (Section 1.2) and the cryptographic
tools we can use instead of plaintext commitments. Section 2 outlines the main
advantages and shortcomings of VAULT compared with prior art. Section 3 then
gives an overview of current audit law and practice in some example jurisdic-
tions. The technical details of our approach are explained in Section 4, with some
detailed examples in Section 5 and an informal argument for its main security
properties in Section 6.
1.1 Ballot-comparison risk-limiting audits
Unlike traditional post-election audits, RLAs adjust the sample size to attain a
desired level of confidence that electoral outcomes are correct, given what the
audit finds as it progresses. There are many methods for conducting RLAs. The
most eﬀicient, measured by the number of ballots that need to be inspected when
reported outcomes are correct, is a ballot-comparison audit. Ballot-comparison
audits are possible only if the vote tabulation system creates an electronic in-
terpretation of voter’s preferences for each ballot—a cast vote record (CVR)—in
such a way that the corresponding paper ballot is uniquely identified and can be
retrieved for manual inspection by auditors, so that their interpretation of the
ballot can be compared to the CVR.
Existing protocols for ballot-comparison RLAs start with:
1. A ballot manifest, which describes in detail how the physical ballots are
stored, so that ballots can be selected randomly and retrieved.
2. A commitment by the voting system to the full set of CVRs.5
5 Here, commitment is a term of art. It means that something about the CVRs must
be published in such a way that observers can tell whether the CVRs that the audits
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To conduct the audit, auditors first confirm that applying the social choice
function to those CVRs yields the reported results, and that there are not more
CVRs than ballots.6 (The social choice function is the rule for figuring out who
won, such as plurality, multi-winner plurality, majority, IRV, or D’Hondt.) The
audit proceeds by randomly selecting ballots and checking whether the corre-
sponding CVRs match a human reading of the paper.
Ballot-comparison audits are like checking an itemized expense report using
paper receipts. The first step is to check whether the itemized expenses add up to
the total requested, and whether there is a receipt for every item. The second step
is to spot-check the amounts of the reported expenses against the amounts listed
on the receipts. Requiring the traveler to itemize expenses keeps the traveller
from being able to fudge the numbers after the fact. Checking whether the
itemized expenses add up to the requested reimbursement prevents a traveler
from reporting every receipt accurately, but adding the expenses incorrectly.
Analogously, requiring a commitment to the CVRs before the audit starts
keeps the system from simply generating CVRs that match whatever ballots
the audit selects; and verifying that the collection of commitments imply the
reported electoral outcomes ensures that if the commitments accurately reflect
their corresponding ballots, the reported electoral outcomes must be correct.
A public auditing algorithm would therefore consist of:
1. Checking that the social choice function, applied to the CVRs, does indeed
produce the announced election result.
2. Checking that the Risk Limiting Audit has been properly applied to the
CVRs and paper ballots. This includes verifying that the random ballot se-
lections are properly computed, checking that the correct paper ballot is
retrieved according to the ballot manifest, applying the RLA risk computa-
tion to the ballot’s true value, and checking that the audit stops only when
the RLA instructs it to (or falls back to a full manual recount).
In this work, we assume that VAULT takes as input a valid ballot-comparison
RLA algorithm and concentrate only on the use of cryptographic rather than
plaintext commitments. Important details such as how to verify that the ballots
are properly selected at random, are out of scope.
1.2 Public evidence and voter privacy
Ballot-comparison RLAs provide strong public evidence that reported outcomes
are correct if the commitment to the CVRs is public, if the ballot selection
process is publicly verifiable, and the public can observe whether the selected
ballots match the commitments about the corresponding CVRs.
check against the ballots are altered during the audit. One way to commit to the
CVRs is simply to publish them all.
6 There are conservative methods for dealing with a mismatch between the number of
CVRs and the number of ballots in the ballot manifest; see [2].
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However, committing to the full set of CVRs by publishing them all may
compromise the anonymity of the vote and enable an attacker to coerce voters
through “pattern voting.” For instance, suppose an employer is running for mayor
and wants to ensure getting the vote of all employees. The employer can select a
lesser oﬀice on the ballot (e.g., “dog-catcher”) and threaten that each employee
who wants to remain employed should cast a vote with the employer selected
for mayor and the employee’s own name written in for dog-catcher. When the
CVRs are released, the employer can check which employees complied with the
demand. Even if write-in votes are not possible, the employer could select, for
each employee, a unique pattern of votes on “downballot” contests and then
check whether the patterns show up in the published CVRs. Complex voting
systems such as Range Voting and Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) are susceptible
even when there is only one race on the ballot.
1.3 Cryptographic commitments and homomorphic tallying
Here we show that cryptography provides an alternative way to commit pub-
licly to the CVRs. This cryptographic commitment still lets the public check
whether—on the assumption that the cryptographic commitments accurately
reflect the votes on the underlying ballots—the reported results are correct, and
also lets audit observers check (statistically) whether the commitments were
accurate enough that the reported outcome is correct. Using appropriately de-
signed cryptographic commitments protects voter privacy while still allowing the
public to verify the audit.
Effective verification, of course, depends upon the protocol being sound. A
verification mechanism may seem to be secure but actually leave gaps that make
an election’s results unverifiable. For instance, part of the protocol may require
the system to prove that the commitment for a CVR does not hide a negative
vote, or more than one vote for a particular candidate. If the system could fake
a proof that the committed value was valid, it could fake election results and
evade detection with probability much higher than the RLA’s risk limit. This
is not merely hypothetical: the protocol for the Scytl/SwissPost Internet voting
system7 contains just such a flaw (Lewis, Pereira, and Teague 2019).
The remainder of this paper describes how techniques that for decades have
been used in end-to-end verifiable (E2E-V) systems can be re-purposed to enable
publicly verifiable ballot-comparison RLAs without revealing the contents of
ballots other than those selected at random in the audit.
We use a cryptographic commitment scheme and denote by c = E(m; r) the
commitment to message m with randomness r. The commitment is opened when
the committer produces (m; r), thus allowing anyone to check that E(m; r) = c:
The scheme must be both hiding and binding, meaning that the commitment
does not reveal the message, and that it is infeasible to open a commitment in
7 The flaw also affects the iVote Internet voting system deployed in New South Wales,
Australia.
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two different ways, i.e. to find (m; r) and (m0; r0) s.t. m 6= m0 but E(m0; r0) =
E(m; r). Precise definitions can be found in any cryptography textbook [5,10].
E must also satisfy the homomorphic addition property:
E(m1; r1):E(m2; r2) = E(m1 +m2; r1  r2)
where : and  are easily-computed functions, usually modular multiplica-
tion and addition. For example, E might be an El Gamal encryption putting
the message in the exponent. This is perfectly binding (because there is only one
possible decryption of any ciphertext), but only computationally hiding (because
an attacker who guesses the key can compute the plaintext). Alternatively, we
could use Pedersen commitments [18], which are perfectly hiding but only com-
putationally binding.
Using the homomorphic property, committed values can be combined by any
observer to form a commitment to the sum of those values. The committed
value can then be publicly opened, so anyone can verify that the claimed total
is correct. With homomorphic tallying, individual votes are never decrypted or
revealed.
Homomorphic tallying has been used in numerous cryptographic voting pro-
tocols to enable independent verification that a set of encrypted votes corre-
sponds to an announced tally, without revealing the contents of individual bal-
lots.
Some systems use perfectly hiding cryptographic commitments to achieve
everlasting privacy [14,15,9,1], meaning that the published data does not ex-
pose information about the individual ballot even to an attacker with unlimited
computational power. VAULT can be implemented with perfectly hiding cryp-
tographic commitments and hence provide everlasting privacy for those ballots
that are not audited.
The key contribution of this paper is the observation that homomorphic tally-
ing also makes it possible to conduct ballot-comparison audits without revealing
the contents of any ballots other than those selected at random in the audit,
which is generally a small fraction of the ballots that were cast.
2 Related Work and VAULT’s advantages and limitations
2.1 SOBA
SOBA (secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audits [3] addresses the coer-
cion problem by splitting ballots into their constituent votes and then creating
a complex web of hash commitments that can be used to verify the required
ballot properties without publishing full ballots. While SOBA is effective, it is
complicated and unintuitive. No jurisdiction has used it to alleviate the real
and practical problem of enabling public verification of ballot-comparison audits
without putting voter privacy at risk.
SOBA and VAULT both rely heavily on cryptographic commitments, but in
different ways. Public perception of the methods might be quite different, as a
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result. In SOBA, people need to trust the cryptographic commitments to ensure
that the plaintext votes for different contests really do correspond to “slicing”
ballots into separate contests. The commitments prevent a cheating authority
from reassembling sliced ballots any way they like—but the public can tally the
plaintext votes themselves.
For VAULT, the public must rely on homomorphic encryption to check
whether the commitments imply the reported outcomes. In SOBA it is less ob-
vious that integrity relies on the cryptography, so SOBA may engender more
public trust even though it relies just as essentially on cryptographic commit-
ments.
Also, SOBA works by splitting up a ballot, which solves the problem for
some social choice functions (such as Borda Count or Condorcet methods), and
for US-style ballots with multiple questions on one ballot paper. It does not
extend in an obvious way to Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), in which one vote
may contain enough information for coercion, but it can not be divided into
smaller parts while still allowing the social choice function to be computed.
Here we show how privacy-preserving ballot-comparison audits can be con-
ducted far more simply and convincingly.
2.2 End-to-End Verifiable Elections
E2E-verifiability is generally achieved by publishing an encryption of all votes
recorded in an election. An election is then end-to-end (E2E) verifiable if two
properties are satisfied.
– Voters can confirm that their own votes have been correctly recorded.
– Voters and observers can confirm that all recorded votes have been correctly
tallied.
The first of these properties is often referred to as individual verifiability
while the second is typically known as universal verifiability. It is the universal
verifiability property that is of interest for RLAs, because it closely matches the
properties required of CVRs in a publicly observable ballot-comparison audit.
However, there are some important differences.
The primary difference between VAULT and E2E-V is the level of protection
that needs to be afforded to the raw data. In E2E-verifiability, releasing even a
single raw ballot can directly compromise a voter’s privacy, because each voter in
an E2E-verifiable election receives a receipt tied to the voter’s encrypted ballot.
To prevent rogue individuals from decrypting the CVRs, decryption keys used
for E2E-verifiability are typically shared amongst multiple independent parties
in a way that some subset must cooperate to decrypt anything.
In contrast, for a ballot-comparison audit, the electoral process is assumed
to have already done something to disassociate ballots from the identities of the
voters who cast them. Thus the threat is lower: releasing an individual CVR does
not immediately compromise privacy because ballots and CVRs are not linked to
individual voters. Ballot-comparison audits require unsealing individual CVRs
74
as the audit progresses. It is ineﬀicient to require a quorum of keyholders to
convene and execute a decryption protocol every time an RLA selects additional
ballots. It is therefore both desirable and suﬀicient for the encrypted CVRs to
have a single decryption key—presumably held by election administrators.
2.3 Effectiveness of VAULT’s coercion-resistance
While it might appear as though the release of the complete set of votes on even
a single ballot creates a privacy risk, the true risk comes from the release of the
contents of most or all ballots. In order for effective coercion to take place, there
needs to be a means by which a coercer can determine that a coerced voter did
not vote as prescribed. However, if the contents of only a minority of ballots are
revealed (at random), a coerced voter can simply assert that the voter’s ballot
was not among those that were revealed.
While the new approach thwarts coercion, it is less effective against voluntary
vote buying and vote selling. Even when the contents of only a small fraction of
ballots are released, a lottery bounty might effectively purchase votes. A voter
who might sell a vote for, say, $10 might be just as willing to sell a vote for, say,
a 1% chance of getting $1,000. A vote buyer could therefore assign patterns to
individual voters and pay a large bounty to any voter whose assigned pattern
appears in a released CVR. A vote buyer’s potential payout could even be pro-
tected by tying the size of the bounty to the number of ballots whose contents
are revealed.
3 Current audit law and practice
3.1 Colorado
Colorado counties that perform ballot-comparison audits upload ballot mani-
fests and CVRs to state-provided, open-source software called RLATool. The
Secretary of State publishes a cryptographic hash of the entire CVR file,8 but
not individual plain text CVRs. The oﬀicials who audit the paper ballots manu-
ally and enter their reading of voter intent into RLATool generally do not have
access to the CVRs, and do not calculate whether there is a discrepancy between
the CVR and their interpretation: that is calculated by RLATool. Members of
the public do not have access to the CVRs, before, during, or after the audit.
After each round of the audit, the state generates a report that lists each ballot
inspected and whether or not the CVR had a discrepancy, contest by contest.9
The public currently has no way to check whether the comparison was done
correctly.
8 See, e.g., https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/RLA/files/2018G/round_1/cvr_hash.csv
(last visited 15 May 2019).
9 See, e.g., https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/auditCenter.html (last visited
15 May 2019).
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3.2 California
California AB2125, signed into law in 2018,10, authorizes pilot RLAs in 2020.
Section 15366(b) defines ballot-level comparison audits (i.e., ballot-comparison
audits):
(1) The elections oﬀicial uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote
records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from
the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those
reported by the voting system.
(2) The elections oﬀicial compares some or all of those cast vote records to a
hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding
ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined
by Section 19271.
Section 15367(b)(2)(G) requires the Secretary of State to establish regula-
tions so that “the audit process is observable and verifiable by the public.” We
interpret 15366(b)(1) in conjunction with 15367(b)(2)(G) to mean that the reg-
ulations must allow the public to verify that the CVRs used in ballot-comparison
audits yield the reported results, and that the correct CVR is compared to each
ballot selected for audit. That could be accomplished by publishing the entire
set of CVRs in plain text—which could compromise voter privacy and facilitate
vote-selling and coercion, as discussed above. Hence, it would be preferable to
provide the public a way to ensure that the CVRs used in the audit yield the
reported results without revealing every CVR. The approach we develop here
solves the problem.
Constraints of Existing California Voting Systems
Conversations with California elections oﬀicials lead us to expect that the
counties most likely to participate in the pilot have voting systems that produce
CVRs that can be matched to ballots by relying on the order in which ballots
are scanned, and that those counties are more likely to pilot ballot-comparison
RLAs than ballot-polling RLAs.
Ballot imprinters were recently certified by the California Secretary of State;
at least one jurisdiction likely to conduct audits under AB2125 plans to purchase
imprinters. However, voting systems in most California counties cannot imprint
10 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2125,
last visited 18 April 2019
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identifiers or salts on ballots.11 To our knowledge, no current voting system in
California can print salts on ballots.
Thus, to comply with AB2125 and still protect voter privacy to the maximum
extent possible, a method that does not rely on imprinting salts on ballots is
needed.
3.3 Australia
Australian federal elections, and some state elections, use an automated scanning
process to digitize paper ballots before counting, but currently no law requires
any auditing of any paper records at all. As far as we know there is no public
auditing in practice either.
4 Technical Details
For a simple plurality election, the process of proving that a set of encrypted
ballots corresponds to an announced tally is identical to what is done for E2E-
verifiability. However, by generalizing this approach, we can accommodate RLAs
for a broader class of elections including instant-runoff voting.
Assume a ballot manifest, known to the electoral authority but not publicly
released, providing a unique ID number for each ballot and attesting to its
contents.
Suppose we have a set of asserted tallies A = fA1; A2; : : : ; AJg for the
election. An assertion claims something about numbers that can be derived
from the ballots, for example that a certain candidate’s tally has some par-
ticular value. These each contribute to some (perhaps several) null hypotheses
N = fN1; N2; : : : ; NIg to be examined by RLA. Each paper ballot contributes
some numerical value (most often 1,  1 or 0).
For example, if the election consists of a simple plurality election, then each
assertion Aj might be the announced total of candidate j, and aij might be 1 if
the ballot i is a vote for candidate j, zero otherwise. N1 might be the hypothesis
that a certain losing candidate actually got a higher tally (according to the paper
ballots) than the announced winner. See Section 5 for detailed examples.
Note that some asserted tallies might be wrong though their dependent null
hypotheses might still be demonstrably false—a small number of misrecorded
votes, and hence some small errors in the announced tallies, don’t usually alter
the election result.
11 Experience in Colorado shows that printing sequential identifiers on bal-
lots substantially increases the speed and accuracy of retrieving ballots.
The Humboldt County Elections Transparency Project does imprint the bal-
lots before re-scanning the ballots using an independent, unoﬀicial system.
https://electionstransparencyproject.org/ While imprinting and rescanning could be
the basis of a ballot-comparison transitive RLA of the kind conducted in pilots in
California and Colorado, we do not anticipate that any California jurisdiction will
attempt such an audit in 2020.
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Let n be the total number of ballots. The audit proceeds as follows.
For each ballot bi, for each assertion Aj , the EA posts a commitment to
aij , which is a number representing bi’s contribution to Aj . This commitment is
denoted by Cij .
Cij = E(aij ; rij) where rij is randomly chosen.
Then for each assertion Aj , the sum of the contributions of all bi’s are com-
puted (which is a public operation) and opened (which the authority has suﬀi-
cient information to do, having produced the summands). That is,
Cj = 
n
i=1Cij
and the EA publishesni=1aij and
⊕n
i=1 rij . This opening can be immediately
checked.
The audit consists of randomly selecting a paper ballot bi, locating its elec-
tronic record, and then for each assertion Aj (j = 1 : : : J), opening the commit-
ments Cij , by publishing the pair (aij ; rij). This allows observers to check the
commitment opening and verify that the committed values aij (j = 1; : : : ; J)
correctly describe ballot bi’s contributions to each assertion.
Each committed value aij is expected to fall within some set Sj of valid
entries, defined at the beginning of the election. For example, in a standard first-
past-the post election the set of valid contributions to a candidate’s tally is f0; 1g;
in a Borda election it is f0; 1; : : : ; n  1g. The RLA defines the assumed sets of
expected values for each assertion, and the EA proves that each committed value
is within its corresponding set. It is critically important that the proven ranges
match the RLA’s assumptions. We will denote the proof that a commitment c
contains a value in set S as ZKPS(c). Depending on the set, these could be
instantiated as witness-indistinguishable disjunctive proofs (Cramer, Damgård,
and Schoenmakers 1994), range proofs (Mao 1998), (Camenisch, Chaabouni, and
others 2008), (Bünz et al. 2017), etc.
The first step is for the EA to define the assertions, RLA algorithm and
corresponding sets of valid committed values. This is shown in Algorithm 1. The
idea is that the assertions form the set of facts to be audited—it is up to the
public to verify that their conjunction implies the announced election outcome.
More precisely, the set N of null hypotheses should obviously, when eliminated,
imply that the announced election outcome is true, and the list of asserted tallies
A should (if true) imply that all the null hypotheses are false.
The commitment process is shown in Algorithm 2. There, rij  R means
that rij is chosen randomly and uniformly from set R.
Verification is Algorithm 3. If there are some committed votes that do not
have corresponding paper ballots, this can be dealt with using the phantom/zombie
approach of [2].
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Algorithm 1 Election outcome statement–EA
Input: Election outcome; social choice function; Risk Limiting Audit algorithm RLA.
1: Announce the election outcome
2: Define the set N of null hypotheses to be examined by RLA.
3: Define each assertion Aj for j = 1::J
4: for j=1..J do
5: Define the set Sj of valid single-ballot contributions to Aj .
Algorithm 2 Commitment and opening algorithm–EA
Input: Ballot manifest; election outcome statement; commitment algorithm E with
randomness range R; set inclusion proof NIZKP ZKP .
1: for each ballot bi do . Make Commitments
2: for each assertion Aj do
3: aij = bi’s contribution to assertion Aj
4: rij  R
5: publish Cij = E(aij ; rij)
6: publish ZKPSj (Cij)
7: for each assertion Aj do
8: compute Cj = iCij . Aggregate commitments
9: publish iaij and
⊕
i rij . Open the aggregate commitment
10: When ballot bi is audited . Auditing
11: Publish aij ; rij for j = 1; : : : ; J
12: Note: actually it is necessary to open the commitments only for those assertions
for which the audit has not terminated.
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Algorithm 3 Commitment and opening verification algorithm—public
Input: EA’s election outcome statement; audited paper ballots; Risk Limiting Audit
algorithm RLA; Commitment algorithm E; set inclusion proof verification algo-
rithm.
1: Check that the conjunction of fAjg over all j
2: implies all the null hypotheses N are false.
3: Check that if all N are false, this implies that the announced election outcome is
true.
4: If either of these checks fail, STOP and perform a full manual recount.
5: for each assertion Aj and each ballot bi do
6: checking that Sj matches the assumed set in RLA.
7: verify ZKPSj (Cij).
8: for each assertion Aj do . COMMITMENT VERIFICATION
9:
10: If the EA does not open Cj , STOP and conduct a full manual recount.
11: Recompute Cj and check that iaij ,
⊕
i rij is a valid opening
12: Check that Aj = iaij
13: for each ballot bi that is audited do . AUDITING VERIFICATION
14: for j = 1; : : : ; J do,
15: verify that
16: aij , rij is a valid opening of Cij and
17: aij accurately describes the paper ballot
18: if the commitment opening is invalid or absent then
19: if rij makes a valid opening of Cij for some other value a0ij 2 Sj then
20: follow RLA, with a0ij as the apparent vote and the physical ballot as
the true one.
21: else
22: follow RLA, making the worst-case assumption about aij .
23: if aij differs from the paper ballot then
24: follow R, with aij as the apparent vote and the paper ballot as the true
one.
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4.1 Defining the worst-case assumption
If the EA refuses (or is unable) to open a commitment, Cij , or if a commitment
opening doesn’t verify, we must make the worst-case assumption about the mes-
sage that was committed to. The worst-case assumption about aij is defined
by the audit method and the valid set Sj . It might be different for each null
hypothesis being tested.
Suppose for example that Aj declares a tally for some announced loser cj ,
and that c1 is the announced winner, in a single-winner plurality contest, with
a tally announced by A1. Then Sj = f0; 1g. Suppose we have retrieved some
particular ballot bi and observed its contents, but the EA refuses (or is unable)
to open the commitment Cij . The commitment must have contributed to Aj ’s
homomorphic tally some value in the set Sj . Consider the implications for a
particular RLA testing a particular null hypotheses Nk, which states that A1 is
a tally lower than or equal to Aj . The worst case assumption about aij is the
maximum, over all values in Sj , of the discrepancy in favour of the announced
winner compared with the true value on ballot bi. This is one if bi contains a
vote for cj , and zero otherwise. (The worst case is that a true vote for a loser
was instead tallied as zero.) If the EA also refuses to open the commitment to
ai1, then a similar analysis shows that the worst case interpretation is another
1 if bi shows a vote for the announced loser—if both of these happen, the RLA
treats it as a two-vote overstatement.
The case in which the EA refuses to open the commitment might be ame-
liorated by using encryption (rather than other kinds of commitments) because
then there is some set of authorities who hold the decryption keys, and may
therefore open the commitment without having generated it. These authorities
may still refuse to decrypt the message, however, so there still needs to be a way
of incorporating this refusal into the audit.
For more expressive voting schemes such as Range Voting, if we let Aj(bi)
be bi’s numerical contribution to assertion Aj , then the worst-case assumption
for the discrepancy is dworstk = argmaxs2Sjfs Aj(bi)g.
Note that the worst-case assumptions are chosen independently across dif-
ferent assertions. We never prove or check that the commitments about a single
ballot are consistent—a cheating authority could have made various assertions
about a ballot that are not consistent with any real ballot.
The above is suﬀicient data to conduct a Risk Limiting Audit, which must
be paramaterised s.t. the set of possible committed values corresponds to Sj for
each assertion Aj .
4.2 Putting it together with an RLA
We now have all the ingredients necessary to conduct a Risk Limiting Audit
of the announced outcome, by testing the null hypotheses associated with each
assertion.
The basis for RLAs described by [19] is simply to test a hypothesis about
the mean of a finite non-negative population—in our case, we are testing the
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hypothesis that the discrepancies between the paper ballot data and the com-
mitted values are large enough to alter the outcome. The set membership proofs
guarantee that each individual discrepancy is bounded by a known value (it
might be negative, but it is bounded below). Hence the statistics of the RLA
work exactly as they would do in a traditional open-CVR-based audit with the
same parameters.
4.3 Locating ballots and keeping track of salts
There are several different ways of doing the bookkeeping necessary to implement
the algorithm.
1. The random openings rij could be printed directly on the paper ballots –
either in plaintext or encrypted.12
2. In the case of multiple commitments per ballot, the random openings could
be generated from a cryptographic PRNG, for which the seed was printed
directly on the paper ballot.
3. The random openings could be posted, encrypted, on the WBB.
4. The index i could be printed on ballot bi.
5. There could be no printing on the ballots, but they could be stored in a way
that made the index associated with each ballot obvious to an observer.
When the only option available is 5, it is important to ensure a publicly-
verifiable correspondence between the ballot IDs and their paper ballots. This
protects against substitution of ballots during the audit. Accidental errors of
this kind have caused problems during audits (Ottoboni 2019)—deliberate sub-
stitution could render the audit meaningless. Printing either ballot IDs (Option
4) or random commitment openings (Options 1 and 2) conveniently prevents
this substitution, assuming that observers can see that all the ballots have been
printed in advance.
Whether the IDs or the random openings are printed on the ballots seems
to matter for convenience but not for security: if only a few random values are
used, printing them on the ballot obviates the need for secure storage elsewhere.
5 Specific examples
5.1 California: multiple-winner first-past-the-post
Consider an election with multiple winners elected by first-past-the-post. The
process here is identical to that which is currently performed for E2E-verifiability.
Each assertion Aj can simply be the tally of candidate cj .
For ballot bi,
aij =
{
1; if bi contains a vote for candidate cj ,
0 otherwise. (1)
12 This was suggested by Marc Rosen of Galois, Inc.
82
So commitment Cij should be a commitment to 1 or 0, with a proof that the
committed value is 1 or 0.
Then Aj = iaij , so assertion j can be checked by homomorphically sum-
ming the commitments and accepting the outcome if, for all j = 1 : : : ; J , the
opened value of commitment Cj matches the announced tally Aj .
This check includes the proof of commitment range.
The null hypotheses N correspond to each case in which an announced loser’s
tally is higher than or equal to the winner’s.
In the audit step, when a paper ballot has been retrieved, observers simply
have to check whether aij has the right value as required above. If bi is a vote for
an announced loser but the commitment Cij is not validly opened, the worst-case
assumption is that aij is 0 if cj is an announced loser, or 1 if cj is an announced
winner.
5.2 Instant runoff voting
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is used in numerous Commonwealth countries and
some US state and local government elections. Each vote is a list of candidates
in preference order. The social choice function first tests whether there is anyone
with a strict majority of first-preference votes. If not, the candidate with the
lowest tally is eliminated and their votes redistributed according to the next-
listed preference on each ballot. This proceeds iteratively until one candidate
has a strict majority.
To apply VAULT, the assertions A could be a description of each elimination
in sequence, but a much more eﬀicient audit could be conducted by using a set
of assertions derived using the techniques of (Blom, Stuckey, and Teague 2019).
In this case, A is a set of assertions about ballot preferences which, in con-
junction, are suﬀicient to prove the election outcome (though not necessarily
the exact elimination sequence that is claimed). For example, it would suﬀice
to prove that one candidate received more first-preference votes than any other
candidate received mentions (if it were true).
Using the notation of (Blom, Stuckey, and Teague 2019), define:
~f(c) = the number of first preference votes for c;
~tS(c) = the tally of candidate c assuming the uneliminated candidates are those in set S
Note that ~f(c) is the minimum tally c can possibly have, while ~tfc1;c2g(c2) is
the maximum tally that c2 can possibly have in any election in which c1 has not
been eliminated. If ~f(c1) > ~tfc1;c2g(c2), then c2 cannot possibly be eliminated
before c1.
The algorithm of (Blom, Stuckey, and Teague 2019) can produce various
kinds of assertions that suﬀice, together, to prove that the reported winner truly
won, and could therefore be immediately used for the set A.
To take a simple example, suppose that in some particular IRV election with
n + 1 candidates, it happened to be the case that for all j 6= n + 1; ~f(cn+1) >
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~tfcn+1;cjg(cj). So define aj = ~f(cn+1)  ~tfcn+1;cjg(cj) for j = 1 : : : ; n. Then cn+1
won the election if, for all j = 1 : : : ; n, aj > 0.
Although this is not always true, it turns out to be true surprisingly often
in real IRV elections, in which case it provides a simple and eﬀicient test of the
announced election outcome.
The audit can proceed by testing the set of n assertions A  faj > 0gnj=1.
More specifically, for ballot bi,
aij =

1; if bi has candidate cn+1 as its first preference,
 1; if bi has candidate cj preferred over cn+1,
0 otherwise.
So commitment Cij should be a commitment to one of these values, with a
proof that the committed value lies in the set f 1; 0; 1g.
Then aj = iaij , so the public can check whether the CVRs satisfy the
assertion Aj  faj > 0g by homomorphically summing the commitments and
accepting the outcome if, for all j = 1 : : : ; J; aj > 0. This check includes the
proof of proper range.
In the audit step, when a paper ballot has been retrieved, observers simply
have to check whether aij has the right value as required above. If the commit-
ment is not validly opened, the worst-case assumption is that aij is 1.
6 Overall risk-limit argument
Here we state our main security claim and sketch an argument to support it.
The adversary controls the EA but not the verification algorithm. The security
is based on the risk limit of a traditional RLA with plaintext CVRs—we assume
correct functioning of the cryptographic aspects of that, including public verifi-
cation that the random choices are correctly made and that the correct physical
ballot is retrieved.
Recapping our setup:
– Let A be a set of assertions which, in conjunction, suﬀice to prove the accu-
racy of the announced election outcome.
– For each assertion Aj 2 A, Sj is the set of possible contributions to aj for
any valid ballot. (Note, it will usually be a range of integer values, but this
is not necessary.)
– For each commitment Cij , the authority proves and the verifier checks that
Cij is a commitment to a value in Sj .
We want to argue that the overall probability of mistakenly accepting a
wrong election outcome (as defined by the physical ballots) is the (negligible)
probability of breaking the cryptography, plus the risk limit of the RLA. We
don’t need to prove consistency across different commitments for the one ballot.
Claim. Let VAULT be parameterised with an RLA with Risk Limit  for
plaintext CVR commitments. Then the risk limit obtained by substituting VAULT
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for the traditional RLA procedure is at most +, where  is the combined prob-
ability of the attacker undermining the soundness property of either the ZKPs
or the commitments, i.e.
– being able to open a commitment in two different ways, or
– producing a set-inclusion proof that passes verification for a value that is
out of range.
Proof. (Sketch)
If the election outcome is wrong, then at least one of the null hypotheses is
true. Wlog call it hypothesis N1, and suppose it is negated by
assertions A1 and A2. Then we have a series of commitments Ci1; Ci2 for i =
1; : : : ; n s.t. the homomorphically-added commitments
C1 = 
n
i=1Ci1 and C2 = ni=1Ci2
can be opened as commitments to A1 and A2 (resp), and ZKPs ZKP i1;ZKP i2 for
i = 1; : : : ; n s.t. zi1 (resp zi2) passes verification for the statement that Ci1 (resp.
Ci2) commits to a value in S1, (resp S2) though in fact the claimed comparison
between A1 and A2 is false according to the physical ballots.
If the authority can produce either a commitment opening to two different
values, or a set-inclusion proof ZKPSi(mi) that passes verification though mi =2
S1, then cheating may succeed with probability greater than .
We assume this happens with probability at most  and, for the rest of this
proof, assume that it has not happened.
Then the authority knows, for each Ci1, at most one tuple (mi1; ri1) that
constitutes a valid opening (and likewise for Ci2). (Note that perfectly binding
commitments, like El Gamal encryptions, get uniqueness automatically. i.e. there
exists a unique valid opening, we don’t have to assume that the authority knows
only one.) Similarly, for the product commitments C1 and C2, the authority
knows at most one valid opening (M1; R1) (resp (M2; R2)).
We have taken a random selection I of paper ballots (leaving aside for now
the question of cheating on the predictability of those selections) and, for each of
them, either had the corresponding commitment opened as (mi; ri) and checked
whether it is a proper opening of Ci1, or had no commitment opened and made
the worst-case assumption.
All commitments have been proven to come from some set, which has been
checked to match the assumptions of the RLA. Some have been opened; others
not, for which we made the worst-case assumption. Thus the process is equivalent
to an RLA in which every ballot’s contributing value was in S1, with the CVRs
being equivalent to the openable values for everything in I, and the worst-case
values for everything else.
So apart from the  probability of cryptographic failure, everything about
the audit is identical to an RLA (whichever RLA is being conducted) with mi as
the apparent/claimed CVR. Thus the overall probability of accepting a wrong
election result is  plus the risk limit of the RLA.
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7 Privacy guarantees
VAULT exposes the exact contents of those ballots that are audited. This still
allows for some coercion, because a randomly selected fraction of voters can prove
that their ballots were part of the tally. There is also, always, the possibility of
a full manual recount, which exposes all individual ballots. Hence the privacy
guarantees of VAULT are usually better than an RLA that publishes plaintext
CVRs, but they are not always strictly better and not better for all voters.
However, if we consider an attacker who observes the WBB but not the full
manual recount, then VAULT does not reveal extra information about those
ballots that are not audited.
We assume that the election authority is trusted for privacy, and that the
identity of the voter is separated from the CVR before it is committed on the
WBB.
Claim. Against an attacker who observes the WBB but not the (possible) full
manual recount, and assuming that the election authority is trusted for pri-
vacy, VAULT does not reveal information about votes that were not audited
except what can be derived from the election outcome statement (Algorithm 1).
The guarantee depends on the form of commitment: it is perfect if perfectly-
hiding commitments are used, or computational if computationally-hiding com-
mitments are used.
8 Conclusions
Risk-limiting audits are an important tool to ensure election integrity and to
provide trustworthy public evidence that reported outcomes are correct: that
tabulation errors did not result in reporting the wrong winner(s). However, the
most eﬀicient approach to RLAs—ballot-comparison audits—are publicly veri-
fiable only if three conditions hold:
i. There is a public commitment to the full list of CVRs before the audit starts.
ii. The public can verify that applying the appropriate social choice function
to the committed list of CVRs yields the reported election results.
iii. The public can verify how the contents of each CVR selected for audit com-
pares to its corresponding paper ballots.
While these can be accomplished by publishing the entire list of CVRs as
plain text, that would enable voter coercion. The only published approach to
mitigate the risk of coercion while meeting (i)–(iii), SOBA [3], has never been
used in a real election, possibly because of its complexity. We have shown that
existing homomorphic tallying techniques used for end-to-end verifiability can
make publicly verifiable, privacy-preserving ballot-comparison audits simpler,
for instance, by publishing a complete list of homomorphically encrypted CVRs
before the audit starts.
The minimal set of required cryptographic elements do not entail any change
to voting systems, only post-processing the CVRs to create a set of cryptographic
commitments for each ballot, and posting the results.
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Abstract. The Swiss postal voting system builds on trust in governmen-
tal authorities and external suppliers. The federal structure of Switzer-
land of cantons and municipalities leads to a distributed architecture.
Detailed information on the current postal voting procedure are mani-
fested as implicit knowledge within fragmented institutions and are not
easily accessible. This work serves (i) as an overview of the Swiss remote
postal voting system, (ii) a detailed insight into the process flow, and
(iii) a respective risk assessment.
Keywords: Remote postal voting, risk assessment.
1 Introduction
Around the globe, government services are becoming increasingly digitized [1].
Naturally, these efforts include electoral processes. In Switzerland, the federal
government defined strategies enabling digitization for public authorities and
processes, including Electronic Voting (EV) [32,11]. Private companies collab-
orate with Swiss authorities to actively define standards across e-Government
processes [35]. The Swiss EV typically refers to Remote EV (REV) carried out
over the internet, which is also often referred to as Internet Voting (I-Voting) [19].
According to recent studies [32], 47% of Swiss citizens would be more likely
to vote if EV were available, and almost 70% of Swiss citizens welcome an EV
system [21]. Despite the positive sentiment surrounding EV, a current political
position proposes a moratorium on EV in Switzerland [15]. According to their
initiative [15], a REV system has to be “at least as secure as the current remote
postal voting (RPV) system”. Thus, the key question is: what exactly does such
a minimal level of security involve? Which security metrics and mechanisms
are mandatory? In the general public perception, EV often provokes a fear of
change, presuming the current RPV system to be mostly analog and tamper-
proof. However, it can be argued that the current Swiss RPV system is already
partially EV, since many steps already involve distributed electronic systems.
Thus, defining and comparing the security properties of a REV also requires an
analysis of the current RPV system in Switzerland.
Reducing cost and increasing the voter turnout by providing a convenient
way to vote are important considerations for Swiss authorities [20]. By 1994,
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all cantons accepted votes by postal mail. As of today, RPV is the dominant
voting channel, used by approximately 90% of the voters in Switzerland [16].
Most eligible voters in Switzerland show trust in the authorities on the federal,
cantonal, and municipal level to handle electoral processes and protect voter
privacy [32]. The trust placed in authorities encompasses state-owned companies,
which are important stakeholders in the current RPV system.
Due to the federal and decentralized structure of Switzerland, each canton
and municipality autonomously manages their respective jurisdictional electoral
procedures. Cantons and municipalities execute a degree of independence in deci-
sions on how to handle certain parts of the voting process. Therefore, the current
RPV system in Switzerland is neither universally documented or specified, nor
homogeneous across entities.
This paper, therefore, summarizes major related work and terminology to
formalize the Postal Voting Process Flow (PVPF) in Switzerland. The approach
taken formalizes the PVPF in a step-based model, for which major assumptions
made, such as trust, people involved, and technology applied, are made explicit,
if known. The dedicated interpretation of social trust assumptions is discussed
within Sec. 3, along with the risk analysis, weaknesses and strengths of a person-
based RPV approach. Finally, the paper performs an overall risk assessment in
Sec. 4, providing the basis for discussions of security-relevant comparisons to
REV or I-Voting, while Sec. 5 draws main conclusions.
2 Legal Background and Related Work
Switzerland is organized as a decentralized system of municipal and cantonal
entities, working together under the umbrella of the Federal Government. The
federal structure is also mirrored in the legal framework (cf. Figure 1). At the
root rests the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, wherein Art. 39
[6] forms the basis for the Federal Act on Political Rights (BPR) [8]. In turn,
Art. 91 BPR [8] is the foundation for the Federal Decree for Political Rights
(VPR) [9]. On a cantonal level, the VPR builds the foundation for the Cantonal
Decrees (e.g., for the canton of Aargau [7]). Every canton is an independent legal
entity and defines its own constitution on the basis of the Federal Constitution.
The political system is under the authority of the cantons, i.e., cantonal laws
and ordinances regarding political rights define elements for these processes.
Various aspects of those elements are relevant for the RPV system in Switzer-
land, and each canton has its own decrees regarding political rights. The federal
structure is mirrored down to the municipal level: each municipality decides
on certain processes, again, aligned to cantonal laws and decrees. For instance,
keeping record of the electoral register is under the authority of municipalities,
leading to different approaches.
A direct comparison of the Swiss RPV system to REV was performed in [29].
Other countries discuss the usage of RPV critically because the secrecy of the
ballot cannot be fully ensured [29]. From a practical standpoint, thorough docu-
mentation is the easiest way to achieve verifiability for RPV. Supervisory bodies
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Fig. 1. Swiss Legal Framework
and authorities should check the documentation and verify it [29]. Also, trust
is crucial for all voting methods. And the relationship between verifiability and
trust is neither linear nor one-dimensional. Technical measures are not sufficient
to create trust, sociopsychological aspects also have to be considered carefully.
An extended literature review is provided in [18] with a focus on Switzerland,
but also outlining the work done in Canada [22], Estonia [19], and Australia [30].
In order to analyze the RPV system with a focus on security aspects, the US
National Institute for Standards Technology (NIST) serves as reference, outlin-
ing and standardizing terminology on the “Effort, Detection and Impact levels
of Threat Events” [26,33,34]. Past work applied such principles to a RPV system
used in the United States [25]. To consistently apply terminology, Table 1 de-
fines the corresponding terminology used in Swiss legislation and their English
translations.
Tab. 1. Official German Terminology with Corresponding English Translations
German English
Zwei-Weg Abstimmungskuvert Two-Way Voting Envelope (VE)
Abstimmungsresultat Voting Result (VR)
Erwahrung des Abstimmungsresultates Legally valid determination of VR
Die Schweizerische Post The Swiss Post (SP)
Stimmkuverts Paper Ballot Envelope
Stimmrechtsausweis Voting Signature Card (VSC)
Stimmregister Electoral Register (ER)
Stimmzettel Paper Ballot (PB)
Vertrauenswu¨rdiger Dritter Trusted Third Party (TTP)
3 Postal Voting Process Flow (PVPF) in Switzerland
This section details the illustrated Postal Voting Process Flow (PVPF) in-depth
(cf. Figure 3), containing an end-to-end process as it is currently implemented
in Switzerland. The detailed sub-steps are formalized and vary between cantons
and municipalities. However, the general process adheres to the federal laws and
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ordinances. The PVPF is divided into six main phases from A to F , each phase
containing one or multiple sub-stages from 1 to N (cf. Figure 2). The ensuing
subsections are structured according to the PVPF within Figure 3 and describe
all the different steps in detail.
Fig. 2. Paper Voting Process Phases
3.1 Setup Phase
The Setup phase A contains four sub-stages 1-4 describing the production and
assembly for dispatch of all necessary ballots and envelopes(cf. Figure 4). The
two-way Voting Envelopes (VE), the Voting Signature Cards (VSC), the Paper
Ballot Envelopes (PBE), and the Paper Ballots (PB) are the physical artifacts
produced in the Setup phase. The secure execution of the Setup phase is crucial,
since all following phases rely on the sound production and assembly of those
artifacts. The main stakeholders of this phase are the municipal and cantonal
authorities supervising the process. Due to cost, time, and capability constraints,
Trusted Third Parties (TTP) support the authorities during the Setup phase as
External Suppliers (ES).
Production of voting envelopes: In Step 1, the certified two-way VEs
are produced by an ES. In the canton of Aargau, the municipality secretaries
place a centralized buying order [28,17] for the two-way VEs at least a year in
advance. After production, the VEs are distributed among the municipalities. In
municipalities where Step 3 is outsourced, the VEs are directly delivered to the
corresponding ES. The exact process steps are under municipal authority and
can differ accordingly. Some cantons contract a single ES to handle the complete
Setup phase A, mainly due to the special requirements of EV systems [10].
Production of Paper Ballots and Voting Signature Card: Step 2 con-
sists of the production of the PBs and the VSCs. The printing of VSCs and
PBs is predominantly commissioned to an ES. Each political layer in Switzer-
land (Federal, Cantonal and Municipal) commissions the PBs within their legal
responsibility, i.e., the production of federal referendum PBs are commissioned
by the federal government, cantonal PBs are commissioned by the cantonal au-
thorities, and municipal PBs are commissioned by the municipal authorities.
A VSC contains the name and address of the eligible voter, embedded within
a template customized by the municipality. It is essential that the printed creden-
tials are valid, since the assembled VE is delivered to the credentials printed on
the VSC. The voter has to sign the VSC for the ballot to be valid. A substantial
amount of ballots are not counted because many VSCs remain unsigned.
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Fig. 3. Paper Voting Process Flow (PVPF)
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Fig. 4. Abstract representation of the necessary paper artifacts
The individual VSCs are printed according to an electoral register (ER). The
ER is a centralized register containing all eligible voters. The ER is under the
authority of each municipality. Neither the cantonal, nor the federal authorities
have copies of the ER [28].
Since most municipalities contract an ES for the printing of the VSCs, a
dataset containing the eligible voters needs to be transferred to the correspond-
ing ES. Most municipalities export a file from the ER (e.g., XLS, CSV) and send
the snapshot to the ES directly via email [31,27]. The transmission of an unen-
crypted, unsigned dataset via standard email is critical, since the dataset could
be tampered with (e.g., the creation of fake identities, entries being removed),
either after the export, during transmission, or when the export file reached the
ES. Most ERs are administered by proprietary software systems provided by
companies targeting Swiss public administrations. Some cantons also provide
process checklists to municipalities. For instance, the election office (EO) of the
Canton of Aargau provides such checklists [17]. These checklists state that the
number of VSCs should be identical to the number of eligible voters present in
the ER. If issues arise, an in-depth manual control should take place. Whether or
not to adhere to these checklists is under the authority of the municipality. Also,
since printing and assembly of the VE is mostly done by ESs, the ES should
verify the integrity of the printed artifacts (e.g., content and amount).
Prepare voting envelope for dispatch: Step 3 concerns the final assembly
of the VEs. For each eligible voter (i.e., each VSC), a VE containing the VSC,
PBs, and the PBE is assembled (cf. Figure 4). The assembly is a monotonous
task, often outsourced to ESs or social institutions and foundations [18]. Receiv-
ing an incomplete VE increases the possibility of the voter’s abstention. Accord-
ing to cantonal checklists [17], handing out new PBs is only allowed if the voter
can make the loss credible. Then, the voter’s credentials should be recorded to
check for attempted dual voting in the Tallying phase E [17].
Dispatch of voting envelopes through postal service: The final step
involves the dispatch of the assembled VEs. In some municipalities, the VEs are
directly dispatched by the ES commissioned with the assembly of the VEs. The
Swiss Post (SP) offers a special service [14] for the dispatch and delivery of VEs.
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3.2 Delivery
In Switzerland, the postal market was partially deregulated in 2009 [13]. Still,
the SP maintains a monopoly on postal letters below 50 gr. Therefore, the SP
is a crucial TTP, since the secure delivery to the municipality falls under the
responsibility of the SP. When using the special service provided by the SP, VEs
can be dispatched on a work day in the week prior to the specified delivery week
[14]. Then, the SP guarantees the delivery of the VEs will take place during the
specified delivery week [14].
3.3 Casting
Phase C outlines the three different options to cast a vote. The vast majority of
ballots are not cast at the urn [16]. Statistics do not indicate whether VEs arrive
through postal services (I) or were delivered to the letterbox by the voter (II).
I: The most popular way to cast the vote is to send the VE by postal mail.
Some cantons pre-stamp the VSCs, which can then be used to return VEs free
of charge [3]. For the voter, it is impossible to verify whether the ballot was
successfully delivered to the municipal office. The SP offers the ability to track
deliveries for an additional cost.
II: Thus, a favoured alternative is to deliver the VE into the letterbox of
the municipality, which is then emptied by municipal officials and safely stored.
According to [12], this option is still a favoured option by many voters.
III: The third option is to personally cast the ballot at the urn, which guar-
antees ballot secrecy. Casting ballots at the urn remains the most secure option
to cast a vote, since the PBE (containing the ballot) is directly cast into the urn
and separated from the VSC (containing the voter’s credentials and signature).
3.4 Storage
Phase D deals with the storage of VEs that were delivered via postal service (I),
or directly cast to the municipal letterbox (II). Often, an employee is tasked to
fetch the postal mail addressed to the municipal office. During votes, the VEs
are collected from the SP and municipal letterbox, and then carried to the safe
storage location. Past incidents describe where municipal employees misused
that trust [4]. The storage safety varies heavily, depending on the municipality.
The Federal Act for Political Rights (BPR) [8] does not specify any security
requirements. Additional considerations include the exact definition of an access
control for the VE storage, (e.g., Who should have physical access to the VEs?).
Also, the definition of a process for incoming VEs can increase process security
(e.g., How many ballots arrived at which date and time? Who got the ballots
from the letterbox or postal office and transported them where?).
Thus, stricter access control and a secured ballot arrival process can maximize
the physical storage security. In practice, physical storage security is not priori-
tized, since the municipal infrastructure is often not sufficiently equipped [27,31].
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3.5 Tallying
Phase E specifies the process of tallying. The main stakeholders of phase E are
the municipality and the local EO. The tallying is not regulated on a federal
level and is heterogeneous among cantons and municipalities [29].
Art. 14 No. 1 BPR [8] states that every polling station should create a report
containing the total number of eligible voters, the total eligible voters living
abroad, the total of blank, invalid, and valid ballot papers, and the number of
votes in favour and against the proposal [8]. Thus, the BPR serves as a federal
guideline, without specific requirements regarding the tallying process.
Approximately 10% [23] of the ballots cast are counted with the help of Elec-
tronic Counting (e-Counting) tools, provided by ESs. The parliamentary control
of the administration investigated e-Counting and concluded that the federal
requirements are neither functional, nor practical, and the control mechanisms
of the federal government are not sufficient [23].
Tallying of all ballots: The local EO usually hires paid and elected helpers
to assist with the manual counting. In large cities, thousands of helpers are
engaged to count the paper ballots [24]. The EO defines the details of the tallying
process. Some municipalities use e-Counting solutions or deploy high-precision
scales to weigh PBs and derive the tally from averaging the weight of (sometimes
pre-counted) batches.
Transmission of results from bottom to top: According to Art. 14
No. 2 BPR [8], the cantonal government is responsible for compiling provisional
results from the entire canton and notifying the Federal Chancellery (FC) of the
results, and publishing the same result in the Cantonal Gazette (or a special
issue thereof) within 13 days of the polling day. As soon as the EO concludes
tallying, the result is transmitted from the municipal EO to the cantonal EO, and
from there to the FC. Some cantonal EOs deploy dedicated software systems to
verify results using statistical methods. Also, most cantons make use of software
provided by ESs to transmit the results. Thus, this phase also includes the use
of web-based assistance tools [18].
Publication of results: The tallying phase is finalized with the publication
of all results on the municipal, cantonal, and federal level. Generally, the FC
publishes the collected results from the Cantonal Chancelleries in the Federal
Gazette. Cantons publish the results and protocols in their Cantonal Gazettes.
Each municipality publishes a final tally and tallying protocol with respect to
the cantonal law. Mostly, the publishing process is performed by uploading doc-
uments to a public web-server and displaying print-outs outside the municipal
offices.
Validation: Art. 15 BPR [8] defines the validation and publication of the
results. The official results can only be declared when no valid appeals are in
process at the Swiss Federal Court. After that, the official result is published by
the FC in the Federal Gazette and can not be appealed anymore.
Storage of paper ballots: Before the results are ascertained, the counted
PBs and VSCs have to be safely stored in the municipalities. It is important that
the ballots remain unaltered because a recount could be triggered before the
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official result is determined. Past cases have shown that premature destruction
of the PBs and VSCs made a full re-count impossible [2].
Set official voting result: As soon as no more valid appeals are with the
Federal Supreme Court, or as soon as a decision has been made on such an
appeal, the legally valid voting result can be determined. According to Art. 15
No. 2 of the BPR [8], the validation decree shall be published in the Federal
Gazette. The officiation by the Swiss Federal chancellery finalizes the Validation
phase. Since a recount is no longer possible and the result is untouchable, the
final phase can be started.
3.6 Destruction
The final phase, G, involves the destruction of the stored VSCs and PBs. Ac-
cording to Art. 14 No. 3 BPR [8], “following validation of the result of the vote,
the ballot papers shall be destroyed.” In practise, the destruction is usually done
by physically shredding all PBs and VSCs [27].
4 PVPF Risk Assessment
A risk signifies the level of impact on the operation of an information system’s
task, given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat
occurring [5,34]. Therefore, a risk assessment (RA) serves as the identification
and determination of the impact of vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit.
A threat covers any event with a potentially adverse impact on the assessed pro-
cess [26]. With respect to the RPV in Switzerland, threat sources are groups or
individuals who could feasibly attack the RPV system. Threat sources can stem
from insiders or external adversaries. All Threat Events (TE) in the following
RA are general in nature and require multiple co-conspiring hostile individuals
or groups to achieve a large-scale effect. The effort for each threat defines the
relative level of difficulty of performing a successful attack based on a threat
[25]. Three relative levels of effort are defined:
– Low (−): An attack requires little / no resources or detailed knowledge of
the system.
– Moderate (◦): An attack requires significant resources (or the ability to
obtain these resources) or knowledge of the system. Inside attacks involving
a small number of co-conspirators fall into this category.
– High (+): An attack requires excessive resources, in-depth knowledge of
the system, or even access to the systems. It also requires specific tactics,
techniques, and procedures [26]. Insider attacks involving a large number of
co-conspirators fall into this category [25]
Detection describes the relative level of difficulty to notice whether a partic-
ular threat has been executed in an attack [25]. Thus, attacks are more severe
when they remain undetected. Three estimated levels of likelihood of detection
exist [25]:
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– Low (−): An attack is unlikely to be detected without extraordinary re-
sources.
– Moderate (◦): An attack may be detectable, but could require a large
amount of resources and time. Such attacks are unlikely to be detected during
the election.
– High (+): An attack would most likely be detected, given proper monitoring.
The impact on PVPF was analyzed according to [26] with the focus on con-
fidentiality (C), integrity (I), and availability (A) as defined in [33]. Some TEs
- all are shown in Tab. 2 - are interdependent or can be combined as depicted in
Figure 5. The following RA serves as a major discussion of potential TEs that
can lead to a loss of voter confidence. The mitigation of identified TEs concerns
the actions of establishing trust and confidence in a system.
Tab. 2. Threat Events on the Swiss Postal Voting Process Flow (PVPF)
Phase TE Description Effort Detection Impact
A TE1 Delay production of physical artifacts − ◦ A+
A TE2 ER master records + ◦ I+
A TE3 ER data snapshot ◦ ◦ I+
A TE4 Forge physical artifacts + ◦ I◦
A TE5 Steal assembled VEs before dispatch ◦ + I+
B TE6 Re-route VEs unknown unknown A+
B TE7 Steal VEs from voter letterboxes ◦ + A◦
C TE8 Steal VEs from municipal letterbox ◦ ◦ I◦
C TE9 Re-route VEs + ◦ C+
C TE10 Cast stolen or forged VEs ◦ ◦ I◦
D TE11 Access stored VEs − − I+
E TE12 Manipulate tallying + ◦ I+
E TE13 Manipulate final tally + ◦ I+
F TE14 Initiate premature destruction − + I+
G no major threat events identified
4.1 Risk Assessment Phase A
The Setup Phase A produces all the necessary artifacts for the secure execution
of the whole PVPF.
TE1 describes the malicious delay of A1 and A2 in the PVPF. For instance,
delaying the production can be achieved by targeting contracted ESs or
directly attacking the municipal information systems.
TE2 describes the tampering of the ER master records. Often, the ER is pro-
vided and deployed by an ES. A targeted attack of an ES provider or munici-
pal information systems with access to the ERs creates the ability to tamper
with ER master records. The modification of master records can damage the
integrity of ER data and the exported subset of eligible voters.
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TE3 describes the tampering of ER snapshot data. Instead of modifying the ER
master records, the snapshot used to print the VSCs can be modified. When
the snapshot is neither digitally signed nor encrypted, an adversary could
modify the data before, during, or after transmission to the ES.
TE4 describes the forgery of physical artifacts with (stolen) digital templates.
If an adversary gains access to digital templates used to produce the physi-
cal artifacts, the adversary can forge VSCs and PBs. Additional information
may be necessary to obtain (e.g., weight and type of paper used). PBEs and
VEs may also be forged, stolen, or even ordered from an ES. Since most
municipalities do not perform a validation of incoming VSCs (by compar-
ing the list of eligible voters with incoming VSCs), the attack can remain
undetected. Practically executing TE4 requires a high effort and specific
knowledge of the PVPF down to a municipal level.
TE5 describes the physical theft of the assembled VEs. By stealing assembled
VEs, the adversary can either destroy or cast ballots. The detection of this
threat event relies on individual voters noticing that they did not receive
their VEs, i.e., the detection probability increases with every voter notifying
municipal authorities.
The integrity and availability of ER is crucial for the Swiss RPV. By targeting
ERs, substantial damage can be inflicted on data integrity, but also on trust in
local authorities and can undermine voters’ confidence. Requirements for EV
systems can serve as a reference for process improvements [10].
4.2 Risk Assessment Phase B
The Delivery phase B is a black-box. The internal processes of the Swiss Post
(SP) are not publicly available. When using the dedicated SP service to dispatch
and deliver VEs, the VSC design must adhere to special layout rules to facili-
tate automatic batch processing [14]. The special layout of VEs could simplify
identification of VEs, but requires an adversary to achieve partial control of the
SP routing system. To achieve such control, a hostile individual or group can
create an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) within the SP and from there,
e.g., identify VEs according to specific attributes and re-route identified VEs, or
attempt to delay the delivery deliberately.
TE6 describes the re-routing of VEs. This TE requires adversarial access to
internal SP systems and the capability to covertly manipulate the postal
routing. A re-routing may require a co-conspiring postal employee because
re-routing a large number of VEs could raise suspicion. Assuming a successful
re-routing of VEs, the adversary is offered multiple options: Either to destroy
the VEs, or open, modify, and re-cast them (cf. Figure 5).
TE7 describes the theft of VEs from voter letterboxes before successful retrieval
by the recipient voter. In contrast to TE5, TE7 requires the adversary to
steal from individual letterboxes, not only at a single location. Similar to
TE5, detection increases with every voter noticing the absence of VEs.
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Phase B is characterized by the trust placed in one large entity, the SP.
Thus, the effort and detection probability of TE6 can only be analyzed with ad-
ditional information or access to internal SP systems, operations, and processes.
Generally, however, an insider can achieve a low detection with moderate effort.
4.3 Risk Assessment Casting Phase C
TE8 describes the theft of VEs from the municipal letterbox. As shown in Figure
5, stolen VEs can either be destroyed or opened and modified.
TE9 describes the re-routing of VEs (before delivery to the municipality). Sim-
ilar to TE8, re-routing offers two different options: either the adversary can
decide to destroy the VEs, or open, modify, and re-cast. Similar to TE6, a co-
conspiring postal employee is crucial, since delivering a large amount of VEs
to a different location than the authorities may alarm an honest employee.
TE10 describes the casting of stolen or forged VEs. An adversary can attempt
to cast stolen and modified or forged artifacts to influence the voting result.
The interdependence among TEs is visualized in Figure 5.
In official logs provided by the municipalities, there is no differentiation be-
tween channels I and II, both count as delivered by the SP. Even though 90%
of votes are cast through I and II, keeping III remains crucial: Multiple chan-
nels strengthen confidence in results because it enables cross-channel comparison
with statistical methods.
4.4 Risk Assessment Storage Phase D
TE11 describes TEs originating from physical storage security. Depending on
the municipality, one or N employees have access to the cast VEs. The
access to VEs offers similar options as presented in Figure 5. Since most
municipalities do not log the amount of incoming VEs, the destruction of
VEs can remain undetected.
The physical access to the ballots stored allows an adversary to either destroy
VEs, modify them, or open VEs and break ballot secrecy. As past incidents show
[4], access control to the stored VEs is a again a question of trust.
4.5 Risk Assessment Tallying Phase E
TE12 describes the risk of manipulation during tallying. According to [23], over
10% of ballots cast in Switzerland are electronically counted. In 2014, sample
checks identified errors in these counting mechanisms and concluded that e-
Counting is neither more exact nor more secure than manual counting [23].
The manipulation of e-Counting requires an adversary to write targeted
malware to influence the counting mechanism in his favor.
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Fig. 5. Threat Event Interdependencies
TE13 describes the possible manipulation of the final tally. Some cantons use
proprietary software to handle vote transmission from municipalities to the
cantonal EO [18].An adversary with access to these tools can tamper with
the final tally. Since the manual tallying process produces logs published on
a municipal level, large discrepancies can be detected by attentive observers.
However, a sophisticated adversary can anticipate that and tamper with all
digital traces to further obfuscate detection. Hence, the risk increases when
PBs were exclusively counted electronically, without any redundancy from
manual counting.
The tallying phase E builds on the integrity of each and every individual
member of the municipal Election Offices (EO). The distribution of trust builds
the cornerstone of the Swiss RPV system.
4.6 Risk Assessment Validation Phase F and Phase G
TE14 describes the prematurely initiated destruction of the PBs and VSCs.
The destruction of PBs and VSCs before validation by the FC makes full
recounts impossible, which already occurred in 2011 [2].
Since the validation finalizes and validates the official result within Phase
G, a recount is no longer an option. Also, PBs are now irrelevant, since legal
appeals are impossible at this point.
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5 Conclusions
The Swiss postal voting system is highly successful, because substantial trust is
placed in third parties, which includes a wide range of governmental authorities,
state-owned companies, and various private companies and suppliers, and the
individual voter. The current Remote Postal Voting (RPV) system is inherently
built on external suppliers and trusted relationships among all parties involved.
For a regular citizen, the current process is hard to decipher. Thus, this paper
provides a coherent insight into the Postal Voting Process Flow (PVPF) and
identifies its weaknesses as well as strengths with practical examples.
The main advantage of the current RPV system is its physical decentraliza-
tion, which is undercut by using centralized information systems to administer
or transfer crucial data (e.g., Electoral Registers (ER) or Web-based assistance
tools to transmit votes). Many aspects regarding the ER, assistance tools, the
Voter Signature Card (VSC), or the physical storage of voting envelopes offer
room for improvements from a security perspective.
The deployment of a Remote Electronic Voting (REV) system potentially
decreases the necessary amount of trust placed in institutions and people, shifting
trust to verifiable processes instead [29]. As this work showed, assessing the risks
of the Swiss RPV system is reliant on the specific process across governmental
entities. This work identified crucial Threat Events (TE) and showed that the
system cannot serve as a suitable reference for electoral processes [15].
Furthermore, the Swiss federal structure leads to fragmented processes across
jurisdictional barriers, from federal to cantonal, down to municipal authorities.
The real-world deployment of the threat events identified requires a group of hos-
tile individuals with specific knowledge. In small municipalities, authorities and
citizens are intertwined and manipulations would either be not widely effective
or detected rather swiftly. In large municipalities or large cities, processes are
secured. Releasing an attack would require substantial effort from an attacker.
Hence, an attack on the RPV is most likely to be successful in medium-sized
municipalities, e.g., where processes have not yet adapted to the larger size of
the formerly smaller municipality.
Apparently, federal laws are not complete yet in guiding the deployment of
secure e-Counting tools [23]. Thus, the compilation of an open and transparent
list of all the electronic tools in use in the current PV flow can help to identify
further threat events and enable the design of mitigation measures to handle risks
better. Further, the Risk Assessment (RA) needs to be extended and ultimately
applied to full real-world processes of cantons. In turn, TEs identified can be
assessed in more detail and improvements can be provided to act as a comparison
to EV systems.
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Abstract. Electronic voting is enjoying growing interest within the scientific 
community. However, the focus is on systems (algorithms, mathematical crypto-
graphic models, user experience, reliability, traceability, security, etc.). Conse-
quently, the purpose of this exploratory research on e-voting is not to address 
aspects that have already been well-studied by scientists, but rather to understand, 
through a qualitative research, bottlenecks and sociological obstacles. This un-
derstanding will help to explain the reasons that might prevent its adoption by 
Swiss citizens and also the dissemination of e-voting in the digital age. Based on 
25 semi-directed interviews (in German, French and Italian) that we have ana-
lyzed, we are able to provide new insights that are more sociological than tech-
nological. These insights are essentially related to the social acceptance of e-vot-
ing. We observe in particular that the vote in Switzerland has an almost sacred 
dimension and that the trust that surrounds the voting “ritual” is of supreme im-
portance.  
Keywords: Democratic Values, Field Studies, Self-Determination, Social Ac-
ceptance, Perception, E-Voting Operations. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Context 
Electronic voting is enjoying growing interest within the scientific community. How-
ever, the focus is on systems (algorithms, mathematical cryptographic models, user ex-
perience, reliability, traceability, security, etc.). Estonia has become a well studied and 
known case since it has been systematically using it for many years. Switzerland could 
also become a reference in this field since it already represents a life-size laboratory 
because of its internationally recognized status as a semi-direct democracy. However, 
even if a law allows it, the Federal Chancellery remains extremely cautious about these 
developments. Last June 2019, the e-voting project has been postponed until the end of 
2020. As a matter of fact arguments are often used to undermine the credibility of elec-
tronic voting, such as its unreliability (amplified hacking in the case of the last presi-
dential elections in the United States), or people's tradition and attachment to the voting 
“physical process that are known and understood for a long time. The intergenerational 
digital divide is also an argument frequently used by some political parties. Thus, our 
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intention regarding this exploratory research on e-voting is not to address aspects that 
have already been well-studied by scientists, but rather to understand, through a quali-
tative field research, bottlenecks and sociological obstacles. This understanding will 
help to explain the reasons that prevent this type of development, as well as its adoption 
by citizens, in Switzerland. While postal voting has not caused any such resistance, and 
its use is well accepted and widespread, this is not the case with electronic voting. 
1.2 Research Purpose and Contribution 
The research project's purpose consists in providing the Swiss parliament and govern-
ment with sociological rather than technical elements to develop a relevant public pol-
icy on electronic voting in Switzerland. Indeed, for the time being, within the frame-
work of the Swiss e-voting project, the Confederation has only surrounded itself with 
experts (academics, the Confederation and the Cantons), with the aim to implement  a 
fully functioning e-voting system. However, it is indispensable to integrate the opin-
ions, perceptions and the rationale of the Swiss population, as the final users of e-voting 
is the population who is entitled to vote. Hence, this is also a matter of social acceptance 
of the new voting system by the population. Our project therefore has the advantage of 
questioning the population in depth (practically this has been done through 25 semi-
structured interviews administered in the three national languages, respectively, Ger-
man, French and Italian, during the period from January to June 2019). Moreover, it is 
important to take into account the cultural and socio-demographic characteristics of the 
different profiles interviewed, to consider all the stages of the different operational pro-
cesses leading to the vote (ballot box, postal voting, electronic voting), to also integrate 
the major changes in all sectors of society caused by the global phenomenon of digital-
ization. Through the analysis of the interview transcripts, we have produced a synthesis 
of the main findings of this field study. This will allow us to develop, in a next step of 
this research, a theoretical model explaining the population's perceptions about the de-
velopment of electronic voting in Switzerland. In a third step, everything will be ready 
to set up a national quantitative survey to validate the assumptions of our theoretical 
model in order to make statistical inferences at the national level. 
From a scientific point of view, our study would be, to our knowledge, the first of 
its kind corresponding to a qualitative research taking into consideration the different 
Swiss cultures (French-speaking, German-speaking and Italian-speaking) that would 
allow the generation of “meanings” explaining the public's perceptions about the de-
velopment of electronic voting. Indeed, the scientific literature on this subject is rather 
sparse compared to that with a more technical orientation. Even if we focus on a small 
country, Switzerland nevertheless represents a highly relevant and credible "democratic 
laboratory" on a global scale. It is indeed the country where the most votes are cast in 
the world and since 2000 more than 200 electronic voting trials have already been car-
ried out (https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/documentation/dossiers/E- Vot-
ing.html). 
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1.3 An Approach Anchored on the Notion of Voting Operations 
The usual way to form a political opinion in Switzerland is to read official documenta-
tion and follow traditional media such as television or the press and recently the Inter-
net. We are also largely influenced by poster campaigns and all-household distribu-
tions. However, new media as well as digitized democratic processes are completely 
changing the situation. Switzerland is the country with the highest number of popular 
votes in the world. The traditional process consists of a preparation period that can be 
quite long (about 6 months) in which parties and the media contribute to the formation 
of voters' opinions. They send their ballot papers by post in advance or go to a voting 
room, where booths will be made available during the weekend of the vote, as well as 
voting materials and the ballot box to cast their ballot. Over the years, there has been a 
decline in participation in these elections, especially among the younger generation. At 
the same time, our economy is currently undergoing very intense digitization. We are 
increasingly talking about the "ubiquitous" nature of the economy, which changes the 
roles assigned to each person and redefines what an expert, a provider or an agent is. In 
terms of information and opinion forming, roles are also changing with a transformation 
of the role of the journalist, editorialist and expert. The scandals in the last US presi-
dential elections and the Brexit vote highlighted the fragility of our democratic pro-
cesses. We intend to address the topic of electronic voting from the perspective of a 
business process (i.e. voting operations), while focusing on the human aspects. In Swit-
zerland, at the present time, two voting options are available: either the voter goes to 
the polling station or the voter votes by mail. A third possibility, electronic voting, has 
recently been accepted in Switzerland, after years of testing. Due to recent develop-
ments, the e-voting process is on hold [1]. In the coming years, it could (or not) become 
a fully-fledged voting option on a par with the two options already in place. Electronic 
voting is based, like ballot box voting and postal voting, on an operational process, 
except that most of the steps are dematerialized, since they are digitized. This is called 
a digital process. 
1.4 Organization of the Text 
This paper is organized as follows, In Section 2, we present a brief literature review 
about e-voting. In Section 3, we describe the methodology that has been employed in 
this research. In section 4, we present an overview of the main elements of electronic 
voting perception. In Section 5, we present an overview of the main elements of elec-
tronic voting security. In Section 6, we present an overview of the main elements of 
electronic voting operations. In Section 7,  we provide a discussion about the notion of 
trust and confidence in the voting process. Finally, we conclude and provide directions 
for further research. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 The digitalization of service operations 
Electronic voting refers to any process that benefits from the use of electronic technol-
ogy by electoral authorities for the conduct of elections [2]. As part of our research, it 
is important to place electronic voting in a broader field of investigation that generally 
concerns the digitalization of society. Digitization can be defined as the integration of 
multiple digital technologies into all aspects of daily life that can be digitized by the 
conversion of analogue information into digital form so that information can be pro-
cessed, stored and transmitted through circuits, equipment and networks digital [3]. 
Thus, referring to the concept of digitization (or digitalization), rather than talking about 
digital processes, implies that it is an emerging transformation process, in progress, still 
in the development phase rather than a completed and clearly defined process [4]. These 
authors believe that that digitization corresponds to the characteristic of the information 
society, as defined by [5], i.e. it is not simply something that is imposed on individuals 
and organizations, but something that individuals and organizations "do" and produce 
themselves through daily practice and social interaction. Therefore, if we consider e-
voting as a phenomenon of digitalization of our democratic society, we must also ana-
lyze it in its integration into the life of voters and in the context of the social interactions 
in which it is integrated. We live in a digital age, because digital technologies are used 
today in almost every aspect of life [6] and they play a key role in shaping and regulat-
ing societies, communities, organizations and individuals [7]. 
2.2 Research on the Topic of E-Voting 
Let us now return to scientific research that focuses more specifically on the field of 
electronic voting. We note that the production of scientific articles on this subject over 
the past decade is very abundant [8], with pioneering scientific works already published 
at the beginning of the new millennium [9]. One country, Estonia, is a precursor in this 
field, having made it possible to use electronic voting in its elections since 2005 [10] 
[11]. However, it should be noted that Estonia has developed strongly from the point 
of view of digitalization in all sectors of society. This Estonian practice attracts the 
attention of all regions of the world. This is particularly the case in Europe. The Council 
of Europe has also issued a specific recommendation on this subject. The Recommen-
dation "Rec(2004)11" on legal, operational and technical standards for electronic vot-
ing is a unique reference source in this field. Europe, through the Organization for Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has sent experts to Switzerland to observe 
the various test phases that have been planned since 2005. Switzerland can thus be con-
sidered as a kind of laboratory for the process of digitizing votes, which has made it 
possible to develop original scientific research [12] [13].  
Most of the scientific contributions in the field of electronic voting deal mainly with 
technical aspects. There are many articles on the following themes: design and evalua-
tion of electronic voting systems, identification and authentication of voters, reliability, 
security and safety issues, end-to-end traceability, etc. A recent article [14] provides a 
109
comprehensive literature review on all these technical and usability aspects. Research 
on e-voting also incorporates the "Blockchain" to address supposed vulnerabilities in-
herent in most existing systems [15]. Some researchers even argue that traditional pa-
per-based voting is subject to the same security problems. However, since we have been 
using paper for a long time, people are no longer even aware of security problems re-
lated to paper-based voting [16]. 
2.3 Taking into Account the Human Factor in E-Voting 
What is not much studied in academic research, however, is everything that touches on 
the human aspects of electronic voting, and in particular the public's perception of this 
new possibility of voting. However, some rare studies of this type exist. This is the case 
with a survey conducted in Australia that shows that there is a correlation between per-
ceived ease of use and perceived utility of e-voting technologies to determine their ac-
ceptance and use [17]. A Malaysian study on a campus shows that when students use 
e-voting to express themselves on university activities, there is a need to have confi-
dence in the electronic system to ensure a real commitment to voting [18]. As part of
this research project, we employ qualitative research to identify and explain the percep-
tions of e-voting by Swiss citizens about the widespread adoption of electronic voting.
To our knowledge, no scientific study has yet been carried out on this subject specifi-
cally.
3 Methodology 
3.1 Methods 
The aim of this study is first of all, through documentary analysis, to better understand 
the innovations linked to the mode of democratic process does not lead to digitalization 
within our societies. It is therefore a question of taking stock of the e-voting initiatives 
carried out at the global level. Through this documentary research, it was also necessary 
to understand the situation in Switzerland (legal bases, parliamentary debates, motions, 
party politics, test phases carried out in the various cantons, etc.). Secondly, we have 
conducted field research based on an ethnographic approach. Ethnography represents 
the descriptive study of the activities of a specific human group. More specifically, we 
use ethnomethodology, which is not based on an a priori theoretical framework. Eth-
nomethodology makes it possible to identify the latent needs of the target population, 
to detect social trends for the design and improvement of given public service processes 
and finally to write scenarios to highlight intangible elements that bring added value to 
users. In practice, we have launched a field research based on 25 semi-structured inter-
views administered in German, French and Italian to directly question citizens about 
their perceptions regarding electronic voting. This research approach is therefore es-
sentially based on the notion of constructivism (or interpretivism).  Its main objective 
is to understand how and why electronic voting, as a new method of voting (on a par 
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with voting by depositing it in the ballot box and voting by post), is at the root of skep-
ticism and opportunities. We therefore believe that this inductive approach is the most 
appropriate for our research. It is indeed well adapted to the understanding of the per-
ception we have of the environment under study. The data collected through semi-struc-
tured interviews have been analyzed on a content analysis basis (with the help of RQDA 
and NVivo) according to the codes or code categories used for the analysis of the tran-
scripts. On the basis of the synthesis of the results, we will develop in a subsequent 
research a new theoretical model to explain the public's major concerns about the adop-
tion of electronic voting.  In a third phase of research the generated model will be vali-
dated through a quantitative survey. 
3.2 Purposeful sampling strategy and interview guide 
For this qualitative research, we used the purposeful sampling technique [19]. The aim 
is not to be representative of the population studied in order to draw statistical infer-
ences, but rather to "go around the issue". Indeed, a qualitative field research has an 
exploratory purpose and not the validation of research hypotheses. For inductive and 
exploratory research, qualitative methods are most suitable, as they can lead to hypoth-
esis building and explanations. Qualitative research also delivers better understanding 
of motivations, values and attitudes on a given context. Data collected from a small 
number of carefully selected samples on relevant issues can be sufficient in this case, 
as it demands a limited number of observations to explain different aspects of the prob-
lem area. Low numbers are justified to do an in-depth study [20]. 
Nevertheless, in our case, we have tried to take into account Swiss cultural diversity 
(14 interviews in German, 8 in French and 3 in Italian). To have broad social insights, 
we chose people from different cantons. Moreover, to understand the perceptions of 
different generations, we chose people covering an age spectrum from 29 to 75 years. 
Apart from that, the other socioeconomic parameters are not representative of the Swiss 
population since the sampling strategy was purposeful. All of the interviewees are 
highly educated [21], most of them have a University diploma and they appear to vote 
on a regular basis.  In our sample, there are solely a few people who are Swiss living 
abroad and who have already experience with e-voting, to enlarge our insights concern-
ing e-voting. The main topics, guided by authors’ discussions (translated into 14 ques-
tions) addressed during our semi-structured interviews were: e-voting “customer jour-
ney/mode of operation”, personal views about electronic voting, trust and security as-
pects, meaning of e-voting in relation to democracy, habits related to digitization, e-
voting for Swiss abroad/disabled people, obstacles and barriers to e-voting. Choices of 
the different dimensions retained in our interview guide have been based on discussions 
taking place before the fieldwork and on the literature review of section 2. 
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4 Findings Regarding E-Voting Perception 
4.1 Different Attitudes Towards E-Voting 
The qualitative analysis of the interviews revealed different attitudes towards electronic 
voting. In the following, we tried to identify some patterns of attitudes towards e-voting. 
Type 1 is a strong supporter of the e-voting system. He or she is accustomed to the use 
of digital devices for many daily activities and e-administration, such as e-banking. He 
or she rather or strongly trusts the political system and/or e-voting. One respondent e.g. 
has been eager for years to vote electronically: “I would love it. It makes everything 
more flexible and easier for me” (German-speaker from Valais, female). Respondents 
of this type of attitude relativize the risks associated to e-voting, as an interviewee 
underlines “If someone wants to manipulate, he or she will succeed in doing it, no 
matter the voting type” (German-speaker from Bern, male).  
On the other side of the spectrum, type 4 is totally against e-voting and would never 
vote like that. However, there was only one person who has this attitude among those 
questioned. This person argues that “a voice cannot be reduced to an action on Internet” 
(German-speaker from Valais, male). Another argument of this person is that via e-
voting “not only Swiss can manipulate the vote, but theoretically the whole world” 
(German-speaker from Valais, male).  
In between this spectrum of supporter and opponent of e-voting, there are different 
nuances of attitudes towards e-voting. Such a profile (type 3) is rather skeptical towards 
e-voting. However, this type acknowledges the convenience aspects of e-voting and
trusts the system for better or for worse by being aware of the various risks associated
with this system. One respondent says: “I have always been very skeptical, because I
asked myself: is it really enough secure?” (German-speaker from Solothurn, male).
Then, we could identify another type of attitude (type 2) that is characterized by a
limited interest in e-voting and do not have a strong feeling of support of or opposition
of e-voting systems. The reasons for this attitude can be different. Some of them say
that “the introduction of e-voting corresponds to modern times” (German-speaker from
Schaffhausen, female / German-speaking from Valais, female). People with this
attitude think that e-voting is a logical consequence of current technological
developments, which also influence the way people vote. Another reason can be that
“they have not yet had the time to deal with that topic” (German-speaker from Basel,
female / German-speaker from Fribourg, male). One respondent mentioned that he has
not yet become accustomed to this “e-government logic” (German-speaking from
Fribourg, male). Yet, these latter persons are also aware of the risks associated with e-
voting.
Several interviewees mentioned that they are more or less obligated to trust the 
system, as they have not the time, nor the interest or competence to understand in detail 
the technological process of e-voting. Therefore, interviewees trust the system in 
general, but one of the respondents says that a lack of security would indeed be a no-
go. Another interviewee says “if there is somewhere a chance, to forge the vote, then it 
is a no-go for me.” (German-speaker from Schaffhausen, female).  
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4.2 Pros and Cons of E-Voting in general 
Pros Cons 
Better for young people Could be a problem for elderly people 
Flexibility, efficiency (process and concern-
ing resources), simplicity  
Less people and resources needed 
Is it really easier? Logins, passwords could 
be more complicated than by postal vote 
The current system functions very well, very 
easy 
Lack of social contact 
Less work for postman, at the beginning a lot 
of technical and financial effort 
Security Manipulation (also a problem for other vote 
systems), hacking, data abuse 
Additional technological elements possible 
(like interactive tools, mistake detection, e.g. 
concerning elections) 
You need internet (but it is a matter of course 
today) 
More ecological 
Table 1. Pros and Cons of E-Voting 
When asked about the advantages of e-voting (see Table 1), respondents stressed in 
particular the flexibility (independence in terms of time and place) and the efficiency 
and simplification of the process (German-speaker from Aargau, male). One respond-
ent says “you do no longer have an excuse for not going to vote” (Italian-speaker from 
Ticino, male). Some respondents also mentioned the environmental aspect, which 
means that less paperwork is needed. However, some interviewees wondered whether 
it really would be a simplification of the process. They are therefore a little skeptical 
on this point. An atypical answer was that one advantage would be that “the envelope 
does not have to be licked like during the postal vote” (German-speaker from Valais, 
male). Even if many respondents mention the convenience aspect as one of the main 
advantages of electronic voting, the two interviewees having already used e-voting sys-
tems (one abroad, one in Switzerland), underline that they perceived the process itself 
as being more complicated than the postal voting process because of additional security 
barriers. However, most interviewees not having used e-voting so far, think that e-vot-
ing has the potential to be easier than the other types of voting. They however underline 
that login and password issues, loading problems or a missing confirmation, that the 
vote has been validated, could complicate things. Many respondents also think that the 
current system works very well and they wonder why it should be changed. This general 
lack of interest is reflected in the responses of the interviewees concerning the question, 
if they have already informed themselves about e-voting; a question that almost all of 
the interviewees denied.  
Cons (see Table 1) are particularly related to the possibility of manipulation and 
hacking. The respondents mentioned that people might be afraid of not having guaran-
teed the anonymity of the data. However, they mentioned this point when talking about 
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possible reasons why some Swiss citizens are not satisfied with the introduction of e-
voting, not concerning themselves. Except for one person, most respondents express 
some concerns about the security aspects. Many of them also mention that today's sys-
tems already work very well and that there is no immediate need to change a well-
functioning system to which the Swiss are accustomed. Another reason one respondent 
mentioned about possible concerns of the Swiss population is that they are worried that 
other people will not vote as seriously as they need to when voting online. Another 
argument is the loss of social contact, which already affects postal voting. Respondents 
also mention that some time must pass before changes are implemented. Respondents 
also note that older people may have some difficulty voting online.  
Therefore, it would be important to retain the other voting options such as postal 
voting and go to the ballot box. Some respondents argue that it would certainly be more 
interesting for younger people. One respondent stressed that e-voting is simply not 
trustworthy in terms of technical aspects and data abuse. Another respondent mentions 
the Internet's associations with electoral influence in the US and Europe. Another dis-
advantage of e-voting could be that paper seems to be more “binding” than voting on 
the Internet. 
4.3 Opportunity or Risk for Democracy? 
Several respondents think that e-voting is rather an opportunity for democracy than a 
risk, although one of them underlines the importance of security being guaranteed. Two 
interviewees think that e-voting will quickly become the norm. Another respondent 
thinks that it makes voting easier for everyone and more comfortable for Swiss people 
living abroad.  
We also asked the respondents, if they perceive e-voting being a thread for a poten-
tial “sacred” meaning ritual dimension of current Swiss voting practices. Most of them 
do not think that e-voting would mean a “desacralization” of the voting process. Some 
of them could imagine that this could be the case for other people, who celebrate the 
social and ritual element of going to the ballot box. One interviewee indicated that this 
kind of “desacralization” has already happened by introducing the postal vote.   
5 Findings Regarding E-Voting Security 
5.1 Trust in Relation to Security Aspects 
Except for one respondent, the majority trusts the Swiss political system and the e-
voting technology. In general, interviewees tend also to trust the government and the 
professionals dealing with the technology. Two of the interviewees say that it is im-
portant to have confidence, as technology is far too complicated for normal citizens to 
be able to understand everything.  
People also generally are accustomed to e-banking, which includes the management 
of incidents and insurance protection. Most of the interviewees are accustomed to e-
banking and thus trust the system. The respondent who is totally against e-voting also 
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uses e-banking. This respondent adds that e-voting differs from e-banking insofar as 
the banking system has not been hacked so far, which is however the case for the e-
voting system managed by the Swiss post enterprise. This same respondent underlines 
that “a problem with e-voting leads to a collective damage, whereas a problem with the 
e-banking system only concerns the money of an individual” (German-speaker from
Valais, male). Another interviewee however says that for her the personal damage
would be much more important than the collective one. Even another respondent says
that, normally it should be possible to realize when a vote is manipulated, as there exist
surveys in the run-up to the votes that give an approximate picture of the voting results.
Even if the security aspect is very important for all the respondents, some of them rel-
ativize the problem by highlighting that the risks of manipulation and loss of anonymity
also exist with regard to postal vote and when going to the ballot boxes. However, some
of them underline that the damage extent could be much higher with an e-voting system,
especially at a national scale, whereas with the conventional types of voting (postal vote
and ballot box) the risk seems to be higher at the local level. One respondent even says
that e-voting seems more secure to her than the other types of voting. Moreover, some
of the interviewees mention that e-voting is especially secure regarding the counting
procedure.
5.2 Information Needed for Transparency 
Respondents said that it would be quite important for them to be informed about the 
concrete procedure of the e-voting process in terms of an instruction, as well as in terms 
of security measures that have been taken. One interviewee however adds that the gov-
ernment’s main aim was to reassure the citizens concerning security measures, which 
relativized the value of the information. Another interviewee says that an info-button 
dealing with security aspects could be helpful (German-speaker from Valais, female). 
As to the concrete procedure to vote online, some of the respondents would like to have 
an easy operating manual, or explanation in a video.  
5.3 Influence on Voting Participation, Voting Results and Voting Decision  
While most of the interviewees think that the introduction of e-voting would only 
slightly influence the voting participation or even not at all, one interviewee guesses 
that the participation from Swiss people living abroad could increase. This respondent 
also believes that the possibility to vote directly with the smartphone could be a reason 
for people to vote more often.  
In general, however, the interviewees think that voting participation is a matter of 
interest and education rather than of the means of voting. Nevertheless, two interview-
ees say that they personally would vote more often, if they could do it online. In this 
context, it is important to bear in mind that all the interviewees have a very high partic-
ipation rate in voting.  
As to a potential influence on voting results, most interviewees do not think that the 
possibility to vote online changes the voting results in a significant way. Some of them 
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think that it could maybe lead to a slightly higher participation of young people, but not 
a significant one.  
We also asked interviewees what they think about e-voting influencing the voting 
decision of people. A majority of the interviewees guess that this could be possible in 
some rare cases or not at all. An example of such a rare case would be that the voter 
changes his or her mind regarding the voting decision later in time. Hence, when having 
voted electronically, he or she will not be able any more to correct his or her opinion. 
When doing a postal vote however, this would still be possible. However, this aspect 
does not seem to have a big importance for the interviewees. Moreover, one interviewee 
even said that the e-voting process strengthens the seriousness of voting, as one is con-
scious of the “seriousness of the moment and the consequences of your choice” (Italian-
speaker from Ticino, male). It implies a shift of responsibility, in a digital platform all 
decisions are made autonomously and at one’s own risk.    
6 Findings Regarding E-Voting Operations. 
6.1 Important Aspects of the Voting process and Suggestions for 
improvement  
As to the e-voting process, many respondents say that it is especially important to have 
an easy process. The user should receive a voting confirmation, and even if there are 
some loading problems, he or she should know if his or her vote was sent. Some of the 
interviewees also mention that e-voting via smartphone should be possible. The re-
spondent having experience with e-voting abroad mentions that he “really appreciated 
to be able to choose between postal vote and e-voting” (German-speaker from Aargau, 
male), meaning that he did not have to choose once and for all for between the two 
possibilities. Another respondent suggests to use a password that can be scanned with 
a smartphone and that leads you directly to the right website.  
However, when talking about the current voting process, most interviewees say that 
the process already works very well. One interviewee says that “it is important to ensure 
in the future that the e-voting will not be the only way but one way to vote” (Italian-
speaker from Ticino, male). The most important aspects needing improvement rather 
concern the steps in the voting process than the voting means.  
Two interviewees mention that the voting questions are sometimes asked in a con-
fusing way. Some of the interviewees criticize the content of the brochure the federal 
government adds to the voting documents. This brochure summarizes the arguments of 
the advocates and opponents and informs the reader of the recommendations of the 
federal government. One interviewee thinks that there is not enough space for the peo-
ple having started an initiative to express their arguments. The opinion of another in-
terviewee goes in the same direction. He thinks that the brochure is too propagandistic 
and that the neutral aspect is somehow missing. One respondent thinks that there should 
be more options to vote about, not only yes or no.  
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When talking about other possibilities how technology could improve the voting 
process, some of the respondents said that it would be interesting to create an applica-
tion that informs about the opinions of the parties, and provide access to neutral infor-
mation sources. Another interviewee mentions the creation of a reward system for par-
ticipation in votes to increase voting participation. Another idea is to show the party 
and voting financing in real time. This could make the population more aware of the 
differences in budget of the different parties. Another respondent says that it is not so 
much about how and where to vote, but about the collection of largely neutral, correct 
and professional information that is independent from political power struggles or eco-
nomic interests.  Another person says that it would be interesting if newspapers would 
provide online information files dealing with the voting topic. One respondent suggests 
an online “one-stop-shop” like an application, where you can inform yourself about 
different points of view, vote and see the results.  
To sum up, among the respondents there was only one person who is totally against 
e-voting mainly out of trivialization of the process and security reasons. In general, the
interviewees have not or not much informed themselves about e-voting and they are
rather happy with and accustomed to the current system, being a matter of habit. There-
fore, people need some time to become accustomed to e-voting. Some of them think
that it could be more convenient and comfortable to vote online, but estimate the risk
of manipulation of voting results as higher than with traditional voting means. In gen-
eral, e-voting must provide a personal additional benefit for voters, otherwise, they are
not so much interested in changing their habits. This confirms the findings of the Aus-
tralian study [17].
E-voting seems to be an advantage especially for Swiss people living abroad. How-
ever, in general, most interviewees think that participation issues do not depend on the 
voting means, but rather on general political interest and education or on the complexity 
of the voting topic. Most of them guess that e-voting would not significantly change 
the participation or even voting results. They are also skeptical of the voting means 
having an influence on the decision. Some of them think that technology could be useful 
to improve the information collection stage, as they think that it is not an easy task to 
inform oneself in a neutral way about quite complex voting topics.  
Moreover, the majority of the interviewees trust in the government and technology. 
They however agree that voting results can always be manipulated, and that the extent 
of manipulation increases with e-voting. Table 2 summarizes the findings of Section 6. 
7 Discussion: Trust and Confidence in the Voting Process 
The results of the interviews generally confirm that the perception of electronic voting 
is strongly associated and correlated with the professional demographics of voters. It is 
understood that the professional background of electors influences their attitude to-
wards electronic voting. Those working in a highly digitalized world and directly wit-
nessing the digital transformation of their businesses are likely to adopt the electronic 
voting system as another information and communication technology tool for democ-
racy.  
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1. Information collection and voting documents
Difficulties Proposed solutions 
Too much,  scattered 
and biased infor-
mation, not enough 
time available for in-
formation 
1) Application regrouping neutral information
2) Linking e-voting platform to neutral information
3) Newspaper provide online information files
4) Interactive platforms with customized information based on
one’s political profile
5) State-organized sensitization with regard to the potential of
being influenced by social media e.g. (to promote critical
opinion forming skills)
6) Inform citizens about budget of the parties for financing their
campaign
7) One stop shop for information on different points of view,
reminder for votes information, results
8) A personalized digital communication, e.g. save the personal
decisions of past votes
Voting questions are 
not clear enough 
Easier formulation of questions 
Complex voting topics 
are reduced to yes or 
no questions 
More choice 
Content of the official 
voting brochure not 
neutral enough, too 
easy / propagandistic 
Two parts: one easy part and one more intellectual part 
Forgetting about vote Reminder via e-mail or application e.g. 
2. Voting process depending on voting type
Difficulties Proposed solutions 
e-voting:
- Too complicated
- Lack of security
It has to be as easy as possible (time-saving, comprehensible, in-
tuitive), accessible for everyone  
1) Password scanning and direct arrival on the website
2) Voting confirmation
3) Possibility to do everything orally
Postal vote: 
- The process is ok
as it is
- You have to lick
the envelope,
which is not com-
fortable
- You have to put a
stamp
3. Information about results
Difficulties Proposed solutions 
No particular difficul-
ties 
Inclusion in application that integrates the whole process, 
from information collection, to voting, to results 
Table 2. Current difficulties linked to the voting process and potential of improve-
ment along the different voting stages 
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On the other hand, the perception of citizens, who work in security activities that 
consist in ensuring the security of people and property, with regard to electronic voting 
is cautious and sometimes very negative.  For the latter, there is no tangible evidence 
of the correct recording of votes because a computer screen can display one thing and 
record another. 
In this field research, trust is highlighted as a particularly important condition for the 
use of the electronic voting system. Beyond the technical malfunctions that can affect 
the accuracy and validity of votes, there seems to be a major concern regarding the 
vulnerability of electronic voting systems to manipulation by external hackers. Alt-
hough manipulations can occur by internal local agents, these intrusions can only affect 
local and isolated structures. There are also risks with traditional voting systems with 
recent examples in some democracies where it was necessary to recount votes. Elec-
tronic voting opens up new possibilities for a single hacker, who may be anywhere in 
the world, to affect the central system disrupting the entire nation. The perception of 
risk from an electronic perspective is more global, where a group of people of an indi-
vidual can intervene and hack from anywhere on the planet. 
The need to combine secrecy and individual verifiability is one of the most important 
attributes identified in this research. Indeed, unlike the e-banking system, where citi-
zens can check their account statements at any time to ensure that all transactions are 
recorded correctly. One can check the accuracy of a bank transaction afterwards, by 
checking account statements online or by printing on official banking documents. Elec-
tronic voting operations concerning secrecy and verifiability (universal and individual) 
are still not clear to voters. In addition, in the event of embezzlement, the bank has 
insurance, through its after-sales service, to compensate its customers. All information 
necessary for data integrity can be stored and tracked, eliminating any secrecy between 
the customer and the bank. In the event of technical malfunction or external interfer-
ence, these failures or manipulations may go unnoticed. 
Swiss citizens will probably trust the electronic voting system and their officials. In 
the case of electronic voting, their trust does not need to be earned at this time, but it 
can only be easily lost. The technical challenges of electronic voting open doors for 
private companies and investors to sell their technologies. There is concern that per-
sonal data and individual voting preferences may be in their possession. It is imperative 
to maintain the confidence that only the government should control all systems. The 
government must be the sole guarantor of the entire system. With the trust established 
with the government, the voter is not very interested in learning more about verifiability 
or verification. 
The results also show that the electronic voting system is accepted as a complemen-
tary means, but should not replace the postal voting system and the ballot box. This 
new possibility of voting will not significantly increase the number of people who par-
ticipate in the vote or change their voting habits, as people vote because they want to, 
and not because of the different possibilities offered. 
In a traditional voting system, voters have learned to trust their fellow assessors not 
to open the ballot box before the counting, which is a public operation understood by 
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all voters. In the case of wrongdoing, citizens are able to accept human fault because 
they too can make mistakes in their own work. However, it is still difficult to accept 
and understand the mistakes made by software. The government official could then 
keep some form of electronic voting ceremony such as broadcasting live the count hap-
pening in the back-stage process. 
8 Conclusion 
The objective of this exploratory research was to focus on the social aspects of elec-
tronic voting. Indeed, an abundant scientific literature already covers the technical as-
pects of e-voting (algorithms, security, etc.). The justification for this research objec-
tive, which focuses on rather social aspects, stems first of all from the fact that elec-
tronic voting, for various reasons, is barely fully established in Switzerland, whereas 
many test phases have already demonstrated the feasibility of this operational process 
and it has recently been accepted as an official way of voting. In this research, we in-
tended to study the perceptions of Swiss citizens regarding electronic voting, and to 
understand their meanings through a qualitative field research (based on semi-struc-
tured interviews). The most important findings are presented in the three following cat-
egories: electronic voting perception, electronic voting security and electronic voting 
operations. These insights are essentially related to the social acceptance of electronic 
voting. We observe in particular that the vote in Switzerland has an almost sacred di-
mension, as opposed to other cultural contexts, such as [5] [13] [17] [18] and that the 
trust that surrounds the voting “ritual” (i.e. voting operations and processes) is of su-
preme importance. 
Through this research project on electronic voting, which focuses on the human fac-
tor dimension, we believe that this study will help to develop relevant and practical 
managerial precepts to better implement these digitized operations processes in the fu-
ture. 
Nevertheless, this study is not without limitations. As the data collection was just 
completed when writing the paper, more in-depth analysis iteration of database must 
still be completed to improve the relevancy of our conclusion. The size of the sample 
(25) is still too limited to draw more generic conclusions. It was however our aim to
investigate the “how” and “why” of perceptions of Swiss citizens rather than percent-
ages as it is the case in a quantitative survey. In a further research, we intend to conduct
a quantitative survey based on the qualitative findings presented in this paper.
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Abstract. In Switzerland, internet voting has been in the experimental phase for 
over fifteen years. With a view to putting an end to trials and normalizing its 
use alongside the paper-based channels (polling station and postal voting), a 
thoroughly updated federal regulation entered into force in January 2014. Only 
systems that are formally certified and offer complete verifiability can be au-
thorized to propose internet voting in an unrestricted manner, i.e. to all the elec-
torate. Furthermore, since July 2018, the publication of the source code of fully 
verifiable systems is mandatory. A major transparency exercise took place in 
February – March 2019. The first system to introduce complete verifiability – 
the Swiss Post/Scytl system – was submitted to a public intrusion test (PIT), 
open to anyone interested. In a parallel development, the source code of the 
same system was published on the internet. Researchers found critical errors in 
the source code of both individual and universal verifiability. The PIT revealed 
other, less critical issues. This experience has fuelled the already heated debate 
over the future development of internet voting in Switzerland. It questions the 
procedures for controlling verifiability solutions and, ultimately, the consensus 
to develop such solutions. Lessons learned will most probably be reflected in 
the future update of the regulation. 
Keywords: Switzerland, internet voting, regulation, security, transparency, 
public intrusion test (PIT), source code publication. 
1 Introduction 
Debate on internet voting in Switzerland focuses on security and transparency. After 
initial experiences with “black-box”1 internet voting systems in political elections in 
several countries, including Switzerland, at the beginning of 2000, consensus emerged 
within the research community that end-to-end verifiable voting systems are a neces-
sary condition for internet voting [1].2 Systems started to be developed that may allow 
the voter and anyone else to verify important aspects of the election, namely his/her 
1 We use this term to characterise first generation internet voting systems introduced in the 
beginning of 2000 which did not provide for independent, transparent verifications. 
2 See also the 2007 Dagstuhl Accord, http://drops.dagstuhl.de/portals/index.php?semnr=07311. 
All links were last checked on 28 June 2019. 
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own vote and the final tally, while protecting the secrecy of the vote, without intro-
ducing any additional danger of improper influence of the voter as compared to postal 
voting and without relying on trust in persons, processes, devices or software. Ac-
cording to this consensus, the challenge for government and civil society should be to 
find ways to foster development and testing of new election paradigms in general and 
to allow them to be assessed and expeditiously rise to meet their potential to improve 
elections, the goal being to develop systems that increase transparency regarding the 
correctness of the election results and yet maintain secrecy of individual votes. Im-
proved voter confidence may follow.3 Proper implementation of such systems as well 
as voter education are considered important to avoid misuse. Recent developments in 
Switzerland show that control of end-to-end verifiability solutions and requirements 
thereof are crucial. 
Complete verifiability is required by federal regulation if a system is to be author-
ized to cover more than 50 per cent of the cantonal electorate [2].4 It is the sum of 
extended individual verifiability and universal verifiability. Extended individual veri-
fiability allows the voter to ascertain whether their vote has been manipulated or in-
tercepted on the user platform or during transmission. Voters must receive proof that 
the server system has registered the vote as it was entered by the voter on the user 
platform as being in conformity with the system. The proof must also confirm to the 
voters that the data relevant to universal verification has reached the trustworthy part 
of the system. Voters (rather “electors” in this case, i.e. persons with voting rights but 
who did not vote) must be able to request proof after the electronic voting system is 
closed that the trustworthy part of the system has not already registered a vote cast 
using their client-sided authentication. For universal verification, the auditors receive 
proof that the result has been ascertained correctly. The proof must confirm that the 
result ascertained:  a. takes account of all votes cast in conformity with the system 
that were registered by the trustworthy part of the system; b. takes account only of 
votes cast in conformity with the system; c. takes account of all partial votes in ac-
cordance with the proof generated in the course of the individual verification.5 Verifi-
ability relies on several trust assumptions.6 
The development of end-to-end verifiable systems provides valuable real-world 
experience. One of the two Swiss internet voting systems, the Swiss Post/Scytl sys-
tem, became the first to allegedly introduce complete verifiability7 after it had been 
certified to offer individual verifiability.8  
3 Ibid.    
4 The definition of complete verifiability is to be found in article 5 read in combination with 
article 4 of the federal Chancellery Ordinance on Electronic Voting (VEleS), RS 161.116. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See e.g., art. 4 para. 4 and 5 as well as art. 5 para. 3 let. c and para. 5 and 6 VEleS 
7 https://www.post.ch/-/media/post/evoting/dokumente/complete-verifiability-security-proof-
report.pdf?la=fr&vs=1 
8 Individual verifiability is required for authorization for more than 30 per cent of the cantonal 
electorate, whereas complete verifiability is required for more than 50 per cent (art. 27f PRO 
and articles 4 and 5 VEleS). The Swiss Post system was the first and eventually only system 
123
The Swiss Post set the objective to present a system offering complete verifiability 
by the end of 2018.9 In this context, it underwent the most complete transparency 
exercise organized so far on a Swiss internet voting system and, to our knowledge, the 
most complete on an internet voting system for political elections. The system was 
submitted to a public intrusion test (PIT) decided by the federal Chancellery and the 
cantons10 which took place from 25 February to 24 March 2019.11 In a parallel devel-
opment, the Swiss Post and its partner, the Spanish firm Scytl, published the source 
code of their software on 7 February 2019,12 in accordance with the federal require-
ment to do so which came into force in July 2018.13 The publication of the source 
code should take place when the system has the property of complete verifiability in 
terms of article 5 VEleS and after successfully passing the examinations foreseen in 
article 7 VEleS.14  
(as Geneva decided to stop developing its system) to be certified for more than 30% of the 
cantonal electorate. See fn. 14.  
9 https://www.post.ch/en/business/a-z-of-subjects/industry-solutions/swiss-post-e-
voting?shortcut=evoting 
10 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
73898.html. See also https://www.evoting-blog.ch/en/pages/2019/public-hacker-test-on-
swiss-post-s-e-voting-system 
11 See https://onlinevote-pit.ch and https://pit.post.ch/en 
12 https://www.post.ch/en/business/a-z-of-subjects/industry-solutions/swiss-post-e-voting/e-
voting-source-code?shortcut=evoting-sourcecode 
13 Article 7a and 7b of the federal Chancellery Ordinance on Electronic Voting (VEleS).  
14 Two types of examinations are foreseen: for less than 30% of the electorate (paragraph 3) and 
for more than 30% (paragraph 2). The Swiss Post system had successfully passed a number 
of examinations required by paragraph 2 of art. 7 VEleS for more than 30 per cent of the 
electorate, in May and June 2017. The certificates issued end June 2017 are valid till end 
June 2020. The information is published on https://www.post.ch/en/business/a-z-of-
subjects/industry-solutions/swiss-post-e-voting. The examinations/certificates published are 
the following:   
- Verification of the cryptographic protocol https://www.post.ch/-
/media/post/evoting/dokumente/zertifikat-pruefung-des-kryptographischen-
protokolls.pdf?la=en&vs=1 
- Verification of functionality https://www.post.ch/-/media/post/evoting/dokumente/zertifikat-
pruefung-der-funktionalitaet.pdf?la=en&vs=1
- Verification of infrastructure and operation https://www.post.ch/-
/media/post/evoting/dokumente/zertifikat-pruefung-infrastruktur-und-
betrieb.pdf?la=en&vs=1 
- Verification of protection against attempts to infiltrate the infrastructure
https://www.post.ch/-/media/post/evoting/dokumente/zertifikat-pruefung-des-schutzes-
gegen-versuche-in-die-infrastruktur-einzudringen.pdf?la=en&vs=1   
We could not find information on the internet about the examination required by art. 7 para-
graph 2 let. e (printing offices) and f (control components) VEleS on the internet. We take 
for granted that “the disclosed source code relates to the implementation of the cryptograph-
ic protocol for complete verifiability at application level” (see 
https://www.post.ch/en/business/a-z-of-subjects/industry-solutions/swiss-post-e-voting/e-
voting-source-code) and that all preconditions for doing so (art. 7a VEleS) were respected. 
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A group of researchers discovered significant flaws in the source code [3].15 As for 
the PIT, a total of 16 responses were classified as breaches of best practice. According 
to the federal Chancellery, they do not constitute major risks.16  
The federal Chancellery declared itself satisfied that these measures (PIT and pub-
lication of source code) led to the discovery of weaknesses and allowed important 
findings to be made. It also declared that it would conduct a review namely of the 
licensing and certification procedures for e-voting systems. The Swiss Post decided to 
suspend internet voting until the source code and other identified errors are addressed 
and not to offer e-voting at 19 May 2019 federal vote. The federal Chancellery con-
sidered the decision on the part of Swiss Post not to make its system available for the 
vote on 19 May to be logical under the circumstances.17 
The next federal vote is the federal (National Council) election of 20 October 2019. 
Requirements for authorizing use of e-voting at federal elections are stringent [4]. The 
correction of the source code most probably classifies as “substantive change” which 
should be followed by tests and a new certification [5].18 The certification require-
ments are currently under review by the federal Chancellery.19 Given this, it is ques-
tionable whether the Swiss Post system can be ready in time for the 2019 federal elec-
tion. The federal Government will decide on authorizing the Swiss Post system to use 
electronic voting in the federal election of 20 October foreseeably on 14 August 2019, 
provided cantons working with the Post will apply for such an authorization.20 
The second system belongs to the canton of Geneva and is operated by its admin-
istration. It offers individual verifiability but not the universal one. Geneva system 
was used for the 19 May 2019 vote. It has not been formally certified so far and is 
authorized for less than 30% of the cantonal electorate. End November 2018, the Ge-
neva Government announced it would cease operating its e-voting system in 2020 for 
lack of financial support to upgrade it to a fully compliant system, namely, to set up a 
new system that offers complete verifiability and have it certified.21 On 19 June 2019 
the Geneva Government decided to stop e-voting with immediate effect because of 
uncertainties around the possible authorization by the federal Government to use e-
voting at the October 2019 federal election. The canton of Geneva and the other can-
tons working with it on internet voting estimated that the expected moment for the 
federal Government decision (14 August 2019) did not leave enough time to adapt the 
procedures in case the decision would be negative.22  
15 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
74307.html 
16 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
74508.html 
17 Ibid. 
18 See article 27l 2 PRO and article 7 paragraph 1 VEleS. 
19 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
74508.html  
20 This was still pending on 28.06.2019 when this paper was last reviewed. See 
https://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/schweiz-demokratie-volksabstimmungen-evoting/45061040 
21 https://www.ge.ch/document/point-presse-du-conseil-etat-du-28-novembre-2018 
22 https://www.ge.ch/document/point-presse-du-conseil-etat-du-19-juin-2019 
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Another potentially disruptive development started in March 2019: the collection 
of signatures in support of a popular initiative – the so-called e-voting moratorium 
initiative – to stop any form of e-voting for at least five years.23 The initiative aims at 
changing the federal Constitution to prohibit e-voting. It foresees a possible ban lift 
by the federal Parliament, through a law, which can be introduced at the earliest five 
years after the introduction of the ban. Several cumulative conditions should be ful-
filled to lift the ban, namely: e-voting should offer at least the same level of security 
against manipulations than paper voting; it should allow voters without specialized 
knowledge to verify the main steps of the e-voting procedure and enable count-as-cast 
of cast-as-intended votes while also respecting vote secrecy; the system should ex-
clude external influences and should make sure that results are unequivocal and unfal-
sified; results can be verified in a sure manner and without special knowledge through 
new counting; it should be possible to exclude results that do not respect the before-
mentioned requirements. One of the conditions, namely the possibility for the layman 
to understand and control every important step without specialized knowledge, seems, 
at first reading, impossible to achieve.24 The 18 months signature collection period 
ends on 12 September 2020. If the initiative committee gathers the required one-
hundred-thousand valid signatures, the fate of internet voting will be decided in a 
popular vote by the majority of the people and cantons. 
These developments unfold in the context of the implementation of a federal Gov-
ernment’s decision of April 2017 to introduce internet voting into regular operation 
alongside the postal and polling-station voting.25 The federal Council submitted in 
December 201826 a proposal to modify the federal Act on political rights (PRA) [6] in 
this sense. The proposed modification upheld the current requirements for internet 
voting and proposed to improve the structure of the regulation by bringing core prin-
ciples of complete verifiability, transparency, certification, risk assessment framework 
and accessibility to the level of the law instead of having them at the ordinances’ lev-
el, as is currently the case. The normalized use of e-voting would have put an end to 
the experimental phase that lasts since 2004. The proposed revision of the PRA was 
submitted to a consultation procedure from 19 December 2018 to 30 April 2019. Can-
tons and interested organizations were invited to comment on the proposal. The re-
sults of the consultation were published end June 2019.27 They show that develop-
ments around the Swiss Post transparency exercise influenced the debate. The consul-
tation revealed that most respondents, including a clear majority of the cantons and 
political parties, support the introduction of e-voting in principle. However, most 
respondents, including political parties which support e-voting in principle, also con-
sidered its introduction into regular operation to be premature. On 26 June 2019, the 
23 Initiative populaire fédérale « Pour une démocratie sûre et fiable (moratoire sur le vote élec-
tronique) », FF 2019 2081 (“FF” is an abbreviation of the Swiss Federal Gazette).  
24 A few months earlier the federal Parliament had refused such a “layman control” on e-voting 
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/boost-for-expat-swiss-group_opponents-of-e-voting-suffer-
setback-in-parliament/44395904 
25 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/fr/home/documentation/communiques.msg-id-66273.html 
26 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/fr/home/documentation/communiques.msg-id-73491.html 
27 https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/57568.pdf 
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federal Council took the decision “to provisionally forgo introducing electronic voting 
into regular operation” and “not to proceed with the partial revision of the Political 
Rights Act at the present time”.28 Internet voting’s introduction as a regular voting 
channel is thus technically delayed. The federal Council also commissioned the feder-
al Chancellery “to amend the general conditions for future trials” namely “to redesign 
the way in which the trials are operated, and to present the results in a report by the 
end of 2020. The aim is to establish stable trial operations using the latest generation 
of systems. Other measures include extending independent audits, increasing trans-
parency and trust, and greater involvement of scientific specialists”.29 
The following sections focus on lessons learned from the PIT and the publication 
of source code, from a regulatory point of view. After an overview of the federal legal 
requirements on security and transparency (section 2), we present the PIT and the 
publication of the source code and related events (section 3). The results call into 
question the current regulation, particularly the control requirements for end-to-end 
verifiable systems and, ultimately, the consensus on the role and adequacy of such 
solutions. The experience has already had an impact on regulation as it prevented the 
amendment of PRA and the introduction of e-voting into regular operation. It will 
continue to have an impact as the federal Chancellery is expected to amend the condi-
tions for future trials and decide later on its transformation into a regular voting chan-
nel (section 4). 
2 Internet voting development in Switzerland 
2.1 Federal regulation of internet voting 
Switzerland has adopted a cautious approach to internet voting which is reflected in 
the long experimental phase. E-voting has been tested with binding effect in political 
votes and elections for more than 15 years. The motto is “security before speed”. At 
the same time, Switzerland has a unique situation: its direct democracy system impos-
es frequent votes at all levels of government. Electors, i.e. the persons with voting 
rights, are invited to vote on issues or elect representatives at local, cantonal (state) 
and federal levels an average four times a year. It is thus important to find ways and 
means to offer effective voting channels to a maximum of electors, including those 
living abroad and those with special needs. 
At the beginning of the years 2000 Swiss authorities concluded that any use of in-
ternet voting in the political field required a legal basis [7]. Federal regulation of in-
ternet voting, including a dedicated article (art. 8a) and other modifications in the 
political rights Act (PRA) [6] and a dedicated chapter (art. 27a ff.) in the political 
rights ordinance (PRO) [5] was introduced in 2002 and has been in force since 1st 
January 2003. Swiss cantons started internet voting trials in 2003 (cantonal votes) and 
2004 (federal votes). The federal Council (federal Government) evaluated the trials in 
28 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
75615.html 
29 Ibid. 
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2006 [8] and 2013 [9].30 In 2006 it decided to continue to experiment internet voting 
and extend the trials to include the Swiss abroad and new cantons. New forms of co-
operation developed between cantons with an internet voting system (Geneva, Zurich 
and Neuchâtel) and those without system. Fifteen out of the 26 cantons have tried 
internet voting so far; the majority outsources the internet voting service to another 
canton with a system (Geneva until June 2019) or to a privately held system (current-
ly, the Swiss Post). In its third evaluation report of 2013, the federal Council decided 
to continue to use internet voting but to gradually replace the “black box” first genera-
tion systems with “end-to-end verifiable” systems. As a result, the federal regulation 
was thoroughly modified in December 2013: the federal Ordinance on Political Rights 
(PRO) was updated and a new instrument, the Ordinance of the federal Chancellery 
on e-voting (VEleS) was introduced,31 both in force since 15 January 2014. An addi-
tional requirement became mandatory as of 1st July 2018: the publication of the 
source code of the software of complete verifiability as well as the procedure for its 
publication (see articles 7a and 7b VEleS).32 
Regulation is based on the idea that e-voting must respect all principles applicable 
to democratic votes and elections and the ensuing legal requirements.33 The federal 
regulatory framework for e-voting has a cascade structure that includes the Constitu-
tion and the higher-level formal law (PRA), the federal Council ordinance (PRO) that 
implements the PRA and, further down, the federal Chancellery ordinance on elec-
tronic voting (VEleS) and its Appendix which contain detailed provisions that imple-
ment the higher level requirements to e-voting. This structure allows for a relatively 
quick adaptation of the detailed provisions (VEleS) to reflect technical developments 
and good practices which are considered important in the security area.34 Generally 
speaking, the federal regulation requires that e-voting systems and their security are 
state of the art, as stated in art. 27l para. 1 let. b PRO.  
According to federal regulation, use of internet voting at federal votes is further-
more subject to authorization by the federal Council and agreement by the federal 
Chancellery.35 Different levels of compliance and respective limitations are fore-
seen.36 The Swiss Post system became the first to be formally certified compliant with 
regulation for systems providing individual verifiability, potentially allowed to cover 
up to 50% of the electorate. End 2018 it was expected to become fully compliant with 
the federal regulation for systems providing complete (individual and universal) veri-
30All evaluations can be found at https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/fr/home/droits-
politiques/groupe-experts-vote-electronique/rapports-et-etudes-concernant-le-vote-
electronique.html 
31 RO 2013 5365 and RO 2013 5371  
32 RO 2018 2279 
33 At the federal level e-voting must comply namely with the principle of free elections of art. 
34.2 of the federal Constitution (Cst., RS 100), the principles mentioned in article 8a PRA, 
which is the legal basis for introducing e-voting, and the detailed provisions of articles 27a 
ff PRO, of VEleS and its appendix.  
34 The VEleS Appendix contains several references to good/best practice. 
35 Art. 8a para. 1 and 1bis PRA, art. 27a and 27e PRO. 
36 Art. 27f PRO. See also the discussion in Puiggali/Rodriguez-Pérez (2018). 
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fiability which opens the door to authorization to cover up to 100% of the electorate.37 
At this point, it was required to pass two important tests: a public intrusion test 
(PIT)38 and the publication of the source code of the software for complete verifiabil-
ity in compliance with the VEleS requirements for doing so.39 
We do not refer to cantonal legislation as it is less detailed and mainly a repetition 
of federal provisions. In principle, cantons have important autonomy in the electoral 
field [10]. However, with respect to internet voting, the main requirements, namely 
those related to security, are defined at the federal level and are the same across the 
country and the systems.  
2.2 Federal requirements on security and transparency 
The federal regulation of internet voting introduced in 2002 was quite a detailed piece 
of legislation which also inspired the development of the Council of Europe 2004 
Recommendation on e-voting [11, 12]. Electoral authorities controlled the implemen-
tation of security related requirements. External audits were conducted but the find-
ings were not published.40 Privileged players, i.e. federal authorities in the context of 
the authorization procedure and the electoral commission in cantons where it existed, 
had access to the documentation. Political parties represented at the electoral commis-
sions, namely in Geneva and Neuchâtel, could access the documents, which is a good 
practice.41 A form of peer-control was provided by federal groups accompanying each 
cantonal e-voting project whose members are e-voting specialists from other cantons. 
However, security and transparency of first generation systems, and indirectly the 
regulation on which they were based, was criticized by research which referred to 
37 On its web page, the Swiss Post says that the advantage of its e-voting solution is that it 
“offers state-of-the-art technology and, in its most advanced phase of development, meets all 
statutory provisions”. To the attention of cantons and municipalities it says that its solution 
is “Certified for all eligible voters resident in Switzerland and abroad”, 
https://www.post.ch/en/business-solutions/e-voting/the-e-voting-solution-for-cantons.   
38 See fn. 10 
39 Art. 7b VEleS 
40 In its second report on e-voting the federal Government said that “the technical documenta-
tion including evaluations of an e-voting system and its security are cantonal confidential 
documents that are annexed to the request for authorization addressed by a canton to the 
federal Council. These documents are not public. Cantons that apply the transparency prin-
ciple can attach conditions to the consultation by the public of these documents and source 
codes or even refuse access to the extent that they contain sensitive security information or 
trade secrets. This practice has been upheld by the federal Court” (our translation), FF 2006 
5205, 5215. In its third report, the federal Council reminds that only one canton (Geneva) 
had introduced legislation on limited access to the source code, FF 2013 4519, 4596 f.. The 
federal Council notes that the mid and long-term objective is to achieve maximum transpar-
ency without violating legal or contractual obligations.  
41 Third report of the federal Government on e-voting, point 5.4.4, FF 2013 4519, 4600 
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them as “security by obscurity” approach [13].42 To sum up, first generation systems 
introduced in the beginning of 2000 did not provide for independent, transparent veri-
fications. They were not submitted to federal requirements to divulgate the source 
code or security relevant documents.43  
The thoroughly revised regulation introduced in December 2013 resulted from 
close cooperation with research.44 It has the following general approach to security 
and transparency issues. The higher-level principles that e-voting should satisfy45 are 
as many objectives that an e-voting system and program should fulfil to receive feder-
al authorization. The objectives take into account the weaknesses inherent to the un-
derlying technology, as well as main threats, both internal and external ones. Threats 
include malware on the client or server side, DNS spoofing, MITM attacks, adminis-
trator attacks both on the content of votes and on the secrecy of the information, crim-
inal organisations’ attacks, DOS etc. Switzerland having already a generalised system 
of distant postal voting, threats related to “family voting” are not considered as they 
are not specific to e-voting [9].46 Risks must be constantly evaluated and kept at an 
acceptable level by the cantons. A risk arises if a weakness in the system can be ex-
ploited by a threat and therefore the fulfilment of a security objective is potentially 
jeopardised. Threats and vulnerabilities inherent to e-voting should be monitored 
permanently and appropriate countermeasures are introduced whenever necessary by 
federal and cantonal authorities.47  
42 For an overview of major weaknesses that technical research identified in first generation 
systems and proposals to correct them in second generation systems, see in particular Dubu-
is, Haenni, Koenig (2012), pp. 10 ff, in particular points 1, 2, 5 and 11.  
43 Security was mainly based on measures taken by the voter to protect her own computer, on 
the discouraging effect of penal law provisions and on the security provided by the system 
itself at the structural, functional and technical levels. The fact for e-voting to be only a 
complementary voting method, not an exclusive one, was considered relevant to its security: 
See the first report of the federal Government on e-voting, FF 2002 612, 632 ss, 640. 
44 The main novelties of the new regulation introduced in 2013, namely verifiability and formal 
certification, as well as the source code publication introduced in 2018, reflect proposals by 
technical research. The federal Chancellery accompanied the publication of the Berner 
Fachhochschule study on the concept and implications of verifiable e-voting systems of 21 
February 2012 with a note saying that, although the full implementation of the proposals of 
BFH is to be considered in the long term, nothing prevents (the authorities) from integrating 
them already in the daily work of improving the systems (our translation), 
https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/fr/home/droits-politiques/groupe-experts-vote-
electronique/rapports-et-etudes-concernant-le-vote-electronique.html.  
45 Mainly found in art. 27b PRO. Some of them, such as the publication of source code are 
currently to be found in the lower level VEleS. The proposed modification of PRA aimed at 
bringing the main principles from PRO and VEleS up to the PRA level. As discussed above, 
the Government decided on 26 June 2019 to postpone the PRA amendment.  
46 This being so, critique on end-to-end verifiable systems related to secrecy does not affect the 
Swiss verifiability solution. With respect to such critique, see e.g. Jones D.W.: Some prob-
lems with end-to-end voting (2009). 
47 VEleS Appendix, point 3 “Security requirements” 
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The regulation admits that absolute security is impossible to achieve in e-voting, or 
in any other voting channel for that matter.48 Optimum security is the objective.49 It 
rests on three pillars: strong requirements (federal regulation of e-voting refers to state 
of the art solutions), controls by independent and competent bodies of the conformity 
of the system with requirements (incl. formal certification)50 and the possibility to 
detect possible problems that may still arise during the voting or counting process 
(plausibility and verifiability checks).51 If more than 30% of the cantonal electorate 
are to be authorised to participate in e-voting, the system and its operation must be 
examined in particular detail with regard to several criteria:52 control of the crypto-
graphic protocol which can be done by a highly specialised institution upon approval 
by the federal Chancellery; control of other aspects (functionalities, security of infra-
structure and operation, protection against attempts to infiltrate the infrastructure, 
requirements for printing offices and control components) which is to be carried out 
by an institution accredited by the Swiss Accreditation Service (SAS).53  
A third provision, important for security, came into force in July 2018: the publica-
tion of the source code of systems that offer complete verifiability. The source code 
should be published only after the system has been certified. In the words of the fed-
eral Chancellery, a trustworthy control prior to publication guarantees that the ad-
vantages of the publication of the source code outweigh the potential risks associated 
with it [14].54 Further, the publication should be done in line with good practice to 
make sure that interested persons have effective access to the source code and the 
time needed to analyse it and to submit remarks. In particular, the source code should 
be prepared and documented in line with good practice.55 Access should be simple 
and free.56 The documentation on the system and its operation must explain the rele-
vance of the individual components of the source code for the security of electronic 
voting. The documentation must be published along with the source code.57 Finally, 
anyone is entitled to examine, modify, compile and execute the source code for idea-
tional purposes, and to write and publish studies thereon.58 This provision integrates 
and goes beyond good cantonal and international practice.59 The legal requirement to 
publish the source code marks a new approach in e-voting security, in line with good 
48 Already the first report of the federal Government on e-voting in 2002 noted that « perma-
nent and absolute security is illusory », FF 2002 612, 639.  
49 VEleS Appendix, point 3 “Security requirements” 
50 Art. 27l PRO 
51 art. 27i PRO  
52 Art. 7 para. 2 VEleS 
53 Appendix VEleS, chapter 5. 
54 See in particular comments on art. 7a, al. 2, VEleS in reference [14] 
55 Art. 7b para. 1 VEleS 
56 Art. 7b para. 2 VEleS 
57 Art. 7b para. 3 VEleS 
58 Art. 7b para. 4 VEleS 
59 Canton Geneva introduced legislation on source code publication already in 2016. An im-
portant previous milestone was the publication of the source code of the Norwegian system. 
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practice and suggestions from research: security is no longer linked to secrecy but to 
openness and independent verification [15].  
To summarize, the regulation requires state-of-the-art security measures. Control 
of compliance with the regulation and detection of problems rely mainly on certifica-
tion, verifiability and publication of the source code. These controls are expected to 
prove a system’s conformity with requirements and the absence/presence of potential 
problems during implementation and should themselves be conducted in a state-of-
the-art fashion. The Swiss regulation on security and transparency of internet voting is 
quite detailed and integrates research recommendations and good practice. It is the 
first standardisation and certification framework for online voting systems [16]. How-
ever, the PIT and source code publication revealed lacunae and raise questions. 
3 Public intrusion test and publication of the source code of the 
Swiss Post/Scytl system 
Intrusion tests are required by federal regulation to check a system’s security. They 
should be organized at least every three years and be conducted by an accredited or-
ganism as part of the certification process.60 The federal Chancellery and cantons 
decided to organize a public intrusion test (PIT), open to anyone, to check the security 
of the Swiss Post system offering complete verifiability.61 The PIT took the form of a 
“bug bounty” with the Swiss Post committing financial compensation to participants 
who would be the first to reveal a relevant vulnerability. The Confederation contribut-
ed a substantive amount (250’000 Swiss francs) to the “bug bounty” fund. The PIT 
lasted one month, from 25 February to 24 March 2019. Around 3,200 people from 
137 countries participated.62 The PIT was accompanied and monitored by a manage-
ment committee composed of members of the Confederation and the Cantons. The 
management committee should prepare a final report to the attention of the Steering 
Committee of the federal internet voting project.63 The PIT participants discovered 
least severe vulnerabilities which include findings that show uncritical optimization 
opportunities.64 
The most critical vulnerabilities were discovered by examining the source code of 
the Swiss Post system, whose publication was done in line with the newest require-
ments of VEleS. According to researchers of the Berner Fachhochschule, these vul-
60 Point 5.5 of Appendix to VEleS 
61 Fn. 10 
62 Swiss Post press release of 29 March 2019 “Facts and figures on the public intrusion test on 
the e-voting system”, https://www.post.ch/en/about-us/company/media/press-
releases/2019/swiss-post-temporarily-suspends-its-e-voting-system 
63 Federal Chancellery’s information on the PIT 
https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/e-
voting/oeffentlicher_intrusionstest.html 
64 The 16 accepted vulnerabilities published on the PIT page https://www.onlinevote-
pit.ch/stats/ are classified as breaches of best practice which do not constitute major risks. 
See “Qualifying vulnerabilities” on https://www.onlinevote-pit.ch/conduct/  
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nerabilities were already apparent in the system specification documentation; the PIT 
and publication of source code only played a secondary role in their detection.65  
The code was published66 on the platform GitLab and made available upon regis-
tration and acceptance of the terms of use, among which the requirement to publish 
the findings only 45 days afterwards.67 The published code “leaked” in the sense that 
researchers who did not accept the terms of use, received it from others and were able 
to examine it. A group of them detected major vulnerabilities affecting the universal 
and individual verifiability [3].68 They communicated their findings ongoing on Twit-
ter, after a short advance notice to the Post, thus in breach of the 45 days deadline. 
Although the distribution of the source code to third parties who have not accepted 
the terms of use is prohibited according to the terms of use, the Swiss Post and the 
federal Chancellery didn’t mention this detail in their communications and took notice 
and reacted after each published finding.69  
The first critical error discovered related to universal verifiability.70 A trapdoor was 
found that would allow the system operator or any person with access to the system to 
modify any number of votes in a way that cannot be detected by the verifiability 
mechanisms. According to the Post, this vulnerability had already been pointed out 
two years earlier by Swiss researchers of BFH but still persisted. They said regretting 
that the technology partner, Scytl, which is responsible for the source code, had not 
made the correction in full earlier.71 The trapdoor was found in the new version of the 
system (for +50% of the electorate) which has never been used so the vulnerability 
couldn’t have been already exploited to falsify a vote. This time, according to the 
Swiss Post, Scytl rectified the error, in full and immediately.72  
A second vulnerability was found that affects individual verifiability. Someone 
could theoretically invalidate votes without being detected. Individual verifiability is 
part of the system that has already been used. However, the Swiss Post relativized 
saying that exploiting this vulnerability would have produced invalid votes which 
cannot be accepted by the system and would have been noticed.73 The question re-
mains: why was it not detected by certification and other tests? 
65 Dubuis, E.: Schwachstellen im E-Voting-System der Post entdeckt, 
 https://www.societybyte.swiss/2019/03/25/schwachstellen-im-e-voting-system-der-post-
entdeckt/ 
66 https://www.post.ch/en/business/a-z-of-subjects/industry-solutions/swiss-post-e-voting/e-
voting-source-code?shortcut=evoting-sourcecode 
67 La Poste Suisse, Accord d’accès au code source de la solution de vote électronique, Janvier 
2019. 
68 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/fr/home/documentation/communiques.msg-id-74508.html 
69 See the two Press releases of the federal Council of 12 March and 29 March 2019, resp. 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-74307.html and 
https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
74508.html 
70 Ibid. Press release of 12 March 2019. 
71https://www.post.ch/en/about-us/media/press-releases/2019/error-in-the-source-code-
discovered-and-rectified 
72 Ibid. 
73 https://www.evoting-blog.ch/en/pages/2019/new-finding-in-the-source-code 
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The group of researchers noted that their control was limited as they could only ex-
amine a very small percentage of the source code documents, enough though to find 
two critical vulnerabilities. They would not be surprised to find others. They question 
other controls which proved successful such as cryptographic and symbolic proofs of 
verifiability properties,74 the role of trust assumptions,75 and suggest solutions to recti-
fy the trapdoor [17].76  
Lewis, Pereira and Teague also highlighted the extremely complex structure of the 
source code (6000 documents). Other researchers also mentioned that in addition to 
the security issues, namely the fact that the code allowed manipulations that could 
have gone unnoticed, a quick examination of the source code revealed other prob-
lems, namely: the code is not clear; the documentation does not comply with the 
standards; all building blocks (code) must be individually configured (by the Post or 
cantons) which makes it prone to errors;  the documentation must not be cited which 
makes it impossible for researchers to inform and discuss about errors. This last con-
dition clearly does not comply with the VEleS requirements on publication of the 
source code.77  
Eventually, the Swiss Post decided to temporarily suspend e-voting and not pro-
vide the service to the cantons for the vote of 19 May. It informed it will correct the 
source code and have it reviewed again by independent experts.78 The federal Chan-
cellery invited the Swiss Post to review its security related procedures. It decided to 
re-examine the certification and agreement procedures.79 On 26 June 2019 the federal 
Council mandated the federal Chancellery to amend the general conditions for future 
trials.80 
4 Lessons learned and questions 
The publication the of source code and the PIT were meant to confirm an already 
certified system and help discover potential errors that certification and other tests 
could not detect. Instead, examination of the code has shown that certification and 
other controls had failed to notice some critical vulnerabilities in both individual and 
74 https://decryptage.be/2019/03/svote/ 
75 Ibid. See also the Berner Fachhochschule experts’ conclusions in 
https://www.societybyte.swiss/2019/03/25/schwachstellen-im-e-voting-system-der-post-
entdeckt/ 
76 See also fn. 74 
77 Kolly, M.-J. based on a discussion with Stiller, B. and Killer, Ch. of the Zurich University: 
Der Quellcode des E-Voting-Systems ist problematisch, und das hat nicht nur mit Sicherheit 
zu tun. NZZ, 12 March 2019, https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/e-voting-der-quellcode-ist-
undurchsichtig-sagen-experten-ld.1461406 
78 Swiss Post press release of 29 March 2019: https://www.post.ch/en/about-
us/company/media/press-releases/2019/swiss-post-temporarily-suspends-its-e-voting-
system. See also Scytl press release of 1st April: https://www.scytl.com/en/statement-related-
to-the-recent-decision-to-place-evoting-temporarily-on-hold-in-switzerland/ 
79 Fn. 69 
80 Fn. 28 
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universal verifiability. No complete evaluation of the experience has been published 
so far. There will certainly be important lessons and conclusions that will be drawn on 
the technical side. E-voting supporters hope that this will make the system/s more 
secure. The experience also raises more fundamental legal and policy questions.  
4.1 Controls 
The Swiss regulation on internet voting is an advanced example of designing internet 
voting requirements to achieve end-to-end verifiable systems in conformity with good 
practice on security and transparency. The practical implementation shows that, de-
spite good will and the important means dedicated to this, we have not yet obtained an 
end-to-end verifiable system free of errors. Of course, experts note that these errors 
would not be there had state-of-the-art solutions been used [e.g. 3, 13, 17].81 Yet, 
experts are puzzled by the fact that other cryptographic proofs and controls (other 
than certification) failed to notice the vulnerabilities.82 And they also question one of 
the basic building blocks of verifiability as practiced here – the trust assumptions.83 
This raises a first question of principle. The lay person considers end-to-end verifia-
bility as the way to verify the result of the election given the impossibility to certify 
that a system, as implemented during e-voting, can be considered 100% secure. If the 
control of the end-to-end verifiability solution and its implementation presents diffi-
culties similar to those related to controlling the system itself, is end-to-end verifiabil-
ity a good solution?  
Second, the regulation requires state-of-the-art solutions on all aspects related to 
security, including its control. A constructive dialogue has taken place between can-
tons, the Confederation and technical research, who have been actively involved in 
designing and evaluating the two systems. Yet, introducing state-of-the-art solutions 
in a timely manner is very challenging, as shown by this experience. Certification 
procedures for end-to-end verifiable solutions were designed end 2013 and allegedly 
respected good practice at that time. According to researchers, at least by the end of 
2018, it became clear that procedures should be redesigned. However, this has not yet 
been done and the certification of the Swiss Post system was conducted according to 
the 2013 regulation. According to researchers of the Berner Fachhochschule, this, 
among others, explains why the system got the certification, despite the flaws.84 This 
shows that, although the Swiss federal internet voting regulation is built in a cascade 
structure which allows the federal Chancellery to rapidly adapt VEleS to take into 
account technical developments, it still takes some time to adapt the regulation and 
the processes. This is unavoidable. Regulation cannot follow technique without delay 
and there will always be a time lag. In our case this was very detrimental as it allowed 
81 See also fn. 77   
82 Fn. 74 
83 Dubuis, E.: Schwachstellen im E-Voting-System der Post entdeckt, 
 https://www.societybyte.swiss/2019/03/25/schwachstellen-im-e-voting-system-der-post-
entdeckt/ 
84 Ibid. 
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certification of a flawed system. State-of-the-art that requires adaptations of regula-
tion cannot be implemented without a time lag. Legality seems to weaken the state-of-
the-art requirement. Quid? 
A third issue is the definition of good practice and state-of-the-art. Researchers for 
instance pointed out the complexity and quality of the source code of the solution [3]. 
Certification bodies are expected, according to regulation, to control that the system 
and security measures are state-of-the-art and respect good practice.85 Is this possible 
at all? Is certification the right instrument for doing this? If yes, is such a certification 
possible within reasonable time and financial costs? If not, who should define what is 
state-of-the-art at a given moment and who should check this? Additional questions 
relate to partial implementation of state-of-the-art and consequences for doing so. 
A fourth, crucial issue, relates to the cost of state-of-the-art security. In Switzerland 
they are covered by the cantons mainly, who organize and conduct elections, includ-
ing federal ones. As security requirements are determined at the federal level and can 
vary according to risk evaluation, there is increasingly a friction which may result, as 
in the case of Geneva, in a decision to abandon internet voting.86 The relation between 
security requirements, which should be uniform and determined at the federal level, 
and financial means, which come from cantons (states), needs further clarification. 
4.2 Transparency 
The publication of the source code was the starting point for discovering the most 
critical vulnerabilities. This highlights the importance of this transparency exercise. 
The “leaked code” experience shows that restrictions to publication of source code, 
such as the 45 days silence period, may be unenforceable. 
Despite its importance, the publication of the source code and its examination is 
not a full and systematic control of a system’s security. Researchers indicated that 
they could only examine a very small fraction of the code. Time and resources fail to 
do more. Unlike the PIT, the source code examination was not designed as a “bug 
bounty”, so incentives to detect and report vulnerabilities may be lower. As publica-
tion of the source code of systems offering complete verifiability is permanent, condi-
tions may be reconsidered to integrate lessons learned from this first exercise.  
85 Art. 27l para. 1 let. b PRO and references to good practice in VEleS. 
86 Following the cantonal government’s decision of fall 2018 to stop using their own system 
and outsource the internet voting service to an external provider from the beginning of 2020, 
on 14 May 2019 the cantonal parliament voted a draft law, which, requires that the design, 
management and exploitation of an internet voting system remains in public administra-
tion’s hands. The Government of Geneva expressed this position – of an internet voting sys-
tem in public hands – at the consultation on the proposed amendment of PRA (see fn. 27). 
On 19 June 2019 the cantonal Government decided to advance the deadline and stop using 
the Geneva system with immediate effect. 
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4.3 Future directions? 
Putting an end to the experimental phase and transforming e-voting into an ordinary 
voting channel similar to the postal and polling station voting proves to be very chal-
lenging. On 26 June 2019, the federal Government decided to delay its introduction as 
a regular voting channel and reframe the trial phase. Depending on the outcome of the 
recent popular initiative to introduce a moratorium on e-voting and the interpretation 
of its requirements, e-voting may even become impossible until its control by the 
layman is ensured.87  
Cooperation with research has been crucial in developing second generation sys-
tems that offer verifiability and transparency. However, cooperation is important not 
only in order to develop and evaluate solutions that respect the federal regulation. 
More should be done already when defining an e-voting policy and regulation. The 
last decision of the federal Government announced “greater involvement of scientific 
specialists”. This seems to point into the right direction and should be welcomed.  
The contribution of end-to-end verifiability to the security of the internet voting 
needs a new reflection. Does researchers’ consensus on developing end-to-end verifi-
able systems need an update? Are elections appropriate playground to try and test 
end-to-end verifiability? Are there undisputed techniques to achieve “optimum” secu-
rity?  
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Abstract. We propose security models for everlasting privacy, which
is a property that protects the content of the votes cast in electronic
elections against future and powerful adversaries. Initially everlasting
privacy was treated synonymously with information theoretic privacy
and did not take advantage of the information available to the adversary
and his behavior during or after the election. More recent works provided
relaxations of the concept, considering the view of a future adversary
as well. We integrate all these approaches into game-based denitions.
This allows us to contrast the two main proposals to achieve everlasting
privacy, namely perfectly hiding commitment schemes and anonymous
channels.
Keywords: Electronic voting, everlasting privacy, perfectly hiding com-
mitment schemes, blind signatures, anonymous channels
1 Introduction
Electronic voting is not simply a digital analogue for traditional elections. It
aims to improve the voting process by formally dening, analyzing and seeking
to satisfy dicult and conicting security properties.
Veriability aims to assure candidates and voters that all votes have been
considered and incorporated into the result. Its close relation with the integrity
of the election process and the acceptance of its output, makes veriability a very
important property, extensively studied [8] and implemented in many protocols
under computational assumptions or unconditionally [1,16].
Privacy hides the choice of a voter from the talliers, other voters or external
agents in order to free her from external pressure and enable her to express her
true will. Veriability without privacy makes no sense. If one assumes that the
contents of all votes are publicly known and linked to individuals, then they
can in eect be dictated by external agents applying emotional, personal, social
and economic pressures. As a result, one cannot be sure that a vote represents
the true will of a voter, as the voter could have yielded to these external forces.
Thus, the vote cast would not be the one that was intended. In that sense, it
would not dier that much from a vote altered by a malicious entity, as is the
case with the veriability threat model.
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Privacy has been studied in many variations, in relation to the capabilities
of an adversary and its duration. A rst level of privacy protections aims to
guard against passive adversaries that want to learn the behavior of a particular
voter (subset). This has been implemented in two ways: by hiding the contents
of the vote or by disassociating the voter identity from the ballot. The former is
usually achieved using a threshold cryptosystem with homomorphic properties,
while for the latter an anonymity primitive such as mixnets [6] or blind signatures
[7] is applied to the communication channel between the voter and the election
authorities. The actual level of privacy oered depends on the implementation.
Homomorphic cryptosystems and mixnets usually provide computational and
trust guarantees, as it is generally assumed that there will be an honest subset
of participants that will follow the protocol. This means that they will refrain
from opening individual votes but will decrypt only the result of the nal stage.
Blind signatures, on the other hand, can oer information-theoretic protection.
Other stronger types of privacy include receipt freeness [3], which protects
the voters against `themselves' and discourages vote selling. Coercion resistance
[14] concerns active adversaries that aim to dictate voter behavior with methods
ranging from abstention, to random voting and impersonation. Perfect ballot
secrecy [15] proposed in the context of boardroom voting schemes, guarantees
that knowledge about the partial tally of a subset of the voters can be computed
only by a coalition of all the remaining voters. However, in all of these cases the
adversary is computationally restricted.
Everlasting privacy. A less researched variation of privacy is everlasting privacy.
Its study, formally initiated by Moran and Naor in [18], focuses on preventing
vote leaks from attacks by powerful future adversaries. It is motivated by the
observation that in most cases, vote privacy is only protected by a cryptosystem
the security of which is based on computational assumptions such as the in-
tractability of the Die-Hellman problem [4]. These assumptions, however, may
be broken or rendered obsolete in the (not too) distant future, as both the theory
and the practice of cryptographic attacks always gets better. This means that
votes encrypted with small keys are in danger of being revealed, even without the
computational assumption being broken. As famously conjectured by Shamir, at
the 2006 RSA Conference cryptographers' panel, all cryptographic keys used at
that time would remain secure for less than thirty years (cf. [18]).
The situation is made worse, because veriability requires utilizing public
evidence generated by the election system. These pieces of data are meant to
be widely available and thus it is easy for an adversary to obtain them, even in
part. However, one must bear in mind that the adversaries against voting sys-
tems are potentially powerful state agencies with enormous budgets and without
time constraints. As a result, they have the capability to collect and store large
amounts of election related data. Furthermore, as large-scale elections are or-
ganized by the government, these agencies can be considered `insiders', having
access to even private parts of the election transcript. Finally, these agencies
can obtain information exchanged through computer and communication net-
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works, both through mass surveillance as well as with the cooperation of the
telecommunication companies.
The problem of privacy is exacerbated, as the information concealed in vot-
ing does not lose its value, contrary to protected messages in other common
cryptographic scenarios. Indeed, one can easily imagine a future authoritarian
regime that tries to gather evidence about its subjects based on past democratic
elections in cooperation with the state intelligence agency. This evidence might
prompt actions ranging from surveillance to questioning and even more severe
repercussions. As noted in [18], such dangers constitute an indirect coercion
attempt. In fact, since there are many potential coercers the only rational reac-
tion from a voter fearing all possible adverse scenarios is to abstain. Everlasting
privacy seeks to protect the secrecy of individual votes in such scenarios.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose the rst game-based denitions
for everlasting privacy. Our denitions are generic, which means that they do
not consider the cryptographic primitives that will be used in order to achieve
this property. This has not been the case so far (cf. Section 2).
More specically we consider the adversarial capabilities in terms of both data
collection and computational power. To model this, we assume two adversaries:
The rst is contemporary to the election, where he can participate actively (using
corrupted voters) and passively (by monitoring communications between the
voters and the authorities). He is computationally bounded, though. The second
adversary is computationally unbounded but operates (long) after the election is
over. The two adversaries can communicate and as a result the future adversary
can obtain election transcripts and auxiliary information.
The motivation for this capability stems from the reasonable assumption that
there exist powerful entities (e.g. governmental agencies) that might passively
hoard election data (among other things as demonstrated by revelations such as
Snowden's). It is realistic to assume that a future totalitarian regime will also
take control of these agencies (among other things) and have access to their data
collection.
By elaborating on the communication options between the present and the
future adversary we dene two types of everlasting privacy: strong and weak ev-
erlasting privacy, the latter corresponding to the notion of practical everlasting
privacy of [2]. Our approach has the added side eect that it associates everlast-
ing privacy with contemporary privacy, which is a relation that, to the best of
our knowledge, has not been explored in the literature.
We then apply these threat models of everlasting privacy, against a generic
voting scheme. Our analysis focuses particularly on the information gathering
capabilities of both adversaries, in relation to the communication channels used.
We reason that perfectly hiding commitment schemes do not oer the same
levels of protection as anonymous channels, since they cannot hide auxiliary
communication information, that can be utilized by a powerful future adversary
with insider information.
142
2 Related work
The term everlasting privacy was coined in [18]. However, there have been pre-
vious works that tackle the same problem, even if they do not use the particular
name. For instance, in [9] the voter uses the information theoretically hiding Ped-
ersen commitment scheme to commit to the vote. The openings are then secret
shared to the authorities using private channels and homomorphically combined.
In order to be veriable, all exchanged data are stored in a Bulletin Board, mod-
elled as a public broadcast channel with memory. Unfortunately, an adversary
that hoards its contents can later use his advanced capabilities to break the
privacy of the encrypted shares and reconstruct the votes. Interestingly, in this
respect, it can be noted that the blind signature-based protocol of [12], achieves
this goal as well, if one assumes a perfectly anonymous channel (as Theorem 3
of [12] points). The use of this primitive resembles the shuing of the ballot box
contents, which in traditional elections provides a sense of everlasting privacy to
the average voter, who as a human is computationally restricted.
The protocols of Moran and Naor [18,19] further elaborate on providing ev-
erlasting privacy through perfectly hiding commitment schemes. They propose a
concrete voting system that provides universal veriability, receipt freeness and
everlasting privacy. Additionally, they do not require the voter to perform com-
plex calculations which makes their scheme easily usable by humans. In more
details, their proposal consists of two authorities that communicate through a
private channel and cooperate in order to produce the commitments that the
voter selects. To tally the votes, the authorities work together (privately again)
to shue the commitments and their openings. The latter are encrypted sepa-
rately using a homomorphic cryptosystem providing computational secrecy. Con-
sequently, one of them can open the perfectly hiding commitments and count
the result. Everlasting privacy is achieved under the assumption that the two
authorities do not collude, and the commitment openings are not made public
and thus available to the future adversary. If only a single authority is hon-
est, then the scheme of Moran and Naor only provides computational privacy,
while if both authorities are corrupted then the system provides only correct-
ness. Despite proving the security of their protocol in the UC framework, the
threat model for everlasting privacy isn't formally captured. It merely rests on
the perfect secrecy of the commitment scheme and an informal description of
the adversary's capabilities. Note that in the future an attacker, that functions
as an insider, can have an equivalent eect as if the two authorities cooperated.
Subsequent works further elaborate and generalize this technique of splitting
voting data into public and private parts, where the private data are never given
to the adversary thus achieving a special version of everlasting privacy - towards
the public. For instance, in [11] the authors apply this procedure to the Helios [1]
voting system, by replacing the exponential ElGamal encryptions with Pedersen
commitments that are published to the Bulletin Board. Their opening values
are sent to the tallier encrypted through private channels. In [10], a relevant
primitive - commitment consistent encryption (CCE) is introduced. It allows the
voters to derive commitments from their encrypted votes. These commitments
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are then posted to a public Bulletin Board for veriability purposes. If they are
perfectly hiding, then the voting scheme has everlasting privacy. Tallying takes
place in parallel using a private Bulletin Board, where the decryption of the result
of the homomorphic combination of the votes takes place. They also provide
security denitions for the privacy properties of their particular scheme but not
for everlasting privacy in general. Furthermore, in [5] this splitting technique
is applied to create two synchronized mixnets that operate in parallel, mixing
public commitments and private decommitment values respectively.
The central idea in all the works presented so far is that a future adversary
might be more powerful in terms of computing power, but he will lack access to
data contemporary to the election or private data available to the authorities.
This was noted and formalized in [2] with the notion of practical everlasting
privacy. However, the formalization used the applied pi-calculus and not the
more usual indistinguishability cryptographic games. Using automated tools the
authors of [2] proved that the protocols of [19] and [11] possess practical ever-
lasting privacy. However, they did not apply their denition to schemes based
on blind signatures and anonymous channels. Moreover, the reliance on private
channels assumes an external adversary, an adversary, that is, who has a view
of the system similar to the view of the voter. This excludes adversaries that
cooperate with the election authorities, who in our opinion are more powerful
and more likely to be the perpetrators of a future attack.
More recent works revisit the idea of an anonymous channel as a way to add
everlasting privacy to voting schemes. In [17], the voter casts an unencrypted
choice to the Bulletin Board along with commitments to their voting credential.
The use of an anonymous channel and the fact that the voting credential consists
of two parts, prevents a future adversary from associating the choice of a voter
with her identity. Along the same lines, in [13], the authors add coercion resis-
tance to the classic protocol of [12]. They also solve the ballot stung problem of
blind signature based systems using a primitive called Publicly Auditable Blind
Signatures, an extension of [20], which forces the election authority to veriably
accept or reject ballots for counting. The advantage of their scheme is that it
requires no private channels between voters and authorities as all the election
data are found in the Bulletin Board. The blindness of the signatures along with
the use of an anonymous channel facilitates everlasting privacy.
3 Voting system syntax
We build our denitions on an abstract election scheme that incorporates ideas
from many proposals in the literature in order to be as generic as possible. It is
associated with three parameters, the security parameter , the number of voters
n and the number of possible choices m. The election scheme is controlled by an
Election Authority EA, which is stateful and its state is updated in every step
of the protocol. In the description that follows we omit this update functionality
for simplicity.
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We assume the existence of a publicly accessible Bulletin Board where all
the election related data is stored. We refer to the current transcript of the
Bulletin Board as BB and we assume that whenever it is used, it contains all
the data already written to it. We note that publicly available information such
as parameters and public keys are always appended to the public transcript and
thus, the BB would suce as the public input in the denitions of the scheme.
However, we explicitly include such parameters in order to make the algorithms'
and protocols' denitions clearer. When we would like to refer to the Bulletin
Board as a functionality and not as a data store we use a method invocation-like
syntax and we write BB(). Notationally, we use := for assignment, = for equality,
and ( for an append operation.
Denition 1. An election scheme
ES = (Setup;Register;SetupElection;Authorize;Vote;Tally;Verify)
is a tuple of algorithms and protocols executed by the election authority EA,
the Bulletin Board BB and the set of voters V = fV1; : : : ;Vng parametrized by
; n;m 2 N such that:
{ (paramsEA; skEA; pkEA) := Setup(1
)
Setup is an algorithm executed by the EA which on input 1 outputs public
parameters of the ES and a key pair of the EA (skEA; pkEA). The Bulletin
Board transcript BB is appended with (params; pkEA).
{ (pki; (ski; pki)) := RegisterhEA(skEA);Vi(); ii
Register is a protocol executed between a voter Vi and the EA. The common
input is the voter id, i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and the output is a voter public key
pki (available to both parties) and a secret key ski as private output of the
voter. The values (i; pki) are appended to the BB. We must stress here, that
is not obligatory for voters to have a key pair. However, its existence will
enable our generic voting scheme to model protocols like [14], that utilize
voter credentials for remote voting and coercion resistance.
{ (I;C) := SetupElection(skEA; n;m; params;Election-information)
The EA with input its secret key skEA, the number of voters n, the number
of choices m and additional election information (e.g. duration) outputs the
set of the eligible voters for the election I  f1; : : : ; ng and the candidate
slate C which contains encodings of the choices. The tuple of lists (I;C) is
posted to the BB.
{ (?; (bi; bi)) := AuthorizehEA(skEA);Vi(ci; ski); params; pkEA; pki; I;C;BBi
Authorize is a protocol executed between the EA and a voter Vi. The private
input of the EA is its secret key skEA and the private input of the voter Vi is
her choice of candidate ci 2 C and her secret key ski. The public input con-
sists of the system parameters, the corresponding public keys pkEA; pki, the
set of eligible voters I, the candidate slate C and the contents of the BB. The
protocol outputs the ballot bi, which is a transformation (i.e. encryption) of
ci and a proof bi of the correctness of this transformation, usually a Non
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Interactive Zero Knowledge Proof Of Knowledge. The election authority re-
ceives no output from this functionality. We again assume that the protocol
transcript is appended to the BB.
{ BB ( VotehBB();Vi(bi; bi)i
Vote is a protocol executed between the voter Vi and the Bulletin Board
BB. The voter Vi essentially appends the authorized ballot bi to the election
transcript.
{ (T; T) := Tally(skEA; params;C;BB)
Tally is an algorithm executed by the election authority with input the secret
key of the EA, the parameters of the scheme params, the candidate slate C
and the transcript BB of the Bulletin Board and outputs the election tally
T and a proof T. The output is appended to the Bulletin Board BB.
{ f0; 1g = Verify(T; params; pkEA;BB;C; I;bi; bi ; T)
Verify is an algorithm executed by any interested party (voters or public in-
terest organizations) with input the election tally T, the parameters of the
scheme params, the public key of the EA pkEA, the contents of the Bulletin
Board BB, the candidate slate C, the set of eligible voters for the election
I, the authorized ballot b and the two proofs T; bi . The output is a bit
representing the result of the election verication. Verify can indeed be exe-
cuted by any interested party using all the ballots, for universal veriability
purposes, since all inputs can be found in the BB.
4 Everlasting privacy formalization
We now formally dene a voting's system properties regarding privacy. For this
reason we consider an adversary, who can corrupt voters and use them with
the aim to learn what the honest voters voted. We examine privacy from two
aspects: The rst concerns `normal' privacy, which models the protection that
voters require during or shortly after the elections. The second applies to the
`everlasting' variation of privacy and models how the voters will be protected
(long) after voting has nished. Previously these two denitions were examined
independently in the voting literature. However, we note that these properties are
intertwined, as an adversary might be motivated to participate in an election,
gather evidence by exploiting the voting system and the corrupt voters and
possibly use these pieces of information later in time when various constraints
might not hold.
More specically, our adversary is assumed to have the following capabilities:
{ He can actively participate in the elections, corrupt voters and collect all data
generated by the voting system. During these interventions he is assumed to
have computational constraints, as his rst goal is to break the privacy of
the honest voters during the original election timeframe.
{ In the future, he can passively (as there will be no voting taking place) exam-
ine the election transcript and extract information about the voters' choices.
This adversary is modelled as having unbounded computational capabili-
ties, reecting the fact that in the future the computational assumptions
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that protect the votes might not apply due to technological improvements.
This future adversary might or might not utilize only the publicly available
election information, thus performing either an insider or an outsider attack
as discussed in Section 2.
We consider all these cases in our denitions, by assuming a pair of algorithms
(A;A0) where A is a PPT algorithm and A0 is computationally unbounded. The
former participates actively in the election by corrupting voters and the latter
looks at the election transcript and (possibly) the information gathered by A
denoted by viewA.
Privacy. The privacy game is a variation of the one presented in [16]. We as-
sume that A is stateful and its state is updated whenever he performs some
action in the game. We complete the notation introduced in Section 3 with the
use of the symbol  to denote the output of an algorithm, and  for infor-
mation interchange using a communication channel. Every such communication
leaks miscellaneous data that are not essential to the protocol but can be used by
the adversary to break the system. Such data include network addresses, times-
tamping information and more. We denote by Aux such miscellaneous data and
stress that they will be included in the view of the adversary viewA. To denote
the execution of one of the functionalities f dened in Section 3 by an entity E
with parameters params we use the following notation: E(params; f).
In the privacy game (Algorithm 1) the challenger C takes the role of the EA,
the BB and the honest voters. It ips a coin and executes the Setup functionality.
After appending its output to the BB it interacts with each voter in order to
complete the Register protocol. Subsequently A executes the SetupElection func-
tionality and dynamically decides which voters to corrupt. If voter i is corrupted,
then the challenger presents to A the private key ski and gives full control to
him. The challenger retains control of the honest voters. The adversary sched-
ules concurrent executions of the Authorize and Vote functionalities for all voters
in the most favorable manner to him. If a voter is corrupted, A executes these
functionalities in her place using a choice ci;A of his own. If a voter is honest,
then C plays her role, receives 2 selections c0; c1 2 C and provides to A the
results of Authorize;Vote as well as the auxiliary information (such as network
trac, timestamps etc.). The vote cast by C on behalf of the honest voters is
dened by a coin ip. When all voters have nished executions of their protocols,
C executes the Tally functionality and announces the result. A then receives the
full contents of the BB and auxiliary information Aux and tries to guess the bit
b. Note that the adversary has full access to the BB during the game and as a
result he can retrieve its contents at will and not only when he is challenged to
guess.
Denition 2. A voting scheme  is private if for every PPT algorithm A there
exists a negligible function  such that for every n;m 2 Z it holds that
Pr[PrivA;(1; n;m) = 1]  1
2
+ ()
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Algorithm 1: Privacy Game PrivA;(1; n;m)
Input : 1; n;m
Output: result 2 f0; 1g
/* Challenger selects random bit and executes setup */
1 b C(f0; 1g)
2 (paramsEA; skEA; pkEA) C(1;Setup)
/* Challenger registers voters */
3 for i 2 [n] do
4 (ski; pki;Aux) C(EA(skEA);Vi;Register)
5 end
/* Adversary setups election */
6 (I;C) A(paramsEA; n;m; pkEA; fpkigi2[n];SetupElection)
/* Voters perform authorization in the order selected by the
adversary */
7 for i 2 I do
/* Adversary chooses voters to corrupt */
8 if A(i; corrupt) = 1 then
9 Vc ( fig
/* Adversary performs Authorize for corrupted voters */
10 (bi; bi ;Aux)
A(EA(skEA);A(ci;A; ski); params; pkEA; pki; I;C;BB;Authorize)
11 else
/* The adversary presents two choices and challenger performs
Authorize */
12 (c0; c1) A()
13 (bi; bi ;Aux)
C(EA(skEA);Vi(cb; ski); params; pkEA; pki; I;C;BB;Authorize)
14 end
15 end
16 Vh := InVc
/* Challenger votes for the set of honest voters in an arbitrary
order */
17 for i 2 Vh do
18 (BB;Aux) C(BB();Vi(bi);Vote)
19 end
/* Adversary votes for the set of corrupted voters. */
20 for i 2 Vc do
21 (BB;Aux) A(BB();A(bi);Vote)
22 end
/* Tally is executed by the challenger */
23 (T; T) C(skEA; params;C;BB;Tally)
/* Define partial tallies for honest voters against c0; c1 */
24 T0 := T
c0
BBVh
25 T1 := T
c1
BBVh
26 b0 A(T0; T1; params;BB;Aux;guess)
27 if T0 = T1 and b = b
0 then
28 return 1
29 else
30 return 0
31 end
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Algorithm 2: Strong Everlasting Privacy Game
StrongEverPrivA0;(1
; n;m)
Input : 1; n;m
Output: result 2 f0; 1g
/* Challenger selects random bit */
1 b R f0; 1g
/* A0 initialises A with honest voter choices and corruption
strategy */
2 A  A0(c0; c1; Vc)
/* Challenger executes the election system against A */
3 (BB;Aux) C(1; n;m; cb; ;A)
/* tallies for honest voters against c0; c1 */
4 T0 := T
c0
BBVh
5 T1 := T
c1
BBVh
6 b0 A0(T0; T1; params;BB; viewA;guess)
7 if T0 = T1 and b = b
0 then
8 return 1
9 else
10 return 0
11 end
Everlasting Privacy. For the everlasting privacy property, we dene two games
in order to capture the dierences in the strategy and knowledge of the future
adversary. In both games the adversary A0 is unbounded and invokes the elec-
tion system that is controlled by the challenger. The dierence is that in the
StrongEverPriv game, A0 collaborates with the computationally constrained ad-
versary A, receiving his full state, and utilizes his view including all the auxiliary
data he has collected. On the other hand, in the weak everlasting privacy game
A0 operates only on the publicly available election data, assumed to be contained
in the BB. In both cases A0 tries to guess the result of the coin ip b.
Denition 3. A voting scheme  has the strong everlasting privacy property
if for every pair of algorithms A;A0, where A is PPT, there exists a negligible
function  such that for every n;m 2 Z it holds that
Pr[StrongEverPrivA;A0;(1
; n;m) = 1]  1
2
+ ()
Denition 4. A voting scheme  has the weak everlasting privacy property if
for every algorithm A0 there exists a negligible function  such that for every
n;m 2 Z it holds that
Pr[WeakEverPrivA0;(1; n;m) = 1]  1
2
+ ()
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Algorithm 3: Weak Everlasting Privacy Game
WeakEverPrivA0;(1; n;m)
Input : 1; n;m
Output: result 2 f0; 1g
/* Challenger selects random bit */
1 b R f0; 1g
/* Selection of honest voter choices */
2 (c0; c1) A0(1; n;m)
/* Challenger executes the election system using cb */
3 (BB;Aux) C(1; n;m; cb; )
/* tallies for honest voters against c0; c1 */
4 T0 := T
c0
BBVh
5 T1 := T
c1
BBVh
6 b0 A0(T0; T1; params;BB;guess)
7 if T0 = T1 and b = b
0 then
8 return 1
9 else
10 return 0
11 end
5 Analysis
Having formalized the desired security notions, we now discuss the necessary
conditions to satisfy them. In particular, we focus on the data interchanged
during the execution of various functionalities.
In Algorithm 1 (line 4) the Register functionality generates the voter creden-
tials. We assume that these have private and public parts. All voting systems in-
clude a similar functionality, mostly using traditional (i.e. not electronic means).
In most cases it does not produce specialized credentials for the voters, except
in the case of voting systems based on the JCJ coercion resistance framework
[14]. Such systems impose the strictest of requirements for this initial commu-
nication between the voter and the authorities, i.e. an untappable channel. The
reason for this is that the private data ought to be out of reach for the adversary
in case - the coercer - so that the voter can deny a purported private key and
successfully apply a coercion resistance strategy. The inconvenience imposed by
the untappable channel, is mitigated by the fact that it takes place only once
and is later applied to many elections. However, such a channel is not necessary
for everlasting privacy.
The more interesting parts of the election system are the execution of the
Authorize and Vote functionalities in Algorithm 1 (lines 13 and 20 respectively).
Note that in many systems these functionalities are integrated, as the authoriza-
tion is assumed to take place `outside' of the election system, in a manner similar
to the registration. In any case, the voter will interact with the election system
and post her ballot to the BB using (a variation of) these functionalities. The
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output of this process will be the election ballot in encrypted form and auxiliary
information (such as network information, timestamps etc.), both of which may
be of interest to the future adversary. Its unlimited computational power will
enable the decryption of the ballot and in turn the linking of the contents of the
ballot to the voter.
A system providing everlasting privacy must act on this transfer of informa-
tion and prevent the data leak. Two options have been proposed on this matter.
The rst one is to hide the choice of the voter, inside the ballot bi, using an
information theoretically hiding commitment scheme. This means that the de-
commitment values must be somehow exchanged in order to tally the result.
Usually this takes place using private channels with the EA. In our model, this
approach does not provide any advantage and is doomed not to possess strong
everlasting privacy. This occurs because the strong adversary in Algorithm 2 has
access to the private channels and the auxiliary information. More specically,
this approach essentially repeats the posting of the ballot, since an encrypted
ballot is essentially the same as a commitment opening, exchanged through a
private channel. In both cases the auxiliary information Aux provided to A0 will
enable linking the voter to the vote. More specically in the strong everlasting
privacy game (Algorithm 2) the view of A contains both network identifying
information valid during the elections as well as the decommitment values. As
a result, A0 can win the game by recovering the votes of the honest voters and
guessing the bit. This is not the case with the weak everlasting privacy game
(Algorithm 3) as A0 views only the publicly available information in the BB. As
a result, he might have access to the vote, but he lacks information about the
voter identity.
Another alternative is the use of an anonymous channel. This has the im-
mediate eect that the auxiliary information Aux is in eect nullied, as the
network addresses are hidden. Note that the anonymous channel must not only
hide identity information, but the casting order as well. If this is not the case
than an adversary that schedules casting to his advantage can break the secrecy
of the vote. All he needs to do is have the corrupt voters cast rst as shown in
Algorithm 1. Subsequently as each honest voter posts her ballot, he can decrypt
the last vote cast (using his unlimited computational power) and learn how she
voted. There are two ways to thwart this attack: Firstly, there can be an explicit
separation of the Authorize and Vote functionalities. In the beginning, all voters
authorize their ballot. After this phase has nished, they cast their votes. This
in eect uses the authorization phase to build an anonymity set that hides the
order of the votes cast in the voting phase. Alternatively, the same eect can be
achieved using an anonymous channel that hides the order of its input messages
apart from their source and origin. We consider such an assumption within the
range of functionalities provided by such a primitive. Finally, one must note
that an anonymous channel can be combined with commitment-based schemes,
to nullify the data that leaks during the use of the various communication chan-
nels.
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One might argue that an unconditionally anonymous channel is required,
in order to thwart the information-theoretically powerful future adversary from
reversing the anonymity. In our view, however, this is not the case. An anony-
mous channel might not be in (full) control of the future adversary. It might be
distributed, operated (in part) by a non-governmental organization and it might
even transcend nation boundaries. As a result, the future totalitarian regime
represented by the unbounded adversary, will not have access to the anonymous
network in its entirety and subsequently there is no need for it to be based on
information theoretically secure primitives. Such a system can successfully suc-
ceed in thwarting the adversary from guessing the honest voters' choices as it
will not be able to associate them with the real identities and thus achieve both
strong and weak everlasting privacy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced security models for everlasting privacy. Our ad-
versary has the strongest capabilities ever dened in the literature as he is both
active during the election by collecting data, as well as in the future where he can
break the cryptographic schemes used. Based on this we dened two models of
everlasting privacy. Our novel contribution was the modelling of the adversarial
capabilities both in terms of computational power and in terms of information
context. Using this model, we reasoned that a system based on commitments
opened using through channels cannot provide the strongest sense of everlast-
ing privacy, as an adversary with internal knowledge (such as a governmental
agency) will have access to both the decommitments and network information.
The use of an independent anonymous channel, however, will be able to thwart
such an attempt. While such a channel is not currently practical, especially at
a large scale, our model indicates that research for everlasting privacy will be
assisted by its existence. Anonymous channels have the added benet that they
resemble the way traditional elections work and as a result such a system will
be more accessible to the voter. Therefore, our paper gives one more reason to
continue the research in this direction. In future work, we plan to rene our
model and to provide more formal evidence based on concrete instantiations of
voting systems and anonymous channels.
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Improvements in Everlasting Privacy:
Efficient and Secure Zero Knowledge Proofs⋆
Thomas Haines and Clementine Gritti
NTNU, Trondheim, Norway (thomas.haines),(clementine.gritti)@ntnu.no
Abstract. Verifiable electronic voting promises to ensure the correct-
ness of elections even in the presence of a corrupt authority, while pro-
viding strong privacy guarantees. However, few practical systems with
end-to-end verifiability are expected to offer long term privacy, let alone
guarantee it. Since good guarantees of privacy are essential to the demo-
cratic process, good guarantees of everlasting privacy must be a major
goal of secure online voting systems. Various currently proposed solutions
rely on unusual constructions whose security has not been established.
Further, the cost of verifying the zero knowledge proofs of other solu-
tions has only been partially analysed. Our work builds upon Moran and
Naor’s solution—and its extensions, applications and generalisations—
to present a scheme which is additively homomorphic, efficient to verify,
and rests upon well studied assumptions.
Keywords: Voting · Everlasting Privacy · Zero Knowledge Proofs.
1 Introduction
Electronic voting schemes have been studied extensively and ongoing research
has developed schemes with increasingly strong privacy and integrity guarantees.
However, at present the literature has few solutions which are simultaneously
efficient, practical, and ensure the ongoing—also called everlasting—privacy of
elections. By practical we mean solutions which are easy to deploy securely.
Much of the existing literature relies on trusted setup or complicated recovery
procedures which reduce the trustworthiness of the election.
Many schemes have sketched how to do elections with everlasting privacy.
The constructions tend to use perfectly hiding commitment schemes and public
key encryption; this is made verifiable by use of Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)
for correct encryption and correct shuffling of ballots. At present, one of the most
common commitment schemes used is not proven secure [17]. A possible method
of mixing has been suggested but the security proof is missing [9]. Further, the
? The authors acknowledge support from the Luxembourg National Research Fund
(FNR) and the Research Council of Norway for the joint project SURCVS.
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suggested method of mixing is not sufficiently practical. The importance of ever-
lasting privacy has been widely recognised and prior works present constructions
with competing efficiency.
We want an electronic voting system with everlasting privacy, which is also
efficient to run. We introduce the following mechanisms that will enable us to de-
sign such a solution, namely Pedersen commitments [19], Sigma Protocols [8,10]
and mix-nets [7]. A Pedersen commitment [19] is an informational-theoretic hid-
ing and computational binding commitment scheme. It provides privacy regard-
less of the computational power of the adversary but its binding property reduces
to the Discrete Logarithm (DLOG) problem. Pedersen commitments are popular
in electronic voting schemes because the binding property is only relevant during
the course of the election, but privacy should be assured even after the election.
Multiparty computation [25] allows the secure evaluation of a function with-
out leaking anything more about the inputs than can be derived from the result
and the inputs previously known to the adversary. ZKPs [14] are a powerful tech-
nique which allows proving the correctness of a statement without leaking any
other information. The application of both multiparty computation and ZKPs to
voting is obvious and commonly mentioned [9,10]. However, the general strate-
gies for both techniques are too computationally intensive in most real elections.
Hence there are tailored solutions (such as those we present here) which take
advantage of the particularities of elections to construct more efficient solutions.
Sigma Protocols [8,10] are a class of protocols known to be secure under
composition. They tend to be more efficient than zero knowledge protocols. A
protocol of the correct form is proved to be a Sigma Protocol by showing it
satisfies the following properties: completeness, capturing that the protocol will
succeed when both parties are honest; special soundness, referring to the inabil-
ity of the adversary to generate proofs without knowing a witness; and honest
verifier zero knowledge, emphasising that the proof leaks negligible information.
Mix-nets were first proposed by Chaum [7], as a way to provide privacy. In the
context of verifiable electronic voting mix-nets are also required to be verifiable.
This is achieved by proving the correctness of the shuffle using a ZKP, of which
two techniques are dominant; namely those of Bayer and Groth [4] and that of
Terelius and Wikström [23]. Both techniques are general in nature and tend to
be optimised for the particularities of the system in which they are used.
1.1 Related Work
Much of the everlasting privacy literature relies on and builds upon Moran and
Naor’s work [17], which was modified as an extension to the web-based voting
Helios scheme [13]. This kind of extension reduces privacy attacks on the system
(from an external adversary) to information theoretic security rather than com-
putational. Hence, no future breakthrough in computation power, mathematics,
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or large-scale quantum computers will put the voters’ privacy at risk. Unfortu-
nately, the bulk of this work relies on primitives which are somewhat unusual.
Since Moran and Naor, a Pedersen commitment variant is often used but its se-
curity appears never to have been rigorously established. Indeed, there is much
literature which states that Pedersen commitments and Sigma Protocols are gen-
erally required to be defined in a prime order group, which this variant is not,
meaning its security should be rigorously established [3,6,20]. We denote, in the
paper, the combination of Paillier encryption [18] and Pedersen commitments
[19], pioneered by Moran and Naor, as the MN encryption scheme.
Arapinis et al. [2] recently showed in ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic
protocol verifier, that various constructions achieve everlasting privacy, some of
these solutions lose verifiability properties in exchange for everlasting privacy but
are highly practical in those situations where these verifiability properties are
not important. Cuvelier et al. [9] systematised much of the research by showing
how certain types of primitives can be securely combined. They also present an
elegant scheme called PPATC based on Abe et al.’s [1] commitment scheme on
bilinear pairings, which they show has efficient encryption on the order of 40
times faster then existing methods. The efficiency is due to the elliptic curves
which are more secure relative to their size than problems based on factorisation.
However, Cuvelier et al. [9] do not account for the verification complex-
ity. We show that Moran-Naor suggestion of Paillier encryption and Pedersen
commitments—refereed as PPATP in [9]—is at least as fast to verify as PPATC
when using the Sigma Protocol and mix-net we will detail later. Further, the
MN system supports homomorphic tallying where PPATC does not which is
a significant advantage in some situations. We note that Cuvelier et al. [9] do
sketch the same Sigma Protocol for correct encryption in their paper that we
later present, but provide no proof. We also note that recent work of Hazay et
al. [16], has made threshold key generation in Paillier practical as with PPATC.
Many of the existing solutions—except Cuvelier et al. [9]—are unsatisfactory
in one of two ways. They complicate practical issues, by detecting issues after
they have occurred rather than using ZKPs initially. Alternatively, they rely on
cut-and-choose based ZKPs rather than Sigma proofs, resulting in an increase
in computation and communication of about six orders of magnitude.
There are efficient mix-nets for both Paillier ciphertexts and Pedersen com-
mitments (e.g., Moran and Naor highlight Groth’s mix-net working for Paillier
encryption scheme [15]). However, mixing the commitments and ciphertexts sep-
arately significantly complicates the election process and weakens security. Cu-
velier et al. note that the general construction of Wikström [24] can be applied
but do not prove the required Sigma Protocol. Further, this construction is sig-
nificantly slower than the optimised constructions popular in electronic voting.
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1.2 Contributions
- We present the Sigma Protocol for re-encryption of the MN cryptosystem;
we also provide the proof for this Sigma Protocol and for the protocol for correct
encryption [9] of the MN cryptosystem;
- We provide the first proof of security for the existing modified Pedersen
commitment of semi-prime order;
- We present an efficient variant of ballot mixing;
- We give an analysis of verification efficiency of MN cryptosystem and com-
pare with PPATC, showing MN is as fast to verify when using the mix-net and
Sigma Protocols from above.
When Moran and Naor first introduced the MN cryptosystem they said “al-
though more efficient (zero knowledge) protocols exist for these applications, for
the purpose of this paper we concentrate on simplicity and ease of understand-
ing” [17]. Unfortunately in the decade since the follow up work has continued to
rely on cut-and-choose [5,13]; and, has found updating the existing zero knowl-
edge work to the requirements of the MN cryptosystem more difficult than Moran
and Naor expected. Our contribution finally closes this gap by providing efficient
proofs for encryption, re-encryption and shuffling.
1.3 Road Map
In the next section, we provide the notations and definitions useful for the com-
prehension of the paper. In Section 3, we present our security proof for the
modified Perdersen commitment scheme [17]. In Section 4, we describe our new
Sigma Protocol for re-encryption, and give the security proofs for the latter as
well for the Sigma Protocol for encryption [9]. In Section 5, we depict our veri-
fiable mix-net, improving the efficiency of the general construction proposed in
[24]. In Section 6, we analyse and compare the efficiency of our solution with the
similar work of Cuvelier et al. [9]. We conclude our paper in the last section.
2 Preliminaries and Building Blocks
Due to lack of space, we let the readers refer to [14] for zero knowledge notions,
and specifically to [10] for Sigma Protocols, and to [7] for mix-nets.
Notations Natural numbers are denoted by N and integers by Z. The ring of
integers modulo n is denoted Zn, and its multiplicative group Zn. Let M denote
a square matrix of order N from ZNNn . Let v be a vector of length N from ZNn .
Let hv;v’i = ∑Ni=1 viv0i denote the inner product. Given a finite set S, s  r S
means a uniformly random assignment of an element in S to the variable s.
A Polynomial-Time Algorithm (PPT) is a probabilistic algorithm running in
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time polynomial in its input size. A relationship R()() is a subset of the
Cartesian product of the sets  and . We denote by R1 _ R2 the relationship
consisting of the pairs ((x1; x2); w) s.t. (x1; w) 2 R1 or (x2; w) 2 R2. LetR1^R2
be the relationship consisting of the pairs ((x1; x2); w) s.t. (x1; w) 2 R1 and
(x2; w) 2 R2.
Discrete Logarithm Assumption Given primes p; q and n = pq, where kn+1
is also prime, for k 2 N. Let Gn denote the group of order n mod Zkn+1 and
let Gp, Gq denote the groups of order p and q respectively mod Zkn+1. Gp and
Gq are called Schnorr groups. The Discrete Logarithm (DLOG) assumptionis
believed to hold for the set of Schnorr groups.
Commitment Scheme
Definition 1. A homomorphic commitment scheme  is a triple of PPT algo-
rithms (:Setup;:Com;:Open), s.t.:
- The Setup algorithm for a given group G defines a set of valid Commit Keys
CK from which one is uniformly selected: CK 2 CK  r :Setup(G).
- A given Commit Key CK defines a message space MCK , randomness space
RCK , commitment space CCK , and opening space DCK . The Com algorithm
takes these as domain and co-domain: 8m 2 MCK ;8r 2 RCK ; (c 2 CCK ; d 2
DCK) :ComCK(m; r).
- The Open algorithm takes a commitment c 2 CCK and opening d 2 DCK and
returns either a message m 2MCK or null ?: :OpenCK(c 2 CCK ; d 2 DCK)!
m 2MCK or ?.
Correctness: 8CK 2 CK, 8m 2MCK , 8r 2 RCK , we have:OpenCK(:ComCK
(m; r)) = m.
Homomorphism: 8CK 2 CK, 8m1;m2 2 MCK , 8r1; r2 2 RCK , we have
:ComCK(m1; r1)  :ComCK(m2; r2) = :ComCK(m1 + m2; r1 + r2). The
homomorphic property implies the ability to re-randomise commitments: let
the ReRand algorithm be defined as :ReRandCK(c 2 CKCK ; r 2 RCK) =
c :ComCK(1; r).
Definition 2. Perfectly hiding property
of a commitment scheme: Given a
group G, a commitment scheme  is
perfectly hiding if for any adversary
A, it holds that Advhiding(A; ;G) =
Pr[Exphiding 1A (;G)]   Pr[Exphiding 0A
(;G)] = 0 (Fig. 1).
Exphiding bA (;G)
CK r :Setup(G)
(m0;m1; ) r A(CK)
r r RCK
(c; d) :ComCK(mb; r)
b0 r A(CK; c; )
Fig. 1. Hiding experiments
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Definition 3. Binding property of a
commitment scheme: Given a group
G, a commitment scheme  is
(t; ) binding if no t-time algorithm
A has Succbinding(A; ;G) >  in
ExpbindingA (;G) (Fig. 2). For simplicity
we will often drop t and  and refer to 
as binding.
ExpbindingA (;G)
CK  r :Setup(G)
(c; d; d0) r A(CK)
m :OpenCK(c; d)
m0  :OpenCK(c; d0)
if m 6= m0return 1
else return 0
Fig. 2. Binding experiment
Public Key Encryption Scheme
Definition 4. A homomorphic public key encryption scheme  is a triple of
PPT algorithms (:KeyGen; :Enc; :Dec), s.t.:
- The KeyGen algorithm defines a set of valid key pairs (PK;SK) from which
one is uniformly selected: (PK 2 PK; SK 2 SK) r :KeyGen(1k).
- A given public key PK defines a message space MPK , randomness space
RPK , and ciphertext space CPK . The Enc algorithm takes these as domain and
co-domain: 8PK 2 PK;8m 2MPK ;8r 2 RPK ; CT 2 CPK  :EncPK(m; r).
- The Dec algorithm takes a ciphertext CT 2 CPK and SK 2 SK and returns
either a message m 2 MPK or null ?: 8CT 2 CPK ; :DecSK(c) ! m 2
MPK or ?.
Correctness: 8(PK 2 PK; SK 2 SK)  r :KeyGen(1k);8m 2 MPK ;8r 2
RPK , we have :DecSK(:EncPK(m; r)) = m.
Homomorphism: 8PK 2 PK;8m1;m2 2MPK ;8r1; r2 2 RPK , we have:EncPK
(m1 +m2; r1 + r2) = :EncPK(m1; r1) :EncPK(m2; r2).
We succinctly recall the IND-CPA security concept for a public key encryp-
tion scheme as intuitively meaning that the adversary cannot distinguish between
the encryption of two known plaintexts.
2.1 Modified Pedersen Commitment Scheme
As we have already noted starting with Moran and Naor [17], Pedersen commit-
ments of semi-prime order have become a significant building block for voting
schemes with everlasting privacy. The construction proposed in [17] was to take
two safe primes p; q (i.e. to be of the form 2p + 1 for p prime), let n = pq and
work in the subgroup of order n of Z4n+1 where 4n+ 1 is also prime.
The modified Pedersen commitment scheme is the triple of PPT algorithms
(:Setup;:Com;:Open), s.t.:
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- CK  :Setup(G) s.t. CK = fG; g; hg. Given a group G of semi-prime order
n, let g be any generator ofG and choose h r G (with overwhelming probability
h will be a generator).
- A given Commit Key CK = fG; g; hg defines the message space MCK = Zn,
randomness space RCK = Zn, commitment space CCK = Gn, and opening
space DCK = (Zn;Zn). The :ComCK algorithm takes m 2 Zn; r 2 Zn and sets
c = grhm and d = (m; r).
- The :OpenCK algorithm takes a commitment c 2 Gn and opening d 2 (m 2
Zn; r 2 Zn). If c = grhm return m else return ?.
2.2 A Commitment Consistent Encryption System
The encryption scheme suggested by Moran and Naor [17] is a particular kind
of encryption system specialised for everlasting privacy, and commonly used in
verifiable electronic voting [12,13]. The standard suggestion, which we describe
below, is to use Pedersen commitments of semi-prime order and the generalised
Paillier cryptosystem. This notation–while slightly unusual–is useful because it
enables the direct application of various existing results, particularly those in
the area of mix-nets, as we shall see later. For convenience, we shall refer to this
system as the MN cryptosystem.
We now describe MN encryption scheme. Let  = (:KegGen; :Enc, :Dec)
denote a public key encryption scheme. Specifically let :KeyGen be the key
generation function of the (generalised) Paillier cryptosystem [18,11] producing
PK = (n) and SK = (d), where n = pq is a RSA modulus and d is the lowest
common multiple of p  1 and q   1. Choose k s.t. kn+ 1 is prime, and let g; h
be random generators of subgroup of order n in Zkn+1, denoted Gn. We denote
the ciphertext space CPK = Gn  Zn2  Zn2 , the message space MPK = Zn,
and the randomness space RPK = Zn  Zn  Zn.
We quickly explain the encryption process. Let :EncPK(m 2 Zn; (r 2
Zn; r0 2 Zn; r00 2 Zn)) produce CT = (c; ct1; ct2) = (grhm mod kn + 1; (1 +
n)mr0n mod n2; (1 + n)rr00n mod n2). That is we encode the message m in a
Pedersen commitment hidden by the randomness r, and we encrypt the opening
to this commitment in two Paillier ciphertexts. Let :DecSK(CT = (c; ct1; ct2))
be the decryption function. First use the Paillier decryption function to retrieve
m; r from ct1; ct2 respectively, then if c = grhm the result is m else ?.
We first make the observation that the  scheme is additively homomorphic,
that is :EncPK(m0; (r0; r00; r000 ))  :EncPK(m1; (r1; r01; r001 )) = :Encpk(m0 +
m1; (r0 + r1; r
0
0  r01; r000  r001 )). Secondly, that there is a shuffle friendly map [24]:
given CT = (c; ct1; ct2) and r = (r0; r1; r2), c0 = c  gr0 ; ct01 = ct1  rn1 ; ct02 =
ct2  (1 + n)r0rn2 . We denote this map by (PK(CT; r) = CPK RPK ! CPK).
The existence of this map is necessary to apply Wikström’s general mix-net
construction to the cryptosystem [24].
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In addition, we preserve the property of Paillier encryption and Pedersen
commitments that given a ciphertext CT = :EncPK(m0 2 Mpk; (r; r0; r00) 2
Rpk) and a message m1 it is easy to compute CTm1 = :Encpk(m0 m1; (r 
m1; r
0m1 ; r00m1)). In this case the exact effect on the randomness is a combination
of multiplication and exponentiation. Lastly, since the Pailler variant we use is
the variant of Damgård et al [11], threshold decryption is also available.
3 Security Proof for the Modified Pedersen Commitment
Scheme
The sketch of the security proof for the commitment scheme in [17] lacks sufficient
detail to be of use in establishing the security of the commitment. Since the group
n is not of prime order, given a tuple (m; r;m0; r0) if GCD(jm m0j; n) 6= 1 and
GCD(jr   r0j; n) 6= 1 then the sketched reduction to the DLOG problem fails.
While it is not particularly surprising that the DLOG problem holds in a group
whose order contains a large prime factor, it is important to show that this
is indeed true and furthermore does not break any other part of the system.
A correct reduction is hence needed. Moreover, we do not require the primes
to be safe and thus consider a subgroup of order n of Zkn+1 for an integer k.
Therefore, the above commitment scheme can be extended to the general case
with integers k; n such that kn+ 1 is prime. We now present the security proof
of the generalization of the modified Pedersen commitment scheme.
Proposition 1. The modified Pedersen commitment scheme  is a homomor-
phic perfectly hiding commitment scheme.
Proof. The correctness of the scheme follows immediately from the definitions
of :Com and :Open. The perfect hiding property of the scheme follows in the
same way as normal Pedersen commitment schemes: for any two messagesm0;m1
and commitment c there exist two unique random coins r0; r1 s.t. c = gr0hm0 and
c = gr1hm1 , and since the random coins are taken uniformly, the commitment
provides no information about which message was committed to.
The key to understanding the next part on the binding property is to recall
that for a cyclic group of semi-prime order n = pq, there are exactly two non-
trivial subgroups: one is of order p and the other q. If we let G be the subgroup of
Zkn+1 of order n, where kn+1 is prime, then the two non-trivial subgroups are
two Schnorr groups. The reduction we present in the next paragraph reduces the
binding property of the modified Pedersen commitment to the DLOG problem
in the two Schnorr groups, which we label Gp and Gq.
To show that the scheme is binding, we present a reduction in two parts.
First, we show that for any t-time adversary A against the modified Pedersen
commitment scheme  with Succbinding(A;;G) = , we can construct an
algorithm which–given a DLOG problem in Gp, and another in Gq–outputs the
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answer to at least one with probability . Then having observed against which
of the two groups the better success rate is achieved, we construct an adversary
against the DLOG problem in that group which succeeds with probability at
least 2 . This suffices to show that the binding property of the commitment
scheme cannot be broken with probability more than twice that of the DLOG
problem in the weakest of the two underlying Schnorr groups Gp and Gq.
There exists an efficiently computable isomorphism between the direct prod-
uct of Gp  Gq and Gn. The challenger takes the two subgroups of Gn and
a DLOG problem in each. It combines these to construct the commitment key
which it gives to the adversary. Since gp and gq are generators of their respective
groups Gp and Gq, if hp and hq are random elements (as they are in the DLOG
experiment) than this is indistinguishable from the honest run. The successful ad-
versaryA(G; g; h) outputs (c; (m; r); (m0; r0)) s.t.m 6= m0. If GCD(jm m0j; n) =
1 or GCD(jr   r0j; n) = 1 then we extract  = dloggh as normal with Pedersen
commitments and calculate dloggphp =  mod p and dloggqhq =  mod q. If
this is not the case, then w.l.o.g. GCD(jr  r0j; n) = GCD(jm m0j; n) = p and
hence there exists unique ;  2 Zq s.t. p = p mod n and hence  =  mod
q. By the Chinese remainder theorem  mod q = dloggqhq and we successfully
answer that.
Our solution is not only provably secure (under reasonable assumptions) but
also more general with the setting kn+ 1, with k 2 N, rather than 4n+ 1. The
homomorphism of the scheme follows immediately from the group properties
and the isomorphism of Zn and Gn.
4 Security Proofs for Sigma Protocols
We present two Sigma Protocols, one for correct encryption from [9] and a new
protocol for correct re-encryption; we believe that proofs of both Sigma Proto-
cols have never been published before. These proofs allow the realisation of an
electronic voting scheme that is secure (compared to without ZKPs) and highly
efficient (compared to the cut-and-choose solutions currently in the literature).
4.1 Sigma Protocol for Correct Encryption
The following Sigma Protocol for correct encryption was proposed by Cuvelier
et al. [9], though they omit the proof. Such protocol is used to prove that given
a ciphertext, one knows the inputs and uses them to generate that ciphertext.
Given CT = (c = grhm mod kn + 1; ct1 = (1 + n)mr0n mod n2; ct2 = (1 +
n)rr00n mod n2), we show that we know m 2 Zn and (r 2 Zn; r0 2 Zn; r00 2 Zn):
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1) Let t1; t2 be random elements in Zn and t3; t4 be random elements in Zn.
The prover computes  = gt1ht2 mod kn + 1;  = (1 + n)t2tn3 mod n2;  =
(1 + n)t1tn4 mod n2 and sends them to the verifier.
2) The verifier sends a challenge  chosen at random in Zn.
3) The prover computes s1 = t1+ r mod n; s2 = t2+ m mod n; s3 = t3 r0
mod n; s4 = t4  r00 mod n, and sends these to the verifier.
4) The verifier accepts if c = gs1hs2 mod kn + 1; ct1 = (1 + n)s2sn3 mod
n2; ct2 = (1 + n)
s1sn4 mod n2.
The transcript (with the elements exchanged between the prover and the verifier)
is ( 2 Gn;  2 Zn2 ;  2 Zn2 ;  2 Zn; s1 2 Zn; s2 2 Zn; s3 2 Zn; s4 2 Zn).
Security Proof
Proposition 2. The above protocol has perfect completeness, special soundness,
and honest verifier zero knowledge and is hence a Sigma Protocol.
Proof. Completeness follows trivially and is omitted due to lack of space.
Special Soundness Given two accepting transcripts (; ; ; ; s1; s2; s3; s4)
and (; ; ; 0; s01; s02; s03; s04), we show that r = s1 s
0
1
 0 ;m =
s2 s02
 0 ; r
0 = (s3=s03)
1
 0 ;
r00 = (s4=s04)
1
 0 must be valid given that two transcripts accept. The dif-
ference    0 has no inverse with negligible probability. To calculate r0 =
(s3=s
0
3)
1
 0 ; r00 = (s4=s04)
1
 0 , we use our knowledge of the message in ct1 and
ct2, extracted from s1 and s2, and the homomorphic property of Paillier encryp-
tion to create ct01 = r0n and ct02 = r00n. We can directly apply the technique from
Damgård et al. [11] to extract r0 and r00 from the elements s3; s03; s4; s04.
Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge Consider a transcript (; ; ; ; s1; s2; s3; s4).
In the honest run, t1; t2 are random elements in Zn, t3; t4 in Zn and  in Zn. To
simulate, choose s1; s2 from Zn, s3; s4 from Zn and  at random from Zn. Set
 = c 1 g
s1hs2 ,  = c 2 (1+n)s2sn3 ,  = c 3 (1+n)s1sn4 , that is a perfect simula-
tion. Moreover, the elements ;  are uniformly random in the honest run, and
the tuple (; s1; s2; s3; s4) is uniquely determined by (; ; ). In the simulation,
the elements s1; s2; s3; s4 are chosen uniformly at random and consequently ; 
are uniformly at random for fixed elements ; c; ct1; ct2.
4.2 Sigma Protocol for Correct Re-Encryption
We introduce the following Sigma Protocol for correct re-encryption. It is used
to prove that given a pair of ciphertexts, the second is a re-encryption of the
first.
Given CT = (c; ct1; ct2); CT 0 = (c0 = c  gr0 mod kn+ 1; ct01 = ct1  rn1 mod
n2; ct02 = ct2(1+n)r0rn2 mod n2), we show that we know (r0 2 Zn; r1 2 Zn; r2 2
Zn):
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1) Let t1 be a random element in Zn and t2; t3 be random elements in Zn.
The prover computes  = gt1 mod kn+ 1;  = tn2 mod n2;  = (1 + n)t1tn3 mod
n2 and sends them to the verifier.
2) The verifier sends a challenge  chosen at random in Zn.
3) The prover computes s1 = t1 + r0 mod n; s2 = t2  r1 mod n; s3 = t3  r2
mod n, and sends these to the verifier.
4) The verifier accepts if (c0=c) = gs1 ; (ct01=ct1) = sn2 ; (ct02=ct2) =
(1 + n)s1sn3 .
The transcript (with the elements exchanged between the prover and the verifier)
is ( 2 Gn;  2 Zn2 ;  2 Zn2 ;  2 Zn; s1 2 Zn; s2 2 Zn; s3 2 Zn).
Security Proof
Proposition 3. The above protocol has perfect completeness, special soundness,
and honest verifier zero knowledge and is hence a Sigma Protocol for correct
re-encryption.
Proof. Completeness follows trivially and is omitted due to lack of space.
Special Soundness Given two accepting transcripts (; ; ; ; s1; s2; s3) and
(; ; ; 0; s01; s
0
2; s
0
3), we show that r0 = s1 s
0
1
 0 ; r1 = (s2=s
0
2)
1
 0 ; r2 = (s3=s
0
3)
1
 0
must be valid given that two transcripts accept. The difference    0 has no in-
verse with negligible probability. To calculate r0 = (s3=s03)
1
 0 ; r00 = (s4=s04)
1
 0 ,
we use our knowledge of the message in ct1 and ct2 extracted from s1 and s2,
and the homomorphic property of Paillier encryption to create c02 = r0n and
c03 = r
00n. We can directly apply the technique from Damgård et al. [11] to
extract the randomenesses r0; r00 from the elements s3; s03; s4; s04.
Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge In the honest run, t1 is chosen at random
from Zn, t2; t3 from Zn and  from Zn. To simulate, we instead choose s1; s2; s3; 
at random and set  = gs1(c01=c1) ;  = sn2 (c02=c2) ;  = (1+n)s1sn3 (c03=c3) .
We get the same distribution in both cases.
5 A New Efficient Verifiable Mix-Net
Verifiable mixing is an important building block for almost all verifiable voting
systems. Given a vector of ciphertexts with known relationships to the voters,
mixing allows this link to be broken without allowing ballot modification or
substitution.
Wikström’s general result [24] shows that verifiable mixing is possible for
all cryptosystems on which a homomorphic map exists and an overwhelmingly
complete Sigma Protocol is known for re-encryption. However, this generic con-
struction gives an 8-round proof, while a more optimised instance is desirable for
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practicality. We can take advantage of special properties from our solution and
derive a secure 4-round proof. We illustrate a verifiable ballot mixing process in
Fig. 3 with three mixers. We now present our more efficient mixers. While there
Formally we operate two mixes, one on the
public bulletin board and on the secret bul-
letin board. At each step, the election au-
thorities check that the two versions of the
Pedersen commitments ej and cj match.
Our solution is similar to Demirel et al. [13],
but is actually shown to be secure and far
more computationally efficient. The green
arrows represent verifiable mixers, the red
arrows represent the equality of Pedersen
commitments at each stage and the blue ar-
row represents verifiable decryption. Fig. 3. Mixing with three authorities
are crucial differences (for instance, the composite group order), our optimisa-
tions and accompanying proofs are similar to those for the optimised ElGamal
version which is presented and proven by Terelius et al. [21]. We first detail the
mix-net for the public board, see Algorithm 1, and then the mix-net for the pri-
vate board, see Algorithm 2. We recall that  is permutation function induced by
the permutation matrixM and  is the re-encryption map defined in Subsection
2.2. We use 1 to denote the all one vector.
We define Rcom to be the relation consisting of pairs of tuples of the form
commitment key CK, commitment c, two distinct messagesM;M 0 and two asso-
ciated randomness vectors r and r0 s.t. c = :ComCK(M; r) = :ComCK(M 0; r0).
We also define R to be the relation consisting of pairs of tuples of the form
commitment key CK, commitment c, message M and associated randomness
vector r s.t. M is a permutation matrix and r = :ComCK(M; r). Let RshufPK be
the relation consisting of pairs of tuples of the form public key PK, two vectors
of ciphertexts CT = (ct1;    ; ctn) and CT0 = (ct01;    ; ct0n) and a permuta-
tion  and randomness vector r = (r1;    ; rn) such that ct0i = PK(ct(i); r(i))
for all i 2 [1; N ]. Let RshufrerandCK to be the relation consisting of pairs of tu-
ples of the form commit key CK, two commitment vectors c = (c1;    ; cn) and
c0 = (c01;    ; c0n), a permutation  and randomness vector r = (r1;    ; rn) such
that c0i = :ReRandCK(c(i); r(i)).
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Algorithm 1: Proof of Shuffle on Public Board
Common Input: Commitment parameters g; h; h1; :::; hN 2 Gn, two Pedersen
commitments e = (e1; :::; eN ) 2 GNn and
e0 = (e01; :::; e0N ) 2 GNn , and a permutation matrix commitment
c = (c1; :::; cN ).
Private Input : Permutation matrix M = (mi;j) 2 ZNNn , randomness
r = (r1; :::; rN ) 2 ZNn s.t. cj = grj
∏N
i=1 h
mj;i
i , and randomness
r0 = (r01; :::; r0N ) 2 ZNn s.t. e0i = e(i)gr
0
(i) for i; j 2 [1; N ].
1 V chooses u = (u1; :::; uN ) 2 ZNn randomly and hands u to P .
2 P defines u0 = (u01; :::; u0N ) = Mu and then chooses
r^ = (r^1; :::; r^N ),w^ = (w^1; :::; w^N ),w0 = (w01; :::; w0N ) 2 ZNn , and
w1; w2; w3; w4 2 Zn. P then defines r = h1; ri, ~r = hr; ui, r^ =∑Ni=1 r^i∏Nj=i+1 u0j
and r0 = hr0; ui. P hands to V , where we set c^0 = h and i 2 [1; N ],
c^i = g
r^i c^
u0i
i 1 t1 = g
w1 t2 = g
w2 t3 = g
w3
∏N
i=1 h
w0i
i t4 = g
 w4∏N
i=1(e
0
i)
w0i t^i = g
w^i c^
w0i
i 1
3 V chooses a challenge  2 Zn at random and sends it to P .
4 P then responds with:
s1 = w1 +   r s2 = w2 +   r^ s3 = w3 +   ~r s4 = w4 +   r0
s^i = w^i +   r^i s0i = w0i +   u0i
5 V accepts if and only if, for i 2 [1; N ],
t1 = (
∏N
i=1 ci=
∏N
i=1 hi)
 gs1 t2 = (c^N=h
∏N
i=1 ui) gs2 t3 = (
∏N
i=1 c
ui
i )
 gs3
∏N
i=1 h
s0i
i
t4 = (
∏N
i=1(ei)
ui) gs4
∏N
i=1(e
0
i)
s0i t^i = c^
 
i g
s^i c^
s0i
i 1
Algorithm 2: Proof of Shuffle on Private Board
Common Input: Commitment parameters g; h; h1; :::; hN 2 Gn, two ciphertexts
e = (e1; :::; eN ) 2 CPK and e0 = (e01; :::; e0n) 2 CPK , and a
permutation matrix commitment c = (c1; :::; cN ).
Private Input : Permutation matrix M = (mi;j) 2 ZNNn , randomness
r = (r1; :::; rN ) 2 ZNn s.t. cj = grj
∏N
i=1 h
mj;i
i , and randomness
r0 = (r01; :::; r0N ) 2 Rpk s.t. e0i = PK(e(i); r0(i)), for
i; j 2 [1; N ].
1 V chooses u = (u1; :::; uN ) 2 ZNn randomly and hands u to P .
2 P defines u0 = (u01; :::; u0N ) = Mu and then chooses
r^ = (r^1; :::; r^N ); w^ = (w^1; :::; w^N );w0 = (w01; :::; w0N ) 2 ZNn , and w1; w2; w3;2 Zn
and w4 2 RPK . P defines r = h1; ri, ~r = hr; ui, r^ =∑Ni=1 r^i∏Nj=i+1 u0j and
r0 = (
∑N
i=1 r
0
i;0ui;
∏N
i=1 r
0ui
i;1 ;
∏N
i=1 r
0ui
i;2 ). P hands to V , where we set c^0 = h and
i 2 [1; N ],
c^i = g
r^i c^
u0i
i 1 t1 = g
w1 t2 = g
w2 t3 = g
w3
∏N
i=1 h
w0i
i
t4 = :EncPK(1; w4)
∏N
i=1 e
0w0i
i t^i = g
w^i c^
w0i
i 1
3 V chooses a challenge  2 Zn at random and sends it to P .
4 P then responds with:
s1 = w1 +   r s2 = w2 +   r^ s3 = w3 +   ~r s4 = w4     r0
s^i = w^i +   r^i s0i = w0i +   u0i
5 V accepts if and only if, for i 2 [1; N ],
t1 = (
∏N
i=1 ci=
∏N
i=1 hi)
 gs1 t2 = (c^N=h
∏N
i=1 ui) gs2 t3 = (
∏N
i=1 c
ui
i )
 gs3
∏N
i=1 h
s0i
i
t4 = (
∏N
i=1(ei)
ui) :EncPK(1; s4)
∏N
i=1(e
0
i)
s0i t^i = c^
 
i g
s^i c^
s0i
i 1
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Proposition 4. Algorithm 1 is a perfectly complete, 4-round special soundness,
and honest verifier zero knowledge of the relationship Rcom _ (R ^RshufrerandCK ).
Proposition 5. Algorithm 2 is a perfectly complete, 4-round special soundness,
and honest verifier zero knowledge of the relationship Rcom _ (R ^RshufPK ).
Proof. Due to space limitations we must omit both proofs but they will be
present in the full version. Since it is infeasible under the discrete logarithm as-
sumption to find z where gz = h or to find a pair satisfyingRcom, the proposition
computationally implies a proof of knowledge of R ^RshufPK .
6 Comparison and Analysis of Efficiency
We study the efficiency of our solution and compare it with Cuvelier et al.’s
results [9]. In order to accurately confront both schemes, we adopt the similar
conventions to Cuvelier et al. The commitments used by PPATC scheme [9]
require an elliptic curve with a type 3 pairing to function. Type 3 pairing is a
pairing in which there exist no efficiently computable homomorphism between
G1 and G2 and where the Decisional Diffie-Hellmen is hard in both groups. We
assume an embedding degree of 16 such that elements of GT are of size p16.
We, also, associate a unit cost to the multiplication of two 256 bit integers.
While Cuvelier et al. supposed quadratic growth in the length of the operands,
we assume O(n1:5), which better reflects that many BigInteger libraries support
the optimised multiplication algorithms. We target a security level equivalent to
2048 bits RSA modulus N . We select G1 to be taken on Fp for a 256 bits long
prime p and G2 to be taken on Fp3 . The size of the target group is then 4096 bits,
and for simplicity we take pairing to cost 10 times the effort of a multiplication
in G1, this seems to hold for most real implementations.
We count the number of operations in Cuvelier et al.’s scheme and our solu-
tion. Tables 1 and 2 show these numbers for both encryption and opening veri-
fication. Let ExpZX denote the number of exponentiations in ZX , and MultGY
the number of multiplications in GY . Pairing is defined as the number of pair-
ing operations.
Scheme ExpZ
kn+1
ExpZ
n2
MultG1 MultG2 Total cost
MN [17] 3.375 4 0 0 1024896 multiplications
PPATC [9] 0 0 9 4 114432 multiplications
Table 1. Total number of operations executed for encryption - Total cost is obtained
according to the implementation setting.
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Scheme ExpZ
kn+1
ExpZ
n2
MultG1 MultG2 Pairing Total cost
MN [17] 1.125 0 0 0 0 79488 multiplications
PPATC [9] 0 0 1 0 3 119040 multiplications
Table 2. Total number of operations executed for opening verification - Total cost is
obtained according to the implementation setting.
While PPATC remains faster for the encryption phase than MN scheme,
the latter is 1:5 time faster for the verification phase than PPATC. In regards to
mixing, which is of course a very substantial part of the verification cost, we have
already shown how an optimised variant of Terelius and Wikström’s approach
[22] can be applied to MN cryptosystem.
Cuvelier et al. [9] suggested using Terelius and Wikström’s approach as well.
However, the efficiency of their general construction is poor compared to the op-
timised variants (especially when dealing with groups of composite order). The
PPATC scheme of Cuvelier et al. is a highly elegant construction but contrary
to expectations is not more efficient overall than our version of MN scheme [17].
Though, if the voting devices were unusually weak PPATC might still be pre-
ferred. In conclusion, while PPATC might still be preferred in some settings, in
others where homomorphic properties are desired MN scheme with our optimised
ZKPs are of comparable efficiency.
7 Conclusion
Ongoing privacy is fundamental for the proper functioning of elections but sig-
nificant gaps remained. We fixed several of the outstanding issues. We showed
that the modified Pedersen commitment is in fact secure and proved that the
Sigma Protocols for correct encryption and correct re-encryption are safe to
use. We also provided computational improvements to mixing and examined the
feasibility of a secure deployment of our solution. In doing this, we help make
everlasting privacy for homomorphic electronic voting a computationally feasible
and rigorously secure reality. We show that this approach provides verification
efficiency comparable to the most efficient non-homomorphic schemes.
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Abstract. Secret ballot elections are a notoriously difficult problem
given their unique set of mandated requirements. One of the primary
difficulties observed is the number and intensity of conflicting require-
ments. Unlike other domains, secret ballot elections do not permit the
customer or users to select which set of conflicting requirements is pre-
ferred when all are necessary for a fair and legitimate election. While
many papers mention these conflicts, little work to systematically iden-
tify, analyze, and resolve these conflicts has been undertaken. In this
paper, we identify and model the conflicts in secret ballot election re-
quirements, including end-to-end verifiability requirements, by using a
goal-oriented approach. Four primary goals are decomposed into sub-
goals and defined in this paper. Finally, this paper uses goal modeling to
graph and discuss the conflicts between sub-goals. As a part of this con-
flict identification effort, each conflict is explained along with examples
of real and theoretical voting solutions which demonstrate the conflict.
Future research in conflict analysis and resolution is also proposed.
Keywords: secret ballot elections · electronic voting · requirements en-
gineering · requirements conflicts · goal modeling.
1 Introduction
Secret ballot elections are often performed today with electronic voting systems.
An electronic voting (e-voting) system is a system for casting, collecting, and
reporting voter intent using predominately electronic means. The Council of Eu-
rope defines e-voting as “the use of electronic means to cast and/or count the
vote”[1]. While building a computer system to collect votes seems simple at first,
creating a system to run binding elections under a rigid set of technical specifica-
tions and complex legal frameworks is riddled with difficulties due to conflicting
requirements. A system developer or researcher who begins without a full un-
derstanding of the goals and requirements for an e-voting system is likely to
become frustrated by rework and unexpected sacrifices. A person with a better
understanding the requirements is likewise likely to become frustrated by the
overwhelming number of conflicts and a lack of a natural starting spot. This is
where conflict identification and modeling can help. For our conflict identifica-
tion and modeling effort, we have chosen to use a goal-oriented approach [23].
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Managing conflicts at the goal level provides more freedom for an implementer
to find adequate ways to handle conflicts, such as alternative goal refinements
and operationalizations, which may result in different system proposals [24]. By
applying a goal-oriented approach to identifying e-voting requirement conflicts,
this paper hopes to enable eventual conflict analysis and full conflict resolution
leading to better and more robust electronic voting solutions for secret ballot
elections.
Electronic voting can refer to various implementation models ranging in the
level of assistance and reliance on electronic components. [26] identifies at least
eight different elections forms ranging from paper-based electronic voting sys-
tems to remote electronic voting. In nearly all cases, electronic voting systems are
systems of systems that work together to define the election, design the ballots or
voting interface, deliver ballots, collect voter intent, tabulate and report results.
Moreover, a jurisdiction may deploy more than one electronic voting system or
merge various implementations to meet the demand of their diverse voting popu-
lation. This creates complex interactions which are difficult to evaluate without
a proper identification of the high-level goals for an electronic voting system.
Relying upon related work in requirements engineering, this paper presents four
primary goals as the basis for its analysis. These goals are universal for any
secret ballot election and must be met by any viable electronic voting system.
These are:
– Voters are afforded a Secret Ballot
– One Person is afforded and limited to One Vote
– Voters are provided Universal Access to the voting process
– The voting process is Transparent and Auditable
Further descriptions for these goals and a mapping to Volkimer’s principles
[25] are provided in Section 4.
2 Our Approach
Our approach builds upon these main goals to identify sub-goals which we then
use to identify and classify conflicts. We selected a goal-oriented approach be-
cause it provides flexibility for implementation while showing the natural ten-
sion between requirements. According to [23], goals are recognized to provide
the roots for detecting conflicts among requirements and for eventually resolv-
ing them. Modeling the interaction of goals supports a requirements elaboration
process that is more accurate and more likely to yield a viable product.
We selected a manual approach to conflict identification, as opposed to au-
tomated techniques. A manual approach is where conflicts are identified by a
requirements engineer or subject matter expert, which the author is both. An au-
tomated approach applies conflict identification techniques using software tools.
Automated techniques typically require the use of formal specifications for re-
quirements and any mistake that occurs during the formalization may lead to
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incorrect conflict detection. Our specific conflict identification approach ana-
lyzes the goals as implemented in real and theoretical e-voting applications and
identifies examples of where trade-offs were necessary due to goal conflicts.
Finally, we classify conflicts as either interference or divergence. Interference
is defined in [16] as the negative contribution of one requirement on another.
Interference causes tradeoffs in satisfying a set of requirements and often means
the requirements cannot be satisfied at the same time. Divergence between re-
quirements refers to situations where some combination of circumstances can
be found that makes the goals/requirements conflicting [24]. Divergence is a
frequent, weaker form of conflict [24].
Managing conflicts is a requirements engineering activity that consists of
three main activities: conflict identification, conflict analysis, and conflict res-
olution. Conflict identification detects the potential conflict. Conflict analysis
evaluates and investigates potential conflicts and their tradeoffs. Conflict resolu-
tion resolves the potential conflict [16]. Our effort focuses on conflict identifica-
tion with some discussion of conflict analysis. Conflict identification is visualized
using a goal modeling graph. This model can be used to evaluate current imple-
mentations, to assist in making trade-off decisions for future implementations,
to assist researchers in conducting more focused conflict analysis, and to identify
the primary areas in need of conflict resolution. Future research is proposed for
conflict analysis and conflict resolution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 discusses related work.
Section 4 provides the decomposed sub-goals stemming from the four primary
goals previously introduced. Section 5 reveals the goal model and discusses the
various conflicts it depicts. Section 6 presents future work and concludes the
paper.
3 Related Work
Identification and evaluation of requirements conflicts in secret ballot elections
is lacking in the literature. There is, however, significant work in requirements
engineering with a particular focus on requirements specification. Perhaps most
influential, Evaluation of Electronic Voting [26] contributes a standardized, con-
sistent, and exhaustive list of requirements for electronic voting systems. These
include system requirements, organizational requirements, and assurance re-
quirements. Volkamer provides these requirements for both stand-alone direct
recording electronic voting machines and for remote electronic voting machines.
Of note, the book provides a detailed review of many sources of e-voting require-
ments.
In [25], Volkamer, et al. discuss the importance of requirements engineering
for e-voting and discuss the development of a new catalog of e-voting require-
ments and corresponding assessment procedures. The authors introduce 6 prin-
ciples for which all of their requirements are associated. These are Secret, Free,
Equal, Universal, Direct, and Trust. These are used in this paper to help identify
goals and sub-goals.
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In [15], the authors analyze a subset of e-voting requirements and establish
a framework for considering various degrees to which these requirements can be
met. The authors consider that in some cases it may be desirable to vary the
degree to which these requirements must be met. In identifying multiple satis-
faction levels for these requirements, the authors contemplate that it may not be
possible to achieve the maximum level for all security requirements in parallel for
each election. Consequently, the authors propose potential future work to “iden-
tify tradeoffs and incompatibilities among individual levels of different security
requirements”. Our effort in this paper makes significant strides to achieve this
proposal.
Researchers of secure voting protocols and end-to-end verifiability have com-
mented many times about the inherent conflicts in the requirements. Public
Evidence from Secret Ballots [4] states that there is obviously tension between
convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy. In this work, Bern-
hard, et al. discuss many of the factors that make electronic voting a difficult
problem. These factors include no one is trusted, the need for evidence, and the
secret ballot. Notably, the paper explains the important requirements for secure
elections, the solutions already available from research, and then identifies the
most important directions for research. The authors present 31 open questions
which provide the basis for countless areas of future research, many of which are
questions of how to satisfy multiple conflicting requirements simultaneously.
An Overview of End-to-End Verifiable Voting Systems [2] is a survey of
attempted implementations of end-to-end verifiable systems. The authors also
discuss the current challenges to the deployment of these systems. While not an
evaluation of conflicts, this paper identifies areas of conflicts and challenges such
as voter privacy and verifiability, verifiability and usability, and vote privacy and
accessibility. Similarly, [19] comments that it would be easy to design a system
in which the public knew how everyone voted but it is much more difficult to
design an end-to-end verifiable system which provides ballot confidentiality, is
easy to use, and is accessible to voters with disabilities.
4 Electronic Voting Goals
In this section, we elaborate on our 4 primary goals and how they decompose
into sub-goals.
4.1 Secret Ballot Goal
A Secret Ballot election is fundamental to a voting process where voters feel
they have the freedom to vote their true conviction. This is achieved by giving
voters confidence the process will not divulge their vote and by preventing voter
coercion. Our Secret Ballot goal maps to the Secret and Free principles from
Volkamer [25]. The Secret Ballot goal is decomposed into the following two sub-
goals:
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Voter Anonymity Voter’s selections must only ever be known to the voter
and anyone he/she willingly shares them with. There must be no means for
anyone to obtain the identity of the voter who cast an individual vote or ballot,
now and in the future. The concept of everlasting privacy was expressed by
Moran and Noar in [17] to define the future portion of this requirement.
Coercion-Resistance The system must protect against vote selling and
voter coercion. This is achieved by allowing a given voter to cast their ballot as
they truly wish even in the event someone is coercing them to vote a certain
way. Voters must also not be able to prove how they voted to anyone even if
they wish to do so [4]. Systems achieving coercion-resistance often do so with the
property of receipt-freeness[5]. This property requires that voters not be allowed
to retain possession of anything that can be used as proof to another person of
how she voted.
4.2 One Person One Vote Goal
In democratic elections, each voter’s vote has equal weight with every other
voter’s vote. This is represented in the Equal principal in Volkamer’s work [25].
This is achieved by treating all votes equally and by ensuring a voter only cast
one valid ballot. This is often referred to as the One Person One Vote concept.
There are some special elections where entities, such as corporations and prop-
erty owners, may be given multiple votes. Thus, this goal could alternatively be
written as “one person has the number of votes specified by law”. The goal for
One Person One Vote is achieved by satisfying the following two sub-goals:
Voter Authenticity The voting process must only be utilized by legitimate
and authenticated voters. The identity of the person must be established with
proof that the person is who they claim to be.
Ballot Accountability Known in [25] as the Direct principle, the system
must record who has received a ballot and prevent attempts to introduce more
than one binding ballot per voter. The system must provide a means to audit
the number of binding ballots compared to the number of authenticated voters.
4.3 Universal Access Goal
Giving all voters who wish to vote an equal opportunity to vote is critical to a
fair and legitimate election. This is achieved by executing a voting process which
does not introduce any undue burden on any voter. This concept of Universal
Access is codified in various international laws and incorporated by Volkamer as
the Universal principal [25]. The following sub-goals are required for Universal
Access:
Voter Usability The voting process must be simple and intuitive for voters
of various cognitive abilities and cultural sensitivity [1]. Voters must be able to
negotiate the process effectively, efficiently, and comfortably [9].
Voter Accessibility The voting process must allow voters with various
physical impairments to vote[1]. Accessibility is measured by the degree to which
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the system is available to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities [9]. The
most common disabilities include those associated with vision, hearing and mo-
bility, as well as cognitive disabilities [9].
Provisional Voting Voters with questionable authenticity or eligibility at
the time of voting should be allowed to cast their ballots and prove their eligibil-
ity later. Once voted, such ballots must be kept separate from other ballots and
are not included in the tabulation until after the voter’s eligibility is confirmed
[9]. This type of voting is not deployed everywhere.
Transparent and Auditable Goal Transparency and auditability ensure that
the public can verify the process was accurate and reliable. This is covered by
Volkamer with her Trust principle [25]. Our goal covers the actual accuracy and
reliability in the voting process as well as the ability to prove the process was
accurate and reliable. This leads to correct results which are accepted by all
parties, including and especially the party which lost. To achieve this goal, we
lean on end-to-verifiability principles from [19] which are included as sub-goals
below:
Cast as Intended Verifiability The voter must be provided the opportu-
nity to verify the voting system correctly interpreted her selections on the ballot
[19]. This verifiability is individual and must be done while the voter can still
revoke or choose not to cast her ballot.
Recorded as Cast Verifiability The voter must be provided the oppor-
tunity to verify that her vote or ballot was received and correctly recorded by
the voting system [19]. In addition, the public must be able to verify that each
recorded ballot is subject to the recorded as cast check.
Tallied as Recorded Verifiability The public must have the option to
verify the vote was correctly tabulated from the same set of ballots which were
cast by voters, and that only ballots from eligible voters were included in the
final tally [19]. Verifying that the same set of ballots subject to the recorded as
cast check is the same as the set of ballots subject to the tallied as record check
is referred to as Consistency by Popoveniuc, et al. We incorporate this concept
into the Tallied as Recorded verifiability goal for simplicity.
The 3 sub-goals provided above are considered the minimum requirements for
an end-to-end verifiable voting system. End-to-end verifiable voting systems are
one type of software-independent voting system discussed by Rivest and Wack in
[20]. A voting system is software-independent if an undetected change or error in
its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome
[20].
5 Electronic Voting Goal Conflict Model
Identification of goal conflicts was performed by literature review, review of e-
voting implementations, and reasoning with the definitions provided in the pre-
vious section. In this section, we discuss each conflict by providing our rationale
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and citing implementation examples which demonstrate the conflict. It is im-
portant to mention that conflict identification is an ever-changing task. As new
implementation ideas surface, the potential for additional conflicts may exist.
Fig. 1. Secret Ballot Elections Goal Conflict Graph.
Drawing from goal modeling [23], the graph in Figure 1 depicts the main
goals, their sub-goals, and the edges between sub-goals. Edges between sub-
goals capture the conflict classification as Interference or Divergence. Conflicts
(negative relationship) are represented by minus (-) signs and red color. Some
positive relationships are depicted with the plus (+) sign. Discussion of positive
relationships is outside the scope of this paper.
5.1 Voter Authentication Interferes with Voter Anonymity
Voter anonymity is best accomplished in a system where the identity of the voter
is never introduced for any purpose. Thus, the goal of voter anonymity conflicts
with voter authentication since voter authentication requires the identity of the
voter be known and proven to the system.
Direct or indirect links between the voter’s selections and the voter’s identity
could lead to a compromise of the voter’s anonymity. Any voter authentication
process will require a record of the voter along with other attributes necessary
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to authenticate the person as that voter. This information, along with metadata
such as the time of the authentication, is ripe for intentional or unintentional
misuse and connection with the voter’s selections. This is especially true when
voting system artifacts are retained for many months or years depending on
local law. The longer the artifacts are retained, the more likely the procedural or
technological mitigations put in place to limit the interaction of voter identities
and voter selections are to be circumvented.
The most common resolution for mitigating this conflict in electronic voting
systems is separation of responsibilities. In this approach, the capturing of voting
selections is done in a system which has no knowledge of the voter’s identity. The
voter authentication is done on a separate system and there is no connection
between the systems. This is achievable in scenarios such as in-person voting
where procedural controls ensure that only authenticated voters can use the vote
capture component of the system. In other scenarios, such as absentee balloting
or internet voting, separation of responsibilities is much more difficult, if even
possible. In those scenarios, weaker resolutions are deployed such as the two-
envelope system used in postal voting. In the two-envelope system, the ballot is
inserted inside an inner envelope which is then inserted in an outer envelope. The
outer envelope is used for postal delivery. The voter is authenticated using his
signature on the inner envelope. Authenticated voters’ ballots are removed from
the envelope and separated to preserve voter privacy. Digital implementations
encrypt and digitally sign the voter’s selections and don’t allow them to be
decrypted in the same system or process where the digital signature is still
associated. These systems use decryption mixnets or homomorphic encryption
to ensure the plain text vote and voter identities are not associated [2]. Since even
the best of these mitigations rely on procedural controls and lack of collusion to
protect voter anonymity, we classify this conflict as interference.
5.2 Voter Authentication Interferes with Voter Usability
Determining the best and most usable way to evaluate a voter’s identity and
eligibility to vote is a matter of intense political and technical debate. The debate
centers around the balance of permitting every eligible voter the ability to vote
and with requiring a certain level of proof. The more proof required, the lower
the usability and the more likely eligible voters are to be incorrectly rejected.
Since nearly all voter authentication implementations hurt voter usability to
some level, this conflict is classified as interference.
Voter authentication can take many forms. The most common form of voter
authentication in American election processes are polling place check-ins with
government identification and signature-based authentication for absentee bal-
lots. In remote electronic voting systems, voters use digital forms of authentica-
tion such as username/password, requests for personal identifiable information
(name, government issued ID numbers, date of birth), smart cards, etc.
Authentication and usability are both essential in the voting process. How-
ever, access control requirements and adequate usability are frequently in conflict
with each other [6]. According to [6]’s comparative analysis, the authentication
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methods which achieve the highest security rating only achieve a moderate us-
ability rating at most. Electronic voting does not present any unique aspects to
this conflict, so we intentionally abbreviate the discussion of this conflict.
5.3 Voter Anonymity Diverges with Voter Accessibility
The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires all American election juris-
dictions to provide the same opportunity for access and participation, including
privacy and independence, equally to all voters [10]. Providing privacy is difficult
while providing universal access to voters with various disabilities. For instance,
one of the easiest ways to provide voters with disabilities a full voting experi-
ence is to provide qualified help. However, doing this will violate that voter’s
right to a secret ballot. As discussed in [2], adapting voting systems to provide
audio/visual aids or human assistance for voters with disabilities may create
situations where the voter’s candidate choice is revealed to a third party. Like-
wise, remote voting systems, such as postal or internet voting, are significantly
more accessible compared to in-person voting at polling stations but result in a
marked deterioration in voter anonymity. We classify this conflict as divergence
because the techniques discussed do reduce the risk to voter anonymity to a level
accepted by most voters with accessibility needs.
While outside of the scope of this paper, not all requirement conflicts are
pair-wise. In reality, there are many complex interactions that occur when 3 or
more requirements are combined. One example is the interaction between voter
anonymity, voter accessibility, and voter verifiability. For example, Votegrity [7]
was one of the very first voter verifiable, privacy preserving end-to-end verifi-
able voting schemes. In this scheme, Chaum uses visual cryptography to split
an image into multiple shares. Individual shares do not yield any meaningful
information about the original image. While in the voting booth, the voter can
see her vote by combining two strips of paper. The voter randomly chooses one
of the strips as a receipt to take home [2]. This provides voter verification and
privacy protection but is not accessible since the use of visual cryptography is
not usable by persons with visual impairments. While this limitation is unique
to the use of visual cryptography, non-accessible mechanisms are often used to
provide voter verification in a private way. Another example is the provision of
ballot receipts which can be compared to a public bulletin board later. These
are often long, seemingly random, and otherwise meaningless strings which are
difficult for voters with cognitive or other impairments to use.
5.4 Coercion Resistance Interferes with Voter Usability
Many of the methods used to achieve coercion resistance ultimately hurt voter
usability. This is intuitive because voting in the most straight forward, usable
manner allows a coercer the opportunity to simply observe the act of voting.
This is especially true in any remote voting method, such as postal or internet
voting. Only supervised in-person voting can truly provide coercion resistance
without hurting voter usability. In many remote voting proposals, the approach
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to coercion resistance is multiple voting. These proposals allow the voter to vote
multiple legitimate ballots and take the last one while other schemes allow the
voter to cast fake ballots which look real to a coercer. Each of these schemes,
however, present usability challenges for voters who are often confused about
which ballot was cast or – worse – if they cast a real ballot at all. Therefore, we
classify this conflict as interference.
JCJ and its successor Civitas, for example, are known for their high level
of coercion resistance but have significant usability issues as detailed in [18].
JCJ/Civitas allows voters to generate fake credentials which are indistinguish-
able from real ones and can be used to cast dummy votes. Dummy votes show up
on the bulletin board for verification but are ultimately not counted. Usability is
hurt with this scheme because the voter is forced to manage multiple tokens and
know which one is the right one and make sure to use the right one in the free
moment(s) she may have away from her coercer. The usability of JCJ/Civitas
was improved by [14] by adding smart card support. If the voter enters his cor-
rect Pin, the correct ballot is created with his real credentials. Otherwise, a fake
credential is used. This could create a scenario where the voter mistypes his PIN,
thinks he cast his legitimate ballot, but he did not cast a ballot at all.
5.5 Coercion Resistance Diverges with Cast as Intended
Verifiability
Cast as intended verifiability is intended to prove to the voter that the system
properly interpreted how they voted. The simplest way to do this is to show
the voter the results of the interpretation, or tabulation. This is not possible,
however, because it would give the voter proof that the she can take away and
provide to a coercer. Therefore, providing cast as intended verification must
be done in a more complex and less straight forward manner. It must provide
proof to the voter in such a way that the voter can’t take that proof to others.
There are known techniques to achieve both of these goals, such as the Benaloh
Challenge [5], so we classify this conflict as divergence. It is critical to mention
that many of the implementations which meet both of these goals negatively
impact voter usability.
A good example of this is seen in the Norwegian Internet Voting Protocol
[11]. In this internet voting system, cast as intended verification is provided by
means of distributing voting cards to voters and then transmitting return codes
to the voters via text message. If the return codes calculated by the system and
provided to the voter via text message match the values on the voting card, the
voter can be assured the system interpreted her vote correctly. This practice,
however, introduces concerns over vote buying as discussed in [3]. Text messages
simplify the task of coercers and vote-buyers because they need only ask the voter
to provide the appropriate proof generated by the internet voting system itself
[3]. Supporters of this protocol point to the multi-voting support as the means
by which the voter can provide proof to the coercer while casting a different,
non-coerced ballot. As discussed earlier, multiple voting often leads to usability
180
issues so while this approach may satisfice this conflict, it moves the concern to
a different conflict.
5.6 Coercion Resistance Diverges with Recorded as Cast
Verifiability
As first highlighted in Benaloh’s seminal work on receipt-freeness [5], crypto-
graphic election schemes have the potential to suffer from a deficiency which
allows the voter to prove to a third party how their vote was cast. Benaloh
points out that this deficiency is a result of attempting to produce correctness
proofs of the election tally.
Recorded as cast implementations must provide proof to the voter that her
ballot was received in its correct form by the election authority. Since this oper-
ation is often not immediate, implementations of this verification typically rely
on a public bulletin board mechanism. Further, this verification approach is not
a simple ballot tracking verification – which would verify the system received a
ballot from the voter – but a verification that proves the system received the
ballot the voter cast. This distinction is important because it means the system
must provide proof to the voter that the contents of the ballot are the same as
when the voter cast it. Because of voter coercion concerns, this proof must not
actually convey the contents of the voter’s ballot. This forces the implementation
to use a more complex and less straight forward mechanism to provide proof to
the voter but no one else. Here again, this conflict is satisfiable with current
technology so we classify it as divergence with the note that its satisfaction is
often at the expense of voter usability.
One example that failed to sufficiently address this conflict was the Rijnland
Internet Election System (RIES), used by about 20,000 expatriate voters in
the 2006 Dutch parliamentary elections [13]. The system works by publishing a
reference table before the elections, including (anonymously) for each voter the
hashes of all possible votes, linking those to the candidates. The original votes
are only derivable from a secret key handed to the voter. After the elections,
a document with all received votes is published. This allows for two important
verifications: a voter can verify his/her own vote, including the correspondence to
the chosen candidate, and anyone can do an independent calculation of the result
of the elections, based on this document and the reference table published before
the elections [12]. The voter is provided recorded as cast verification because if
the voter’s vote has been registered incorrectly, or not at all, the voter can detect
it. This system’s fundamental flaw is that the voter verification scheme can also
be used to sell votes. If the voter lets someone else verify their vote, he or she
could pay the voter for making the right choice [12].
5.7 Provisional Voting Diverges with Voter Anonymity
Provisional voting is sometimes referred to as conditional or second-chance vot-
ing. As these names indicate, provisional voting provides voters an opportunity
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to vote if something goes wrong on Election Day under certain conditions. Of-
ten, the voter has appeared at the wrong precinct or forgotten a required form of
identification. While the ballot is cast on Election Day, the ballot is not counted
until the conditions are met. This means the ballot must be held separate from
counted ballots and stay associated with the voter herself, so it can be identified.
In fully electronic systems, this creates a significant risk to voter anonymity. In
paper ballot systems, the voter’s identity is only associated with the ballot until
the eligibility is determined and then the ballot is separated from the identi-
fication. In a digital system, the ballot and voter identity may never be fully
separated even though the ballot is counted. Since this concern is limited to
digital systems, we classify this conflict as divergence.
One example of this conflict is blockchain voting schemes. To support provi-
sional voting, records of the ballot must be added to the blockchain which are
not completely anonymous. There must be a link indirect or direct back to the
voter. There may be another block added to the chain later to denote the ballot’s
ultimate status, but the original block still contains the ballot and the voter’s
identity. In one blockchain implementation we are aware of and likely others,
the ballot is encrypted and the voter identification is a unique ID related only
to the voter through an oﬄine system. These techniques mitigate the conflict,
but they do not solve it. This conflict is also present in oﬄine e-voting devices.
5.8 Cast as Intended Verifiability Interferes with Voter Usability
The desire to add cast as intended verifiability to the voting process requires that
voters perform some action. This action may be as simple as deciding whether
to verify the ballot. As expressed in [2], requiring voters to verify their vote
negatively impacts usability by adding extra steps to the process and possibly
confusing the voter. Since there is no current implementation that provides voter
verification without an extra, undesirable step in the voting process, this conflict
is classified as interference.
One example of this conflict is in the Pre´t a` Voter [21] scheme. The key idea
behind the Pre´t a` Voter approach is to encode the vote using a randomized can-
didate list. The randomization of the candidate list on each ballot form ensures
the secrecy of each vote while providing one half of the ballot as a receipt for
cast as intended verification. Because the scheme used in Pre´t a` Voter alters the
printing of the ballot, the voter must also have a way to verify the ballots are
well-formed [19]. This check is provided by giving the voter the ability to request
two ballots, one to audit and spoil and one to cast. Similarly, in the PunchScan
system, the voter can detect maleficence by choosing either the top or the bot-
tom page to keep as her receipt [19]. In both cases, the cast as intended check
requires the voter to perform actions well outside the nominal voting experience.
Collecting more than one ballot or choosing which receipt to keep contributes
to voter confusion and detracts from usability.
It is also important to note that usability is the main factor in whether voters
choose to perform the verification process. When given the choice, voters will
not choose to perform the verification if it is confusing, inefficient, and seemingly
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unimportant. This is also reported in a usability study performed on end-to-end
verifiable internet voting systems by the US Overseas Voting Foundation [22].
The less voters who choose to audit the system, the less effective the verification
becomes. Therefore, conflicts such as this one not only hurt usability but also
negatively impact the verification goal. This dynamic is discussed in [4] and
leads to many questions about how to best perform the verification, how to
track whether voters performed the verification, and whether the verification
can be abstracted away from voters.
5.9 Cast as Intended Verifiability Interferes with Voter Accessibility
Cast as intended schemes rely on generating proof to the voter that the voting
system has correctly handled her ballot. Most schemes fall into one of three buck-
ets: independent encryption and compare, Benaloh challenge, and return codes.
In each of these cases, the voter is asked to compare values between the voting
system and a definitive source which is often on physical media or a separate
system. This is very difficult for voters with disabilities, particularly with visual
or dexterity limitations. We, therefore, classify this conflict as interference.
A good example of this is code voting schemes first introduced by Chaum in
[8]. Code Voting gives each voter a sheet of codes with one for each candidate.
Assuming the code sheet is valid, the voter can cast a vote on an untrusted ma-
chine by entering the code corresponding to her chosen candidate and waiting to
receive the correct confirmation code [4]. This scheme and its successors require
voters to manage the interaction between a code sheet and the system and then
confirm the confirmation codes and the code sheet. This is not possible for voters
with visual impairments.
5.10 Recorded as Cast Verifiability Diverges with Voter Anonymity
In many voting schemes, voter identities are maintained along with the ballot
until late into the voting process. This is true in postal voting and many forms
of internet voting. This makes it difficult to provide recorded as cast verification
while maintaining voter anonymity. Recorded as cast verifiability provides voters
the assurance that their ballot has reached the voting authorities without com-
promise or deletion. This is unique proof that the ballot fidelity remained intact
but must be given is such a way that no one can determine from the proof how
any voter voted. Each individual proof must be free from any evidence linking
the voter to a vote and there must be no way to take the collection of proofs to
determine a voter’s selections.
Since several schemes have been proposed which address this conflict, we
classify it as divergence. These schemes provide the voter only a confirmation
code which is tied somehow to the content of the ballot. In Scantegity, Three-
Ballot, and other paper ballot-based systems, the voter takes part of the ballot
while the corresponding part is posted to a public bulletin board [2]. The voter
can reconstruct the ballot and be assured her ballot was recorded as cast. In
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electronic systems like Helios, a probabilistic ballot hash or ballot encryption is
posted to the public bulletin board for the voter to review [2].
5.11 Tallied as Recorded Verifiability Diverges with Voter
Anonymity
As discussed in the prior conflict, voter identities are often maintained late into
the voting process to provide recorded as cast verification and to generally prove
the legitimacy of the ballots in the ballot box. This is necessary to show that
the ballots being tallied are in fact the same ballots which came from legitimate
voters. This creates tension for the actual tabulation process which must strip
away voter identification information to preserve privacy while also producing a
tabulation result which is verifiably calculated from the original set of ballots.
This conflict was first addressed by Chaum using decryption mixnets [2]. These
mixnets rely on multiple rounds of decryption each owned by a separate election
official. Each mix can be verified but it takes all trustees to accomplish the full
decryption. This provides voter anonymity and tallied as recorded verifiability,
but voters must trust that all trustees are not colluding.
Several improvements have been proposed which significantly address this
problem using homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption is a crypto-
graphic primitive which enables ballot tabulation while still in encrypted form.
The result of a homomorphic addition on a set of cipher texts is equivalent to an
addition operation performed on the set of plaintexts. Only the result of the ad-
dition operation is decrypted, thereby preserving the individual voter’s privacy
[2]. Scratch and Vote, VoteBox, and STAR-Vote are examples of systems which
use homomorphic encryption. We, therefore, classify this conflict as divergence.
6 Future Work and Conclusions
We took a fresh look at the goals for secret ballot elections to properly and
fully identify the requirements conflicts which make electronic voting solutions
difficult to build. We did this by presenting four primary goals which we decom-
posed into ten sub-goals. After defining each sub-goal, we used goal-modeling
to present the conflicts between the sub-goals in a graphical model. Finally, we
discussed the conflicts and included examples of these conflicts materialized in
various electronic voting solutions. While many researchers have referenced the
inherent conflicts and difficulties with conducting secret ballot elections on elec-
tronic voting systems, this is the first work to identify and model these conflicts.
This work is intended to be foundational work in e-voting requirements con-
flict analysis. Starting with this conflict identification model, we hope to en-
courage the development of practical and innovative e-voting solutions through
further research in conflict analysis and resolution. Our work here will help re-
searchers and engineers understand the difficulties in developing electronic voting
solutions for secret ballot elections in a way that does not restrict implementa-
tion approaches. Future work will further the conflict analysis provided here
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and more precisely identify which conflicts have not been fully resolved in cur-
rent solutions. This future work will show researchers and practitioners which
techniques have more promise than others.
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Abstract. This paper presents a mobile application for vote-casting and
vote-verification based on the Selene e-voting protocol and explains how
it was developed and implemented using the User Experience Design
process. The resulting interface was tested with 38 participants, and
user experience data was collected via questionnaires and semi-structured
interviews on user experience and perceived security. Results concerning
the impact of displaying security mechanisms on UX were presented in
a complementary paper [7]. Here we expand on this analysis by studying
the mental models revealed during the interviews and compare them with
theoretical security notions. Finally, we propose a list of improvements
for designs of future voting protocols.
1 Introduction
Voting protocols are carefully designed to satisfy certain security properties,
most importantly Privacy and End-to-End (E2E) Verifiability. Some notable pri-
vacy properties are ballot-secrecy, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. E2E
verifiability is usually separated into the votes being cast-as-intended, recorded-
as-cast, and tallied-as-recorded.
E2E-verifiable schemes often require voters to handle encrypted ballots [3,
5, 10]. The Selene e-voting protocol [24] has been designed in order to hide the
cryptographic operations from the voter. Instead, each voter is assigned a pri-
vate tracking number, which lets them verify that their vote has been correctly
included in the tally. In the setup phase, a unique tracker number is secretly as-
sociated with each voter and cryptographically committed to the bulletin board.
At the end of the election, the votes are posted on a public bulletin board along
with the associated tracking numbers. To avoid coercion, the voters are notified
of their tracking number only after the vote/tracker pairs have been published.
This gives coerced voters the opportunity to identify a tracker that points to the
coercer’s candidate that they can then claim is theirs. The hypothesis is that this
mechanism is more intuitive, transparent and easy-to-use than the usual E2E
verifiability: where voters should check the encryption of their vote and then
presence of this encryption of their vote on the bulletin board.
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User tests on voting protocols have shown that schemes that provide security
often have usability issues [1, 17, 13]. According to [27], usability measures the
effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction of a software in a specified context of use.
Effectiveness is the accuracy and completeness with which the users achieve their
goals. Efficiency represents the resources expended for effectiveness. Satisfaction
is defined by the comfort and acceptability of use. In the papers [1, 17, 13], the
effectiveness of vote casting, that is the ability to cast successfully a vote, has
been at most 81.25% [17]. In addition, the meaning of the verification phase is not
always well understood, which can lead to voters not performing the verification
task or unintentionally aborting the task. Ensuring system usability is further
complicated by the fact that elections occur rarely and voters are expected to
understand and use a system they are not familiar with.
User Experience is defined as “a person’s perceptions and responses that
result from the use or anticipated use of a product, system or service” [28]. It
considers emotions, psychological needs and temporal aspects of the interaction
between the system and the user, and can measure a person’s perceptions of
system qualities such as attractiveness, ease of use and novelty, in addition to
usability aspects. To improve the user experience, user-centred methodologies
have been developed in order to include the final users in the development of a
product [21, 20, 6, 14]. We will describe the process in detail in section 2.
In this paper we present two main contributions, the first is the development
of a prototype interface for smartphones for the Selene e-voting protocol, fol-
lowing a user-centered design process [21, 20, 6] called User Experience Design
(UXD) Process [14]. We will discuss the impact of our implementation choices on
the initial protocol. Then we did a user study on which the primary goal of the
interviews was to retrieve insights and interpretation of behavioural data and to
complement and triangulate data from the questionnaires, results can be found
in [7]. Our second contribution is to study the gaps between voting research
and users expectations for a voting system, by exploring the mental models of
voters for Privacy and Verifiability expressed in the semi-structured interviews.
We define mental models as the concepts in people’s mind that represent their
understanding of how things work [20]. This paper describes the first application
of the UXD method for app development in the e-voting context and evaluates
on its use.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Selene mechanism
and details the development of the mobile application following the user-oriented
process. Section 3 describes the steps of the user tests that have been done for this
study. Section 4 provides an analysis of participants’ interviews and describes
the mental models for Privacy and Verifiability. Finally section 5 discusses the
implementation, the mental models found and the limitations of the study. We
conclude in section 6 by suggesting design improvements and discuss future work.
Related Work The study of mental models is useful to align the system design
with the users’ expectation of a system, reducing the possible interaction errors
that could lead to additional security (or safety) issues. The subject has received
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little attention in voting, we relate our work to the few publications here and
discuss them in detail in section 5.
Mental models of verifiability in postal voting and paper voting have been
explored by Olembo et al. through a survey conducted in Germany [22]. They
suggested breaches in the procedures that could lead to integrity issues and asked
participants about different aspects of verifiability. Our approach is different as
we do not mention possible security issues in our interviews but we have let
the participants express themselves based on the experience of voting with our
application (see section 3).
Another paper from Acemyan et al [1] analyzed mental models for three
voting schemes which are Helios, Preˆt a` Voter and Scantegrity II. The exper-
iment aimed to study the participants’ mental models through drawings and
interviews after using each of the voting systems. The analysis of participants’
feedback showed that many participants did not see the E2E-verifiable schemes
as being more secure than a standard paper-based voting method. The authors
also highlighted that participants tend to focus more on the voting phase, we
noticed a lack of understanding for verifiability as described in section 4.
Human factors in security were highlighted by Kulyk and Volkamer in [13].
They extract five concepts including concern and self-efficacy, as we did here: we
noticed a lack of concern for verifiability and a lack of self-efficacy (in the sense
of knowledge and understanding).
Trust was pointed out by Schneider et al. in [25] as an important factor for
participants, as people are aware of potential security issues. Here trust is also
an identified mental model of voters.
2 A mobile application for Selene
2.1 Selene mechanism
Protocol overview Most verifiable voting schemes involve voters seeing and
handling cryptographic data which can lead to errors or misuses [1]. Selene [24]
is an e-voting protocol that has been designed to provide an easier and more in-
tuitive verification procedure for voters. It lets the voters verify that their votes
have been included in the tally using a unique tracking number. To protect
against coercion threats, i.e. achieve receipt-freeness and coercion mitigation,
voters first learn their private tracking number after the votes have been posted.
Selene uses ElGamal encryption, that is homomorphic and can act as a com-
mitment scheme. An ElGamal encryption is a pair (α, β). For a given voter, the
tracking number is encrypted using ElGamal and the β-term is published at the
beginning of the election. The α-term is kept secret and shared between several
entities called Tellers. After the tally has been published, the α-terms are sent to
the voter, who can decrypt the tracking number with her key. Full details about
the cryptographic mechanisms can be found in the original paper [24].
Voter experience As in Ryan et al. [24] we assume that the voter already
has the cryptographic key material needed for the protocol, i.e. we skip the key
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setup phase. The voting ceremony without coercion is as follows:
(1) The voter receives an invitation to vote.
(2) The voter makes her vote choice in the provided application, encrypts and
signs the vote, and sends it to the Election Server.
(3) (Optional) The voter later receives an invitation to visit the bulletin board
when votes and tracking numbers are published.
(4) The voter receives the α-term, and can retrieve the tracking number to verify
her vote.
The third step is optional as it is only necessary if the voter is being coerced.
For our implementation, we will assume that no coercion is happening and thus
the third step is not available. Moreover, we simplified the fourth step by au-
tomating the α retrieval and tracker computation. The detailed methodology
deployed during the user tests is described in section 3.
2.2 Application Design
A user-oriented approach We followed a user-centred design methodology,
which has originally been described by Norman [21] and then detailed as a design
process [6, 20]. In particular, we followed the UXD by Lallemand et al. [14]. The
process consists of five steps which are planning, exploration, followed by an
iterative process (shown in figure 1) with ideation, generation, evaluation.
Fig. 1. Iterative process.
The exploration phase includes a collection of user needs, and can be done
using various methods, such as the a literature review of previous studies, in-
terviews, focus groups or observations. In our case, we discussed the voting is-
sues mentioned in several papers [1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 17] during meetings with Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) experts who helped us develop and test prototypes
of the e-voting application in a user-centred process in close collaboration.
Then we focused on the iterative process: we worked together with the HCI
experts for the generation of ideas for the design during group sessions with up to
ten group members. We then came up with the concept for a mobile application,
that will have both features of voting and verification. We developed a first
version that is a low-fidelity paper prototype. We evaluated this version with
HCI experts. The received feedback on design and understanding of security
allowed us to iterate and develop a second paper prototype, that was tested with
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both HCI and security experts. The final iteration was a high-fidelity software
version that will be described in detail in subsection 2.3.
A particular challenge for the user experience of Selene is that a certain level
of understanding might be necessary to achieve fulfillment of privacy needs: as
secure and easy-to-use as the application might be, displaying the plaintext cast
vote to the voter after election could seem insecure. Further, the verification
phase is not commonly used in standard elections and is largely unknown to
users. Following a UXD process, we tried to anticipate users’ expectations on
voting and their questions on such a protocol, hence we designed an interface
that, hopefully, is more understandable.
Cryptography Selene uses several security mechanisms, however, the crypto-
graphic details can be hidden from the user during the voting and verification
phases. As mentioned above, we assume here that the voter doesn’t have to con-
figure her device with her secret keys or explicitly handle other keys such as the
election public key.
As mentioned before, the tracking number retrieval (fourth step in the voting
experience) is simplified here and the voter simply has to click on a single button
to use the α-term, to download the β-term and to compute the tracking number.
It will highlight the result on the bulletin board, displayed in-app, automatically.
The voter’s trapdoor key won’t be explicitly manipulated by the voter and it is
embedded in the phone, unlocked by the voter’s credentials.
The other primitives used in Selene do not require direct interaction with
voters (e.g. zero-knowledge proofs, mixnet, PET tests). Hence these are not men-
tioned in the conducted user experience test. In a real election implementation
all of this can be public and verifiable by observers and interested voters.
We emphasise that this implementation is a first step that provides a user
interface, in order to answer our research questions on user experience. This
application is not ready to be used in a real election as both software security
and the full cryptographic features have not been integrated yet. As described
in the protocol, the public key, the encrypted tracker, the commitment and the
encrypted vote should be displayed on the bulletin board after every vote update.
In this study we simplify and only update the bulletin board in the end.
Trust assumptions Even if not all of the cryptographic primitives have been
integrated in this version, we can already discuss the consequences of the design
choices on the security properties. Firstly, we assume that the voting device is
trusted for privacy. Further, in this test we have used a single device for voting
and verification. In real scenarios, we would recommend that different devices, or
at least apps, are used for vote-casting and vote-verifying for improved security.
The reason for using only one device was to simplify the experience for the
participants focusing on a basic voting and verifying experience and to test this.
The tracking number retrieval is also automated: the voter does not have to
manually combine the α and β terms and decrypt the tracking number. Since
the α term is not shown to the voter, no visible α term needs to be faked, but
a coercion-mitigation mechanism stills needs to implemented in the app to fake
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the tracking number itself. Further, the level of receipt-freeness in Selene will
also depend on the chosen vote-casting method, e.g. a Helios type of electronic
ballot will only achieve software-dependent receipt-freeness. However, this is a
first iteration in the UX development of Selene, and the feedback from the par-
ticipants given in section 4 will help us to take the correct direction in the future
developments.
Finally, the verification phase was mandatory as a part of the test procedure.
But in a real election it is to be expected that not all of the voters will verify
their vote. We have not investigated the voters’ motivation yet.
2.3 Interface implementation
The final application has been developed with the Android native language
(Java) and the back-end server is developed in php and deployed on an Apache
server. No security analysis has been performed as the goal of this interface is to
run user tests. The security of the application remains basic. We describe below
the interfaces provided.
Android application The final application contains the two phases: one for
voting and one for verification.The application retrieves flags related to the voter
after authentication, that indicates: the voter’s state (has voted (true/false)),
and the election’s state (vote/verify).
Fig. 2. Application workflow with states.
Figure 2 shows the organization of the application with the corresponding
flags. The application has been developed with a linear workflow, the voter only
has a minimal choice for navigation, namely going backwards or forwards. One
should notice that in the context of a real election, the application might contain
more screens with additional information. However, we will discuss in section 5
the advantages of such a linear construction.
Administration page The back-end server is used to verify voter eligibility
during authentication, to receive votes sent by the app, and tally the results.
When tallying the results, all pairs (tracker, vote) are counted and published on
the Bulletin Board. When allowing a voter to verify, the flag for the election’s
state is set to verify and the voter will be able to go through the verification
workflow in the application.
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Bulletin Board The bulletin board is retrieved during the verification phase
by the application. An additional button lets the voter highlight her vote. For
this experiment, the bulletin board was accessible on the phone only but can
be accessed directly from any browser, however it only contains minimal data
needed for the user test.
3 User Testing protocol
Participants We recruited 38 French participants (19 male and 19 female)
through social networks, trying to ensure a fair distribution of our sample in
terms of gender, age and education level. The average age was 35,4 years old
(Min=19, Max=73, SD=12,45). The education level broadly varied as well: no
diploma (13%), A-Levels (29%), some college degree (21%), Bachelor (18%),
Master (16%) and PhD (3%). The study has been run in French and the data
presented has thus been translated into English.
To make their answers consistent and accurate, we selected participants that
had participated at least in one political national election in France.
Procedure We provided each participant with a paper sheet explaining the con-
text of the user test, that is a national election in France, together with the can-
didates’ programs. Two personalized letters were distributed to each participant
to provide them their individual credentials to access the application. Then the
sessions were split up into 4 phases: (1) the voting phase, (2) a semi-structured
interview, (3) the verification phase and (4) a semi-structured interview3. Before
the verification phase, we gave them a second letter which was an invitation to
verify their vote using the application.
Methodology The goal of the present analysis is to identify which mental mod-
els participants have of privacy and verifiability in e-voting. The semi-structured
interviews entailed the following topics: general opinion about the application,
trust, control, understanding of the verification phase and of the bulletin board.
The three first topics were addressed after both the voting and verification
phases. The two last topics were addressed after the verification phase only.
We avoided security priming by not addressing security-related topics (such as
privacy) until the very end of the study in order to avoid influencing participants’
answers. In most cases, they mentioned by themselves the different security is-
sues they could face with regards to e-voting. We describe in section 4 which
mental models we identified. Information about the verification procedure was
provided through paper letters and inside the application. The Q&A screens
are mandatory in the workflow and the participants have to go through them
before verification. We told the participants that the tracking number let them
3 A questionnaire about User Experience and Psychological Needs Fulfilment were
also filled by participants during phases (2) and (4). The analysis is discussed in an
other paper [7].
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verify that their vote has been counted in the final tally, that it helps to validate
the election results, that this tracking number is unique and that the count can
be verified by anyone. As we did not want to prime participant with possible
security issues, we have not mentioned the risks of using one device and the
associated trust assumptions.
Data analysis The user test was devised as a between-subjects study, and
two versions of the e-voting application have been tested with our participants:
half of the participants tested a baseline version and the other half an extended
version where security aspects are additionally displayed to the participant. It
contains additional information about the ongoing process in the application yet
with no extra interaction. The impact of displaying security-related mechanisms
was the topic a recently published paper [7] alongside with additional factors
impacting UX (attractiveness, novelty, etc.) and psychological needs (autonomy,
competence, etc.). Interestingly, we noted that this additional layer of communi-
cation remained largely unseen by the participants, with the perceived security
being rated as only slightly higher in the elaborated version. The analysis of
this paper focuses on interviews only and explore the feedback of participants
regarding the security properties of voting, to check their understanding as it
will be described in the next section.
To analyze the data retrieved from the interviews, we followed the methodol-
ogy described in [16]. We coded the data through a theoretical thematic analysis,
to look for patterns relating to the voting security properties. We organize the
participants’ answers into a list of concepts. We classified these concepts in cat-
egories given in section 4 to understand voters’ mental models of security. The
categories were organised to match with the known theoretical models of security
of e-voting: privacy properties including ballot-secrecy and coercion-resistance,
and verifiability.
The qualitative analysis of answers in the semi-structured interviews leads
to similar concepts for both versions, and we will thus analyze the participants’
feedback in a similar way without considering the tested version.
One goal of user-centred design is to achieve a better alignment between
participants’ mental models and researchers’ security vision, by ”ensuring that
products do fit real needs, that they are usable and understandable” [20], we
will discuss this in section 5.
Ethics The study follows the guidelines provided by the ethics commission at
the authors institution and was conform to GDPR.
4 Mental models
In [19], Norman defined mental models as being ”people’s views of the world,
of themselves, of their own capabilities, and of the tasks that they are asked to
perform, or topics they are asked to learn”. The interactions they have with the
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environment make them form internal models of the system they are interacting
with. We here propose a categorization of participants’ feedback. An overview
is given in figure 3. From the identified concepts, we derive a categorization of
the mental models expressed by participants. We will discuss how these results
should impact the future development of the application in section 5.
Categories Sub-concepts
Privacy

Secrecy
{ Confidentiality
Verification impact
Not Applicable
Coercion
{
Politics
People
Trust

Security
Authority
Built-in
Verification impact
Verifiability

Hacking Integrity
Approachability
{
Contribution
Understanding
Observer
{
Not Applicable
Public tally
Fig. 3. Mental model categorisation
We now explain this structure in detail.
4.1 Privacy
Secrecy Mental Model Participants mentioned that their vote must be kept
confidential and anonymous. They questioned the data management, wondering
if someone knows the relation between identities and votes. Some participants
stressed the importance of the booth, another argued that the booth is not
private either, ”some people are looking” (P10).
The verification could have a negative impact on secrecy of votes as well, ”it
is like someone else could see it too” (P22).
Finally, another concept was not applicable, as some people did not feel con-
cerned by secrecy, as ”others know who I am voting for” (P13) or ”you have to
take responsibility for your political decisions” (P38).
Coercion Mental Model Coercion from people (in the sense of a physical
attempt to coerce) was mentioned several times. In particular, participants men-
tioned the advantage of being able to vote at home, as other people won’t in-
fluence them: ”Here I don’t have interactions with other people” (P5), or ”I am
sure to make my own choice [...] I feel less pressure than in polling station, with
people behind” (P2). Vote buying was mentioned once ”We can be manipulated,
one could buy our vote, but we need to evolve” (P23).
Finally, the political aspect of coercion was also mentioned a few times, as
some parties could try to cheat and to steal credentials from voters: ”We must
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pay attention to parties, ensure there is no violation, that the elderly or other
vulnerable persons do not get their vote stolen” (P10).
4.2 Trust
The concept that appears the most for Trust is security. Participants mentioned
that their trust in the application is highly dependent on the security provided:
”I don’t trust it, how could we know if it is really secure?” (P29), ”I trust
it, there are breaches everywhere but I think we can secure this” (P10). In
particular it was reflected on their other mental models related to privacy and
efficiency. Hence, we can derive this security concept with the following sub-
concepts: coercion, secrecy, and understanding that increased or decreased the
security perceived.
Another concept was authority, mentioned as trust-transference in [4]. Par-
ticipants refer to some trusted third party to emphasize their own trust: ”if it is
done by an authority, I will trust it” (P2) or ”I trust the government, they will
do what is necessary to ensure vote security” (P12). They rejected the verifica-
tion process arguing with their trust in the authority: ”If I trust the application
I don’t see why we should verify that the vote has been taken into account”
(P12).
Some participants expressed a built-in trust, e.g. ”I always trust technology”
(P14) or ”I trust it as I would trust any mobile applications”.
A verification impact was raised, mostly decreasing trust, e.g. ”I don’t trust
the application after verification, even if the tracking number is private” (P33),
even though an opposite positive effect on trust was also mentioned by some
users: ”the second phase makes me feel secure” (P4).
4.3 Verifiability
Hacking Mental Model Participants were concerned by the security of in-
ternet technologies and had many preconceptions. Even if participants didn’t
master the complexity of internet security, they were aware that it could be an
issue. For example, they mentioned problems they heard about other voting sys-
tems with electronic ballots: ”In United States there was this elections hacking.
Paper is more reliable” (P15). Others feared internet technologies in general:
”I think internet is vulnerable, even if the app is secure” (P24). Ballot stuffing
was also mentioned as a big problem: ”There are people who can buy hackers’
services to have thousand of votes added, we will never know.” (P28).
Integrity is a concept that often appeared during the interviews. Participants
questioned the good behavior of the application as they did not receive any proof
of it. The reliability of the system is questioned: ”It does not guarantee that it is
really my vote.” (P33). Some participants also expressed the need for a procedure
in case of encountering an issue: ”Who should I call in case of problem? And if
my vote is not in the list?” (P19) or ”If I voted A and it shows B, what should
I do?” (P32).
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Approachability Mental Model Some participants were convinced of the
good behavior of the system due to the verification phase. It was mentioned as
a proof of their personal contribution to the elections: ”Seeing that my vote is
taken into account, seeing others’ votes, it lets me believe that I contribute to
something” (P18) or ”It is important to see that my vote has been counted”
(P27).
Most participants understood that they were seeing a confirmation of their
tallied-as-intended vote. But they expressed their [lack of] understanding in the
process of verification: ”I feel in control maybe because I can see what I did, I
can see my vote again” (P11) or on the contrary ”I wonder why this is here,
seeing results with percentages is enough for me” (P3).
We tried to rate participants’ understanding of Selene’s mechanism, through
the two last questions stated in section 3. To help participants to answer, we
provided some light explanation of the verification phase meaning. However,
many participants did not manage to provide a complete description of the
verification phase after using the app. Furthermore, the tracking number has
not always been understood as such, but rather as a counting of votes: ”We can
see our candidate and the number of people who voted for him” (P6).
Observer Mental Model Some participants stressed the importance of ob-
servation. In France, voters are allowed to go to the polling-station to observe
the public count of votes. However, most of our participants did not noticed the
link between this real-life procedure and the availability offered by the bulletin
board: ”The list is not really informative” (P35), ”I can’t see if there is any in-
terest to see this list with all details” (P17). This can be explained by their lack
of understanding of the procedure, as compared to a physical count of votes, in
which they can see and understand each step: ”In polling stations you can verify
by yourself, on internet it’s questionable” (P24).
Finally, the individual aspect seems to be enough to participants, e.g. ”Seeing
percentages with general results, and my individual vote is enough” (P17).
5 Discussion
Norman in [19], and Cooper et al. in [6], show that three models must be con-
sidered in the design of a user interface: the system or implementation model
that reflects how the system actually works, the system image or represented
model that reflects what is shown to the user and the mental model that is the
projection made by the user. Here we focus on the discrepancies between those
three distinct categories. The goal of a user-oriented design process, such as the
UXD process, is to provide an interface, a represented model, that is close to
the user’s mental model and that remains accurate with the system model.
5.1 Comparison between mental models and security properties
The properties on which we base the implementation model of a voting scheme
are Privacy properties and Verifiability. Selene provides ballot-secrecy, receipt-
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freeness and has a coercion mitigation mechanism. It also provides individual
and universal verifiability. However, as mentioned in the previous subsection,
the coercion mitigation mechanism has not been implemented.
Despite this, voters were concerned about Coercion and about Privacy during
elections in general. Mental models for Privacy were consistent with the proper-
ties of the system, and the reason might be that Privacy is a mandatory element
required by law during elections in France, and it is taught to people at an early
age at school.
On the other side, the novelty of the verification phase seemed to prevent
participants from properly explaining their experience. However, indirect prop-
erties and potential issues were mentioned, such as hacking and integrity, and
public tallying. It appears that participants were able to point out the potential
issues of online voting without seeing that the verification mechanism was part
of the solution.
Also for privacy, we can argue that an early education on verifiability could
lead to a better understanding and acceptance of the concept.
Trust is not a security property of voting protocol. However, it plays an im-
portant role for voters and impacts the use of a system. This aspect is important
for people to accept the system they use.
Even if the convenience of online voting was mentioned many times, voters
stressed their lack of knowledge about internet technologies as a big drawback.
Paper-ballot voting contains steps that are understandable and accessible to
people, and this is not in general the case for online voting. Even if this aspect
is not required by law as in Germany, it seems reasonable that voters are more
willing to trust a process they fully understand.
5.2 Impact of a user-centred application on the voting experience
First of all, we observed 100% of effectiveness for vote casting: all participants
were able to cast their vote successfully.4 The application was designed in order
to be easy-to-use and responding to users’ expectations, and we can argue that
it is the linearity of the vote casting in the Selene implementation that leads to
this excellent result. The quality of this straightforward behaviour was mentioned
several times by participants, e.g. ”we follow the workflow but we can’t really
make a mistake” (P3).
Another explanation for the observed usability can be the design of the pro-
tocol itself. As mentioned in the introduction, Selene was designed in order to
reduce complicated interactions with users, and to be more intuitive. Helios is
another e-voting scheme that requires, or at least suggests, voters to perform
audits of their ballots through a Benaloh’s challenge [3]. This often leads to a
lower effectiveness rate: a study from Marky et al. [17] has shown that this pro-
cedure is considered as counter-intuitive by participants. Indeed, participants
4 The verification phase was mandatory in our experiment and everyone managed to
go through the verification workflow. But not all participants understood what was
happening and we can’t ensure that the effectiveness would be as high for verification
if it is not mandatory.
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who audited their ballot did not understand why they were not allowed to cast
the audited ballot after-all. This kind of step does not occur with Selene, as
the verification happens after the end of the election. The voting phase is thus
not burned with a verification step. Moreover, the authors of [17] showed that
automation of the verification feature improved effectiveness. In our application,
we automated the retrieval of the tracking number. Instead of asking partici-
pants to manipulate alpha and beta terms, we retrieve them and computed the
tracking number automatically.
The questionnaires analyzed in [7] showed that the usability aspects, i.e. ef-
ficiency, perspicuity and dependability [26], scored above average. Despite this
and the fact that all voters managed to cast their votes, the participants’ feed-
back show that our application needs more development iterations to be better
consistent with voters’ model of voting.
Also, simply displaying information about security features to the partici-
pants was not enough to make them explicitly see it (as discussed in [7]). How-
ever, we have seen here in our analysis that the security of such an application is
an important factor for trust and it was emphasized for the secrecy and verifiabil-
ity concepts. Moreover, the information related to security in the expanded ver-
sion of the app was shown during loading screens. It might be that the progress
bar prevented the participants from reading the information displayed below5.
In a small study [12], the authors found that the voters chose more secure sys-
tems as their preferred scheme even if they scored lower on the SUS scale. It is
thus interesting whether allowing more cryptographic interactions could increase
the acceptance, even if it reduces the usability. One idea could here be to also
implement coercion mitigation mechanism. This mechanism allows the voter to
ask for a fake tracker in case of coercion. It might be that voters have missed
this mechanism to understand the verification phase.
Indeed, the meaning of the verification phase and in particular of the tracking
number was explained through Q&A screens. However, many participants did
not understand fully, or were not able to describe the verification phase. As
Acemyan et. al observed in their study [2], when participants were requested to
draw their mental model, they expressed the voting steps for each tested scheme
and avoided the verification steps and the verification phases of each system was
considered useless in many cases, like in our observations. On the other hand,
participants who understood the interest of seeing their vote in the app did
not understand why they were seeing others’ votes, as their own vote and only
this vote was highlighted in the application. The implementation of the coercion
mitigation mechanism could also help here, however this assumption needs to
be tested in a new iteration of the application.
Olembo et al. [23] showed that specific messages could motivate voters to
verify their vote, as they understand better the objective of such a procedure.
In particular, they focused on risks, norms and analogies. In our application,
the focus has been done on norms only, i.e. we explained what is the purpose of
verification and what it brings to society. We emphasized democracy protection
5 An other study could verify where the information displayed would be more visible.
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and integrity of votes records. Now, according to voters’ models for Coercion
and their concerns on hacking, a stronger emphasis on the incurred risks and
solutions provided by verification might help the voter to understand. Some
people understood that the tracking number was instead the number of people
voting like they did. A simple improvement is to add letters to the tracking
number.
In this version of the application, the bulletin board was not accessible be-
fore the individual verification phase6. One improvement could be to make the
bulletin board available before the individual verification. The possibility to re-
quest a fake tracker must also be implemented at this stage. In addition, once
the Selene check is doable, we could show the individual vote first (with fake or
real tracking number) and let the voter consult the bulletin board on purpose.
Limitations The results of our study are bounded by some limitations.
First, the user tests were done in a laboratory that had a reassuring impact
on participants. Some of them admitted that they were not really feeling any
threats for their vote as they were part of an experiment. The influence in a lab
context on user studies is discussed in [15].
We mention to our participants that the elections were related to the national
elections in France, however we did not use real candidate names nor run an
election that already happened, as suggested in [18].
Also, the participants had a very limited amount of time to understand the
verification procedure, and the novelty of such a protocol might require more
time to be understood and accepted. A broader context would be provided in
real elections, giving users time to understand the process of verifiability of the
application. We also assumed in our study that the configuration of the devices
was already done. The ease of use might be questioned if the registration to on-
line voting and keys configuration must be performed by voters. However, this
configuration could be done only once for several elections.
Finally, we asked the participants to verify their vote right after the vote cast-
ing phase. In other protocols and user studies, the verification is done during
the vote casting (e.g. Benaloh’s challenge, or return codes). In this protocol,
the verification is performed after the results have been published and due to
experimental constraints the participants had to do it right after vote casting,
that could have disconcerted them.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have provided the first interface prototype for the Selene e-
voting protocol. We have followed a user-centered design, UXD, where the usabil-
ity is enhanced and cryptographic interactions have been hidden. This approach
has consequences on trust assumptions for the voting protocol, but has pro-
vided insights on the mental models of Privacy and Verifiability. User tests have
highlighted possible improvements on our application for Selene, but it has also
6 See third phase of the voter experience described in subsection 2.1
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raised more general concerns we need to consider in the design of e-voting pro-
tocols. We have seen that mental models for Privacy with Secrecy and Coercion
were consistent with the voting protocol concepts. However, the understanding
of the verification phase has to be facilitated. We have seen that the lack of
understanding could lead to trust issues: participants questioned integrity of the
elections and the purpose of the verification phase. Voting schemes are devel-
oped today to be end-to-end verifiable, but verification is not natural to users
and voters need more time to accept it and understand it. An easy-to-perform
mechanism for verification like the one described in Selene has been effective but
is not enough to convince voters of the security behind the scheme. For future
work, the implementation of missing mechanisms for Selene must be performed
in order to provide a complete experience to voters. A new iteration of the appli-
cation (using two devices) based on the received feedback is being developed in
order to increase the understanding of voters, and reassure them of the security
mechanisms in use.
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Abstract. The Estonian data shows that people with higher ICT literacy are 
younger, better educated, have a better income and live in cities compared to 
people who self-report to have low skills. This is typical for the digital divide that 
holds almost universally in all societies [3] and the self-branded “digital nation” 
of Estonia is no exemption here. On top of the digital divide there is however 
another quite universal “law” for lack of a better word – people with better 
knowledge of technology tend also to be more aware of the limitations and po-
tential threats it might entail. It holds especially for the digital realm where one 
can assume, that the more you knowledgeable you are, the more threat averse you 
also tend to be. Voting technologies are clearly a case in point as demonstrated 
by the vocal opposition to electronic voting by groups with advanced knowledge 
in [1,2,5]. In light of this one could say that ivoting diffusion and usage faces a 
curse of knowledge. The more you know about technology the less trusting to-
wards it you should be given the heightened integrity standards set for elections 
[4]. We would take it even further and argue that based on the above, ivoting 
seems to face a class ceiling in terms of usage, it should not be used or trusted 
among the ones who ideally should be the target audience, i.e. those who know 
most about the potential of this technology. 
Keywords: trust in ivoting, trust in technology, diffusion of ivoting 
Survey data on Estonia shows that people with higher ICT literacy are younger, better 
educated, have a better income and live in cities compared to people who self-report to 
have low skills. This is typical for the digital divide that holds almost universally in all 
societies [3] and the self-branded “digital nation” of Estonia is no exemption here. On 
top of the digital divide there is however another quite universal “law” for lack of a 
better word – people with better knowledge of technology tend also to be more aware 
of the limitations and potential threats it might entail. It holds especially for the digital 
realm where one can assume, that the more you knowledgeable you are, the more threat 
averse you also tend to be. Voting technologies are clearly a case in point as demon-
strated by the vocal opposition to electronic voting by groups with advanced knowledge 
in technology [1,2,5]. In light of this one could say that ivoting diffusion and usage 
faces a curse of knowledge. The more you know about technology the less trusting 
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towards it you should be given the heightened integrity standards set for elections [4]. 
We would take it even further and argue that based on the above, ivoting seems to face 
a glass ceiling in terms of usage, it should not be used or trusted among the ones who 
ideally should be the target audience, i.e. those who know most about the potential of 
this technology.  
We examine this problem from the (potential) user perspective to see how trust to-
wards ivoting technology is dependent on the technological skill level. We also inves-
tigate to what degree are technological solutions that should help to build more trust, 
such as individual vote verification, actually being used depending on the trust and skill 
level of the user. We do so employing two unique datasets. First survey data from Es-
tonia between 2013-2019 entailing post-election surveys on ivoting from a total of 5 
elections all in all with more than 5000 interviews, and second using anonymized ivot-
ing log data from the same period on more than 800 000 ivoting sessions.  
The results are puzzling. We do see a clear “ivoting digital divide”. A majority has 
very high trust levels and a small but persistent minority extremely low trust levels with 
hardly anyone at mid trust levels - ivoting seems to polarize trust towards itself. But 
when the trust distribution is examined according to computer literacy the exact oppo-
site holds. The more skills a person has, the more trusting towards ivoting they actually 
are (see Figure 1).  
Fig. 1.  Trust towards online voting by computer literacy levels. 
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Even after controlling for other covariates that correlate with better ICT skill levels, 
such as age, gender, education or income, people with good or very good computer 
literacy levels have on average between 15 to 19 percentage points higher trust score 
towards ivoting that people with very poor or non-existing skills. There is a strong as-
sociation between having voted electronically and trusting this voting mode, so we 
might be conflating user experience with general attitudes. But the positive association 
between skill and trust level is still clearly observable also among the non-ivoting and 
non-voting population, who in general tend to have a much lower trust levels towards 
online voting than the actual users.  
Examining the typical user profiles from the log files we notice that ivote verifiers 
are in comparison to non-verifiers on average four years younger and made up of 70% 
males whereas among non-verifiers males make up less than 50%. Verifiers, who made 
up an average of 5% of ivoters in the last four elections, have also proportionally four 
times more Linux and two times more Mac users among them than non-verifiers. In 
addition, the largest share of ivotes are verified on the very first voting day just as elec-
tronic polls open, indicating more active usage among the most eager electronic voters. 
And finally, the largest share of ivotes being verified at any given time over the seven 
day ivoting period are votes given late at night between 12pm and 3am. All in all this 
points towards verification being more likely used by young males, using Linux and 
voting late in the night. This is indeed a typical profile of a tech savvy ivoter who might 
use verification exactly because they tend to know more about how technology works 
and would like to see additional technological developments that makes ivoting more 
resilient against potential threats.  
The paradox reintroduces itself however when we use survey data to connect verifi-
cation with perceived trust levels. Vote verifiers have by far the highest trust level to-
wards electronic voting out of all possible other groups (non-voters, paper voters, non-
verifying ivoters). In 2019 for example the average trust level towards ivoting among 
verifiers was 9 on a 0-10 trust scale. We also see that being knowledgeable about the 
possibility of ivote verification option correlates with high trust level even when people 
have not used it to verify the vote (or even ivoted) and people who do not know about 
the option have clearly lower trust levels. In other words, knowing about the option to 
verify, without necessarily using it, already has a positive effect on trust towards ivot-
ing. The survey evidence therefore clearly points towards verification being used by 
tech savvy voters who at the same time exemplify excessively high trust towards the 
technology.  
In conclusion we find overwhelming evidence that more knowledge leading to more 
skepticism does not hold in the Estonian case. Ivoting has been available in Estonia 
since 2005, individual verification was introduced in 2013, the perceived trust towards 
this technology has over the years balanced around 70% of people having either high 
or very high trust. One can assume, that the large experience with using electronic ser-
vices in the public sector, the over 10 years tradition using electronic voting seem to 
have had an impact on the overall trust of users in electronic voting. Consequently, 
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Oostveen and van den Besselaar [4] identified in their original study that context plays 
an important factor, including learning how one can verify the functionality of a tech-
nical system such as ivoting.  
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Abstract. Indigenous communities are increasingly adopting technology to cre-
ate digital opportunities for members and enhance engagement and governance. 
One recent trend in the adoption of online services is the use of online voting. 
To date, more than 90 Indigenous communities in Canada and the United States 
have deployed online voting with many more considering implementation. This 
article draws upon interviews with local government officials and voter exit 
surveys as part of community-engaged research with Wasauksing First Nation 
in Ontario, Canada to explore the specific opportunities and challenges online 
voting presents for governance and engagement in Indigenous communities and 
implications for future adoption. Specifically, we examine a 2017 Land Code 
vote where online voting was introduced to achieve a participation threshold 
required to pass the framework. Our findings point to online voting as a key 
tool to modernize Indigenous governance and enhance participatory capacity by 
making voting more accessible for members. We argue that online voting is an 
engine that can advance self-determination and support communities seeking an 
iterative path to self-government.   
Keywords: Online voting, Indigenous governance, First Nations, Self-
determination, Canada, Community-Engaged Research 
1. Introduction
To date online voting has been used by a growing number of Indigenous communities 
across Canada and the United States for elections or other types of community votes. 
Online voting is appealing to Indigenous communities as a tool to improve voter ac-
cessibility and engagement, especially for communities where large segments of the 
membership live off of reserve lands [14]. While the engagement of off-reserve 
members is important to ensure balanced representation of community voice, in the 
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Canadian context it is crucially important since many communities are subject to fed-
eral legislation that has required them to meet participation thresholds in order to pass 
community laws and gain back autonomy. In this regard, online voting use among 
First Nations in Canada represents a tool for communities to not only bridge partici-
patory gaps with off-reserve members, but also to increase their capacity to ratify 
their own legislation and move away from federal control over decision-making and 
governance processes. Despite optimism about online voting’s potential to enhance 
participation and governance, questions persist about the ability of the technology to 
do so. There are also important considerations around the cultural appropriateness of 
online voting and whether its adoption is consistent with Indigenous culture, commu-
nity visions of self-determination, and local decision-making. 
This article examines the opportunities and challenges online voting presents for 
participation and governance for Indigenous communities through a case study of 
Wasauksing First Nation in Ontario, Canada. Building upon previous research fo-
cused on understanding First Nations’ satisfaction with online voting, online voter 
characteristics and the potential for online voting to improve voter engagement in a 
First Nation context [14], we draw upon semi-structured interviews with local gov-
ernment officials, participant observation data, and exit survey data from online and 
paper voters as part of a land code ratification vote in February 2017 to examine how 
online voting affects perceptions of participation and governance. Specifically, we 
assess the degree to which online voting contributed to the community’s capacity to 
ratify the land code legislation and its potential to enhance, or limit community capac-
ity and self-determination in the future. The original contribution of this work is its 
focus on the implications online voting presents for governance and the enhancement 
of self-determination in First Nations. Findings suggest that online voting is a tool to 
modernize Indigenous institutions and governance, improve community connected-
ness, particularly by better connecting off-reserve members in policy discussions, and 
as an engine to support meeting quorums for critical votes that, if successful, can ad-
vance community capacity and enhance self-determination as part of an iterative path 
to self-government.   
This article proceeds as follows. First, we present some brief background about the 
colonial context in Canada and how online voting can contribute to First Nations 
gaining back their political power. This is followed by a literature review that ex-
plores understandings of Indigenous self-determination and self-government to guide 
our assessment of the impact of digital technology in Wasauksing First Nation and 
reviews what studies have found about First Nations’ use of online voting. Next, we 
present an overview of Wasauksing and explain the rationale for, and steps taken to, 
implement online voting for the ratification vote. In the fourth and fifth sections, we 
present our methodological approach and analysis. Finally, we discuss what our find-
ings mean for future adoption of online voting in First Nations and Indigenous com-
munities more broadly, notably implications for self-determination, community en-
gagement, and governance. 
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2. Background
Indigenous communities around the world face many social, economic, political and 
legal inequalities arising out of ongoing colonial legacies. In the case of Canada, the 
presence of paternalistic legislation designed to subvert complex systems of Indige-
nous governance has created enduring conditions of dependency as First Nation, Mé-
tis and Inuit communities have been subordinated under the oversight and administra-
tion of the federal government. While Indigenous resistance to colonial administration 
has been constant throughout Canada’s history, in the past 50 years there has been a 
shift in the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state. Bolstered 
by the emergence of an international Indigenous rights movement [19], Indigenous 
peoples have taken steps to assume greater control over governance and policy-
making within their communities, albeit with overarching institutional apparatuses of 
colonial administration still intact. While the assertion of the right to self-
determination has become a prominent feature of Indigenous politics in Canada, vari-
ation exists in the approaches Indigenous communities take to achieve self-
determination and their capacity to pursue it. 
Numerous strategies and approaches have been taken to achieve self-government 
and enhance self-determination. One strategy is to take larger steps such as the sign-
ing of self-government agreements and land claim negotiations, while a second type 
of approach is more incremental, characterized by smaller steps involving the devolu-
tion and decentralization of decision-making into the hands of Indigenous communi-
ties and stakeholders. Literature on Indigenous politics has mostly focused on the 
former set of approaches, exploring the “high politics” of self-determination and self-
government, emphasizing formal agreements and negotiations between Indigenous 
communities and other levels of government [17]. Far less attention has been given to 
the smaller, less-visible steps that communities are taking to achieve the same ends. 
Aided in part by legislative opportunities created by the federal government, an in-
creasing number of Indigenous communities across Canada are enacting iterative 
steps toward the development of self-determination through the ratification of com-
munity-based legislation [11]. In recent years the iterative approach has become in-
creasingly possible through the adoption of online voting as a tool to enhance voter 
engagement and pass key pieces of legislation. We explore this process and its im-
pacts in this article in the context of First Nations in Canada. 
3. Indigenous Governance, Digital Technology & Online Voting
3.1. Indigenous Governance 
First Nations in Canada face an array of governance and participation challenges 
stemming from Canada’s history of colonization and continued colonialism. While 
beyond the scope of this article to summarize in full, this history has left previously 
autonomous Indigenous nations with truncated forms of territorial sovereignty and 
decision-making authority over their communities [4, 18]. The legislative framework 
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under which most First Nations are governed is the federally written Indian Act. Orig-
inally devised by representatives of the Crown in 1867, the Indian Act allowed for the 
forcible removal of First Nation peoples from their traditional territories while replac-
ing previous forms of Indigenous governance with colonially-imposed band councils. 
Under the terms of the Indian Act, First Nations are given the ability to democratical-
ly-elect representatives for their communities. However, the Indian Act’s legal 
framework effectively limits the governing authority of these representatives by 
granting the federally-appointed Minister of Indian Affairs the authority to approve or 
disallow many decisions passed by band councils [16]. Furthermore, the original 
terms of the Indian Act provide the Minister with the ability to replace democratical-
ly-elected band council representatives and assume authority over First Nations. This 
has infused an inherent element of instability into First Nation governance. 
While the majority of First Nations in Canada continue to operate under the Indian 
Act’s legal framework, substantive efforts have been made to revitalize on-reserve 
governance and improve political engagement. These efforts have come in many 
forms including amendments to the Indian Act itself and intergovernmental negotia-
tions [2, 1, 27]. While many First Nations have replaced the Indian Act in its entirety 
with self-government agreements, most have pursued a more incremental approach. 
This incremental approach has focused on increasing the autonomy and self-
government capacity of First Nations through targeted reforms to specific provisions 
of the Indian Act and negotiated agreements with the federal government that allow 
for the decentralization of on-reserve services to First Nation governments [27]. The-
se changes have provided opportunities for communities to take iterative steps toward 
self-government, negotiating with the federal government to gradual develop their 
governance capacity and assume control over service delivery in areas such as health, 
housing, education and social services. This incremental approach does not include 
systemic reform to broader legal and political frameworks. Change instead comes 
largely through targeted reforms to specific provisions of the Indian Act or the negoti-
ation of agreements between individual or collective groups of First Nations. While 
these changes tend to be smaller and less visible, they represent important evolutions 
in governance and Indigenous sovereignty often overlooked by post-colonial or neo-
Marxist scholars [3, 5].  
To date more than 90 Indigenous communities in Canada and the United States 
have deployed online voting. Decisions to adopt online ballots have been primarily 
motivated by a desire to improve political participation [14]. Under the terms of the 
Indian Act, however, voting in elections and referendums is permitted only by paper 
ballot (either in-person at a poll location or by mail) though it is allowed for other 
types of votes, such as ratification votes or community polls. 
3.2. Digital Technology & Online Voting 
In recent years, digital technologies have emerged as important tools for First Na-
tions pursuing incremental approaches toward self-government. Digital technologies 
have allowed First Nations to strengthen governance capacity while addressing social, 
political and economic challenges. Scholarly literature has explored the use of tech-
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nology in the areas of healthcare, education, social services, economic development 
and cultural renewal [20, 26, 21, 28, 23]. These studies have demonstrated the re-
sourcefulness of First Nations in overcoming digital divides through the creation of 
innovative funding and ownership models [19]. This body of research has also drawn 
connections between digital technology and self-determination, exploring the ways in 
which technology has been used to support broader political goals. For example, sev-
eral scholars have noted how technology has been used by First Nations to improve 
administrative capacity to assume greater control over service design and delivery. 
For First Nations, digital technologies are not only an avenue to improve service de-
livery or public outreach, but are also understood as tools within a broader decolo-
nizing struggle to roll back the power of settler governments and realize self-
determination [22]. 
To date, few scholars have examined the effects of online voting on Indigenous 
communities. Research in this context mostly focuses on First Nations in Canada [9, 
10, 13] despite the fact that Indigenous communities in the United States and New 
Zealand are embracing the technology. Existing work has pointed to a number of ben-
efits in Indigenous contexts. Studies have documented improved political engagement 
through enhanced voter accessibility [9, 10, 13], albeit with small sample sizes, and 
improved community connectedness by stimulating intergenerational communication 
among youth and elders [9].  While studies of online voting use in municipal elections 
in Canada has shown that the voting method can increase turnout by 3.5 percentage 
points [15], other analyses in comparative contexts that employ similar methodologi-
cal approaches find no increase [12]. It is unclear whether we could expect the same 
effect in First Nations as in Canadian municipalities given the unique context and 
since online voting is used less frequently for Chief and Council elections given legis-
lative limitations and more so for other types of votes (referenda, agreement votes 
etc.).  
Beyond engagement, online voting has also been shown to positively benefit the 
governance capacity of First Nations. By allowing communities to engage a larger 
number of their citizens, online voting has supported communities in reaching diffi-
cult quorums required to ratify legislation [8, 9]. Further, online voting has also been 
shown to benefit local governance and strengthen administrative capacity by expedit-
ing tabulation of results and by generally including a wider group of community 
members [14]. Though self-determination has been an important theme in research on 
online voting in First Nations, it has been relatively underexplored compared to issues 
of participation and engagement. 
 Despite benefits covered in the literature, recent research also highlights the 
unique challenges First Nations face with online voting deployment. First, access to 
quality broadband is a concern, especially because many communities are located in 
rural or remote areas [8]. Second, the tendering of online voting contracts to private 
sector vendors has raised issues especially with respect to data governance and own-
ership. In addition, the fact that some communities have limited technical resources 
and capacity has made adequately vetting suppliers more challenging. In response to 
this a recent report has called for the development of online voting standards to boost 
technical capacity in First Nations [8]. Finally, it is important to point out that voters’ 
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unfamiliarity with online voting can pose a challenge to implementation. While issues 
with the novelty of online voting are not unique to First Nations, there is the potential 
that unfamiliarity coupled with pre-existing feelings of distrust or suspicion toward 
government may deter uptake.  
4. Methodology
4.1. A Community-Engaged Approach 
For this study we employed a Community-Engaged Research (CER) approach 
which seeks to overcome some of the power inequities that exist between researchers 
and Indigenous communities through the development of research partnerships which 
promote empowerment, inclusivity, and respect [6, 7].  Such projects share underly-
ing goals of influencing social change, and equitably involving community partners 
throughout the research process from the inception of the project through knowledge 
mobilization [24]. Our study employs a qualitative research design, which is consid-
ered ethical, respectful, applicable, authentic, beneficial and relevant to the experienc-
es of Indigenous peoples.  
We began building a relationship with Wasauksing First Nation in March 2016. 
This included a number of phone conversations, contributions to community newslet-
ters, attendance and presentations at community events, and presentations to Chief 
and Council. In addition to receiving university ethics approval, Chief and Council 
also approved and were supportive of the research. Community members were pro-
vided with information about the purpose of the project, data collection process, re-
sponsibilities, risks or inconveniences, benefits, assurances of confidentiality and any 
additional information requested. The practice of gift giving, whether for ceremony or 
for community events, is common in Indigenous communities [25]. We felt that gift 
giving was an important part of maintaining positive community relationships and 
building trust. As a result, we raffled off door prizes at each community meeting, in-
cluding a number of gift cards and tablets. 
4.2. Data Collection 
The data for this article comes from semi-structured interviews undertaken with 
political and bureaucratic leaders in the community, participant observation on voting 
day, and voter exit surveys. All questionnaires were constructed in active consultation 
with the community and specific items were added based on their needs.  
Interviews asked questions about the process of adopting online voting, challenges 
and benefits and the role of digital technology in self-determination and self-
governance. Notes taken during the interviews and observation were analyzed using 
NVIVO qualitative data analysis software. Transcripts were uploaded to the software 
and analyzed using a multi-stage inductive approach, which involved identifying core 
themes in the transcripts related to community views toward the introduction of 
online voting. These core themes were then used as coding categories to sort and ana-
lyze our interviews with the community. This inductive method of analysis is con-
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sistent with the broad CER approach taken in our overall study and allowed for com-
munity perspectives and voices to be expressed clearly in the research findings. Our 
analysis uncovered 3 core themes related to the introduction of online voting: innova-
tion and community modernization, community connectedness, and self-
determination and self-governance. 
Voter exit surveys were administered to online and paper voters once they had cast 
a ballot. All persons who voted online or in-person at the polls were offered the op-
tion to participate, and completion was voluntary. To support participant recruitment 
six youth research assistants and one elder interpreter were hired and completed a 
training course on data collection at the polls. Online voter surveys were administered 
online. The survey was open for completion during the online voting period, which 
lasted from December 10th, 2016 until 8:00am on the primary voting day, February 
25th, 2017. Paper voters casting a ballot on voting day were encouraged to complete 
the survey by iPad, but could also fill out a paper copy or complete the survey orally 
with the assistance of an interpreter. Paper surveys were also offered to voters on De-
cember 10th as part of in-person advanced voting.  
Survey questions probed voter satisfaction, rationale for use, concerns, likelihood 
of future use, digital access and literacy, participation histories and standard socio-
demographic items. A total of 15 online voter surveys were completed, representing a 
response rate of 20 percent, and 66 paper voter surveys for a response rate of 66 per-
cent.1 Respondents self-selected for both surveys and so may have been more likely to 
like or dislike online voting. Given the self-selected nature of the sample, and the 
small N’s,2 descriptive statistics are used to analyze data where appropriate. These 
limitations prevent us from drawing broad conclusions about online voting’s affect on 
voter engagement in a First Nations context and should be taken as suggestive evi-
dence that could be further explored in future studies. 
As part of the knowledge mobilization strategy for this project, Wasauksing was 
provided with written reports of survey results. Findings were also presented to Chief 
and Council and the Lands Management committee. These efforts are in line with a 
CER approach and intended to ensure that the research process and results are mean-
ingful, respectful and relevant, and that they reflect community concerns and inter-
ests. 
1 The paper voter sample includes more women (64 percent) than men (34 percent), with 2 
percent identifying as ‘other’. Paper voter respondents have a median age of 46 years, house-
hold income range of $20,000 to $29,000, median education level of “some technical com-
munity college”, and are likely to reside on reserve. The sample of online voters, by compari-
son, also contains more women (71 percent) than men (29 percent). This sample also reports 
a median age of 46, household income range between $80,000 and $99,000, median educa-
tion of completed “technical, community college”, and are more likely to live off-reserve. 
2  While the N’s are small, they are very good based on the size of the community. 
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5. Wasauksing First Nation and their Land Code Ratification
Wasauksing First Nation (WFN) is an Ojibway, Odawa and Pottawatomi community 
located near Parry Sound, Ontario, Canada. The community has a land base of ap-
proximately 7,875 hectares and a total population of 1,090 with 369 community 
members residing on reserve. The community is currently engaged in two land claim 
negotiations with the federal and provincial governments to extend the boundary line 
of the reserve to cover an additional 223 hectares of traditional land. The Indian Act 
presently governs elections and referendums in WFN. 
In addition to the land claims, WFN has sought to extend its control over its re-
serve land by signing on to the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Man-
agement. The framework agreement was initially signed in 1996 between 13 First 
Nations and the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Since then, the 
it has been ratified as part of the First Nations Land Management Act (1999) and ex-
panded to include an additional 125 First Nation signatories. As a signatory, each 
First Nation is provided the opportunity to develop land code legislation to replace 
sections of the Indian Act related to the governance and management of reserve lands. 
The agreement is a sectoral self-government agreement that provides First Nations 
with the legal status and powers to govern and manage their lands and resources 
through the passage of laws under their own land code. 
Once a community has signed on to the framework agreement, they are tasked with 
developing and drafting their own land code legislation. This legislation covers a 
number of areas related to land management including general rules and procedures, 
occupation of reserve lands by members and non-members, financial accountability 
measures for revenues, and laws and regulations related to environmental protection. 
Land codes empower communities by setting out the rules and procedures for making 
and publishing their own land laws, while also diverting funding and fees collected 
from the administration of land back to the community instead of to the federal gov-
ernment. Passing a land code represents removal from 25 percent of the Indian Act. 
The penultimate step once a First Nation has drafted land code legislation is to ne-
gotiate and sign an Individual Agreement with the Government of Canada. The 
Agreement establishes the specific terms of the transfer of management of reserve 
lands from the federal government to the First Nation. After this has been reached, the 
First Nation must proceed to ratify the proposed Land Code legislation and Individual 
Agreement by holding a ratification vote. The ratification vote must include all eligi-
ble or registered band members aged 18+. Although legislation passed by parliament 
in December 2018 has softened the requirements to pass a land code, at the time of 
WFN’s vote at least 50% + 1 of registered voters were required to vote, with at least 
25% + 1 of all eligible voters casting a yes vote. Historically, meeting this quorum 
has been difficult [9] and has resulted in failed votes [14].  
WFN signed on to the framework agreement in December of 2013 and held a rati-
fication vote on the Land Code in February 2017. Ratification of the Land Code re-
quired 178 yes votes from the community’s 725 eligible electors. To bolster engage-
ment, WFN decided to offer online voting as a complementary voting method for 
advanced voting. Paper ballots at the polls and by mail-in were also offered. The final 
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tally resulted in 191 ballots cast in support of the Land Code and 60 against its pas-
sage, Table 1. WFN was successful in ratifying the proposed land code legislation by 
meeting the required quorum of registered and eligible voters.  
Interestingly, 151 ballots (75 internet and 76 mail) were cast remotely, while 100 
were cast in person at traditional poll locations. This suggests that remote voting 
methods were the preferred voting channel for community members and may be im-
portant for community engagement. This is explored more fully in the following sec-
tion. 
Table 1. Total Counts in Wasauksing First Nation Land Code Ratification Vote 
Votes Received Yes No Totals 
Internet 69 6 75 
Paper (76 received by mail) 122 54 176 
Totals 191 60 251 
6. Findings
Examination of interview and participant observation data using NVIVO reveals three 
prominent themes: innovation and community modernization, community connected-
ness, and self-determination and self-governance. In the section that follows we dis-
cuss the findings according to these three themes and reflect on implications for gov-
ernance and participation in Wasauksing and the future well-being of the community. 
6.1. Innovation & Community Modernization 
One key theme identified was the connection between online voting adoption and 
the modernization of First Nation governance. The deployment of online voting in the 
Wasauksing Land Code referendum was discussed not just as a one-time novelty to 
help the community reach quorum, but also as part of a more generalized approach 
that First Nations are taking to meet citizens’ needs and modernize local governance. 
Most commonly, interviewees discussed the challenge posed by off-reserve residen-
cy. Like many First Nations, a large portion of Wasauksing’s members reside off-
reserve, posing challenges for political involvement such as potentially being less 
informed and engaged. As one community leader explained: 
“Our demographics of our population, that’s a real challenge to us. It might even 
be a 60/40 or 50/50 that live on-off reserve. We try to maintain all the data on our off 
reserve members but that’s a challenge because we find historically that, our people 
move with the seasons. So a lot of people still move that way and so we might have 
multiple addresses on an annual basis. So that’s one of the challenges, tracking our 
people that are off reserve and they, to some degree, they hold the big piece of the 
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mandate. So we want to ensure that we can reach out to them, have a tool or a method 
of reaching out.” 
Community leaders and administrators discussed the role online voting has played 
to diminish these challenges by reaching citizens off-reserve or whose residency 
changes frequently. Specifically, officials remarked that online voting provides an 
effective low-cost avenue to keep community members informed and engaged. 
In addition, interview data clearly reveals the connection between political mod-
ernization and online voting. For Wasauksing, online voting represents a natural evo-
lution of the community’s engagement with digital technology as a means of adapting 
governance to the changing realities of member’s lives. As one senior administrator 
who has worked with land code issues in several First Nations told us, online voting 
has become standard procedure when undertaking community referenda:  
“So currently, every First Nation that is in the development process will be doing 
e-voting. There are none that are opting out of it. Every one of them is going that
route. The way I see it going is that it will replace mail in ballots, we won’t have that
cost anymore. So it will just become that. Post land code, I think all the votes on ref-
erendums may have some component of in person voting, whether that be a show of
hands, because we can do that. But I think e-voting may become the one avenue
where all the votes are done through e-voting. So it will just be a more streamlined,
economical, efficient way of doing things and so that’s where I see it’s going. But
every community that I’ve been working with, they’re all embracing e-voting. It’s not
a question of should we do this, it’s just we’re doing it.”
As this quote illustrates, the adoption of online voting is inextricably linked to the 
community's vision for future governance. Online voting represents a continuation of 
local innovation that First Nations have been experimenting with.  
However, while the leaders and administrators we spoke with voiced mostly fa-
vourable views of online voting, concerns and issues were also raised. Many inter-
viewees discussed concerns similar to what has been observed in non-Indigenous con-
texts [13] such as breaches in security or privacy posed by potential hacking or inter-
ference. Administrators also pointed to confusion and challenges associated with re-
quiring online registration prior to casting a ballot, especially in situations where 
quorum involves reaching benchmarks of both registered and eligible voters. Com-
ments also focused on the changing nature of voting verifiers in First Nations votes. 
As one local administrator explained: 
“The registration part of it that’s more of challenge because now online, you regis-
tered whereas with the paper registration, you had the name of the witness and both 
signed. So the mindset, not so much of the administrators, not so much of the ratifica-
tion officers and not so much of the eligible voters, we have an additional person 
who’s like a scrutineer, their verifier. And so, in their role, they go from reviewing the 
land code to making sure it’s compliant with the framework agreement to then ensur-
217
ing that the community ratification process is followed. So then in their minds it be-
comes “Okay, if there is a challenge based on e-voting, how do I verify that?” 
The issues with registration and voter verification stem from administrative confu-
sion that can arise when tallying both paper and online ballots and breaking from tra-
ditional processes. None of the administrators we spoke with viewed issues with reg-
istration and voter verification as insurmountable challenges, and most stressed that 
with education and clear communication among administrators, verifiers and electors 
potential issues could be avoided.  
Perhaps the most serious set of issues regarding trust of online voting have nothing 
to do with the technology, but rather stem from the history of colonialism and Indige-
nous politics in Canada. Interviewees stated that many citizens who expressed mis-
trust toward online voting did so on the basis that any change, even one made inde-
pendent of non-Indigenous governments, may work against the broader political in-
terests of the community and consolidate colonial power dynamics. When explaining 
this apprehension, one administrator told us: 
“I’ve used online voting a few times, there’s not a large response to it and I think 
that’s because it’s new. I also find that our communities resist change. And that’s 
probably because in the past in dealing with the government, whenever we agreed to 
change, it didn’t work to our benefit, it worked to our detriment. So we’re apprehen-
sive about change and even though online voting can be a good thing, it’s a change 
from the traditional system on how we did it by voting coming in person and voting 
on paper. So it will take a while for that.” 
This fear of introducing online voting highlights the unique political concerns fac-
ing First Nations. These are broader concerns that may not be relevant to other juris-
dictions, but which First Nations must be acutely aware of and contemplate deeply. 
These complex and historically situated heuristics fundamentally alter the calculation 
for enacting any sort of reforms, even one that seemingly extends participation and 
legal jurisdiction in the community. As one administrator explained: 
“That’s right and we don’t really look at change in the way that it could benefit us, 
such as online voting. That may not be a detriment, it’s change. And so we’re appre-
hensive, we don’t jump at the chance to change the way.” 
These concerns highlight the tension that exists between innovating voting pro-
cesses with online voting and traditional norms and practices within a First Nation 
context. The political fissures created by colonialism and threats posed to Indigenous 
rights lead many First Nation citizens to view political reform with suspicion out of 
fear that it will lead the community astray from traditional ways of practicing politics. 
This poses a challenge to the success of online voting use in First Nations, particular-
ly amongst those who may already be disenfranchised or distrustful of governments. 
As one administrator communicated, face-to-face interaction and the voter experience 
plays an important role in First Nations: 
218
“I did hear from some community members that weren’t in favour of the use of 
online voting, that they didn’t like it because one of the big things with voting in per-
son is that it brings the community together and the people get to see each other again 
and talk and to have that bit of discussion.” 
While none of the tensions between modernization and traditional practices were 
expressed as fatal to the long-term prospects of online voting, it highlighted that 
online voting should not be viewed as a direct replacement for pre-existing practices 
and opportunities to participate. Rather, for online voting to be accepted it must be 
integrated with traditional cultural structures and norms in a supplementary fashion. 
This was crystallized by Wasauksing’s Chief when speaking about his experiences 
using social media:  
“Social media is one of the tools that we use. Again, some of our approaches to a 
big change like this, have to go through our structure, our community structure. So 
again, it’s not so easy when a Chief and Council have an idea and going to a commu-
nity or the elders, there is a structure in our community and we try to utilize that. 
That’s going to our elders first and trying to get an idea of what they’re thinking and 
how they feel and then they infiltrate their families. So that was one of the approaches 
as well that we do traditionally. I guess it’s my duty, as Chief, to touch base with our 
elders in regards to that.” 
Overall, interviewees positioned online voting as part of the broader modernization 
of governance practices in the community. Community leaders and administrators 
were optimistic about the prospects of online voting to improve community connec-
tion in local politics.  
6.2. Improving Community Connectedness 
The second major theme that emerged from interview and participant observation 
data is the potential for online voting to improve community connectedness by better 
engaging some members and enhancing community well-being. Improving voter 
turnout is a commonly cited motivation for the introduction of online voting [12, 13]. 
For Wasauksing’s leadership, there was hope online voting would improve voter ac-
cess and enhance participation, but implementation was more focused on better con-
necting community members by more fully bringing off-reserve members into the 
policy discussion. Wasauksing’s Chief emphasized this point when asked to reflect on 
the community’s experience with online voting: 
“It gives us that opportunity to be able to connect with them [off-reserve members] 
and make them feel like they’re part of the reserve and they’re still part of the voting 
processes and they’re still part of the governance of the reserve and the community 
and their people. One of the big things with people living off reserve is of course em-
ployment and that’s an issue and it doesn’t mean that they don’t want to be part of the 
reserve, it just mean that for their own financial gains and for their own life circum-
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stances, they, for whatever reasons, aren’t living on reserve anymore. But it doesn’t 
mean that they don’t want to be connected…the online voting, I think that really 
helped to increase the involvement and the participation of those off reserve mem-
bers.” 
In addition, interviewees stressed hopes of augmenting community connectedness 
with on reserve citizens. In speaking about her experiences with other First Nations, 
one senior administrator explained that online voting can be a key tool to engage on-
reserve members who may not otherwise make it out because they are less engaged. 
She commented that uptake was equally high among those living on reserve lands: 
“On reserve yeah. And you do door-to-door with the mail in ballots or with the 
VIN numbers or whatever and they attend to participate that way, because these are 
people who don’t come out to council meetings, they don’t come out to community 
meetings, to the annual general meeting. They just don’t like to participate or they’re 
intimidated or they’re quieter people or they’re shy or whatever, this allows them to 
participate without having to [I: Put themselves out there.] Yeah, yeah. I find, they 
participate greatly with the online voting but I think it’s the on reserve that we’ve 
seen a lot of uptake…” 
While the assessment of greater uptake by on reserve members is unexpected, it 
highlights the compatibility and usefulness of technology within a First Nation con-
text.  
Looking at Wasauksing’s voter survey data, however, shows that paper voters are 
more likely to reside on reserve while those that chose to vote online are more likely 
to live off-reserve. In addition, as outlined above, of the 251 votes cast 151 of these 
were cast remotely – 75 by internet and 76 by mail-in ballot. This suggests that in 
Wasauksing online voting appeals to off-reserve members and that remote voting 
methods are important for enabling engagement [14]. This is reinforced by the fact 
that the primary reasons internet voters cast a ballot online, and why paper voters 
would consider doing so, include enhanced convenience and accessibility.  
In addition, paper voters were asked if they would use online voting in a future 
vote. Sixty-three percent said they would. Of these, 28 percent said they would do so 
“in all circumstances” while 35 percent noted they would use it under “special cir-
cumstances” such as in instances where they were sick, away, or too busy to make it 
to a traditional poll location. This signals that online voting may be increasingly im-
portant to provide access to, and equality of, the franchise. Put a different way, paper 
voters were asked how they would prefer to vote if they could not attend a physical 
poll location. Forty-nine percent of respondents chose online voting, 22 percent vot-
ing by mail, 10 percent said they would vote by proxy, 5 percent by telephone and 5 
percent reported that they would abstain in such circumstances.  
Finally, reflecting on community connectedness by age among both paper and 
online voters we see that while paper voting is a preferred voting channel for the 
youngest and oldest voters, online voting had significant uptake from middle-aged 
voters. This implies that both voting methods are important to connect and engage 
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community members in votes. Reported satisfaction with paper and online voting 
emphasizes this point. One hundred percent of online voters reported being satisfied 
with the online voting process, while 89 percent of paper voters expressed satisfaction 
with paper voting at the polls. Overall, available survey data from paper and online 
voters in Wasauksing supports the finding online voting is a tool to engage off-
reserve members. It also indicates that online voting is an option paper voters want to 
see to improve their future voting access, and suggests it could be a means to better 
connect middle-aged voters with these types of policy discussions. 
The importance of community voice was emphasized by the Chief when he re-
flected that “Chief and Council cannot do it alone”. He noted it was essential citizens 
shared and discussed information regarding the land vote as a way to increase the 
collective knowledge about the proposal and extend the number of participating citi-
zens. Overall, for Indigenous communities that face challenges with members located 
on and off of community lands findings from Wasauksing’s land code experience 
suggest that the voting method can improve community connectedness and contribute 
to enhanced community well-being regardless of where members reside. This is con-
sistent with earlier findings published about Wasauksing and other First Nations in 
Canada [14].  
6.3. Self-Determination and Self-Government 
The third and final theme that emerged in our analysis is the connection between 
online voting use and the community’s pursuit of self-determination and self-
government. For Wasauksing, understanding the potential gains in self-determination 
and self-governance by leveraging online voting was a key motivation in partnering 
with our project. Their goal was not only to understand how online voting could sup-
port the community in reaching the quorum to ratify the Land Code, but also to un-
derstand whether online voting could be harnessed to create a vibrant and connected 
citizenry and contribute to long-term sustainable gains in self-determination. As the 
Chief explained, one of the foremost challenges to enacting self-determination and 
decision-making is difficulties consulting with community members: 
“I know within our nations, I do speak with the regional chiefs and at multiple lev-
els of leadership within the First Nations; we all have issues with reaching out to our 
off reserve voters. We, as I mentioned, we might be 50/50. I know of communities 
that are 75/25, 75 living out of their community. So they have real challenges when 
they need a ratification vote, they don’t have the statistics to hold the data [I: They 
need a threshold, yeah.]. So they go nowhere in their development, their governance, 
their development. I guess, to some degree, it’s really, really tough for them to govern 
and move their communities forward.”  
Interviewees viewed online voting as a strategic tool to overcome these challenges, 
offering an effective and cost-efficient way to foster inclusiveness and enhance con-
nectivity amongst Wasauksing’s membership. Moreover, the use of technologies such 
as online voting is understood as a viable and necessary pathway to support First Na-
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tions in achieving self-determination and seeking recognition of Indigenous rights. 
For example, as the Chief commented, “The UN Declaration guarantees our inherent 
rights. We're taking back jurisdiction on many fronts and developing laws, and assert-
ing our rights but we'll need digital tools to do this.” In the context of the land code 
ratification vote, online voting played a critical role in enabling the community to 
reach the quorum necessary to ratify the legislation. More significantly, however, the 
community’s ability to deploy online voting and define the terms of its referendum 
represented an important enactment of self-determination in its own right. This was 
made clear to us by a senior administrator:   
“It’s huge…I’ll try to go back to the reasons why we’ve been able to utilize those 
platforms is because we’re not guided by the Indian Act rules for elections or under 
the referendum regulations. So under the framework agreement under First Nation 
Land Management, First Nations have really taken on the role of developing their 
own community ratification process. So that has allowed them to take advantage of all 
the emerging technology, e-voting. I’ve been doing this since 2001. So in 2001, I ac-
tually did approach Elections Canada and asked them ‘What do you know about e-
voting and where’s that at?’ ‘Nowhere.’ And they’re still nowhere. But First Nations 
have really been able to take this on and municipalities too.” 
Interviewees discussed the role of online voting and technology more broadly in 
assisting the community in moving out from under the Indian Act. For Wasauksing, 
the Land Code referendum was viewed as a preliminary step toward future gains in 
self-governance. The impetuses to pursue a Land Code by the community and for the 
community was made clear by one administrator:  
“The motivation is actually very simple, it’s jurisdiction. We’re not asking for any-
thing new, this is returning to how things used to be before the Indian Act was im-
posed on us before the oversight of Indian Affairs or Aboriginal Affairs or Indigenous 
Affairs; however you want to call them.” 
Broadly, interviews with political and bureaucratic officials in the community il-
lustrate the usefulness of online voting for enhanced self-determination and progress 
toward self-government in two distinct respects: (1) enabling the passage of legisla-
tion that builds community autonomy and capacity, and (2) that the adoption of online 
voting is an empowering process in and of itself. On the one hand, passing legislation 
to gain autonomy and move away from governance under the Indian Act is a crucial 
step as part of an iterative approach to self-government. Yet, as outlined, passing such 
legislation has often been difficult to accomplish with historically imposed quorums. 
With growing numbers of community members living off-reserve land, connecting 
members to participate in these processes has become challenging and resulted in 
failed votes [8]. In this sense, online voting has played a crucial role in connecting 
community members and enabling their engagement in such votes, without which the 
passage of these types of community-oriented legislation would not have been possi-
ble. Second, the process of adopting online voting as a complementary voting method 
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and new digital initiative is itself a process of empowerment that enhances self-
determination. The process of the community introducing its own chosen tools to en-
hance its self-determination results in improved capacity on its own.  
7. Conclusion
By drawing on community experiences and narratives, this article contributes to our 
understanding of how online voting affects Indigenous communities, notably the rela-
tionship between governance and digital technology. Findings lead us toward optimis-
tic conclusions about online voting positively advancing Indigenous self-
determination and community capacity. In the case of Wasauksing First Nation’s 
Land Code referendum, the community accrued significant capacity to reach out to 
and involve its membership by leveraging online voting. In addition, community 
leaders and administrators identified online voting as a strategic tool essential in pur-
suing an iterative approach to self-government.  
Wasauksing’s experiences with online voting mirror many of the findings and dis-
cussions in the scholarly literature focused on notions of digital decolonization and 
self-determination [22]. For the community, the land code vote represented an oppor-
tunity to decentralize authority and decision-making over lands from the federal gov-
ernment. The use of online voting helped the community ensure that the land code 
process was inclusive by promoting consultation with members living both on and 
off-reserve. While there are tensions and challenges with online voting use in a First 
Nation context, our engagement with Wasauksing finds no evidence of online voting 
conflicting with traditional norms and decision-making practices and its adoption in 
no way superseded important cultural protocols of community consultation. Rather, 
the technology was introduced in a manner consistent with the pre-existing decision-
making structures that centered on community deliberation and openness. The success 
of online voting in this case is largely due to the fact that the community dictated the 
terms of its introduction. This ensured the voting method would be deployed in a 
manner consistent with the community’s broader political goals and that members 
could be educated and socialized toward the technology. 
While these findings are not meant to argue that online voting can be successful in 
all First Nations, they suggest that by employing an appropriate approach online vot-
ing can be a useful tool in the pursuit of Indigenous self-determination. They also 
emphasize what previous research has underscored about the potential to engage off-
reserve membership [14] and the extent to which this enhances community capacity. 
While some research has explored good practices regarding Indigenous deployment 
of online voting [8, 13] additional studies are needed to determine the conditions and 
steps which best ensure online voting serves the interests of First Nations, particularly 
in other jurisdictions such as the United States or New Zealand. Future research could 
also more systematically examine how online voting affects voter turnout in Indige-
nous communities and whether these differ from findings of local government elec-
tions [15, 12]. Finally, comparative assessments of how online voting impacts Indige-
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nous governance and self-determination in other contexts could support the results of 
this article.  
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1 Introduction 
Despite the initial expectations that digital divide would create a barrier for wide-scale 
Internet voting [1], the usage of Internet voting in Estonia has been steadily growing in 
relative and absolute numbers, reaching  a record during the 2019 Parliamentary elec-
tions. 44% the votes were casted over the Internet, becoming the most popular voting 
channel for the first time ever, supporting the claim that Internet voting is habit forming 
being “more persistent and repetitive than paper voting or non-voting” [5]. However, 
the growing popularity of Internet voting has raised concerns among stakeholders [2]. 
This paper aims at highlighting a set of impacts which growing usage of Internet voting 
has on the election administration, that will be explored in further research. 
2 Practical implications of growing usage of Internet voting 
 Impact on security: The growing usage of Internet voting raises the stakes for in-
terference in elections. That is an underlying assumption of many Internet voting
systems. Over years, the system of Internet voting in Estonia has already evolved
significantly, with many actors and properties being added [3]. However, unlike
some countries which have legal requirements in place to reflect on the increasing
usage of Internet voting (e.g. in Switzerland), Estonia has never mentioned them
explicitly, hence, representing the alternative approach of regulating less to guaran-
tee the possibility for further innovations.
 Impact on delivery of paper-based voting channels and financing of elections:
Growing usage of Internet voting inevitably results in decreasing popularity of pa-
per-based voting channels (see Table 1), hence, their lower cost-efficiency in com-
parison to Internet voting. Previous research [4] reveals that the cost difference be-
tween paper and electronic voting channels in Estonia in some cases reaches 10
times. This opens the discussion on optimization of supply of polling stations and
variety of voting channels. We present an overview of how supply of polling stations
changed since introduction of Internet voting and what the reasons are behind this
decision.
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Table 1. Votes’ distribution among voting channels in 2017 Local elections and 2019 
Parliamentary elections. 
Voting channel 2019 2017 
Internet voting 43,8% 31,4% 
Election day voting 37,4% 47,2% 
Advance voting 13,8% 15,7% 
Early voting  3,8% 4,6% 
Home voting 0,9% 1,1% 
Voting in diplomatic 
missions 
0,25% n/a 
Postal voting 0,05% n/a 
 Impact on supporting electoral infrastructure: The Estonian electoral system is a
combination of a modern Internet voting channel and a set of analog voting channels.
Apart from Internet voting, Estonia does not use other sophisticated electoral tech-
nologies: 1) paper votes are counted manually; 2) voting machines have never been
used at polling stations; 3) candidate registration is not automated, and 4) paper voter
lists are manually marked-off. Thus, Internet voting system is surrounded by ana-
logue electoral processes, and consolidation of Internet voting with paper-based vot-
ing channels is frequently done manually. While manual consolidation was not seen
to be a problem when the number of Internet voters was small, growing usage of
Internet voting challenges the further feasibility of manual consolidation. We con-
sider a process of manual consolidation in detail, and reflect on measures taken to
address the growing need for update of supporting electoral infrastructure.
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Abstract. In this paper we analyze the security of the online Danish
party endorsement system (DVE) and present two attacks: one tech-
nical, which we discovered during our study of the system in 2016 and
which compromises the integrity of the endorsements stored in the DVE-
database and another socio-technical, which allows parties to circumvent
mechanisms to protect voters against abuse. To understand these attacks,
we introduce the legal and technical frameworks of the DVE-system, an-
alyze its problems, and describe a sequence of events that has led to
endorsing three new parties that stood in the 2019 Danish Parliament
election.
1 Introduction
Collecting signatures to endorse parties running for parliament is an important
part of the democratic process, and for Denmark it is no exception. Prior to
March 29, 2014, all endorsements were done on paper. Prospective parties had
to go out to shopping malls and libraries, talk to people, and collect hand-written
signatures. These signatures were subsequently checked by the municipalities for
eligibility and correctness, i.e. that each endorser had the right to endorse and
had not already endorsed another party. This was tedious work.
On March 29, 2014, the law governing party endorsements was changed to
allow a digital solution to be used for collecting endorsements. The Ministry for
Social Affairs and the Interior (in Danish “Social- og Indenrigsministeriet” or
SIM, as it was known at the time) would become responsible for providing, run-
ning, and maintaining the solution. The prospective parties would be responsible
for collecting endorsements using the solution. Prior to the law change, SIM was
not involved in the operational aspects of collecting and checking endorsements,
but with the new law in place the ministry had to provide a digital solution
assisting parties to collect endorsements.
The law requires that to stand for Danish Parliament election, a prospective
party must collect at least a number of endorsements equal to 1/175 of all valid
votes cast in the previous Danish Parliament election, which corresponds to
20.109 endorsements in 2019. In comparison, to be admitted to the European
Parliament election, a prospective party must collect more than 2% of all valid
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votes cast in the previous Danish Parliament election, which corresponds to
70.380 endorsements in 2019.1
Not long after the law changed, SIM released the corresponding administra-
tive regulation and commenced with the procurement of the Danish party en-
dorsement system (DVE). A feasibility study was conducted, requirement docu-
ments were drafted, and the Danish company KMD was tasked with developing
the system.2 Eventually, the DVE-system was deployed after some delay, and
voters were invited to endorse prospective parties.
From an operational point of view, the DVE-system works as follows: any
new prospective party that strives to be recognized collects email addresses of
potential endorsers and then forwards invitations to endorse the party through
the DVE-system. Eligibility is checked using Denmark’s national digital identity
system, which allows the DVE-system to verify information about the endorser,
such as nationality and age. Moreover, the DVE-system allows endorsers to with-
draw their endorsements at a later point in time. The system also supports the
collection of paper-based endorsements.
In this paper, we discuss some challenges that accompanied the introduction
of the DVE systems in the Danish electoral process. We first describe the legal
and technical framework of the DVE-system in Section 2, then present best prac-
tices following recommendations of international and non-governmental organi-
zations in Section 3. In Section 4, we show two attacks against the 2016 version of
the DVE-system, one technical and one socio-technical. In Section 5, we present
our reflections and unsolicited recommendations, which we consider important
for a future DVE-system. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude and discuss briefly
the impact of the DVE-system on the 2019 Danish Parliament election.
2 The DVE Framework
2.1 The Legal Framework
In Denmark, every resident has a digital ID, called NemID3, a personal identifica-
tion number, which is called CPR4, and access to an authenticated email service,
called e-Boks5 (Digitale Post). With the availability of these technologies, Den-
mark’s Parliament passed a law in March 2014 that would allow the collection of
party endorsements using a digital online system.6 SIM, which changed its name
to Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior (Økonomi- og Indenrigsmin-
1 See European Parliament election law §11, Section 1.
2 Neither the authors nor their affiliations were involved in this project, neither during
procurement, nor development, nor quality assurance.
3 See https://www.nemid.nu
4 See https://cpr.dk/
5 See https://www.e-boks.com/danmark/da
6 See https://www.ft.dk/samling/20131/lovforslag/l124/index.htm
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isteriet, ØIM) in 2016, was ordered to develop the appropriate administrative
regulation, which was published in January 2016.7
Compared to the early versions of the legal framework, this administrative
regulation focused on the usability of the digital solution. To this end, the author-
ity to check the validity of the endorsements and the eligibility of the endorser
was transferred away from the municipalities to the DVE-system, relieving the
municipalities of the need to procure their own local systems.
The new regulation defines necessary roles in connection with the digital
solution, among them the “party administrator”, who works on behalf of the
prospective party to drive the endorsement collection activity. The regulation
also uses several technical terms, such as “granting access to the digital solu-
tion”, “is contacted by email”, “the email contains a link”, “a voter declaration”,
“voter’s declaration’s key”, “archive key” etc. which are underspecified and can
be interpreted in many different ways. In addition, the new regulation explicitly
requires that seven days must pass between the time of registration to the time
of endorsement, granting the prospective endorser time to reflect upon whether
or not to endorse the prospective party. The new regulation also prescribes what
must happen in case the digital solution is not functional or ceases to work.
We observe that the new regulation does not make any reference to the veri-
fiability of the operation of the DVE-system, the accuracy of the endorsements,
the integrity of the database, the confidentiality of the endorser, nor the avail-
ability of the DVE-system.
2.2 The Technical Framework
The steps to endorse a party using the DVE-system are depicted in Figure 1. The
process is driven by the prospective party. In a first step, the party has to apply
with ØIM to initiate the endorsement collection process, and ØIM configures
the DVE-system accordingly. Prospective voters can be asked to endorse a new
party either by email or by regular mail. As nearly all of the Danish residents
have a digital ID, only few will endorse parties by regular mail (this case will
not be considered any further in this paper).
The legal framework requires that the party should initiate the process (Init)
by sending the email address of the prospective voter to ØIM through the online
interface of the DVE-system. Once received, the email address will be stored
for seven days (which is referred to as the “period to reflect”) before sending an
invitation (Invitation) email to the endorser containing the link to finalize the
endorsement and the token to identify it.
After receiving the email, the endorser can follow the link to log into the DVE-
system through the website vælgererklæring.dk using the digital ID NemID.
By confirming the information on the screen, the endorsement is then given
(Endorsement). The DVE-system will subsequently send a receipt (Receipt) to
7 See Vælgererklæringsbekendtgørelsen, https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/
R0710.aspx?id=176933
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Fig. 1. Process of endorsing a party
the endorser via the authenticated email service e-Boks including a link that
give the endorser the possibility to withdraw the endorsement (Revocation).
The DVE-system was implemented in 2016 by the Danish company KMD,
and since then has been used by more than 100 prospective parties, four of which
applied for recognition, with the result that three applications were granted and
one was rejected.
3 Best Practices
In this section we describe our reflections on best practices, before analyzing the
legal and technical framework of the DVE-system in the subsequent sections.
Although party endorsement is usually considered secondary to electronic
voting, it exhibits all defining characteristics of an Internet voting system: all
endorsements are submitted through the Internet; there is no paper trail; the
integrity of the database (of all endorsements) is instrumental for creating public
confidence in the decisions that follow from it; all voters who are eligible to vote
in the election are also eligible to endorse upcoming parties; finally, voters can
only endorse one party. Newly approved parties will appear on the ballot and
there is likely extensive media coverage of such new parties. Therefore, the DVE-
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system qualifies as an election technology that should live up to best practices
and standards of any election technology.8
Any election technology must be software independent, which means that
an undetected error in the system software cannot lead to a undetected error
in the election outcome [RW06]. One way to achieve software independence is
through verifiability, which can increase the level of trust in voters, by checking
that a system performed correctly by secondary means [BRR+15]. The election
technology must be secure, which means that it can be used safely in adversar-
ial environments, and accountable, which means that there are mechanisms to
identify misbehaving participants.
4 Findings
We have been following the development of the legal and the technical framework
of the DVE-system attentively since 2014 and in particular during its launch in
2016. In this section we share our reflections and observations.
4.1 Legal Framework
Lack of Verifiability The administrative regulation lacks mention of basic re-
quirements usually associated with the introduction of electronic voting technolo-
gies, which is contrary to international standards and best practices. The regula-
tion does not mention requirements regarding security, accountability, software
independence, or verifiability. Consequently, it is impossible to judge whether a
DVE-system is compliant with the regulation, which is particularly worrisome.
A grave oversight of the regulation is that essential elements of the DVE-
system are not adequately defined, including what constitutes a binding en-
dorsement. The regulation fails to specify how endorsements should be linked
to the voter (if at all), and how they are secured. The regulation also omits
which mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee the authenticity of an
endorsement, and to protect them against copying, tampering, and deletion.
Absence of Endorsement Privacy It is also noteworthy that the regulation
fails to take advantage of new opportunities to guarantee higher levels of en-
dorsement privacy. The role of vote privacy in Internet voting systems is well
understood as are the mechanisms and the challenges to protect it. We believe
that the reason why endorsement privacy is not considered in the regulation
is most likely because prior versions of the legal framework did not require it
either. Operationally speaking it is not clear how to collect party endorsements
on paper, while at the same time verifying the eligibility of the endorser and
guaranteeing their privacy.
8 See Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5[1] of the Committee of Ministers to member
States on standards for e-voting (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 June
2017 at the 1289th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies)
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The Impossibility to Revert Before the law was changed and the adminis-
trative regulation was released, the municipalities had the authority and respon-
sibility to verify the validity of endorsements and the eligibility of the endorser.
By transferring this responsibility to the digital solution run by ØIM, the legal
framework has forfeit the possibility to revert to a manual process, which would
have to be, presumably, carried out by the ministry, which simply does not have
the resources to do so. The legal framework therefore did not only create the
legal foundation for the use of a digital solution, it made its use mandatory.
Transparency The legal framework refers to the digital solution, as if it was al-
ready constructed and as if under no circumstances it could negatively affect the
public confidence of endorsers and voters. The administrative regulation does not
explicitly require any quality assurance processes (for example software reviews
or penetration tests) nor certification with respect to applicable standards (e.g.
ISO). It also does not require the source code of the system nor any evaluation
or penetration testing reports to be public [EBB+15].
4.2 Technical Framework
The protocol depicted in Figure 1 is implemented in the DVE-system. As, ap-
parently, there is no concern to run the DVE-system in a highly contested ad-
versarial environment, it is perhaps not surprising that the implementation that
we studied in 2016 did little to defend against cyberattacks and socio-technical
attacks, which we discuss next.
Cyberattacks The design documentation and the source code of the DVE-
system is closed source, contrary to best practice and international recommenda-
tions [CKN+14]. It is therefore impossible for any outsider to conduct a security
analysis of the DVE-system, in its entirety, i.e. review of requirement documents,
design documents, implementation, and deployment plans. Collaborating closely
with officials at ØIM, we were asked to endorse a fictional test party (which in
our eyes required a limited security analysis, pretending to be an ineligible ad-
versary who was invited by a party administrator to endorse). We submitted our
email-address to our contact at ØIM, who set up a test party, and invited us to
endorse. By they time we tried to endorse, we observed that the invitation had
already expired. Upon request, our contact in the ministry forwarded a second
invitation, this time not for the test party but for a real and non-fictional party
“De Visionære”. The invitation message is depicted in Figure 1.
Architecture. The outward facing interface of the DVE-system is a website that
runs a Java application server and is connected to NemID for the purpose of
authentication. Once authenticated, a set of JavaScript files are uploaded to the
client computer and the application is then executed client-side.
Following the exchange of messages described in Figure 1, the party owner
sends an invitation to the endorser by the way of the DVE-system, who receives
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a link and a token (a random looking string of characters) that initiates the
endorsement procedure. To endorse, the recipient of the mail follows the link,
authenticates via NemID and confirms the party endorsement.
The website follows a three-step process. The first step checks whether the
endorser has the proper rights to endorse the party: endorsers can only endorse
one party and they must have the right to vote in the election the prospective
party stands for; the second step requires confirmation from the voter, showing
the party details and the voter identity; finally, the third step returns feedback
on the success or failure of the process. Because endorsement invitations and
endorsers are not linked, the requirement that seven days must have passed
between the initiation of the process and the actual endorsement (“reflection
period”) is not checked by the DVE-system.
Adversary model. An election is a contest, where different stakeholder groups,
often with conflicting interests, stand as candidates before an eligible voting
population to determine who will go in power. Public confidence in the election
outcome is paramount.
The party approval process is similar, except perhaps that there is not one
but many winners. The adversary model is therefore relatively well defined. It
includes every individual who tries on behalf of a party to influence the approval
process in any form. Any individual can get an invitation to endorse a party,
by contacting the party administrator directly, and therefore any user of the
DVE-system must be considered an adversary, which is exactly the adversary
group that we focus on in this paper.
In the bigger picture, there are of course other adversaries that must be
taken under consideration, including insider attackers (working for example for
ØIM or the system vendor), generating spurious endorsements or removing them
to influence the result. There are also Nation States who aim to influence the
approval process, for example, with the objective to destabilize a country or
influence the public discussion on media. Unfortunately, because of ØIM’s policy
to keep all information confidential, our security analysis is restricted to an
individual attempting to endorse a party by breaking client-side security.
Client-side security refers to the capability of the end-points of a larger dis-
tributed system to defend against cyberattacks by keeping adversaries out, pro-
tecting the integrity of the data, the confidentiality of sensitive information, and
the overall availability of the system. ØIM should be concerned with client-side
security because it grants endorsers direct access to sensitive data by the way
of end-points, such as laptops, mobile phones, or tablet computers. Weak or no
client-side security allows adversaries to gain access to sensitive data, i.e. party
endorsement, corrupt the integrity of the databases, or, in the worst case, disrupt
service altogether.
Objective of the security analysis. According to Danish law, citizens are permit-
ted to endorse parties for the Danish Parliament, EU-citizens are permitted to
endorse parties for the European Parliament elections, and every individual is
only allowed to endorse one and only one party. The DVE-system should enforce
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this policy and the objective of the security analysis is to determine if it really
does. Unfortunately, this was not the case.
Detailed description of an identified vulnerability. On August 12th 2016, 9:00
the authors of this paper commenced the security analysis of the DVE-system
by studying the client-side security of the website vælgererklæring.dk. Figure 2
Fig. 2. Invitation Email with token (sensitive information redacted)
depicts the redacted version of the Invitation email that was forwarded to us on
August 11, 2016, 15:20, only three hours after our initial request on August 11,
12:10. It is also noteworthy, that this email was not sent to the email address
we provided, but to the email of an employee at ØIM (redacted), which means
that the ØIM staff was aware that tokens are not bound to the identity of the
endorser, but can be forwarded to anyone, effectively circumventing the seven
day “reflection period”. The token is clearly displayed as the last argument to
the clickable link in the email.
Upon receiving this token by email, we followed the link, and were prompted
with the NemID login procedure, which we used to authenticate the first author
of this paper. At this point, it was time to launch the tools that any security
expert and hacker would use.
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Fig. 3. Screen displaying the attack (sensitive information redacted)
Figure 3 shows a screen shot of our system, running Kali Linux9. The window
in the upper left corner runs Wireshark10, a tool that records all network traffic
and analyzes it. The window below depicts an editor window showing parts of the
JavaScript code application that our machine has downloaded from the website
vælgererklæring.dk and which we used to review and understand the code. For
example, the highlighted number ’41504f53-0203-0124-4158-41504f494e54’ is the
code word that tells the DVE-system that the endorsement was confirmed by
the endorser and is ready to be submitted. To the right, we see an instance of
the Firefox11 client window in split screen with the web developers tools running
in the lower part.
Our first step was to collect information on how the DVE-system works, so
we logged into the website using the first author’s credentials, and proceeded to
try to endorse the party “De Visionære”. We observed that the system worked
according to specification: as the first author is not a Danish citizen, the system
rightly rejected his attempt to endorse the party, which was acknowledged by an
“access denied” message on screen. With this information at hand, we started to
study the JavaScript code that was running on our computer to learn as much
as we could about the implementation.
1 page.find(’a.button ’).bind(’click’, function(e){
9 See https://www.kali.org/
10 See https://www.wireshark.org/
11 See https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new/
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2 e.preventDefault ();
3 $.ajax({
4 type: ’GET’,
5 url: ’!checkVoterRightsProxy ’,
6 dataType: ’xml’,
7 async: false ,
8 cache: false ,
9 data: {
10 cpr: $.session.get(’personCpr ’),
11 type: $.session.get(’indsamlingsType ’)
12 },
13 success: function(xml){
14 if($(xml).find(’responseMessage ’).attr(’response ’)
15 == "success"){
16 eve.page.confirmAfgivErklaering ();
17 }else if($(xml).find(’responseMessage ’).attr(’response ’)
18 == "dobbelterklaering"){
19 $.session.set(’afvistGrund ’, ’dobbelt ’);
20 eve.page.afvistErklaeringKvittering ();
21 }else if($(xml).find(’responseMessage ’).attr(’response ’)
22 == "valgret"){
23 $.session.set(’afvistGrund ’, ’mangledeValgret ’);
24 eve.page.afvistErklaeringKvittering ();
25 }else{
26 eve.core.confirmationsDialog(
27 $(xml).find(’responseMessage ’).attr(’response ’));
28 }
29 }
30 });
31 });
This piece of code contacts the !checkVoterRightsProxy to check if the user
has the proper rights to vote. On line 13 we can see how the client reacts to
possible responses by the server. There are three cases:
1. all the checks succeed (response == ’success’), so the user is allowed to
endorse the party; in this case eve.page.confirmAfgivErklaering() is called
by the client;
2. the user has already endorsed a party (response == ’dobbelterklaering’),
hence the user is hence denied the option to cast an endorsement;
3. or the user does not have the right to vote at all, (response == ’valgret’),
and is similarly denied to cast an endorsement for the party.
Since the first author is not Danish, the request is clearly is handled by case
3. and so we inspected the code for implementing the necessary functionality.
First, the following function is called:
1 afvistErklaeringKvittering: function (){ //V9
2 eve.core.clean($(’#vContent ’));
3 eve.core.clean($(’#vInfo’));
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4 eve.page.renderAfvistErklaeringKvittering ();
5 eve.page.configHelpButton(’V9’);
6 },
which then in turn calls:
1 renderAfvistErklaeringKvittering: function (){
2 var page = $(’#vContent ’), information = $(’#vInfo’);
3
4 $.ajax({
5 type: ’GET’,
6 url: ’!rejectVoterProxy ’,
7 dataType: ’xml’,
8 async: false ,
9 cache: false ,
10 data: {
11 uuid: $.session.get(’functionUuid ’),
12 cpr: $.session.get(’personCpr ’)
13 }
14 });
15
16 page.append(eve.page.breadcrumbs (3, 3);)
17
18 var insdsamlingsNavn =
19 $.session.get(’indsamlingsType ’) == "FV" ?
20 "folketingsvalg" : "Europa -Parlamentsvalg" ;
21 var partyNameLink = $.session.get(’www’) != "" ?
22 ’<a href="’ + $.session.get(’www’) + ’" target =" _blank">’
23 + ’Link til ’ + $.session.get(’navn’) + ’ hjemmeside </a>’ :
"" ;
24
25 [...]
26
27 page.find(’a.button ’).bind(’click’, function(e){
28 e.preventDefault ();
29 eve.page.logout ();
30 });
31 },
This function contacts the server calling !rejectVoterProxy, then constructs
a return HTML message using a sequence of appends, which we have abbreviated
under [...] on line 25. Now we understood and could reconstruct the behavior
of the DVE-system. The next step therefore was to try to trick the DVE-system
into accepting the first author’s endorsement despite him not being a Danish
citizen. We traced the code to determine what would have happened if all checks
succeeded and inspected the confirmAfgivErklaering function, which displays
the confirmation of a vote, and it looked as follows:
1 confirmAfgivErklaering: function (){
2 var dialog = $(’#confirm_dialog ’);
3
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4 dialog.find(’span.handling ’).text(’Du er ved at bekræfte’ +
5 ’ din vælgererklæring. Er du sikker?’);
6
7 dialog.dialog ({
8 width: ’450px’,
9 modal: true ,
10 position: {"my":"center", "at": "top +200"},
11 title: "Godkend vælgererklæring",
12 buttons: {
13 "Ja": function (){
14 eve.page.changeState($.session.get(’functionUuid ’),
15 ’41504f53 -0203 -0124 -4158 -41504 f494e54 ’,
16 $.session.get(’personCpr ’));
17 $(this).dialog("close");
18 if(!error) {
19 eve.page.afgivetErklaeringKvittering ();
20 }
21 },
22 "Nej": function () {
23 $(this).dialog("close");
24 }
25 }
26 });
27 },
Line 13 displays the function call that gets executed once the endorsement is
confirmed, which is triggered by the user pressing the “Ja” button as the last
step. In particular, the following function call is interesting:
1 eve.page.changeState($.session.get(’functionUuid ’),
2 ’41504f53 -0203 -0124 -4158 -41504 f494e54 ’,
3 $.session.get(’personCpr ’));
Digging deeper into the JavaScript code, we observe that the function being
called is the following:
1 changeState: function(funktionUuid , stateUuid , cpr){
2 var data = {functionUuid: funktionUuid ,
3 stillingsbetegnelseUuid: stateUuid}
4
5 $.ajax({
6 type: ’GET’,
7 url: ’!changeVoterStateProxy ’,
8 dataType: ’xml’,
9 async: false ,
10 cache: false ,
11 data: data ,
12 success: function (xml) {
13 if($(xml).find(’responseMessage ’).attr(’response ’)
14 != "success") {
15 eve.core.confirmationsDialog($(xml).find(’
responseMessage ’)
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16 .attr(’response ’));
17 error = true;
18 } else {
19 error = false;
20 }
21 }
22 });
23 },
The function contacts the server on !changeVoterStateProxy to change the record
of the voter.
Returning to the preceding code snippet, we notice that there are two pa-
rameters missing from the function call that have to be provided, which are
functionUuid and personCpr. After finding the right functionUuid (see Figure 3)
in the browser’s cookie store, and knowing the first author’s civil registration
number (CPR) we were able to construct and place a request to the DVE-
system through the vælgererklæring.dk website that would allow us to submit a
fraudulent endorsement for the party De Visionære (which we later removed to
return the database to an “uncorrupted state”).
Fig. 4. The attack line (sensitive information redacted)
Figure 4 depicts the problematic command with the CPR number redacted
that we issued through the Firefox console, while Figure 5 shows the letter sent
to the first author’s authenticated e-Boks, confirming a successful attack.
In summary, we have shown that even the simple client-side security objec-
tive was violated. After this shocking revelation, we did not attempt further
attacks, but many, similar in nature, come to mind. For example: would it be
be possible to submit or withdraw endorsements impersonating other voters? or
to circumvent other restrictions imposed by the law? We concluded at the time
that this attack demonstrates a complete lack of integrity in the endorsements
database, which also questions the decisions that have been drawn from it.
4.3 Socio-Technical Vulnerabilities
Another grave vulnerability of the DVE-system was pointed out by ØIM, when
they sent us the invitation depicted in Figure 2: the tokens for submitting en-
dorsements are not bound to the identity of the endorser. This observation can
certainly be turned into another serious attack. A party administrator could, just
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Fig. 5. The receipt (sensitive information redacted)
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as our contact at ØIM has done, generate many tokens by specifying a party
email. These tokens will arrive in the mailbox after seven days, which can then
be forwarded to potential endorsers, effectively bypassing the seven day “reflec-
tion period” required by administrative regulation. Endorsements can happen
right in front of party representatives, exposing voters to social engineering and
coercion attacks.
The only argument that softens the severity of the attack is that endorsers
receive a final receipt to their personal e-Boks, and therefore they will always be
able to withdraw an endorsement that they may not feel comfortable with.
5 Reflections and Recommendations
The legal framework and the technical framework do not match. The legal frame-
work is weak, because it does not require the digital solution to be software in-
dependent or at the very least verifiable. The administrative regulation permits
technical solutions that do little to strengthen public confidence in endorsement
integrity. The technical framework (that we studied in this paper) is weak, be-
cause it is not made to be used in an adversarial environment.
We recommend that the ØIM strengthens the administrative regulation and
involves experts in designing a new generation DVE-system as soon as possible,
to ensure that the system lives up to best practices and follows international rec-
ommendations. ØIM should also consider to strengthen the privacy of endorsers
and require coercion resistance beyond just the ability to withdraw endorsements
at a later stage.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present an analysis of an early and unpatched version of the
Danish party endorsement (DVE)-system and argue that the design of the law
and the DVE-system are fundamentally flawed. We show that even non-eligible
endorsers in possession of an invitation email and a valid NemID could have
endorsed the prospective party. According to ØIM this was the only successfully
executed attack using this particular vulnerability before the system was fixed in
December 2016. A consequence of our demonstration is that the DVE-database
of endorsements may lack integrity, and consequently so do all decisions based
on it.
Responsible disclosure. After discovering the flaw on August 12th 2016, we in-
formed the ministry of our findings by email. On August 25th the ministry
asked the first author to present a detailed document with all our findings. On
September 14th 2016 we were invited to present our findings to ØIM and the
software vendor, which we did on September 27th and offered our help to fix
the fundamental design issues in the protocol. Finally, on October 25th, 2016,
we organized a meeting with the vendor at the IT University of Copenhagen,
screening a video recording of the attack, and on December 19th we received
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notification that the specific issue was resolved. Since then, ØIM has neither in-
vited us to look at the security of the DVE-system again, nor have they invited
us to bid or participate in a commissioned security review, nor have they shared
with us the results of the security review conducted by an unknown third party.
The aftermath. In 2016, a new party called the “Nye Borgelige”12 was intro-
duced on the ballot based on the endorsements stored in the database. Another
prospective party “Nationalpartiet” 13 also applied to become a party in 2016,
but did not succeed, citing unavailability of paper endorsements and problems
with the DVE-system. Their application was eventually rejected. Both decisions
were made using the version of the DVE-system discussed in this paper. In 2019,
two new parties were added to the ballot, “Klaus Riskær Pedersen”14 and “Stram
Kurs”15. Both parties stand accused of having exploited the socio-technical vul-
nerability described in Section 4.3.
In the the light of the recent accusations, representative of all parties repre-
sented in the parliament have voted that a new DVE-system should be built/pro-
cured, citing lack of usability and usable security. The new system should be in
place as soon as possible. We pledge our support to ØIM to assist with improving
both the regulatory framework and the technology.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Christine Boeskov and Søren
Stauning from ØIM for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Abstract. This paper presents the first comprehensive study of the use
of online voting technology in the province of Ontario, Canada. Despite
having one of the largest concentrations of online voters globally, its use
is not governed by any federal or provincial standards. This has left many
municipalities to make decisions largely in isolation, relying on for-profit
vendors to set their own bar for cybersecurity and public accountability.
This study presents important observations about online voting use in
the 2018 Ontario municipal election and questions whether the legal
principles are being met by the technology deployed in practice.
1 Introduction
In an era characterized by foreign interference in national elections, it can be easy
to lose sight of the cybersecurity of elections held at the municipal level. With
much of our attention squarely focused on state-level threat actors, we must
occasionally remind ourselves of a more fundamental threat to our democracies:
loss of confidence in the process itself. This idea is summarized expertly by the
Supreme Court of Canada:
Maintaining confidence in the electoral process is essential to preserve
the integrity of the electoral system, which is the cornerstone of (our)
democracy. ... if (electors) lack confidence in the electoral system, they
will be discouraged from participating in a meaningful way in the elec-
toral process. More importantly, they will lack faith in their elected rep-
resentatives. Confidence in the electoral process is, therefore, a pressing
and substantial objective.1
? This paper is an extended abstract. The full version is available online:
https://whisperlab.org/ontario-online.pdf
1 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 SCR 827, 2004 SCC 33 (CanLII).
Available online: http://canlii.ca/t/1h2c9
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In this paper, we study online voting in the context of Ontario’s 2018 municipal
elections in which as many as one million voters cast a ballot online. In the
absence of almost any federal or provincial government standards or oversight,
municipalities and their private for-profit vendors are primarily left to set their
own bar for cybersecurity and public accountability in their elections.
We present several observations about the election and question whether the
associated practices align with the legal principles established in case law. We
believe these observations will prove significant to municipalities, since, as the
Chief Electoral Officer of Ontario recently pointed out:
As the public becomes more informed about software, malware, and ma-
nipulation of technology data systems, they are increasingly interested
in knowing exactly how election technology preserves the integrity of our
electoral process and the confidentiality of their personal information [5].
This leads to the central thesis of this work: purposeful, malicious interference,
or fraud is not necessary to undermine an election. Nor is the honest discharge
of an election sufficient to prevent it. Given enough time, a seed of doubt in an
otherwise faithfully executed election may eventually grow to accomplish what
even the best threat actor cannot. With the goal of preventing this outcome,
we hope this work will serve as an encouragement to Ontario municipalities and
others contemplating online voting to develop standards to address these issues.
Contribution. We present the first comprehensive study of the cybersecurity
of online voting in Ontario’s 2018 municipal elections, including a complete ac-
counting of municipalities, ballot options, vendor partnerships, and the extent
of municipalities affected by emergency extensions to the voting period on elec-
tion night. We present findings showing issues with weak voter authentication;
poor transparency of election results; and, a general lack of disaster-preparedness
which resulted in nearly one million voters receiving an emergency extension to
the voting period due to a misconfiguration in the online infrastructure on elec-
tion night. We study date of birth as a login credential and show that it could
by used to uniquely re-identify up to 50% of online voters in the 2018 election.
2 Background
Canada does not offer online voting at the federal level, and cybersecurity is
a significant factor in that position. The parliamentary Special Commission on
Electoral Reform (ERRE) reviewed the possibility of online voting in 2016 and
recommended against its introduction on cybersecurity grounds [18, 3].
2.1 Online Voting in Ontario Municipalities
Municipalities in the provinces of Ontario and Nova Scotia have held online elec-
tions since 2003 [10]. Since then, adoption in Ontario has followed an exponential
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trend, nearly doubling with each election cycle. As of the 2018 municipal elec-
tion, we observed 45% of municipalities (accounting for 29% of the province’s
9.4 million voters) offered online voting. Furthermore, 33% of municipalities (ac-
counting for 16% of all voters in Ontario) eliminated paper ballots completely.
While hard numbers of turnout by voting method have not been made pub-
licly available, we estimate the number of Ontario voters casting a ballot online
between 2-4 times higher than Estonia (see Section 3.3).
Despite concerns about the use of online voting, the Communications Security
Establishment (CSE) assesses threats to municipal elections as “very likely to
remain at its current low level,” [3], which is often cited by municipal councils
and clerks favoring the adoption of online voting. While the report considers
conventional threat actors (nation-states, hacktivists, cybercriminals, terrorist
groups, political actors), it overlooks others, such as election officials, system
manufacturers, and system operators (cf. [17]). Nor does it consider the inherent
threat to confidence posed by the use of non-transparent election technology.
Furthermore, no technical standards currently exist within Canada for de-
signing, testing, or certifying online voting systems, nor auditing or otherwise
independently verifying the result they produce. Nor do the federal or provin-
cial governments provide guidance on the procurement and operation of such
systems. As we discuss in Section 3.1, Ontario offers almost no oversight to the
degree that they do not even track which municipalities offer online voting.
Finally, the population difference between the largest and smallest municipal-
ities in Ontario is four orders of magnitude. While some municipalities have the
resources to perform security reviews of vendor proposals,2 others rely almost
entirely on their vendors for cyber-expertise.
2.2 Legal Context
A commonly used expression in Ontario municipal politics is that “cities are
creatures of the province,” which references the fact that the province legislates
their existence.3 Municipalities are categorized by three tiers: single, lower, and
upper. Upper-tier municipalities correspond to counties or regional municipali-
ties, which consist of multiple lower-tier municipalities. Municipal councils exist
at all three tiers; however, elections are only conducted by single- or lower-tier
municipalities. The composition of upper-tier councils is either determined au-
tomatically, e.g., as a council of all the mayors of the constituent lower-tiers
(as in Bruce County) or by a direct ballot question in the constituent lower
tier-elections (as in the election of the Regional Chair of Durham).
Ontario has 444 municipalities: 30 upper-tier, and 414 lower- and single-tier.
In the 2018 Ontario Municipal Election held on October 22nd, each single- and
2 Security Assessment of Vendor Proposals, Toronto, 2014. Available online:https:
//www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Canada-2014-01543-
security-report.pdf
3 Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25. Available online: https://www.ontario.ca/
laws/statute/01m25
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lower-tier municipality was responsible for organizing and delivering its own
independent election. This means up to 414 municipal councils made up to 414
individual decisions about the use of online voting in their election.
Municipal Elections Act (MEA). The main piece of legislation governing
municipal elections in Ontario is the Ontario Municipal Elections Act (MEA).4
Although online voting is not explicitly mentioned in the MEA, it allows a
municipal council to pass by-laws authorizing the use of “an alternative voting
method, such as voting by mail or by telephone, that does not require electors
to attend at a voting place in order to vote,” (MEA sec. 42). Additionally, it
grants municipal clerks the power to establish procedures for alternative voting
methods.
Whereas the MEA provides extensive language surrounding the delivery of
paper-ballot elections and other electoral matters such as the use of rank-choice
ballots, it provides no guidance regarding how to deliver an online election. The
Act does not even contain the words “online,” or “internet.”
This contrast between specificity for paper-ballot in-person elections on the
one hand and ambiguity toward online voting on the other leads to an apparent
contradiction in places between the letter of the law, and the technology being
used in practice. For example, the Act requires that “no person shall communi-
cate any information obtained at a voting place about how an elector intends to
vote or has voted,” (MEA, Sec. 49 (2)c). However, the act of casting a ballot in
an online voting system communicates—in the literal network communication
sense—information to the online system about how an elector has voted.
Legal Principles. Democratic and legal principles provide an important lens
through which to interpret the use of technology in elections (cf. [1]), especially
in the absence of technical standards. The principles of the MEA are not included
in the MEA itself, but have been inferred from its provisions and set out in case
law as follows:5
– Ballot secrecy. The secrecy and confidentiality of the voting process is
paramount,
– Fairness. The election shall be fair and non-biased. Voters and candidates
shall be treated fairly and consistently,
– Accessibility. The election shall be accessible to the voters,
– Integrity. The integrity of the voting process shall be maintained through-
out the election,
– Certainty. There is to be certainty that the results of the election reflect
the votes cast,
– Eligibility. Valid votes are counted and invalid votes are rejected so far as
reasonably possible.
4 Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sched. Available online: https:
//www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/96m32
5 Cusimano v. Toronto (City), 2011 ONSC 2527 (CanLII) at para. 67. Available online:
http://canlii.ca/t/fl5pg
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3 Election Statistics
3.1 Initial Survey of Available Data
Several months before the election, we set out to obtain a list of which cities were
intending to use online voting. We wrote to the Ontario Ministry of Municipal
Affairs and Housing (MAH) in March 2018 and were surprised to discover this list
did not exist. Although the MEA requires local municipal councils to formally
pass a by-law authorizing the use of an alternative voting method in the year
prior to the election, we were informed in an email response that “municipalities
are not required to declare their intentions to the province ... the Ministry does
not have a list of municipalities that will be using internet voting in the 2018
municipal election.” Several of the vendors had commented publicly on the total
number of their municipal clients, but none offered a breakdown. One of our
colleagues requested such a breakdown from one of the vendors, but they refused
to provide it. It was evident that we would need to collect the data ourselves.
3.2 Data Collection Methodology
Correcting the Municipal List. Our first step was to obtain a complete
list of Ontario’s 444 municipalities, their tier-status, and associated URL. We
consulted MAH’s online list6 and quickly discovered many URLs were incorrect
or outdated. For example, many municipalities had switched from the older
city.on.ca form to the newer city.ca form. Some cities no longer owned the
URL listed. For example, the URLs listed for Mattawan and Larder Lake directed
to Japanese-language websites. We had to inspect each of the 444 URLs for
correctness manually. We wrote to MAH around the time of the election and
received an acknowledgment that they would undertake to update their list. Six
months later, many of the errors we identified remained uncorrected.
Tracking Down Voting Website URLs. Our next step was to determine
which municipalities were planning to use online voting, which vendor they con-
tracted, and the URL of the voting website. We were concerned that finding the
URLs would be challenging, since many municipalities we observed made it a
practice never to list it anywhere online, revealing them only in the voter infor-
mation package mailed to voters before the election. Sample voter information
packages found online used a placeholder URL (e.g., anytown.election.ca, and
candidate social media fairly consistently respected this approach. We believe
the practice of concealing URLs was meant as a cybersecurity protection to make
the voting site harder to find by non-residents.
We made inquiries with colleagues in the province about the URL of the
voting site in their respective cities and observed a trend in which vendors were
encoding a municipality’s voting website either into sub-domain (e.g., Intelivote
6 List of Ontario Municipalities. Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/page1591.aspx
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used the form city.evote2018.ca), or sub-directory (e.g., Dominion used the
form intvoting.com/city). We then wrote a collection of automated scripts
that used the municipal list to search for the existence of voting sites based
on the particular URL form a vendor was using. For municipalities encoded
into sub-domains, we performed passive DNS lookups. For names encoded as
sub-directories, we attempted to fetch the HTTP header from the server and
inferred whether the page existed from the response code.
For any municipalities not captured by the bulk search, we conducted a labor-
intensive manual web search of online municipal documents, including meeting
minutes of councils and voter accessibility documentation. This allowed us to
identify municipalities using custom domain names (e.g., kenoravotes.ca), and
abbreviations (e.g., Elizabethtown-Kitley used ektwp.evote2018.ca). The only
URL we were not able to find with this approach was Markham’s, who were
partnered with Scytl, so there was no obvious way to infer the URL from others.
Furthermore, staff and candidates made a seemingly flawless effort of not men-
tioning the URL in online documents, social media, etc. Ultimately, however, we
found it (evote.markham.ca) by searching certificate transparency logs.
Cross-validation and Corrections. After the election, the Association of Mu-
nicipalities of Ontario (AMO) published a list of municipalities broken down by
election results, number of eligible voters, and voting methods offered.7 Rather
than being made available as a single downloadable data file, the figures were
spread across 444 individual web-pages, which we scraped in order to cross-
validate against our list.
We found a few mistakes in the AMO list. For example, the municipalities of
Belleville, Bracebridge, and Timmins were reported as not using online voting
when, in fact, they did. The township of Machin was reported as using online
voting when it did not. We shared this information with the AMO. We also
discovered three municipalities with active websites on Intelivote’s domain for
which no election was held as the races were acclaimed. We also initially falsely
concluded that Newmarket had contracted Intelivote since there was an active
website on the evote2018.ca domain. The Newmarket deputy clerk later con-
firmed they contracted Scytl instead.
In terms of the correctness of self-declared vendor figures, we observed three
of the four vendors reporting more municipal clients than actual elections run.
See the full report for further discussion.
3.3 Results: Who Used Online Voting?
Of the 444 municipalities, 30 upper-tier municipalities do not hold elections, and
23 single-/lower-tier municipal councils were acclaimed and therefore did not run
an election. In total there were 391 elections involving 9,444,628 eligible voters.
7 https://elections.amo.on.ca
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Voting method Municipalities Eligible Voters
Electronic ballot only 131 (33.5%) 1,512,076 (16.0%)
Electronic and paper 46 (11.8%) 1,230,019 (13.0%)
Paper ballot only 214 (54.7%) 6,702,533 (71.0%)
Total 391 9,444,628
Table 1. Voting methods offered in the 2018 Ontario municipal election.
Of those, 177 offered an online voting option, of which 131 were completely
paperless. Our full dataset is available for download online.8
Table 1 shows the number of municipalities and eligible voters by voting
method. These consisted of electronic ballot options (online and telephone bal-
lot casting), paper ballot options (incl. optical-scan and postal mail-in), or a
combination of options. Combining the AMO’s population data with our ob-
servations, our results show that online voting was available to approximately
2.74 million voters, or 29% of the voting population. Of these, approximately
1.51 million voters, or 16% of the voting population experienced a completely
paperless ballot, cast either online or by telephone.
Most municipalities did not report turnout categorized by voting method.
However, if we combine our numbers with the AMO’s province-wide turnout
rate of 38.2%, we estimate the total number of voters who cast ballots online to
be between 0.5–1 million, which is approximately 2–4 times the online ballots
cast in the 2019 Estonian parliamentary elections.9
We observed 4 vendors active in the 2018 Ontario election: Dominion Vot-
ing Systems, Intelivote Systems, Simply Voting, and Scytl. Intelivote and Scytl
worked together in partnership, although the extent of their business relationship
remains unclear to us. Though ostensibly distinct business entities, we observed
both Scytl Canada Inc. and Intelivote Systems Inc. have a registered office at the
same mailing address in Dartmouth, NS. Additionally, we observed a consider-
able portion of Intelivote’s web content (Javascript, images) and infrastructure
(IPs, domains) appears to have been provided by Scytl. Of the municipalities
offering online voting, Table 2 shows the relative market share.
4 Election Observations and Findings
In this section we present three significant findings. Additional findings are pre-
sented in the full version.
8 https://whisperlab.org/ontario-online.csv
9 https://www.valimised.ee/en/archive/statistics-about-internet-voting-
estonia
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Vendor Municipalities Eligible Voters
Dominion Voting Systems 49 (27.7%) 1,323,194 (48.3%)
Intelivote Systems 98 (55.4%) 860,985 (31.4%)
Simply Voting 28 (15.8%) 304,479 (11.1%)
Scytl 2 (1.1%) 253,437 (9.2%)
Total 177 2,742,095
Table 2. Online voting market share in the 2018 Ontario municipal election.
4.1 Disaster Preparedness
One open question was how municipalities were preparing for the possibility of a
disaster in the online voting infrastructure (accidental or otherwise), especially in
the absence of standards. Our initial examination of municipal documents found
no mention of a disaster recovery plan. We raised this issue in the media six
months prior to the election [8]. Several clerks were also interviewed but “could
not provide a disaster plan to be implemented in case the election is hacked, or
irregularities tip the balance in favor of a candidate who should not have been
elected.” The clerk of Sarnia acknowledged, “I don’t have a disaster plan in place
right now, I’d have to talk to my vendor about that.” The clerk for St. Thomas
added, “We’re hoping nothing does happen.”
Election night emergencies. As it turned out, something significant did hap-
pen. Starting around 6 p.m. on election night, the voting websites of 43 munic-
ipalities experienced a dramatic slowdown. Just before 6 p.m., we performed a
network capture of the login page for Hanover’s voting site, and after 2 min-
utes the page load timed out. Although the static content appeared to load, the
dynamic content loads dragged on, and some eventually timed out.
In the face of an unavailable voting website, and with many affected munic-
ipalities without any paper ballot option as a back-up, many clerks made the
extraordinary decision to declare emergencies to extend the voting period. In
some cases, voting was extended later into the evening by 1-2 hours. The major-
ity of affected municipalities, however, extended voting by a full 24 hours [20, 12].
A statement by Dominion on the night of the election attributed the slow-
down to their co-location provider (an IT sub-contractor) “placing an unautho-
rized limit on incoming voting traffic that was roughly 1/10th of the system’s
designated bandwidth.” Dominion did not disclose the names of the affected
cities, so we assembled this list manually by examining multiple news sources
and municipal websites.14 The number of municipalities and affected voters are
shown in Table 3. A complete list of municipalities who extended voting periods
is provided in the full version.
Five months after the election we were invited to present preliminary results
of this paper to the Association of Municipal Managers, Clerks and Treasurers
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Emergency Extension Municipalities Eligible Voters
24-hour extension 35 575,022
Same-evening extension 8 422,085
Total 43 997,107
Table 3. Emergency extensions due to Dominion’s election night slowdown
of Ontario (AMCTO). We spoke to several clerks and a representative from Do-
minion. None were willing or able to provide any explanation for the events that
lead to the co-location provider’s bandwidth restriction, nor even the provider’s
identity. According to Sudbury’s post-election report, however, the slowdown
was determined to be a “miscommunication between Dominion and the service
provider.”10
Conflict with principles. The outage may contradict the accessibility prin-
ciple on the basis that the voting websites became inaccessible to voters. The
unexpected nature of the outage may contradict the fairness principle on the
basis that the emergency extensions to the voting periods allowed some voters
an additional day to form a decision relative to those who had cast their ballots
just prior to the slow-down.
4.2 Voter Authentication
Voter lists at the municipal level are largely derived from the Municipal Prop-
erty Assessment Corporation (MPAC), whose primary business is not voter list
management. This mismatch of focus has lead to inaccurate municipal voter lists
over the years, and numerous news stories ran prior to the election on the sub-
ject. Because the lists are derived from property ownership, we heard anecdotal
accounts of rental tenants who did not receive their online voting login creden-
tials, whereas non-resident adult children away in college did. Other accounts
described land owners of multiple properties receiving multiple login credentials.
One news story reported a deceased dog in the town of Mono received a PIN [7].
Online voting credentials. The primary credential needed to cast a ballot
online consisted of a knowledge factor (a PIN and/or ID) transmitted to the
voter in a voter information package via postal mail. To our knowledge, the sole
exception was the city of Cambridge, which sent PINs via email. In almost all
cases a second knowledge factor (date of birth) was required. See Table 4 for a
breakdown of credentials used by the vendor.
10 City of Sudbury. Post Election Report. Jan 21, 2019. Available: https:
//agendasonline.greatersudbury.ca/index.cfm?pg=feed&action=file&agenda=
report&itemid=25&id=1312
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Vendor Primary credential (mailed) Secondary credential
Dominion 13-digit ID & 8-digit PIN Date of birth
Intelivote 16-digit PIN Date of birth
Scytl 16-digit PIN Date of birth
Simply Voting 9-digit PIN Date of birth
Table 4. Credentials needed to vote online
The use of single credential for voter authentication is inadvisable since ac-
cess to the voter information package is sufficient to cast a ballot on another’s
behalf. Furthermore, some voters observed that the PINs were legible through
the envelope when held up to bright light. See Figure 1. In order to mitigate this
risk, most municipalities required a date of birth as a secondary credential. Note
that authentication is still considered single-factor (as opposed to multi-factor)
authentication since both credentials are knowledge factors.
Dates of birth, however, make a poor login credential for several reasons.
Aside from the significant privacy implications (which we discuss in Section 5),
they are low entropy, cannot be changed, and typically are not very secret, espe-
cially when considering one’s co-habitants (i.e., friends and family) are potential
threats. Aside from the widespread practice of sharing dates of birth on social
media websites, some US states such as Ohio include dates of birth in voter
registries which are freely available for download online.
Much of the voting literature on eligibility and authentication focuses on
threats like coercion and vote selling. In practice, however, it appears that a far
more pervasive version of these threats is also more casual.
Voting on someone else’s behalf is an offense under the MEA. Nevertheless,
we heard anecdotal accounts from several independent sources of parents who
voted on behalf of children living in another city, or people who voted on behalf
of their spouse while they were at work. We also heard accounts of individuals
gifting their unopened voter information packages to friends and family.
Ultimately, knowledge of a PIN or date of birth does not establish a voter’s
identity. It merely establishes to the voting server that some entity on the other
end of the connection knows a secret. Secrets, of course, can be transferred or
intercepted. Indeed, the fraudulent interception of online voting PINs is currently
the subject of a criminal investigation in Alberta [6, 15].
Conflict with principles. This form of voter authentication and eligibility
verification may contradict a number of principles. The use of dates of birth
evidently contradicts the ballot secrecy principle (see Section 5). The multiple
anecdotal accounts of individuals voting on behalf of others would seem to con-
tradict the principles of fairness and eligibility.
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Fig. 1. Voter login credentials visible through mail envelope
4.3 Transparency and Accountability
The opportunity for an independent evaluation of security claims and imple-
mentations is vital to the public interest. There are numerous examples in the
academic literature of improperly implemented software leading to critical vul-
nerabilities in online voting technology (see, e.g., [16, 21, 9, 19]).
As a substantial illustration of this point, academics recently discovered sev-
eral critical implementation vulnerabilities in Scytl’s software as implemented
for the proposed Swiss Post national online voting system [11, 13]. These in-
cluded, among other things, the possibility of the election provider creating a
valid-looking mathematical proof of a fake election result. On March 29, 2019,
Swiss Post announced that it would suspend its e-voting system as a result of
critical “errors in the source code.” Importantly, these findings were possible be-
cause Swiss Post made the system and source code available for independent
review not only to the general public but to the international community (Swiss
Post reported 3,200 participants from 137 countries).11
No such opportunity for independent review was provided in the election.
This fact is troubling, as we found numerous municipal documents in circulation
which made security claims which were: short on detail; mostly non-technical;
and, largely unverifiable by members of the public.
Result by fiat? For several months after the election, we received phone calls
from council candidates from around the province asking how they could verify
the correctness of the online vote totals. Many of them had experienced an un-
expected loss, and although they all acknowledged there were entirely legitimate
possible explanations for the outcome, they were understandably in search of
answers.
Unfortunately, however, there appeared to be little objective evidence either
supporting or disputing a particular online election result beyond the clerk’s
11 https://www.post.ch/en/about-us/company/media/press-releases/2019/
swiss-post-temporarily-suspends-its-e-voting-system
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declaration of results itself. None of the deployed online systems produced an
accompanying paper trail, and there is currently no online equivalent of risk-
limiting audits [14].
Based on URLs found in municipal documents obtained under access to infor-
mation, clerks accessed election results by logging into their vendor’s web admin
portal, where they could generate reports of events, activity, and results. The
extent of objective evidence the clerks received (if any) remains an open ques-
tion. Many of the public documents we examined either pointed to the existence
of an independent auditor who performed basic logic and accuracy testing, or to
third-party firms who performed routine penetration testing of the online sys-
tem. Aside from neither of these constituting proof of an election outcome, our
search of municipal documents uncovered no publicly available reports on the
topic. What reassurance do audits provide the public if their scope, methodology
and findings are entirely unavailable?
After the election, several residents and former candidates in Wasaga Beach
contacted us to share their deep concern about an unexpected election loss.
Among other things, we suggested they inquire as to whether there were any IPs
responsible for casting an unusually large proportion of ballots in the election.
Initially, residents contacted the vendor but were referred to the city clerk. We
then helped them write a freedom of information request. The clerk responded
that they could not provide this information because the municipality did not
have any such records.
Conflict with principles. Our observations point to what we believe is a
serious concern over the degree of certainty of results achievable in the current
online voting setting. If there ever was evidence of an incorrect result or fault
(whether due to error or otherwise), some of the experiences we heard suggest
that it would exist beyond the reach of the public.
As Elections Ontario pointed out in its study of alternative voting technolo-
gies, unless the implementation of an online voting system provides auditable
evidence of the election results, then “the process is open to question” [4]. Per-
haps the most pressing issue for Ontario municipal elections is whether online
voting in the next election can provide candidates an objective measure of cer-
tainty in the results they will have worked so hard to achieve.
5 Analysis of Voter Confidentiality and Ballot Secrecy
A significantly overlooked question in the online voting conversation in Ontario
has been to what extent an online voting vendor can associate a voter’s identity
with their ballot selection. Recalling the MEA principle stating secrecy of the
ballot is paramount, in this section we ask how unique is a voter’s date of birth
(DOB) within their particular municipal election.
Data collection. As part of our study leading up to the election we collected
basic web data from each of the 180 active voting websites we found. This in-
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cluded the IP addresses, TLS certificates, HTTP headers, and static HTML of
the login pages. We examined the source code of each web page for elements that
indicated the presence of a DOB field. Most voting sites loaded the DOB field
dynamically. We did not wish to burden on the election servers by capturing
full HTTP sessions of the login pages of every municipality. Loading the login
page of a single Dominion municipality, for example, required over 100 separate
GET requests, so we opted to capture a single municipality per vendor. As a
result do not have a complete accounting of which municipalities used DOB as
a login credential, though our sampling of municipal documents suggests a large
majority did.
We used a web proxy on the evening of the election to capture HTTP mes-
sages sent by the voting client to the election server when the login button was
clicked. We used breakpoints so that we could intercept and examine POST mes-
sages without actually forwarding them to the server. At the time of capture,
we were unable to complete a load of Dominion’s login page (see Section 4.1).
We found that within a single web session the server receives information about:
the voter’s city (from the URL itself), their date of birth (from the login), and
how they voted. We now examine the degree to which this information could be
used to associate voter and vote.
5.1 Re-identifying Voters with City and Date of Birth
As a rough estimate, there are approximately 30,000 possible dates of birth in
a voting age population (365 days times 80 years). Considering that many of
the municipalities who ran online voting had voting populations numbering in
the low thousands, it seemed likely that many voters would have a unique DOB
in their town. To model this, we used the AMO’s data on eligible voters in
each municipality, combined with a sizable real-world DOB dataset to create a
distribution from which we could run experiments to study the uniqueness of
dates of birth within each municipality.
Modeling Date of Birth distribution. Our experiment required a DOB
distribution representative of a general population of voting age individuals. In
the US, many states provide public access to voter registries. Most include names
and postal addresses, and some even include birth dates. We decided to use the
statewide Ohio voter registry, which is a large publicly available dataset (>7
million records) containing voter DOB information.12
For each municipality, we ran the following experiment: we uniformly sampled
dates of birth from the Ohio voter registry equal to the number of eligible voters
in the given municipality. To determine the uniqueness of each record, we counted
the frequency of each DOB in the sample, and then counted the number of times
each frequency value was recorded. The result was a probability distribution of
finite outcome, where the probability of each outcome represented the likelihood
12 Ohio statewide voter files. Available: https://www6.sos.state.oh.us
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k = 1 k = 5
Max % of Max % of
Vendor Eligible Voters Affected Eligible Affected Eligible
Dominion 1,323,194 531,758 (40.2%) 1,181,876 (89.3%)
Intelivote 860,985 613,999 (71.3%) 847,876 (98.5%)
Simply Voting 304,479 190,097 (62.4%) 294,912 (96.9%)
Scytl 253,437 32,880 (13.0%) 123,712 (48.8%)
Total 2,742,095 1,368,734 (49.9%) 2,448,376 (89.3%)
Table 5. Degree to which voters were uniquely identifiable (k = 1) or near-uniquely
identifiable (k=5) by the use of date of birth as a login credential
that a DOB record would have exactly that many matches in the election. We
ran 1,000 trials for each municipality, generating a cumulative distribution where
the probability of each outcome represented the likelihood that a particular DOB
would have up to that many matches in the election. We estimate the number of
re-identified voters within a cell size of k by multiplying the number of eligible
voters in a given municipality by the probability of k or fewer matches from its
cumulative distribution.
Results. The repeated trial experiment was run for each municipality, deter-
mining the maximum number of affected voters that were uniquely identifiable
(i.e., k = 1). We also considered an almost uniquely identifiable case (k = 5),
which we chose as the smallest cell size found in industry, although a cell size
of k > 20 is typical. [2]. A breakdown of our findings by vendor is shown in
Table 5. Of 9,444,628 eligible voters in the province, 2,742,095 (29.0% of the
total voting population) were at some risk of being re-identified by the combi-
nation of their city and DOB. Of these, up to 1,368,734 voters (49.9% of the
total affected population) could be uniquely identified, and 2,448,376 (89.3%
of the total affected population) could be near-uniquely identified. That these
numbers are so high is reflective of the fact that much of the 1.4 million voters
were spread across numerous small towns, significantly increasing the chance of
a unique city/DOB combination. If we were to simulate this effect for the entire
province in the scenario where municipalities used online voting, we estimate
that up to 2,638,340 voters (27.9%) would be uniquely re-identified and up to
5,302,183 (56.1%) would be near-uniquely identified.
In conclusion, roughly half of the voters eligible to cast online ballots in the
2018 Ontario municipal election were uniquely re-identifiable by their date of
birth and town. Given this information is transmitted to the voting server in the
same web session as the voter’s cast ballot, there is a strong case to be made that
dates of birth as login credentials conflicts with the principle of ballot secrecy.
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6 Conclusion
There is significant work to be done in Ontario if online voting is to continue in
the long term. As one clerk of a large city acknowledged to us, it may take as
little as one successful cyber attack for online voting to be banned permanently.
The observations made in this study, however, point to a more likely failure mode
without hackers, malice, or fraud. Until the technological practice inhabits the
same universe as the legal principles, the absence of standards for online voting
in Ontario may lead it to collapse on its own.
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Abstract. Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems have been
shown time and time again to be vulnerable to hacking and malfunction-
ing. Despite mounting evidence that DREs are unfit for use, some states
in the U.S. continue to use them for local, state, and federal elections.
Georgia uses DREs exclusively, among many practices that have made
its elections unfair and insecure. We give a brief history of election secu-
rity and integrity in Georgia from the early 2000s to the 2018 election.
Nonparametric permutation tests give strong evidence that something
caused DREs not to record a substantial number of votes in this elec-
tion. The undervote rate in the Lieutenant Governor’s race was far higher
for voters who used DREs than for voters who used paper ballots. Under-
vote rates were strongly associated with ethnicity, with higher undervote
rates in precincts where the percentage of Black voters was higher. There
is specific evidence of DRE malfunction, too: one of the seven DREs in
the Winterville Train Depot polling place had results that appear to be
“flipped” along party lines. None of these associations or anomalies can
reasonably be ascribed to chance.
Keywords: Permutation testing, anomaly detection, DREs
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1 Introduction
The state of Georgia was a focal point in the civil rights movement of the twen-
tieth century. It also has a history of election problems: systematic voter sup-
pression, voting machines that are vulnerable to undetectable security breaches,
and serious security breaches of their data systems.
The 2018 midterm election returned Georgia to the national spotlight. Civil
rights groups alleged that then Secretary of State Brian Kemp—who was run-
ning for Governor against Stacey Abrams, a Black woman—closed polling places,
deleted voters from the rolls, and challenged voter signatures—disproportionately
in Black neighborhoods [9,18,22]. A federal lawsuit against the Secretary of State
demanded that Georgia replace paperless direct recording electronic (DRE) vot-
ing machines with optically scanned voter-marked paper ballot (opscan) voting
systems [34]. While the judge accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that DREs (and
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Georgia’s election management) have serious security problems, defendants suc-
cessfully argued that they were unable to replace their equipment in time for the
election. Ultimately, in-person voting in Georgia’s 2018 election was on DREs.
The 2018 election produced anomalous results that could have been caused by
malfunctioning, misprogrammed, or hacked election technology, including DREs.
The accuracy of DRE results cannot be checked (for instance by a risk-limiting
audit) because the DREs used in Georgia do not produce a voter-verifiable paper
record. There has been no forensic investigation of the DREs used in the 2018
election, although the (continuing) suit seeks to conduct one.
This paper begins with a short history of recent election integrity issues in
Georgia. We summarize known security flaws of DRE voting systems and what
took place in the months leading up the 2018 election. We analyze public election
results and poll tapes photographed by a volunteer, finding strong statistical
evidence that DREs were the source of these anomalies: that something caused
DREs to miss votes in the Lieutenant Governor’s contest and to “flip” votes for
one party into votes for another.
2 DRE Voting Machines
Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 after the prob-
lems in Florida in the 2000 presidential election. HAVA requires states to allow
provisional voting and to build statewide voter registration databases, and pro-
vided funds for states to upgrade voting systems for accessibility. To receive
funding, states were required to replace punchcard and lever voting systems and
to provide at least one accessible voting machine per polling place [14].
Two types of systems were on the market: optical scanners (opscan), which
primarily used hand-marked paper ballots, and DREs. DREs eliminate the need
to print and store paper ballots, can present ballots in multiple languages, and
satisfied the accessibility requirement [14].1 DREs and in-precinct opscan sys-
tems also make it easier to report results faster than central opscan systems.
While HAVA only required one accessible machine per polling place, some states
opted to use DREs exclusively [43]. In 2002, four voting machine manufactur-
ers offered DREs: Diebold Election Systems, Election Systems and Software
(ES&S), Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems. This paper focuses on
Diebold (now Premier), the lone DRE provider in Georgia.
In the following year, newly-adopted DREs caused serious problems. In the
2002 Florida primaries, some machines in Miami-Dade county failed to turn on,
creating long lines that prevented some would-be voters from voting. In New
Mexico, faulty programming caused machines to drop a quarter of the votes. In
Virginia, the software on 10 machines caused one vote to be subtracted for every
100 votes cast for a particular candidate [40].
In 2007, studies sponsored by the Secretaries of State of California (the Top-
to-Bottom Review, TTBR) and Ohio (the EVEREST study) gave conclusive
1 There is ample evidence that the systems are not very usable in practice by voters
with disabilities [33], yet they satisfy the legal requirement.
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evidence that the DREs on the market had fundamental security flaws. The
TTBR found physical and technological security flaws with Premier Election
Systems’ (formerly Diebold) DREs, including vulnerabilities that would allow
someone to install malicious software that records votes incorrectly or miscounts
them; susceptibility to viruses that propagate from machine to machine; un-
protected information linked to individual votes that could compromise ballot
anonymity; access to the voting system server software, allowing an attacker to
corrupt the election management system database; “root access” to the voting
system, allowing attackers to change the settings of any device on the network;
and numerous physical security holes that would allow an attacker to disable
parts of the device using standard office tools [5]. EVEREST found that the
software for Premier DREs was “unstable” and lacked “sound software and se-
curity engineering practices” [17]. California decertified DREs from Premier,
Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia, and the EVEREST study prompted Ohio to move
to optical scanners.
White-hat hackers have found even more security flaws. In 2005 and 2006,
Finnish computer scientist Harri Hursti demonstrated that Diebold’s optical
scanners could be hacked to change vote totals, and uncovered security flaws with
Diebold’s AccuVote-TSx machines that render “the voting terminal incurably
compromised” [12,13]. In 2017, the annual DEF CON hacker conference held
a “Voting Village” and supplied participating hackers with over 25 pieces of
election equipment used in the United States. While EVEREST restricted the
types of hacks that could be deployed against the machines, there were no such
restrictions at DEF CON. Within minutes, hackers with little prior knowledge
of voting systems penetrated several DREs, including the Premier AccuVote-
TSx used in Georgia. They uncovered serious hardware vulnerabilities, including
chips installed in sockets instead of being soldered in place to prevent removal
and tampering [2]. The Voting Village has become a regular part of DEF CON
as voting system vulnerabilities persist: the organizers reported in 2018, “while,
on average, it takes about six minutes to vote, machines in at least 15 states can
be hacked with a pen in two minutes” [3].
Security experts recommend that jurisdictions using DREs conduct forensic
audits both before and after every election. An examination of the software and
machines done by an independent, neutral party might detect tampering, bugs,
or hacking, and would help discourage malicious attacks [35]. (However, forensic
investigation is not guaranteed to detect all hacking: for instance, malware can be
programmed to erase itself after doing its damage.) But historically, it has been
illegal to examine voting machine software because it is considered proprietary
information [24]. Without a forensic audit or a reliable paper trail against which
to check reported results, there is no way to know whether a DRE accurately
captured and tallied votes.
To make DREs more secure, printers can be added to create a “voter-verifiable
paper audit trail” (VVPAT) displayed behind glass, so the voter can check
whether their vote was cast as intended. The paper record can be used in a
post-election audit, and serves as a back-up in case the device’s electronic mem-
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ory fails. The NIST Auditability Working Group found that the only satisfactory
way to audit DREs is with a trustworthy paper record such as a VVPAT [20].
However, VVPATs can be compromised. If the printer malfunctions, the pa-
per record is incomplete. VVPATs are difficult to audit: they are typically printed
on continuous, flimsy, uncut rolls of paper, which need to be unrolled and seg-
mented to count votes. Most VVPATs are thermal paper, which degrades quickly
when exposed to heat, light, human touch [20], or household chemicals [5].
Verifiable does not imply verified : voters might not check a VVPAT effec-
tively or at all. Research has shown that voters don’t review their selections
effectively. Voters often walk away from DREs before an electronic review screen
is displayed. Errors in votes occur at the same rate whether a review screen
is shown or not. In experiments where the wrong candidate was marked on an
electronic review screen, only 37% of study participants noticed the error on the
review screen, though 95% reported that they had checked their ballot either
somewhat or very carefully [7]. A report by the Pennsylvania State Department
found that when voters were shown VVPATs displayed behind glass, the glare
and edges of the glass cage obstructed their selections [33]. VVPATs may not
reflect voter intent, even if voters claim to review them.
Many states have been phasing out paperless DREs. In 2006, nearly 40%
of voters used DREs to cast their vote. In 2016, 28 states used DREs in some
capacity, but most jurisdictions had some paper record, either opscan or an elec-
tronic method with a paper backup [40]. Only five states still use paperless DREs
exclusively: Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey, and South Carolina.
3 Voter Suppression in Georgia
Georgia faced heightened scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 due to
a history of discrimination in elections. Sections 4(b) and 5 of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act required jurisdictions with prior evidence of racial discrimination to
get “preclearance” from the federal government before changing their election
policies. In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in Shelby County v. Holder that these
sections were unconstitutional because they placed undue burden on some states
based on outdated evidence of discrimination against minority voters [30].
The ruling revitalized efforts to disenfranchise minority voters: without fed-
eral oversight, some states that were previously subject to the preclearance rule
of the Voting Rights Act reinstated some discriminatory policies. States began
to close polling places and create stricter voter registration laws. Previously,
counties and states would have had to show that these changes would not differ-
entially disenfranchise minority voters. After Shelby County v. Holder, Arizona,
Louisiana, and Texas made changes that affect a large number of registered
voters, disproportionately Black and Latino [36].
Strategically closing polling places can reduce voter turnout for specific de-
mographic groups. It can force voters to travel farther to vote and create long
lines in remaining polling places. Since the ruling, nearly a thousand polling
places in the United States have been closed, many which served African Amer-
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ican communities [36]. Since 2012, election officials in Georgia have closed 214
precincts—nearly 8% of the state’s polling places [22]. Officials claim that consol-
idating low-turnout polling places is purely a cost-saving measure [38]. However,
39 of the 159 counties in Georgia where polling places were closed have poverty
rates above the state average and 30 of them served significant African American
populations [22]. These closures would not have been permissible prior to 2013
under the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance rule.
Under Secretary of State Kemp, over 1.4 million voter registrations were
cancelled in “routine maintenance” of the voter rolls, eliminating those marked
inactive according to the law. Kemp implemented the first “exact match” law
in 2010 with preclearance from the federal government, requiring a name on a
registration application to exactly match the voter’s legal name. The law made
it harder for voters whose registrations were removed to get back on the voter
rolls. The law was dismantled after it was found unconstitutional in 2016 [32].
It was replaced in 2017 by a new exact match law. Any discrepancy between the
name on the application and legal name—as innocuous as a missing hyphen—
renders the registration “pending.” Civil rights groups argue that, though they
are eligible, having a pending application discourages people from voting. Over
53,000 voter registration applications were pending leading up to November 2018.
Nearly 70% of pending applications were from Black voters, more than double
the 32% Black population percentage in the state [18].
Kemp denies he has attempted to suppress minority voting, claiming that
the decision to close a precinct is up to county election officials. However, in
2015 his office provided a document giving county officials guidance on why and
how to close polling places [22]. Kemp blames the racial disparity in pending
voter registration applications is on sloppy voter registration efforts and poorly
trained canvassers, in particular the New Georgia Project, a voter registration
group (founded by Kemp’s gubernatorial opponent Stacey Abrams) that tar-
geted African American voters and used primarily paper registration forms [18].
4 Georgia After HAVA
Georgia was the first state to adopt DREs statewide in the wake of HAVA: in
November 2002, just days after HAVA was passed, the state signed a $54 million
contract with Diebold Election Systems to use the AccuVote-TS/TSx DREs [43].
During the summer of 2002, Diebold began preparing more than 20,000 DREs
to be used in Georgia for the November election. A former Diebold employee
alleged that during this time, before the machines had been delivered to counties,
employees were asked to install three software patches on all of the DREs that
would be used statewide that year. These patches did not undergo the federal
certification process for voting equipment [41]. Another former Diebold employee
reported that the president of Diebold’s election unit, Bob Urosevich, came to
the warehouse himself to order the installation of uncertified software patches on
about 5,000 machines used in DeKalb and Fulton, two historically Democratic
counties [15].
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This raised eyebrows when key contests in Georgia’s 2002 election defied poll
predictions. Longtime Democratic Senator Max Cleland was predicted to beat
Republican opponent Saxby Chambliss by 3%, but in fact lost his seat by a 7%
margin. Democratic incumbent Governor Roy Barnes was predicted to win 51%
to 40%, but in fact lost to Republican candidate Sonny Perdue by 6% [8,24].
These Republican victories were a surprise in a historically Democratic state:
Perdue was Georgia’s first Republican governor in 130 years. There is no way to
tell whether the outcome resulted from faulty programming or hacking, because
the DREs left no paper trail.
Diebold has used political connections to ensure they remained the sole voting
machine provider in Georgia. Former Secretary of State Cathy Cox, who signed
the 2002 contract with Diebold, had strong ties to the company. The election
director she appointed, Kathy Rogers, helped kill house bills that would have
required paper records. In 2006, she resigned and took a job as Government
Liaison at Diebold [6]. Cox’s successor as Secretary of State, Karen Handel,
started as a vocal supporter of paper trails and acknowledged publicly that
she would not interact with Rogers as Diebold’s liaison due to the conflict of
interest. Later, Handel reversed her position on paper ballots, and the media
revealed that she had received $25,000 in campaign contributions from employees
connected with Diebold’s lobbying firm, Massey & Bowers [37]. Members of the
state government have ignored security experts who pointed out problems with
Diebold’s touchscreen machines.
Georgia’s election security issues reach beyond voting machines. In 2016, a
cybersecurity researcher at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Logan Lamb, dis-
covered that he could download files from the state’s “secure” election server.
Among these files were the entire voter registration database for the state of
Georgia, including sensitive personal information, instructional PDFs with pass-
words for poll workers to sign into a central server on Election Day, and software
files for the state’s ExpressPoll pollbooks that are used to verify voters’ eligi-
bility [44]. This intrusion would have allowed Lamb to alter entries in the voter
registration database or the pollbooks, preventing some voters from casting their
ballots. Lamb’s concern about malicious hacking was not a purely theoretical: an
NSA investigation found that Russian hackers targeted 39 states in the summer
and fall leading up to the 2016 presidential election [26].
These were not the only security concerns at the state’s Center for Election
Services (CES), housed at Kennesaw State University under a long-standing
contract with the Secretary of State. For instance, CES was using an outdated
version of their content management software, Drupal, which would allow hackers
to seize control of their websites. A software patch had been available since 2014,
but CES had not installed it. Lamb notified the executive director of CES, Merle
King, of the problems; King agreed to fix them and allegedly pressed Lamb not
to talk to the media or other officials about the security issues [42].
CES did not secure their server, nor did they inform anyone about the Logan’s
breach. In March 2017, another cybersecurity researcher found that CES still
had not secured its files properly. The issue was elevated to authorities above
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King, and it was the first time that the Secretary of State’s office heard about
the breach. In response to this poor management, the Secretary of State office
signed a new agreement with Kennesaw State University to transfer CES to its
own offices [42].
In July 2017, state voters and The Coalition for Good Governance filed a
lawsuit against Georgia Secretary of State Kemp, alleging that he had ignored
evidence that the state’s electoral system is vulnerable to fraud and hacking.
The plaintiffs demanded that the state use paper ballots in future elections to
guard against interference [34,35]. They requested to examine the CES servers
at Kennesaw State University for evidence. Four days after the group filed the
lawsuit, IT employees at CES wiped their servers of all prior election data. They
later degaussed two remaining servers: key evidence was permanently erased.
There is no proof that CES deliberately destroyed evidence, and the Secretary
of State’s office claims that the servers were wiped before they were officially
served with the lawsuit in late July. However, Kemp’s office was alerted about
the lawsuit and declined to comment in the days between when the suit was filed
and when the CES wiped its servers [27].
4.1 The November 2018 Election
The lawsuit, Curling v. Kemp, continued into September 2018, just before the
midterm elections (and is ongoing at the time of writing). Testimony from the
plaintiffs centered on two issues: security issues with DREs and the state’s pro-
cedures and data handling before and after Election Day. The current director
of CES testified that the server that each county uses to construct its ballots is
“air-gapped” from the Internet, but that he uses thumb drives, email, and an
online repository to store and move data—all of which expose voting systems to
malware. A county official testified that they use analog phone lines to transmit
results to the Secretary of State. Computer scientists have testified that these
are all vulnerable channels [19].
The state’s rebuttal did not seriously address the security concerns, but ar-
gued that there was not enough time before the election to switch to paper
ballots. Kemp had convened the Secure, Accessible, & Fair Elections (SAFE)
Commission in 2017 to select a new voting system in time for the 2020 election.
Ultimately, U.S. District Judge Amy Totenberg ruled that the trade-off between
election integrity and the feasibility of making changes before the impending
election tipped in favor of continued use of DREs for the 2018 election. Judge
Totenberg ruled that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that DRE voting
has the potential to cause irreparable harm to voters, but that the burden of
switching to paper ballots so close to the election could cause even more harm
to voters by causing bureaucratic confusion.
Ultimately, any chaos or problems that arise in connection with a sudden
rollout of a paper ballot system with accompanying scanning equipment
may swamp the polls with work and voters—and result in voter frus-
tration and disaffection from the voting process. There is nothing like
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bureaucratic confusion and long lines to sour a citizen. And that de-
scription does not even touch on whether voters themselves, many of
whom may never have cast a paper ballot before, will have been pro-
vided reasonable materials to prepare them for properly executing the
paper ballots.
Judge Totenberg also noted that the evidence and testimony “indicated that the
Defendants and State election officials had buried their heads in the sand” [34].
Secretary of State Kemp refused to recuse himself from overseeing the election
in which he ran for Governor, a clear conflict of interest [39]. Election Day voting
in November 2018 was conducted on paperless DREs. Machines in four polling
places in Gwinnett County malfunctioned, forcing voters to use paper ballots,
which caused some voters to wait four hours to cast their vote [16]. Reported
vote totals were anomalous: the rate of undervotes in the Lieutenant Governor
(LG) contest was unusually high compared to historical LG races and compared
to other statewide contests on the ballot, and the undervote rate was far higher
for DREs than for paper ballots. The Coalition for Good Governance brought
another lawsuit against the Georgia Secretary of State, calling for a redo of the
LG contest [29]. Statistical evidence of anomalies in this election, presented in
that lawsuit, is discussed below in Section 5.
After the election, Kemp’s office planned to certify the election results six
days before state law required it, omitting nearly 27,000 provisional ballots.
Provisional ballots are cast by voters whose registration or identification is in
question; deliberately omitting provisional ballots is one way to disenfranchise
voters. It would have ensured that the margin between Kemp and his opponent
Stacey Abrams remained large enough to avoid a runoff election [4]. A civil rights
group sued to delay the certification, and Judge Totenberg ruled against Kemp,
ordering election officials to review the provisional ballots.
The SAFE Commission was scheduled to recommend a new voting system in
January, 2019. In early January, the Democratic Party of Georgia called on Kemp
to delay any decision to purchase new voting systems as more misbehavior came
to light: now-Governor Kemp appointed Charles “Chuck” Harper, chief lobbyist
for ES&S (the voting machine company that eventually acquired Diebold), as
Deputy Chief of Staff in the Governor’s office [23].
5 Evidence of Malfunctioning DREs in 2018
While the controversy surrounding the Governor’s race did not result in anoma-
lous election results, the LG race did. Shortly after the November 2018 election,
The Coalition for Good Governance filed another lawsuit against the new Sec-
retary of State, demanding a redo of the LG vote. The plaintiffs blamed mal-
functioning DREs for an unusually high number of undervotes in the LG race,
but not in others [29]. The judge overseeing the case initially agreed to let the
plaintiffs examine the memory, but not the programming, of machines in three
counties. She eventually dissolved this agreement and dismissed the case [45].
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The plaintiffs did not specify the cause of the malfunction—faulty program-
ming, poor electronic ballot design, hacking, or something else [29]. Numerous
voters reported irregularities when attempting to cast their vote for LG on DREs,
including many who reported that the race did not appear on their ballot until
they were shown the review screen. Without forensic evidence, it is impossible
to determine exactly what happened.
This section gives three lines of statistical evidence that DREs did not record
every vote properly in this election. First, in 101 of Georgia’s 159 counties, the
rate of undervotes in the LG race was much higher among DRE votes (those cast
on Election Day and advance in-person) than on (paper) absentee ballots. (For
other statewide contests, the undervote rates are similar across modes of voting
in nearly all counties.) Second, in Fulton County, higher differential undervote
rates tended to occur in precincts where a larger percentage of registered vot-
ers were Black. Third, on six of seven machines in the Winterville Train Depot
polling place in Clarke County, Democrats got the majority of votes in every
statewide contest, matching the overall results at the polling place. On the sev-
enth machine, Republican candidates got a majority in every statewide contest.
Permutation tests show that these three anomalies are implausible unless
something went wrong. Permutation tests require a minimum of assumptions,
which can make them appropriate and convincing in situations where standard
parametric tests require unrealistic or counterfactual assumptions, for instance,
assumptions that voter preferences follow a parametric model, such as multino-
mial logistic. In contrast, the permutation tests we use treat one characteristic,
such as the mode by which a ballot containing an undervote was cast or the
machine on which a ballot was cast, as an arbitrary label that might as well
have been assigned at random. Software implementing the tests reported here
can be found at https://github.com/pbstark/EvoteID19-GA.
5.1 Undervotes for Lieutenant Governor
Undervotes occur when a voter selects fewer candidates in a contest than the
contest rules allow, for instance, not voting for any candidate in a winner-take-
all contest. The rate of undervotes tends to increase for “down-ticket” contests
compared to major contests such as presidential and gubernatorial contests. In
Georgia in 2018, the LG race had a 4% undervote rate, while the next contest
on the ballot had an undervote rate of 1.4%. Moreover, this pattern appeared
only in votes cast on DREs—Election Day votes and advance in-person votes.
Data were downloaded from Clarity Elections, the private sector vendor that
reports official election results on behalf of the Georgia Secretary of State.23
Data included the total number of ballots cast in each county and the number
cast by each mode of voting (e.g. by mail) for each candidate by county. The file
2 The fact that this crucial election function is outsourced without oversight might
give the reader pause.
3 https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/91639/222278/reports/detailxml.zip,
downloaded in January 2019.
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did not report ballots cast in each county by mode of voting. In order to calculate
the number of undervotes, we assumed that the total number of ballots cast by
county and mode of voting equalled the maximum number of votes cast in any
contest for that county and mode of voting.
While political preferences might differ systematically between voters who
vote by mail (on paper) and those who vote in person (on DREs), there is no
reason to think that interest in a contest should differ across those groups. The
usability literature suggests that DREs ought to help people of disparate edu-
cation and ethnicities vote correctly, in which case, the undervote rate on DREs
should be lower than the rate for paper ballots [31]. If so, then it is reasonable
to treat the mode of voting as a label assigned randomly to ballots in such a
way that the number of ballots cast on DREs and the number cast on paper is
fixed (conditioned to be equal to the actual numbers). The number of undervotes
in a contest among DRE votes then has a hypergeometric distribution. Under
the alternative that undervotes are more likely on DREs, we would expect to see
more undervotes on DREs (and fewer on paper ballots) than the hypergeometric
distribution predicts.
In 101 of 159 Georgia counties, the difference in undervote rates between mail
votes and DRE votes in the LG race is statistically significant at level 0.01%.
In contrast, in the 8 statewide contests further down the ballot, the difference is
statistically significant in no more than 5 counties. Table 1 shows the counts.
Table 1. Counties with statistically significant (p < 0.0001) disparities in undervote
rates between paper ballots and DREs.
Contest Counties with significant
undervote rate disparities
Lt. Governor 101
Secretary of State 4
Attorney General 4
Commissioner of Agriculture 5
Commissioner of Insurance 4
State School Superintendent 5
Commissioner of Labor 2
Public Service Commission District 3 4
Public Service Commission District 5 4
5.2 Undervotes and Race in Fulton County
Undervote rates on touchscreen voting machines were reported to be higher in
predominantly Black precincts across the state [10]. If so, that is evidence that
security and usability issues with DREs disparately impact historically disad-
vantaged groups. We investigated this issue in Fulton County, which includes
most of the capital, Atlanta, and had over 424,000 voters in November 2018.
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Precinct-level reported vote totals were downloaded from the Clarity Election
site that reports official results for the Georgia Secretary of State.4 Data included
total votes cast for each candidate by each mode of voting, in each precinct
within Fulton County. As with the statewide data, we estimated the number of
undervotes by subtracting the votes from the maximum number of votes in any
contest, by mode of voting and precinct.
Voter turnout data were downloaded from the Secretary of State’s web-
site.5From these data, we computed the percentage of registered voters who
were Black in each precinct.
A permutation test was used to assess the correlation between the difference
in undervote rates between voters who used paper ballots and voters who voted
electronically and the percentage of registered voters who were Black. Of the
373 precincts in Fulton County, we restricted analysis to the 302 precincts in
which at least 10 people voted electronically and at least 10 voted on paper.
The undervote rate was substantially lower for voters who used paper ballots
than for voters who voted electronically, by an amount that—on average—was
larger in precincts with a larger percentage of Black registered voters. Table 2
shows the correlation between the difference in undervote rates and the per-
centage of registered voters who are Black. p-values are for randomized per-
mutation tests with 10,000 replications, carried out using the Python permute
package.6Small p-values for multiple statewide contests could explained by voter
behavior; prior research suggests that Black voters may intentionally undervote
at a higher rate than other voters, and may cast valid votes at a rate that is
lower than the rate for the general electorate [11,31]. However, it is notable that
the correlation for the Lieutenant Governor’s contest is more than twice what it
is for any other contest.
5.3 Party Preferences in Winterville Train Depot Polling Place
A citizen photographed printed poll tapes from the seven DRE machines in the
Winterville Train Depot polling place in Clarke County. The photographs were
transcribed to CSV and double checked by a second person.7
The Winterville Train Depot polling place is just one polling place in Georgia
where a member of the public photographed poll tapes posted at the precinct
after the polls closed. It was not selected at random, but neither was there
particular reason to suspect problems there. There is no reason to believe that
problems are confined to this polling place—where then-Secretary of State Kemp
himself voted—but even if they were, any anomaly is of concern.
The DREs in the precinct recorded comparable numbers of voters (117, 135,
131, 133, 135, 144, 135). In this polling place, Democratic candidates won a
4 https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/Fulton/91700/221530/reports/
detailxml.zip, downloaded in January 2019.
5 http://sos.ga.gov/admin/uploads/PRECINCT Nov 2018.zip, downloaded in Jan-
uary 2019.
6 http://statlab.github.io/permute
7 The data were submitted as evidence in [29].
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Table 2. Correlation between the difference in undervote rates and percentage of
registered voters who are Black, for the 10 statewide contests in Georgia in November
2018, in Fulton County.
Contest correlation p-value
Governor -0.134 0.9903
Lt. Governor 0.557 0.0001
Secretary of State 0.092 0.0582
Attorney General 0.078 0.0902
Commissioner of Agriculture 0.207 0.0003
Commissioner of Insurance 0.246 0.0001
State School Superintendent 0.154 0.0050
Commissioner of Labor 0.041 0.2376
Public Service Commission District 3 0.042 0.2329
Public Service Commission District 5 0.125 0.0145
majority in all ten statewide contests. Every DRE reported a majority of votes
for the Democratic candidate in every statewide contest except machine 3, which
reported a majority for the Republican candidate in every statewide contest.
If voters were directed to DREs as if at random, then the number of voters
who used different machines should be roughly equal, as should the percent-
age of votes for each candidate. Conditional on the number of ballots on each
machine and the total number of votes for each candidate across machines, all
permutations of votes across machines are equally likely under the null hypoth-
esis. We performed a two-sided permutation test using the difference between
the expected and actual fraction of Republican votes in each contest as the
test statistic. Permutations were done using the cryptorandom pseudo-random
number generator for Python8. The p-values for different contests were combined
using Fisher’s combination function to obtain a global p-value on the assumption
that the distribution of Fisher’s combining function under the null hypothesis is
chi-square. That would be true if votes in different contests were independent;
however, voters tend to vote along party lines. If ballot-level data were available,
a Fisher’s combining function could be calibrated to take that correlation into
account. However, the poll tapes give only totals by contest. Hence, while p-
values for individual contests are on a firm statistical footing, the global p-value
should be viewed as suggestive rather than precise.
On the assumption that voters were directed to DREs as if at random, the
chance any of the seven machines would show disparities as large as machine 3
did in individual contests ranges from less than 1% to approximately 15%. Seven
of the ten values are significant at level 5% or below; see Table 3. The global
p-value for the ten tests is 0.00009%.9
8 http://statlab.github.io/cryptorandom
9 As mentioned above, the assumptions under which Fisher’s combining function has
a chi-square distribution may not hold, so the global p-value should be viewed as
suggestive.
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Table 3. Consistency of results across DREs in Winterville Train Station Polling Place
and consistency of results if D and R were flipped on machine 3.
Contest p-value p-value if machine 3
were flipped
Governor 0.114 0.464
Lt. Governor 0.025 0.795
Secretary of State 0.018 0.450
Attorney General 0.151 0.543
Commissioner of Agriculture 0.026 0.734
Commissioner of Insurance 0.030 0.604
State School Superintendent 0.097 0.807
Commissioner of Labor 0.008 0.797
Public Service Commission District 3 0.046 0.280
Public Service Commission District 5 0.025 0.939
These results are entirely driven by the results on machine 3. If the Demo-
cratic and Republican party labels were flipped on that machine, the anomaly
disappears, and the global p-value for the ten contests becomes 97%. For indi-
vidual contests, no p-value is then below 0.280, compared with values as small
as 0.008 (and seven values below 5%) for the actual poll tapes. See Table 3.
These tests strongly suggest that machine 3 had some software or hardware
problem: misconfiguration, error, defect, hack, or malfunction. The most plausi-
ble explanation is that misconfiguration caused votes for Republican candidates
to be recorded as votes for Democratic candidates, and vice versa.
6 Conclusion
The 2018 midterms demonstrated that election integrity in Georgia remains
fraught. In the weeks leading up to the election and for weeks after, citizens
challenged the Secretary of State’s treatment of provisional ballots and voter
registrations, alleging that these practices were intended to disenfranchise mi-
nority voters. Touchscreen DRE voting machines were used statewide, even after
security experts voiced their concerns and a nonprofit organization sued the state
to replace DREs with hand-marked paper ballots. There is evidence that some
DREs malfunctioned in the election; statistical anomalies suggest that DREs
failed to record a large percentage of votes cast in the Lieutenant Governor’s
race, and that “missing votes” were more frequent in jurisdictions with large
African American populations [10]. The Secretary of State has refused to inves-
tigate these issues. Some particular anomalies (i.e., the Winterville Train Depot
data) are most easily explained by “vote flipping,” in which the DRE recorded
votes for one candidate as votes for the candidate’s opponent.
Lawmakers are poised to replace the state’s DREs with a new system: ei-
ther hand-marked paper ballots with optical scanners, using touchscreen ballot-
marking devices (BMDs) for accessibility, or BMDs for all voters. In February
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2019, the state legislature voted to purchase BMDs statewide [21]. While BMDs
do produce a paper record, they are more expensive than opscan systems,10and
they are neither as reliable nor as secure as hand-marked paper ballots and
opscan systems. Among other issues, BMD malfunctions can prevent voting on
Election Day; inadequate provisioning of equipment can produce long lines; there
is evidence that voters cannot and do not reliably verify their BMD selections;
and BMDs require the same trust in software as DREs, with no practical recourse
if machines malfunction and little possibility that outcome-changing errors will
be detected [1,28]. The SAFE Commission’s only security expert, Prof. Wenke
Lee, warned against BMDs.
House Minority Leader Bob Trammell expressed his stance on the evidence
for hand-marked paper ballots [21]:
It’s unequivocally clear that cybersecurity experts have expressed con-
cerns about the ballot-marking devices. It comes down to whether you
think the opinion of election officials . . . is more important than the issue
of credentialed experts in the field talking about a material risk to the
voting process.
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Abstract. This article examines the historical context and framework
of cybersecurity efforts and their impact on electoral integrity in the
case of Ukraine since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. It looks at the
spectrum of incursions and attacks that the country has faced on the
elections-aspect of its critical infrastructure, documenting historically the
context that the country currently faces in this sphere. It examines the
specific adversaries that have been involved in the Ukrainian cybersecu-
rity space, the measures taken, and developments made to better protect
the electoral process and buttress public confidence. Finally, it analyzes
the current threats and challenges Ukraine faces and proposes measures
to address them in the future. As such, this article presents a cohesive
snapshot of a country that is at the frontlines of an iterative process in
which lessons learned are then applied by adversaries to target other elec-
toral democracies. Thus, it presents an important point of understanding
as this field of research develops.
Keywords: Cybersecurity· Ukraine· Elections
1 Introduction
The challenges faced by Ukraine in the space of cybersecurity and elections are
not unique. Numerous electoral democracies over the last decade and a half
have been facing increased attacks by adversaries, both foreign and sometimes
domestic. Ukraine, however, has been in a rather unique position to be a sort of
‘ground zero’ for weapons testing in this space. In what is clearly an iterative
process, lessons from one game are analyzed, honed and re-deployed in further
rounds and often in different jurisdictions. One can draw a relatively straight
line from the advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks on Ukrainian critical
infrastructure (CI) and its election administration in 2014 and 2015, further
to the French and German incursions in April and May 2015 and then to the
attacks in the 2016 U.S. presidential race, and beyond.
With this in mind, the authors believe that a thoughtful and analytical ex-
amination of the history of cybersecurity incursion and response is timely in a
global perspective where such threats are becoming increasingly important to
278
the integrity of elections. Where once, focus was on the vulnerabilities of vot-
ing machines and electronic voting systems, increasingly ancillary systems (such
as voter registration systems, political parties, media or local authorities) have
proven to be equally vulnerable to such cyber-related threats. In fact, in the
latest iteration of cybersecurity intrusions, it is precisely the ‘weak spots’ and
soft targets that are being sought out by adversaries as states place more focus
on shoring up their cyber defenses in the electoral sphere.
This paper will seek to analyze and understand the dynamics of the cyber
threat to elections during three time periods: 1) pre-2008, where most attacks
were DDoS-oriented and scattershot; 2) 2008-2014, where such cyberattacks were
linked to military incursions in a new type or hybrid warfare, and 3) post-2014,
where elections were added as a focal point of attacks in an overall CI-oriented
strategy on the part of adversaries (Ukraine and U.S., as specific examples). From
these exercises, lessons-learned are being drawn and ostensibly re-focused before
being deployed in key upcoming elections such as the European Parliamentary
elections in May, the Ukrainian parliamentary elections in the autumn (which
are likely to be much a focal point of potential attack), and the U.S. presidential
elections in 2020.
Thus, the paper examines the cybersecurity challenges in Ukraine from a his-
torical perspective, before turning to an in-depth analysis of the cybersecurity
challenges presented during the Ukrainian presidential elections held in March
and April 2019. The paper then turns to an examination of the current threats
and challenges facing the country prior to the upcoming parliamentary elections
to gain a perspective of how the threats may be mutating. Finally, it attempts
to draws lessons for the future, both in the specific Ukraine-oriented scenario,
as well as at a more global level.
As such, it is hoped that this paper presents a unique perspective, which is at
once specific to Ukraine, while also having global implications. It represents a
singular examination of the Ukrainian and related cases in the region, which has
been sorely lacking for some time and with unique, first-hand evidence and data.
As such, the authors believe that represents a significant advance in this and
related fields of a holistic and integral approach to the question of cybersecurity
in an electoral context.
2 Ukraine and its Cybersecurity Challenges in Historical
Perspective
It was election night of the Presidential race in the immediate aftermath of the
February 2014 Revolution of Dignity (or EuroMaidan in common parlance). It
was the first experience that Ukraine was having of holding a poll since the
ouster of Viktor Yanukovych and the end of ever-increasing deterioration the
country had faced since his taking power in 2010/11. It would be a key test of
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Ukrainian democracy and its ability to reflect the will of the people through a
legitimate nationwide vote.
Yet, as certain members within the Central Election Commission (CEC) watched
the results being reflected on their official website, they knew there was a prob-
lem. The commission IT department had been under a massive Distributed De-
nial of Service (DDoS) attack over the last 24-hours.1 Later, on election day,
Commissioners and CEC staff looked in horror as Dmytro Yarosh was announced
as the winner of the election on Russian TV from the CEC official website; an
announcement clearly conflicting with the results of the electronic tabulation
system.2 [1]
The CEC deployed all resources at their disposal, as the results were isolated
and located in a separate website, and the commission was able to identify
and block the incursion and remove the fake results. Without surprises, Petro
Poroshenko, who had been leading the results in the polls led the tabulated votes
and was eventually identified as the winner in the official results, which are still
based by law on paper protocols. The crisis had been averted.
Yet, the damage had been done. The narrative that the foreign adversary iden-
tified behind the attacks had been promoting was that Ukraine was on the brink
of chaos, a proto-fascist state which could not even manage to hold credible
elections. The false results fed into this narrative and attempted to undermine
public trust and confidence in the results. It would prove to be a strategy that
APT 28 and 29 were linked to in future elections, including the U.S. 2016 pres-
idential election. Yet, Ukraine in 2014 was ”ground zero”. It was the inception
point from which future strategies to challenge elections on the cyber side would
develop.3
This was not the first challenge European states faced from foreign adversaries.
Incidents of such ”weapons-system” testing occurred in Estonia in 2007 (and
even earlier), where DDoS attacks nearly shutdown the country’s internet in-
frastructure (including websites of parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers,
1 DDoS is a flood of fake internet traffic coming from different sources over the internet,
with the intent to overwhelm the network and make the services, the CEC result
website, unavailable to the public.
2 If it had not been discovered and removed, the fake results would have portrayed
ultra-nationalist Right Sector party leader Dmytro Yarosh as the winner with 37 per-
cent of the vote (instead of the 1 percent he actually received) and Petro Poroshenko
(the actually winner with a majority of the vote) with just 29 percent, Ukraine offi-
cials told reporters the next morning.
3 This would be replicated in the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2014,
which saw another attack launched against the election infrastructure, with hackers
attacked Ukraine’s CEC website on the eve of elections. Minimal damage was done
in these attacks, which Ukrainian security officials blamed on DDoS attempts. The
Ukrainian side, however, had learned from its previous presidential hack experience
and had put measures in place.
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broadcasters). For a country moving whole-heartedly and at a fast pace to a
philosophy of e-governance and e-elections, this was a serious shock.4 A simi-
lar tactic was employed in Lithuania in June 2008 following the adoption of a
law prohibiting the use of Soviet symbols. Some 300 websites were subject to
DDoS attacks and vandalized, including those of key government agencies.5 This
type of strategy was stage one, in an ever-evolving game plan that was further
developed in the next iteration.
This attack plan was replicated in Georgia in 2008 during the first utilization of
hybrid warfare tactics (where cyberattacks were used in concert with traditional
military operations) when key government sites in the country were brought
down on the eve of the Russian invasion. This strategy was also replicated in
the invasion of Crimea and support to Donbas in 2014. It has also become the
hallmark of this wider-scope attack, with the aim of bringing down a maximal
of critical infrastructure to achieve maximum chaos.
This new style of attack was supplemented by additional tests targeting CI
sectors. In 2015 and 2016, the Ukrainian energy grid as well as its train ser-
vices were brought down by malware with a clear signature pattern ). [2] These
types of malware would later be discovered as far away as the U.S. electricity
grid (Sandworm, BlackEnergy [3]).6 Such malware targeted bad cyber hygiene
practices through spearphising to gain and exploit administrator access to the
CI systems and shut actual administrators out. It took nearly four months to
properly address the incursion of the energy grid in Ukraine.
In Ukraine 2014, for the first time, attacks were directed at electoral systems and
administration, specifically. This time, the tactics of the previous two iterations
were added to, with a specific target focus. Rather than just causing disruption
and sowing chaos, this latest iteration tried to project different electoral results to
an entire population.7 This would mark a third generation of cyber incursion in
an attempt at foreign interference. This is presented in the table below, showing
the additive properties with each iteration.
4 Most of the attacks were distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks ranging from
single individuals using various methods like ping floods to expensive rentals of
botnets used for spam distribution. 20-year-old Dmitri Galushkevich was eventually
charged in the attack.
5 Government, political party and business webpages were defaced by hackers with
hammer-and-sickles and five-pointed stars.
6 Sandworm has shown a special interest in power grids. FireEye has tied the group
to a series of intrusions on American energy utilities discovered in 2014, which were
infected with the same Black Energy malware Sandworm would later use in its
Ukraine attacks.
7 An earlier DDoS attack in March, which was 32 times larger than the previously
largest attack when Russia invaded Georgia was coupled with Russian-armed, pro-
Russian rebels seizing control of Crimea.
281
DDoS + Hybrid + Election Focus
DDoS + Hybrid
DDoSpre−2008
2008−2014
post−2014
Table 1: Cyber Interference in Elections
The innovation of combining targeted CI incursions with the exploitation of
soft targets due to bad cyber hygiene was ultimately exploited in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, where one soft target (namely, John Podesta [4]) was used
to effectively bring down the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and sow
doubt amongst American citizens as to the efficacy of their democracy. This had
its seeds in 2014 Ukraine and prior. To prevent making the same mistakes in the
future, we need to learn from this history.
3 The 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Election and
Cybersecurity Challenges
In September 2018, six months before the March 2019 presidential elections in
Ukraine, the CEC had yet to finalize preparations for its cyber-defense or take
necessary measures that would protect its infrastructure against another poten-
tial cyber-attack. While the election commission did take important measures
in establishing cybersecurity best practices to protect its network, these efforts
only scratched the surface of the extensive actions the organization would need
to take, in co-operation with Ukrainian cyber agencies, to improve the security
of the electoral process. Moreover, the CEC was in the final months of prepara-
tion for an election that was widely seen in the media1 and among experts [5] [6]
as the next testing ground for new types of attacks that would eventually be
unleashed in other countries.
3.1 Pre-election preparation
The CEC Secretariat is a permanent organization with over 250 employees work-
ing in 15 departments. It has a dedicated IT team working on operational and
cybersecurity needs. As part of the modernization and cybersecurity efforts be-
ginning in 2015, the IT department segmented the CEC office network and the
election information systems, disconnecting these systems from the regular day-
to-day emails and internet communication of the CEC. Notably, election infor-
mation systems in Ukraine ensure 2 critical functions [7]:
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– The Result Management System (RMS) is used by clients in the District
Election Commissions (DEC) on a dedicated line isolated from the internet.
Its purpose is to capture electronically the polling station results (polling is
paper based in Ukraine).
– The State Voter Register (SVR) database is used by 761 local administrative
offices to update the voter list monthly.
In addition to isolating these critical systems from the internet and the rest of
the organization’s network, the CEC installed modern and comprehensive net-
work monitoring systems, partly owing to its collaboration with the government
security agencies. Most importantly, the CEC, including the newly appointed
Chairperson and commissioners, was significantly more aware of the risk cyber-
attacks could represent to the integrity of the presidential elections.
Despite these efforts and recognition of the importance that cybersecurity would
play by key figures, the infrastructure and the election information systems used
by the CEC remained widely unaudited by the end of 2018. Little progress had
been made to replace outdated equipment or to review and establish necessary
protective measures to improve the CEC’s cybersecurity posture. With an un-
predictable Russia on the border, and many cybersecurity vulnerabilities still
unaddressed, Ukrainian cybersecurity resilience and protection efforts remained
an urgent priority as 2019 - and the presidential election - dawned.
3.2 Involvement of the cybersecurity agencies, a coordinated effort
Ukraine’s CEC is a formally independent body and is responsible for ensuring
the cybersecurity of its own systems. It is assisted during the election period
by the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection
(SSSCIP) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, Ukrainian acronym) and
the National Police.
Like in most democracies, election infrastructure in Ukraine is not considered
critical infrastructure according to the Law on Cybersecurity in Ukraine (in force
since May 2018). This legal reality creates a different structure of cooperation
between the CEC and cybersecurity agencies. Several cybersecurity think-tanks
and international agencies [8] have advocated in favor of the classification of
election systems, processes and infrastructures as critical infrastructure to en-
sure the necessary cybersecurity measures are put in place. This model could be
useful in Ukraine, although the current bi-lateral Memorandums of Understand-
ing regulating cooperation between the CEC and cybersecurity agencies have so
far been sufficient.
Furthermore, the SSSCIP and the SBU have different mandates with regards
to the protection of the CEC infrastructure. While the SSSCIP is responsible
for implementing technical and organizational measures to prevent, detect and
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respond to cyber-attacks, the SBU as a law-enforcement authority and gov-
ernment security agency, oversees system penetration testing (pen-testing) and
provides support to the CEC with regards to detection of criminal intrusions on
the election systems.
Both the SSSCIP and SBU cooperated with the CEC before, notably in miti-
gating and investigating the 2014 cyber-incidents. However, the preparation for
the 2019 election required more coordinated and strategic approaches. This sup-
port came in the form of a working group, established several months prior to the
election, composed of technical experts from the CEC, SSSCIP, Security Bureau
of Ukraine and National Police [9]. A similar working group had been created
before, and Ukraine managed to hold elections in difficult circumstances as the
war unfolded [10]. The working group initially met monthly, but at the request
of the CEC gathered more often during the weeks leading up to the elections.
During the pre-election period, the CEC and the cybersecurity agencies also
participated in tabletop crisis simulation [11] [12]. During these activities, both
managerial and technical crisis response capacity was tested and adapted based
on the outcome of simulations. In addition to increasing the technical skills,
these exercises also create a sense of common responsibility among stakeholders
in ensuring cybersecurity.
3.3 The challenge of replacing outdated equipment
Outdated equipment was identified as a risk for the CEC infrastructure imme-
diately in the aftermath of the 2014 elections. Although never confirmed by the
manufacturer and not reported by any official, a 0-day vulnerability [13] was al-
legedly reported being used by the hacking group CyberBerkut on the old Cisco
ASA software used by the CEC. This class of device was no longer supported
by Cisco. Devices reaching “end-of-support”can put an organization at a higher
risk of a security breach, as newly discovered vulnerabilities such as the one dis-
covered by CyberBerkut are not being patched. By mid-2018, although several
plans for replacement had been made, procurement difficulties were still getting
in the way, leaving gaping holes in the security of the election commission net-
work, in particular, the Result Management and the State Registry of Voters
systems.
With the assistance of international organizations, the CEC received replace-
ments for the outdated equipment in the 11th hour of their election preparation.
While the new equipment did resolve the issue of un-patchable vulnerable net-
work devices, the late delivery introduced a new kind of risk. Despite the short
timeframe, this new equipment needed to be set up, configured, tested and au-
dited to ensure functionality prior to the presidential elections. Procurement of
the needed software and hardware shifted the risk, rather than eliminating it, as
the new equipment had to be integrated into the existing infrastructure with-
out creating performance bottlenecks, and more importantly, creating new or
additional security vulnerabilities.
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The SSSCIP support to the CEC following 2014 cyberattacks [13] was limited
to forensic investigation and incident response management. In February 2019
and upon the delivery of the equipment, both the SSSCIP and the SBU provided
support to the CEC and ensured that the equipment was installed, configured
and audited ahead of the first round of the presidential election on March 31,
2019.
3.4 Cybersecurity awareness
Humans are often the weakest link when it comes to defending cybersecurity,
while ideally, they should be the first line of defense. Studies report that 93
percent of reported cyber intrusion incidents could have been avoided with basic
cyber-hygiene best practices [14]. Elections are no exception to this statistic
and the CEC secretariat staff is a prime target for adversaries. Spear-phishing
and social engineering campaigns can start months before an election, and the
available tools and methods of cyberattacks are diverse and proven. These tactics
can be used by adversaries to influence or blackmail users or exploit stolen
information to compromise the integrity of the electoral process. With support
from international organizations [15] the CEC developed a cyber-hygiene course
to introduce stakeholders to the current risks linked to weak online security
and the measures that can be taken to protect them and their workplace from
adversaries who seek to harm the democratic process. By the end of 2018, all
the CEC secretariat staff had received the training.
Members of DECs are appointed the between 40 and 65 days prior to the
election, they are hence more difficult to identify and target via social engineering
techniques. Conversely, DECs are less trained and more prone to mistakes as they
work under a highly stressful environment with various levels of experience and
understanding of the tasks they must perform. In consideration of this, members
of DECs also participated in introductory cyber-hygiene trainings. The training
of more than 500 members of the electoral commission at the central and district
level was a major milestone in improving the security posture of the election staff.
3.5 Incidents reported before the election
During the months leading to the presidential elections, the intensity, frequency,
and types of cyber-attacks increased substantially. In January 2019, several gov-
ernment offices including the CEC, were the target of a wide phishing cam-
paign [16] using greeting cards (Christmas cards), shopping invitations, offers
for software updates and other malicious phishing material intended to steal
passwords and personal information. As these attacks were using some of the
same mechanisms used in 2014, they were suspected by the cyber police to origi-
nate from the same adversary, namely organizations under the control of Russian
special agencies.
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On 24 and 25 February, a DDoS attack targeted the CEC infrastructure [17]
[18]. While the attack was mitigated, based on the timing of the attack experts
interpreted that the assailants were testing the system in preparation of a future
attack. During a press conference the next day, the President reported the attack
as originating from the Russian Federation.
On 26 February, the SBU announced it had uncovered a plot by a Ukrainian
telecom organization contractor (and a resident of Russia) [19]. The Russian
contact was interested in collecting data on the networks of strategically impor-
tant mobile operators, the location of telecommunication nodes and the periods
of time necessary to restore them after damage. His objective was to block the
communication capacity and disrupt activities of the SVR and disrupt the prior
to elections.
While none of these attacks ended up seriously damaging the CEC systems or
destabilizing the preparation activities of the cybersecurity agencies, it supported
the general trend of growth of attacks both in intensity and sophistication [20],
and validated the public’s concern for the preparedness of the CEC with regards
to its cybersecurity protection.
3.6 Elections days
The first round of the presidential elections witnessed several coordinated at-
tacks on the CEC infrastructure. While the technical details of the attack have
not yet been disclosed, it has been established that the systems, particularly
the CEC web servers [21], were incessantly probed for vulnerabilities on elec-
tion day. Several waves of DDoS attacks were also launched against the CEC’s
result website. As these attacks are frequent in Ukraine, notably mirroring the
attacks during the 2014 elections the responsible agencies had the experience
and capacity to mitigate them. The efficient collaboration between the SBU, the
SSSCIP, and the CEC was vital in providing protection and preventing these
attacks from having an impact on the electoral process.
In comparison to the first round, the second round of the presidential election on
21 April was relatively uneventful [22], with no major incident reported by media
organizations or government agencies. This should however not be interpreted
as an absence of attacks; lessons-learned and preparations made by stakeholders
following the first round of the election had mitigated them.
4 Current Threats and Challenges
4.1 Interpretation of the cyberattacks of the presidential elections
As anticipated, the CEC infrastructure and the electoral process, as a whole, were
the targets of several cyber-attacks prior to and during the presidential elections.
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While the intensity of the attacks was not as high as many experts predicted,
they were coordinated with a clear and consistent intent: find an entryway into
the CEC information systems. There is no indication that the DDoS attacks
launched against the CEC website and the RMS were meant to disrupt electoral
operations. Instead, the level of intensity would suggest an attempt to cover
other attacks to penetrate the systems to obtain control over the resources that
could allow the modification of the results.
If the disruption of the electoral process was the main aim of the adversaries,
critical infrastructures upon which the election information system heavily relies
would likely have been targeted. Cybersecurity agencies did report an increase
of attacks against critical infrastructure before the election [23] but they did not
materialize during the election itself, which could be interpreted as a strategic
decision rather the lack of capacity for disruption.
Furthermore, a cost-benefit analysis by adversaries offers a probable explanation
on why there were no indications of attacks attempting to change the presiden-
tial elections results. The Ukrainian election is grounded in the fundamental use
of paper ballots. The manual reconciliation of results and the multiple checks in
place are important security features of the Ukrainian electoral system. While
the potential to disrupt the electoral process by compromising the preliminary
results published on the website exists, it would affect the public perception of
the electoral process rather than the actual integrity of the election results8 By
establishing important and necessary cybersecurity protections, including im-
proved user cyber-hygiene, good information security practices and coordinated
response capacity, the CEC has substantially increased the cost of an attack that
would bring a limited return of investment.
The cost of any attack seeking to effectively alter the outcome of the election
would be high, since it would require that the adversary alters votes from a
significant number of polling stations. Moreover, there was also no clear pro-
Russian candidate (the likely beneficiary of a “hacked” election) in the 2019
Ukrainian presidential election, making this kind of attack not very attractive.
It is important to remember that the cost of this type of attack reduces with
the size of the constituency. As such, an attack that could affect the election
results of a parliamentary election is hence cheaper than it would be for a pres-
idential election. This distinction is important to remember in preparations for
the parliamentary elections this autumn.
4.2 Alternative attacks/secondary targets
Targeting ancillary systems (voter registration, candidate registration, etc.) is
particularly attractive for adversaries, especially when the election infrastructure
8 That being said, the Ukrainian CEC has been in the process of considering moving
to an automated results tabulation system, which would increase this risk. Thus,
considering such questions and measures prior to any such implementation is consider
good practice on their part.
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does not offer enough attack surface (the different access points that an adversary
can use to penetrate a system to be able to exploit it). The same is the case if
there is not sufficient return on investment or the system has been hardened to
make any kind of attack costly. Recent and visible attacks on ancillary systems
include the attacks targeting the U.S. Democratic Party in 2016 [24] and the
Macron leaks in 2017 [25].
Ukraine is not an exception, the website of then presidential candidate Volodymyr
Zelensky’s campaign was under attack multiple times before the election [26]. As
political parties and candidates are increasingly using the internet and digital
tools to communicate with their constituencies, they logically become the target
of foreign or domestic groups who have an interest in changing the perception of
certain candidates or parties. In several countries, national cybersecurity agen-
cies provide instructions and in some cases advice to political agents (NCSC [27]
in the UK, ANSSI [28] in France). While it is still unclear what type of sup-
port could be provided to political parties and candidates in the preparation
of the parliamentary elections, cybersecurity agencies may consider a politically
acceptable level of engagement to assist parties and candidates in ensuring the
cybersecurity of the electoral process as a whole - even if this assistance is not
comparable to the level of effort provided to the CEC. To note, the risk against
these ancillary systems is particularly high in Ukraine during the campaigning
period, as it comes at the crossroad of cybersecurity and disinformation, with a
potentially high impact at a low cost from the part of foreign actors (including
such as Russia).
4.3 Remaining Challenges for the CEC
The CEC has greatly improved its cybersecurity protection in the wake of the
presidential election. However, some challenges remain and need to be addressed
before the 2019 parliamentary elections. Addressing these remaining challenges
is extremely important as the political environment and the potential gain that
could be obtained from a successful foreign or domestic attack will make the
parliamentary election an attractive target.
The CEC has understandably prioritized the implementation of cybersecurity
measures to ensure the integrity of the presidential elections. With support from
the cybersecurity agencies, the CEC has concentrated efforts on strengthening
the accuracy of the results management and transmission systems for the pres-
idential election. Other systems such as the SVR or the CEC’s official website
have not received the same level of attention. This is understandable, and the
CEC already has plans to increase the cybersecurity level of these systems -
nonetheless, it is essential these plans are followed through. A carefully planned
and long-term attack on the SVR should not be excluded as a possibility, with
the objective being the fraudulent modification of the voter list would be suffi-
cient to destabilize or delegitimize election day in some constituencies without
triggering the CEC’s alarms.
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The result management verification and data entry are highly decentralized
operations run by 225 DECs. DECs rely on staff appointed 45 days before the
election, preventing the necessary training on cybersecurity awareness. This rep-
resents a major challenge for the parliamentary elections as these DEC officers,
particularly those responsible for the IT operations, will be the first line of
defense against localized and potentially rewarding hacks against the results
system. The CEC and the cybersecurity agencies may mitigate this risk by es-
tablishing an advanced cyber-hygiene program for IT officers operating for the
temporary district election commissions.
Maintaining a high level of cyber vigilance will be another challenge for the
CEC. As it successfully navigated the presidential election, the organization
needs to be fully aware that its defense was tested but its capacity to respond to
incidents was not. The cybersecurity agencies involved in the incident simulation
organized before the parliamentary election expressed the wish to repeat this
type of exercise on a regular basis, particularly before an election.
4.4 Information warfare
Foreign interference in the electoral process does not stop at hacking electoral
commission infrastructure. There is a wide range of possible attacks that govern-
ment and all political stakeholders must prepare for, and from recent experiences
in Ukraine and abroad, foreign interference often leads to information warfare.
An election in which there is doubt whether the will of voters has been fairly
translated into elected mandates leaves a wound that is difficult to heal. In
this context, the perception of cyber-attacks against the electoral system might
be as important as the attack itself. While the presidential election was widely
seen as genuine and democratic by Western observers, disinformation campaigns
from Moscow have been distributing a counter-narrative using a wide range of
topics and targets [29]. Fighting disinformation is not part of the mandate of
the CEC, even when it comes to the electoral process. On this front, the SBU
has been proactive in addressing these matters. However, an approach limited
to law enforcement and legislation can become a challenge as it needs to balance
freedom of expression whilst still lessening the impact disinformation can have
on society.
Facebook is currently the largest social network operating in Ukraine with more
than 13 million users [30], accounting for more than half of the total internet
audience. Facebook’s status in Ukraine is a relatively recent phenomenon as it
replaced the Russian social network VK or VKontakte [31]. As part of its global
objectives, Facebook has launched a global campaign against election interfer-
ence, particularly the establishment of political advertising transparency policies
and the crackdown on Russian-linked group pages or accounts distributing fake
information [32].
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5 Lessons for the Future
Coordination among cybersecurity and election stakeholders was a key element
to the success of the presidential elections and it represents an important mile-
stone in establishing a sustainable program for the protection of the elections in
Ukraine. While coordination during the most recent election was efficient and
considerate, it calls for higher transparency. There is no international norm of
cooperation between Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) teams and
cybersecurity agencies with regards to the protection of electoral infrastructure.
As Ukraine is in the front-line of foreign interference in the electoral process,
it can take a leading role into establishing publicly available standards defin-
ing the rules of engagement of national cybersecurity agencies in response to
cyber-incident during an election.
Timely and agile procurement allowed the CEC to patch critical vulnerabilities
in its infrastructure. It is most likely that the CEC will need new equipment to
secure the next national election cycle (2024). It is very difficult to sufficiently
estimate the needs in advance due to the long and rigid rules imposed by gov-
ernment bureaucracy. A revision of the procurement procedures for cybersecu-
rity equipment in general, and cybersecurity equipment for elections specifically,
would provide the means to maintain the necessary protection against attempts
to threaten the integrity of the electoral process. Additionally, an iterative and
planned approach is preferable to an all-or-nothing, last minute solution.
Staff training and cyber awareness at all levels is proved to be effective way in
reducing the amount of successful attacks on information systems. Of course, one
can only know about the failed attempts, but the fact that Ukraine government
agencies experienced several waves of cyber-attacks during the months before
the elections, and that none of them provided tools to adversaries to compro-
mise any information system for the presidential election is a good indicator of
success. Thanks to users’ awareness and cyber-hygiene trainings, targets knew
what phishing would look like and thanks to coordination efforts, cyber agen-
cies knew how to monitor and stop campaigns. It should be noted that analysts
usually consider that users in Ukraine are very aware of the cyber risk, but do
not really know how to behave in order to reduce it. Cyber hygiene programs
are hence more adapted than cyber awareness.
The tools of adversaries will very often depend on the return on investment.
Hacking an electoral database is a highly spectacular but very often sophisti-
cated operation that represent a substantial cost, particularly if the system is
well protected. Hacking the email account or developing a deepfake video of a
candidate that have views opposed or not in line with those of adversaries, is
cheaper and can provide more immediate benefits.
A nexus of political, technical and regional strategy made the cost of an attack
high in comparison to the expected benefit. This will not likely be the case dur-
ing the upcoming parliamentary elections. In the months prior to the Ukrainian
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presidential election, the EU and the rest of the world closely watched the situ-
ation unfolding in Ukraine, learning from the CEC and Ukrainian society about
the potential risks to the upcoming EU parliamentary elections. Now, Ukrainian
officials both within and operating around the CEC should be looking at the EU
parliamentary elections in the preparation for its next election in the autumn.
6 Conclusions
In conclusion, the current article has presented a comprehensive analysis of the
background and history of the specific Ukrainian case and its significance to
the global perspective on current cybersecurity threats to election processes. It
has presented a typology of adversary incursion in this space within the former
Warsaw Pact countries and sought to show how this impacts strategies likely
to be implemented in other parts of the world, now focusing on a composite of
DDoS attacks, hybrid warfare, and electoral focus.
The article has also analyzed the recent 2019 presidential election in Ukraine
and the cybersecurity threats that were faced, including how they were miti-
gated. It has also examined the current threats and challenges that the country
faces in specific areas such as alternative attacks / secondary targets, information
warfare, and remaining challenges that the country’s CEC must face.
Finally, it looks at lessons learned from this analysis and its applicability to
elections that will take place in the coming period (2018-19), highlighting some
of the issues that those concerned with cybersecurity in elections should be
focused on. It also presents important issues and questions in need of further
investigation.
As such, the authors feel that it makes an important contribution to the field.
Both in documenting what has happened in a singular and analytical way. But
also, in drawing the threads together to present a common narrative of an in-
creasingly globalized threat to electoral security and integrity. It is hope that it
will prompt further research and investigation into this increasingly vital field.
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Abstract. Starting from 2019, the annual elections of the GI (German Society
for Computer Scientists) will be carried out using a new online voting system
developed by POLYAS, aiming at providing high, state-of-the-art security guaran-
tees. We describe the steps that POLYAS plans to take together with the GI and
academic partners in order to achieve the level of transparency and trust that is
expected from modern online voting. The participation of the academic partners
is the key factor to make the verification process both practical and meaningful.
Online voting has been used by the GI — German Society for Computer Scientists
(Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.) — for its annual elections since 2004. These elections
have been so far carried out using the POLYAS 2.3 voting system. Starting from 2019,
the GI elections will be carried out using the new POLYAS online voting system, POLYAS
3.0, based on currently available cryptographic methods.
The current state of the e-voting research offers variety of techniques that address
the fundamental security concerns of e-voting: privacy and end-to-end verifiability.
However, to fully utilize the potential of those methods, one has to take into account
some practical aspects and challenges, such as usability and constraints imposed by the
organisation which carries out the elections. Also, as commonly agreed, the desired de-
gree of confidence and trust cannot be achieved without a high level of transparency
and without participation of independent experts. In this paper, we discuss the steps
already taken and those planned by POLYAS, the GI, and the academic partners, which
are designed to result in an election process which satisfies the pragmatics of the GI
elections and, at the same time, provides practical and meaningful security guarantees.
Independent verification tools. POLYAS 3.0 implements standard mechanisms aiming
at providing universal verifiability: all the important steps of the tallying process (such
as shuffling and decryption) produce appropriate zero-knowledge proofs. It is then, in
principle, possible for everyone to check those zero knowledge proofs in order to make
sure that the tallying process has been carried out correctly. However, in order to uti-
lize this ability in a practical and meaningful way, we have established a cooperation
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including academic partners in order to build independent verification tools. The de-
tailed documentation of the tallying process, based on which verification tools can be
implemented, has been provided by POLYAS to the GI and to the academic partners for
review. POLYAS has also provided a reference implementation of the verification proce-
dure. Both the documentation and the reference implementation will be made publicly
available. As of now, one independent implementation of the verification procedure has
already been built by Maximilian Noppel from KIT and implementation of two other
verification tools have been started in the group of Prof. Küsters from University of
Stuttgart, one of which is being funded by POLYAS.
In the election process, an auditor will have an option to choose (one or more of)
the verification tools in order to verify the final election data. We have already used the
two existing verification tools to verify the tallying process of a test election carried out
in July 2019.
Generation of voters credentials and formal verification of some security goals.
In order to establish a mechanism preventing ballot stuffing (or to provide, so-called,
eligibility verifiability), the process of generating voters’ private credentials (used to
digitally sign the ballots) is be carried out in a controlled way by an entity designated
by the Election Council (GI). Consequently, POLYAS does not know the voters’ private
credential upfront. The specification of this process, as well as the source code of the
credential generation tool has been provided by POLYAS (with the option to build inde-
pendent implementations in the future). The process of credential generation (carried
out by GI using the provided tool) has been part of the mentioned above test election.
We plan to make both the specification of this process and the source code of the corre-
sponding tool publicly available.
The central security goals of the credential generation tool is that the randomly gen-
erated plaintext passwords are only saved in an encrypted file designated for the trusted
distribution facility and they do not leak in any other way (in particular, they should
not make it to the file designated for POLYAS which should only contain the corre-
sponding derived public credentials). We plan to use program verification methods to
formally prove this property on the implementation level. In this non-trivial task, which
has already been started by Michael Kirsten from the group of Prof. Bernhard Beckert
(KIT), the KeY tool will be used in combination with techniques from simulation-based
security.
Individual verifiability. The known solutions for individual verifiability involve several
trade-offs, including the usability aspect: the voters should understand the process and
be able to carry out the prescribed steps. Moreover, the election council must establish
well define procedures for handling voters’ complaints. We plan to address this security
requirements in the second step, that is in the GI Elections 2020. The solution which
POLYAS offers is based on the optional use of a second device (such as a mobile phone)
by the voter. The details of this process are being still discussed.
The goal of our cooperation between POLYAS and the academic partners described
above is to make the election process offered by POLYAS transparent and auditable in a
practical and meaningful way. We believe that opening this process is the best way to
build up trust and to improve the offered e-voting solutions.
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Abstract. Pakistan recently conducted small-scale trials of a remote
Internet voting system for overseas citizens. In this contribution, we re-
port on the experience: we document the unique combination of socio-
political, legal, and institutional factors motivating this exercise. We de-
scribe the system and it’s reported vulnerabilities, and we also highlight
new issues pertaining to materiality. If this system is deployed in the
next general elections —as seems likely —this development would con-
stitute the largest enfranchised diaspora in the world. Our goal in this
paper, therefore, is to provide comprehensive insight into Pakistan’s ex-
periment with Internet voting, emphasize outstanding challenges, and
identify directions for future research.
Keywords: Internet Voting · Overseas Voters · Pakistan.
1 Introduction
Pakistan recently piloted a remote Internet voting system for overseas citizens.
This system, i-Voting3, was indigenously developed and originally scheduled for
full-scale deployment in the General Elections of July, 2018. However, these
plans were deferred after a third-party technical audit of the system uncovered
numerous vulnerabilities and security concerns. i-Voting was deployed shortly
after on a trial basis: in bye-elections, first in October, 2018, spanning 35 con-
stituencies, and next in December, 2018 in 1 constituency. Some 7,538 votes were
cast (7,461 in October and 77 in December) using this system and these were
declared binding and incorporated into the final results.
It is widely expected that this pilot is a prelude to full-scale deployment
in the General Elections of 2023.4 Since Pakistan currently has over 8 million
overseas citizens [1], this may well be the largest deployment of Internet voting
in the world. It is therefore essential to document and study this experiment.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. We report on the deployment: we document the public debate on Internet
voting and the legislative and political process to facilitate it. We describe
the i-Voting system and we report on the pilot exercise.
3 also referred to as iVoting, iVOTE, IVoting
4 Currently, the law restricts use of such systems to bye-elections.
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2. We describe the various risks involved in this modality of voting and sum-
marize key findings of the technical audit. We examine the materiality, and
therefore the potential political significance of overseas voting.
3. We highlight the unorthodox combination of unique political and social fac-
tors in Pakistan that have resulted in this exercise and we discuss various
particular challenges that may arise as a result.
This paper holds relevance for election stakeholders including governments,
political parties, election administrators, political scientists, researchers, and
technologists. Pakistan’s Internet voting experience may also prove instructive
for other countries, particularly in the developing world, where governments are
severely limited in terms of financial resources, technical expertise, and infras-
tructure to undertake such critical large-scale projects.
2 Background
Organization of Government Pakistan has a parliamentary form of govern-
ment with bicameral legislature, comprising a Senate (upper house) with 104
members and a National Assembly (lower house) with 342 members. Each of
the four large provinces have a unicameral legislature, consisting of a Provincial
Assembly.5 The electoral system is the first-past-the-post system under universal
adult suffrage. Members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly are
elected by representation in electoral districts (referred to as seats or constituen-
cies). The number of seats in each administrative division is listed in Table 2.
General elections are conducted every five years and are overseen by the Election
Commission of Pakistan (ECP), which is an independent and autonomous body
as defined in the Constitution of Pakistan.
Body Total Federal Baluch- Federally Khyber Punjab Sindh
Seats Capital -istan Administered Pakhtun-
Islamabad Tribal Areas -khwa
National 272 3 16 12 39 141 61
Assembly
Provincial 577 - 51 - 99 297 130
Assembly
Table 1. National and Provincial Assembly Seats [2]
Overseas Pakistanis and the Right to Vote Pakistan, has over 8 million
overseas citizens [1] which comprises the sixth largest diaspora in the world
[3]. Overseas citizens are actively engaged in the socioeconomic well-being of
the country and every year send home remittances worth approximately US$19
billion, which accounts for around 5% of Pakistan’s GDP [4].
Article 17 of the Constitution of Pakistan grants all adult citizens the fun-
damental right to vote [5]. This article has generally been interpreted to ac-
knowledge that this right extends to all Pakistani citizens, irrespective of place
5 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Federal Capital Islamabad are
administrative divisions in addition to the four provinces, included in the contested
elections and comprise National Assembly seats only.
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of residence. Overseas Pakistanis have raised calls for enfranchisement and facil-
itation of their voting rights since the first general elections of 1970 [6].
The earliest constitutional petition filed to facilitate overseas voters was in
1993 by a British-Pakistani student and the Supreme Court of Pakistan referred
it to the government and the ECP for consideration [7]. After a hiatus of almost
two decades, more petitions followed in quick succession: in 2011, Dr. Arif Alvi,
Secretary General of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), a popular political party
petitioned the Supreme court in this regard; in 2014, the Islamabad High Court
was likewise petitioned by a concerned overseas citizen, and in June 2015, by
the Chairman of PTI, Mr. Imran Khan.
The judiciary, while addressing this grievance, has upheld this fundamental
right of overseas citizens on multiple occasions [8] [9] [10], ruling that this right
cannot be denied on technical grounds, and it has repeatedly directed the ECP
to make the necessary logistical arrangements. We discuss these attempts next.
Efforts by the Election Commission and Parliament In 2012, in one of
the earliest statements on the subject, the ECP dismissed the possibility of over-
seas citizens’ participation in the General Elections of 2013, citing logistics and
budgeting issues [11]. However, by 2015, the ECP had established a Directorate
for Overseas Voting in its Secretariat, which conducted mock overseas voting
exercises using postal ballots and voting via telephone [12].
These trials were unsuccessful. The reasons were clarified in a study com-
missioned by the ECP: “We find that any remote voting solution using cur-
rently available technology whether postal, internet, telephone, or proxy will
lack the necessary electoral integrity checks to preserve the credibility of an elec-
tion result.” Commenting on the feasibility of other modalities, the report stated:
“...given the size and dispersal of the Pakistani diaspora, coupled with the lim-
ited official resources available in-country and abroad, any significant in-person
voting operation would be expensive and logistically challenging” [13].
In July of 2014, the Parliamentary Committee for Electoral Reforms was
constituted with Finance Minister Ishaq Dar as chair. A sub-committee was
formed in January, 2016 by MP Dr. Arif Alvi (one of the petitioners for overseas
voting mentioned earlier and Secretary General of PTI) to devise a mechanism
for overseas voting [14] and in March, 2017, it proposed remote Internet voting as
a potential solution. Consequently, the committee authored the Elections Act of
2017, which authorized the ECP “to conduct pilot projects for voting by Overseas
Pakistanis in bye-elections” [7].
The ECP subsequently requested the National Database Registration Au-
thority (NADRA) to build a system. NADRA is an independent and autonomous
agency working under the Ministry of Interior and tasked with managing gov-
ernment databases and issuing national identity cards to citizens. However the
system did not materialize: in June 2017, ECP again contacted NADRA, but
NADRA expressed its regrets at not having a solution available [12].
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The Supreme Court Intervenes Interest in overseas voting peaked again in
the six months leading up to the General Elections of July, 2018. The Supreme
Court of Pakistan consolidated 16 similar constitutional petitions and resumed
hearings on the issue [15]. It sought reports from the ECP and NADRA over
non-compliance of Section 94 of the Elections Act (regarding pilot projects for
overseas voters) [16]. In an attempt to break the deadlock, the Supreme court
directed NADRA to develop an Internet voting system. NADRA informed the
court that it would require 4 months to build a system and would cost Rs.150 mil-
lion (approximately US$ 1.36 million) [17]. However, the Court ordered NADRA
to present it in 10 weeks [18].
The new system, i-Voting, was unveiled on April 12, 2018 at a public session
convened by the Supreme Court [19]. The audience included members of various
political parties, IT experts from Pakistani universities, concerned citizens, and
members of the media. It was here that IT experts aired serious security concerns
regarding this system and pointed out that similar systems had been demonstra-
bly attacked and were being phased out in developed countries. The Supreme
Court concluded the session by forming an Internet Voting Task Force (IVTF)
to audit the system and assess its suitability for deployment in the forthcoming
general elections of July, 2018.
3 The i-Voting System
Here we describe NADRA’s i-Voting system and summarize the IVTF findings.
System Architecture The i-Voting system conforms to the traditional design
of Internet voting solutions, where a centralized database is used to store and
tabulate votes, which voters access using a Web portal.
More specifically, as depicted in Fig. 1, a central datacenter hosts the overseas
votes database and an application and email Server. These servers interface with
a webserver hosting the i-Voting Web portal (Fig. 2) and NADRA databases (for
verification of voter information). The ECP can monitor the system using an
administrative portal. Load balancing and backup arrangements are deployed
as well as standard security solutions including firewalls, intrusion detection
mechanisms, and mitigation of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
Voter Registration The registration process is depicted in Fig. 3 [20]. To enrol,
a user must possess his/her passport, a National Identity Card for Overseas
Pakistanis (NICOP), and a valid e-mail address. The ECP announces a public
Registration Phase during which prospective voters enter their basic details into
the system. A confirmation email with a PIN is then sent to the voter. To confirm
the account, the user enters the PIN and solves a CAPTCHA.
Now the user logs in to the system and provides further details of his NICOP
and passport. He also answers two randomly chosen questions pertaining to his
identity after which he is successfully registered. The system allows a maximum
of 3 answer attempts, failing which the NICOP number is restricted.
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Vote Casting and Preparation of Results Prior to polling day, each regis-
tered voter is emailed containing a unique passcode (which acts as a one-time
password), enabling him to log on to his i-Voting account and cast a vote for his
respective National Assembly and/or Provincial Assembly seat (Fig. 3).
When polling concludes, the ECP tabulates the votes via the Reporting Por-
tal and dispatches the tally to concerned officials for consolidation of results.
Internet Voting Task Force The Internet Voting Task Force (IVTF) was
given a time window of 3 weeks to assess the security of the i-Voting system.
The team comprised of IT and security specialists and academic researchers [21].
They conducted a high level security analysis of the system, examined the code,
and mounted some typical attacks. The results were written up in a report and
submitted to the Supreme Court. Their key findings are as follows:
1. i-Voting does not provide ballot secrecy, a fundamental right defined in the
Constitution of Pakistan. This further opens up the possibility of vote buying
and coercion of overseas voters.
2. A key security vulnerability allowed overseas voters to bypass their native
constituencies and cast votes for any two seats of their choice in the country.
3. The IVTF successfully launched impersonation attacks, enabling them to
send fake emails purportedly from the ECP to direct voters to fake websites.
4. i-Voting avails the services of a leading DDoS mitigation solution, a measure
which researchers have recently demonstrated can potentially compromise
ballot secrecy and election integrity [22].
5. The system employs certain third-party security components (such as text-
based CAPTCHAs) which are obsolete and demonstrably insecure.
The IVTF also raised other critical non-security concerns: i-Voting lacked
verifiability, fail-safe, or redundancy mechanisms. There were no security poli-
cies or procedural controls defined to protect critical security processes from
insider attacks. No usability studies or trials had been conducted for the system.
Futhermore, the system was built in an ad-hoc manner with key documentation
missing. For instance, there was no documented Solution Requirements Speci-
fication (SRS) or documentation pertaining to key operational processes (such
as administration, hosting, responsibility of critical components), which limited
assessment for certain important security attacks.
The IVTF therefore strongly argued against the deployment of i-Voting in
the upcoming General Elections of 2018. Their report stated that this would be
“a hasty step with grave consequences” The report also emphasized that “many
Fig. 1. i-Voting: System Architecture
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Fig. 2. iVoting: Interface
of these security vulnerabilities are not specific to iVOTE [sic] but are inherent
to this particular model of Internet voting systems” [23].
The report also made various recommendations to facilitate overseas voters.
We discuss these in Sec. 6 and 7.
4 Deployment
The Supreme Court of Pakistan revisited the matter of Internet voting after the
general elections in August, 2018, and ruled: “Based on these representations
we prima facie find the mechanism of I-Voting (sic) to be safe, reliable and
effective for being utilized in a pilot project. We are sanguine that the aforesaid
proposed rules shall be incorporated in the Election Rules, 2017 to enable overseas
Pakistanis to exercise their right of vote in the forthcoming bye-elections.” The
court further stipulated that votes cast using i-Voting not be added to the final
tally until the ECP is satisfied with regards to their “technical efficacy, secrecy,
and security”. In case of any dispute the ECP was authorized to exclude these
overseas votes from the official results [10].
The ECP consequently amended the Election Rules to accommodate the
requirements of Internet voting. NADRA implemented certain technical recom-
Fig. 3. Voter Registration
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Fig. 4. Vote Casting
mendations of the IVTF6 and trained ECP officials to administer the system.
The ECP launched a media campaign for voter awareness and published detailed
guides and video tutorials for the i-Voting system. A dedicated support center
was also set up to provide telephone and email assistance [12].
First Pilot (Bye-Elections - 14 October, 2018) Bye-elections were held
for 35 constituencies (11 National Assembly and 24 Provincial Assembly seats).
The total overseas Pakistanis eligible to participate in these polls numbered a
significant 631,909. However, out of these only 7,419 citizens (1.17%) actually
registered to vote using the new system. On the day of the elections, a total of
6,146 voters of these citizens cast their votes [12].
ECP later reported that on the day of the polls the system successfully
withstood 7,476 DDoS attempts.7 The top 5 countries by voter count were the
United Arab Emirates (1,654), Saudi Arabia (1,451), the United Kingdom (752),
Canada (328), and the United States (298). The pilot project cost approximately
Rs. 95 million (0.67 million USD approximately) [12].
The trial was smooth and uneventful. In its own report, the ECP attributed
the low turnout to the short time frame within which the system was deployed
and advertised. The ECP also cited key issues which echoed the concerns of the
Internet Voting Task Force (discussed in Sec. 3), in that the system violates
ballot secrecy, enables voter coercion, lacks auditability, and may be vulnerable
to state-level cyberattacks.
Second Pilot (Bye-Elections - 13 December, 2018) As many as 4,667
overseas Pakistanis from more than ten countries were eligible to vote for one
Provincial Assembly seat [24]. However, only 77 overseas Pakistanis registered
to vote. The ECP has not released any further details about this trial [25].
5 Materiality - Are Overseas Votes Decisive?
In this section we undertake a basic post-election analysis to examine the po-
tential impact of overseas votes on final results.
6 No details have been published on what specific changes were made.
7 No details of these attacks have been released to the public.
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The leading Pakistani citizen observation group, Free and Fair Election Net-
work (FAFEN) has conducted an analysis of 2018 General Election results [26]
and has determined that, in a significant number of constituencies, the Margin
of Victory (MoV) is less than the number of invalid votes. A similar analysis, but
comparing Margin of Victory with number of Eligible Overseas Voters would be
useful to highlight the materiality8. There is no publicly available voter regis-
tration or population data which shows how many registered voters are actually
Overseas Pakistanis for all constituencies. The only exception to this is for the
constituencies where by elections were conducted using i-Voting in October and
December 2018. The average percentage of eligible overseas voters, as a per-
centage of total voters in the October 2018 By-elections is 6.88% ( Table 2).
With this assumption, we estimate the number for eligible overseas voters for
individual constituencies under scrutiny.
We then calculate an estimated Overseas Pakistani Voters value for each
contested constituency in the October 2018 By elections that was also contested
in the July 2018 General Elections. We now compare these Estimated Overseas
Voters (EOV) value with the margin of victory and flag where the MoV is less.
We do this both for the October 2018 By-elections and the July 2018 General
Elections. We may describe the number of Overseas Pakistani Voters in these
cases as material to the outcome of the election9.
As Table 3 shows, in ten of twenty-seven by-election races, Overseas Pakistani
Voters had the potential to be material. This grows to thirteen of twenty-seven
for General Election races. In five races, both Bye-Election and General Election
saw Margin of Victory less than estimated Overseas Pakistani Voters. It is, we
believe, reasonable to assume that, in competitive future General Elections at
least one in five races may be decided by votes cast by overseas Pakistani voters.
This places the integrity of and trust in any internet voting solutions deployed
by the Elections Commission of Pakistan into very sharp focus. This is positive
in the sense that overseas Pakistanis can feel their votes count. At the same time
it necessitates election integrity checks so that this right is not misused.
6 Discussion
In this section we further examine outstanding issues arising from this experi-
ment and we attempt to contextualize these by examining the unique political
and institutional factors that motivated these pilot projects.
8 Materiality in this context refers to the theoretical scenario where all possible over-
seas votes are cast, and all are cast for the second place or losing candidate, the
outcome of the election might have been different/might be different.
9 The public domain sources for Table 2 and 3 are no longer available on ECP Website.
The documents will be made available at a URL which will be cited later (to retain
anonymity).
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Description Number
Total Registered Voters in bye-election 9,185,705 []
Total Eligible NICOP 734,777 []
Non-Machine Readable Passports ( 14%) 102,868 []
Estimated Total Overseas Pakistani Voters 631,909 []
Eligible Overseas Pakistani Voters as % of Voters Registered 6.88% []
Table 2. Calculating Estimated Percentage of Overseas Pakistani Voters
Fig. 5. Twitter users Posting Screenshot of Vote
6.1 Ballot Secrecy and Voter Coercion
In delivering one right (the right of overseas Pakistanis to vote), the solution risks
undermining another (the right to secrecy). The i-Voting system does not comply
with Article 226 of the Constitution of Pakistan [27] and the Elections Act 2017,
Section 8110 [28], that impose ballot secrecy. Being a remote voting modality,
there is no mechanism to prevent an individual from revealing their vote to
others. Similarly, certain event logging software (specially on a shared/public
device) can secretly capture the choice of a voter.
Electoral offences were committed by voters unintentionally, by posting screen
shots on social media, as shown in Fig 5. The tweeters seem to be unaware their
actions are electoral offences, and being outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan it is
unclear, how such offenders can be brought to justice11.
In addition, to the lack of secrecy for the voter at the client end, the low levels
of participation in pilots also mean that, in some cases, typically PA seats (PB-
35, PP-165, PP-292 from October 2018 bye-elections [12]), the voter’s choice is
revealed. The usual solution to this problem (mixing votes from multiple ballot
10 The exceptions in Section 81 are not to the secrecy requirement, rather to require-
ment of casting a vote by inserting paper ballot into a ballot box.
11 Section 178 of the Elections Act 2017 elaborates the offences relating to ballot se-
crecy.
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Constit Total Estimated General Elections Bye Elections Both
uency Registered Overseas July,2018 October,2018 Elections
Voters Voters (EOV) MoV MoV <EOV MoV MoV <EOV Mov <EOV
PB-40 76,173 5,240 13,345 - 9,141 - -
NA-53 313,141 21,541 48,763 - 18,630 - -
NA-35 582,785 40,091 7,001 Yes 23,455 - -
PK-3 146,180 10,056 5,550 Yes 1,163 - -
PK-7 155,719 10,712 5,825 Yes 334 - -
PK-44 202,601 13,937 10,857 Yes 1,630 - -
PK-53 153,352 10,549 6,729 Yes 61 - -
PK-61 139,517 9,597 4,593 Yes 5,247 - -
PK-64 160,728 11,056 18,579 - 13,215 - -
PK-97 155,032 10,665 16,461 - 10,172 - -
NA-56 640,133 44,036 64,490 - 41,593 Yes -
NA-63 371,713 25,571 35,979 - 26,292 - -
NA-65 553,289 38,062 51,963 - 68,591 - -
NA-69 469,177 32,275 73,172 - 50,803 - -
NA-124 535,172 36,815 65,287 - 47,533 - -
NA-131 365,677 25,155 756 Yes 10,031 Yes Yes
PP-3 224,755 15,461 37,008 - 227 Yes -
PP-27 312,370 21,488 1,766 Yes 656 Yes Yes
PP-118 222,190 15,285 548 Yes 5,189 Yes Yes
PP-164 137,906 9,486 20,870 - 7,561 Yes -
PP-165 132,077 9,085 20,372 - 5,742 Yes -
PP-201 232,120 15,968 17,297 - 7,024 Yes -
PP-222 196,858 13,542 11,446 Yes 6,083 Yes Yes
PP-261 187,510 12,899 9,371 Yes 14,261 - -
PP-272 167,467 11,520 5,390 Yes 8,899 Yes Yes
PP-292 141,297 9,720 253 Yes 10,692 - -
NA-243 402,731 27,704 67,291 - 21,601 - -
Table 3. Materiality of Overseas Voters in Selected Constituencies, General and Bye-
Elections 2018
boxes or polling stations) is not available in the i-Voting context or could only
be implemented at the cost of further erosion of already minimal transparency.
As the IVTF report points out, some jurisdictions [29] allow a voter to waive
their right to secrecy. This is not a solution to the problem, as any voter (or
party or candidate) to assert their constitutional and legal rights to secrecy for
the system to be challenged.
Almost half of the diaspora, over 4 million Pakistanis reside in the Middle
East, and about a quarter (over 1.5 million) reside in Europe [30]. A bulk of the
diaspora specifically in the Middle East are labourers. The ECP itself recognizes
the risk of vote buying and coercion when it speaks of the ”kafeel”12 abusing
custody of passports [12]. The ILO13 describes this system as placing migrant
workers in ”a position of vulnerability and have very little leverage to negotiate
with employers, given the significant power imbalance embedded within the em-
12 Sponsor for a migrant worker
13 International Labour Organization
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ployment relationship. Common grievances expressed by migrant workers include
restrictions on free movement, confiscation of passports, delayed or non-payment
of salaries, long working hours, untreated medical needs, and violence all condi-
tions that can give rise to situations of forced labour and human trafficking” [31].
It is reasonable to assume that anyone who will treat migrant workers in this
manner will not hesitate to exploit their votes for political or financial benefit.
Migrant workers are bound to face difficulty to independently use the i-Voting
System. This could pave the way for coercion, vote buying and compromise
secrecy if vote casting is aided by a computer literate party. Thus, usability tests
need to be conducted to receive direct input from real users. It might be argued
that low usability, was a primary reason of the low registration turnout, where
only 1.17 % [12] of the total eligible overseas voters successfully registered with
the i-Voting system. Further, there seem to be no special accessibility features
incorporated to address the needs of voters with disabilities.
6.2 Voter Authentication
The process of registration on the i-Voting platform [32] is entirely out of ECP’s
control, relying as it does on a verification method conducted and adjudicated
by a computer programme. Potential overseas voters are quizzed with questions,
whose answers are considered ”secret”. Common sense dictates that, despite the
familial/personal nature of these questions, the answers will not be known ex-
clusively to the voter. As a consequence, ECP cannot guarantee that the voter
registered via the online platform [32] is indeed the eligible citizen, or an impos-
tor. Other key mechanisms to protect the integrity of the electoral rolls - the
public display of and claims/objections on the draft electoral rolls - are omitted
from the online process. Political parties, observers, and voters themselves, are
not given the access to these electoral rolls to allow for the scrutiny that would
contribute to stakeholder confidence in the electoral rolls.
Furthermore, the mechanism within i-Voting to “lock” an identity following
repeated incorrect answers or CAPTCHA verification may be used for voter
suppression - a sort of denial-of-service attack, albeit on a vote-by-vote basis.
Voters may not know the answers to all the questions they might be asked
(where, for example, an 18 year old was registered and a parent provided the
information). Corrupt or partisan Presiding Officers could merely strike out the
names of legitimate voters saying that they had registered online for i-Voting.
6.3 Election Integrity and Dispute Resolution
On election day in polling stations across Pakistan, a long list of integrity mech-
anisms are in place, arising from the Constitution, the Elections Act 2017 and
the Election Rules 2017, as amended14. In the i-Voting system these fourteen
14 The election is conducted in full view of polling staff, party/candidate agents and
observers, who first-hand witness the integrity checks in place: verify ballot boxes
are initially empty, identify voters on arrival, ink their fingers (to prevent multiple
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separate mechanisms are missing with consequences for electoral integrity. The
exclusion of party/candidate agents and citizen observers from the i-Voting pro-
cess is compounded by the inherent absence of any verifiability mechanism or
possibility to audit the i-Voting system - by design -”In order to ensure that
Voting is kept secret, all data was encrypted and no audit trail of voting was
kept by the system” [12].
ECP may exclude based on its ”opinion” as to whether the ”technical efficacy,
secrecy and security of the voting has not been maintained” [12]. It is not known
how ECP informs that opinion, or whether it has the required access to the i-
Voting system. Given the 2018 recourse to establishing the IVTF, it seems likely
that ECP lacks the technical capacity to properly arrive at an informed opinion.
Given the likely materiality of votes cast by overseas Pakistanis in a significant
proportion of contests, we may expect many electoral disputes to centre around
the integrity of i-Voting system.
Specifically, in a developing country like Pakistan, where the democratic pro-
cess is at an inflection point, and the mechanisms to investigate and resolve elec-
toral disputes, are still very fragile, electoral improprieties or even the impression
of such can potentially lead to political deadlock and turmoil. An indication of
this is the PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Trans-
parency) report on the perception of pre-poll fairness which notes that ”the
internet-based OP voting may also be a major instrument of rigging in 2018
General Election” [33]. Diverse stakeholders including the ECP itself [12], and
prominent mainstream political parties expressed similar reservations [34] [35].
Lack of auditability features means there is no evidence if results are challenged
through an election petition. These, coupled with questions over the capacity
and willingness of the judiciary, raises concerns about the resolution of electoral
disputes around internet voting.
6.4 Threat Model
Concerns have also been raised regarding the threat model on which i-Voting is
based. The recent controversy of foreign interference in US elections hints that a
developing country like Pakistan may also be at risk. ECP’s report on the pilot
deployment highlights this concern: “[adversaries] did not materially interfere
merely to put us off track. When the system is finalized and put into practice in
the next elections, shall we be able to counter/control cyber attacks[?]” [12].
Furthermore, whereas the high number of DDoS attacks (around 7476 on bye-
elections day), posed an outage threat, the use of a DDoS mitigation service, as
demonstrated recently by Culnane et al. [22], introduces a new attack vector.
The mitigation service is in a position to decrypt incoming traffic, thereby able
to compromise ballot secrecy and potentially even alter the content. The IVTF
voting), vote casting in secrecy behind a screen, placing the ballot paper into the
transparent ballot box, the Presiding officer conducting the count and disseminating
the results form to all stakeholders, and packaging all ballot papers (valid, invalid,
challenged, spoiled) separately in tamper-evident envelopes.
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audit highlighted this concern in their report and pointed out that the servers
employed by the DDoS mitigation service were all based overseas and beyond
control of Pakistani authorities.
6.5 The Curious Case of Pakistan
We see the Supreme Court at the forefront, driving the institutions to deliver a
voting solution to overseas Pakistanis. Here we try to make sense of the unique
predicament and examine the various factors that led to this situation. The
judiciary has time and again reiterated the ECP to roll out a voting mechanism
for overseas Pakistanis, but to no avail. A concrete step in this direction was
long overdue and it had to take the Supreme Court to push it through, given
the institutional inertia within the government.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan frequently takes Government ministries and
other public bodies to task for not fulfilling their obligations [36]. Whether
through judicial activism (using suo moto powers) or responding to petitions
from interested parties, it often gets involved in the technical specifics of cases.
Its jurisdiction “is not limited to mere procedural technicalities as it enjoys cer-
tain inherent powers to do complete justice in any case” [37]. A vivid example of
the Supreme Court’s ambition beyond procedural technicalities is the fund es-
tablished in July 2018 to raise money to build dams. This fund currently exceeds
ten billion Pakistani rupees (approximately 71 million US $) [38].
Cognizant of this deviation, the Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan, in-
quired whether it was the job of the Supreme Court to give the right to vote
to overseas Pakistanis? [16] In the matter of how best to enfranchise overseas
Pakistanis the Supreme Court initially directed the elections management body
to develop an internet voting system and then later mandated the use of this
system in binding political bye-elections. In doing so, the Supreme Court dis-
missed unambiguous and dire warnings from the IVTF about the hazards of
the proposed system as mere ”technical and security apprehensions”, and that
the report was ”generally positive and encouraging” [10]. While the IVTF re-
port clearly says ”Hopefully, this discussion thus far demonstrates to the reader
why internet voting is recognized by security experts to be a controversial and
risky undertaking”, and it concludes by asserting ”We would, therefore, urge all
stakeholders to exercise extreme caution in approaching the question of internet
voting” [23]. This disconnect has received media recognition [39].
The ECP itself was very reluctant to adopt this modality of overseas voting.
Recently, when the matter was taken up in the Senate, in May 2019, Senator
Javed Abbasi recollected that ”the ECP had convinced political parties that the
system should not be introduced in Pakistan, but could not convince the Supreme
Court”, at which an ECP representative expressed his dismay that while the
ECP tried to dissuade the Supreme Court, no political party supported the
ECP in Supreme Court [40]. The absence of a broad political consensus on the
use of i-Voting to enfranchise the diaspora does not bode well for the future.
Neither the Elections Commission of Pakistan, nor the developers of the i-
Voting system challenged the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the IVTF find-
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ings or recommendations. Since there is no higher court than the Supreme Court,
no appeal is possible. If a future election is decided on votes cast by overseas
Pakistanis, via the i-Voting system, and the result is challenged —which seems
highly likely, given both the deficiencies and materiality described earlier in this
paper —it will be interesting to see if the electoral dispute resolution process
ends up in the same court.
7 Way Forward and Conclusion
Pakistan’s experiment for the October 2018 by elections was the largest de-
ployment of Internet voting in a binding election, anywhere in the world. The
recommendations of both the IVTF report, and ECP’s own report on the Octo-
ber 2018 pilot exercise are comprehensive and we endorse these. Going beyond
these, and comparing the Pakistani experience with other countries who are fur-
ther along the internet voting pathway, we would highlight two vital priorities.
First, transparency: ECP and NADRA succeeded in delivering a working pro-
totype system in the short time available, but the details of the process were,
and remain, opaque. Stakeholder acceptance cannot be assured in future with-
out meaningful transparency and greater consultation, having regard to voter
secrecy. Second, capacity building across all stakeholders, starting with, and led
by ECP (such as establishing a dedicated R&D cell within the ECP), to deliver
competent national ownership and informed policymaking. It seems likely that
escalation from pilots in bye-elections to full-scale use of internet voting for the
enormous Pakistani diaspora will happen in 2023. The issues highlighted in this
paper should receive urgent attention by all Pakistani stakeholders.
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Abstract. During February and March 2019, Switzerland successfully conducted 
a Public Intrusion Test (PIT) event on the new Swiss Internet Voting system de-
veloped jointly with Scytl. The goal was to identify, categorize and correct vul-
nerabilities as early as possible, to improve the security of the voting system. 
This event drew the attention of most of the e-voting community, especially the 
attention of security researchers. The event took place in parallel with the publi-
cation of the source code of the voting system, that was also used to detect and 
design attacks for the PIT. A total number of 3187 researchers/teams have regis-
tered for the event and reported 173 findings. 16 of them were accepted under the 
category of “best practices”. Regarding source code findings, 84 were reported 
and 3 of them were deemed critical. The latest three findings, despite not having 
been exploited in the PIT, affected the main cryptographic properties for achiev-
ing complete verifiability: universal and individual verifiability. The attack relat-
ed to individual verifiability also affected the version of the voting system used 
in production elections. However, the attack could be detected by auditors and it 
is excluded that past elections or votes have been manipulated. The production 
system was put on hold for scrutiny until the issues are solved and verified again 
by the experts.  
Keywords: Switzerland, internet voting, regulation, verifiability, certification, 
source code publication, public intrusion test, online voting experiences 
1 Introduction 
Between February 25th and March 24th 2019, the security of the new Swiss Internet 
Voting system implemented jointly with Scytl (sVote) was publicly tested by research-
ers and security experts. The closest experience conducted before is the public test on 
the “D.C. Digital Vote-by-Mail Service” voting system piloted by the Washington, 
D.C.Board of Elections and Ethics (BOEE) in 2010 [17]. In this case, the voting sys-
tem consisted of an open-source web-based platform for downloading and uploading
PDF files through the internet.
Thus, sVote is the second internet-based voting system that has gone through a pub-
lic intrusion test (PIT). The PIT conforms with the security and transparency require-
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ments [1] set in August 2018 by the Electronic Voting Experts Group (EXVE) estab-
lished by the Federal Chancellery. Prior to this experience, transparency was only 
achieved through the publication of the source code (excluding [17]). In 2011, within 
the context of the Norwegian Municipal Elections, the first case of source code publi-
cation took place, namely the Norwegian voting system, also developed by Scytl [2]. 
The source code of the Estonian voting system was partially published in 2013 [3] (the 
voting application was excluded). Finally, the Canton of Geneva published in 2016 part 
of the source code of its CHVote voting system (only the offline administration appli-
cation), as a transparency effort [4]. 
The source code of the cryptographic protocol of the new sVote voting system was 
also published before starting the PIT. The publication is mandatory for any voting 
system compliant with the complete verifiability requirements of the Swiss Internet 
Voting legislation (VEleS) [5]. The new sVote voting system passed the audit certifica-
tion processes for complete verifiability compliance in January 2019 and therefore, the 
source code was published under the previous registration before starting the authoriza-
tion process from any Canton [22]. 
These two steps (source code publication and PIT) were important to detect and 
solve any issue that was not previously detected during the certification process. The 
new sVote is an evolution of the sVote voting system previously certified in September 
2017 by the individual verifiability requirements of VEleS (Level 2 certification). De-
spite the differences between both voting systems (individual and complete verifiabil-
ity requirements), the source code publication and PIT also served to detect issues that 
could affect the individual verifiability properties of the previous sVote voting system. 
In other words, the PIT was relevant since it could also affect the sVote voting system 
already in production.  
In this paper, we analyse the source code publication and provide statistics arising 
from the PIT. Such event was open for a limited period (one month), but, as required 
by VEleS, the source code will remain publicly accessible. Interestingly, the analysis 
of the source code conducted by researchers has been concentrated during the PIT. 
This paper will cover all the aspects regarding the source code publication. We explain 
the requirements gathered in VEleS, the certification process, preparation of source 
code publication, and the results and impact of the source code publication during the 
PIT. The paper concludes with lessons learnt and conclusions that the author has taken 
from this experience. 
The goal of this paper is therefore to share the acquired experience during the PIT 
related to source code publication. We hope this experience can be used by other gov-
ernments or entities to establish transparency practices on electronic voting systems. 
Statements, analysis and conclusions are those of the author of this paper. 
2 Complete verifiability in Switzerland 
2.1 Online voting regulation (VEleS) 
As described in [6], in 2014 a new online voting regulation (VEleS) [5] was estab-
lished by the Swiss Federal Council regarding the deployment of electronic voting 
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systems in Switzerland. The new regulation introduces three levels of authorization for 
internet voting in the Cantons. Each level increases the security of the previous one. 
Systems are authorised to be used by up to 30% of the Canton electorate provided they 
meet a minimal set of functional and security requirements gathered by the Federal 
Chancellery (ChF). Systems authorised for up to the 50% of the Canton electorate must 
be compliant with the so-called individual verifiability requirements of VEleS. Finally, 
systems authorized for up to the 100% of the electorate must be compliant with the so-
called complete verifiability requirements of VEleS. The latter requirements were en-
forced in 2018 by requesting publication of the source code of those software compo-
nents in charge of providing complete verifiability. This enabled public scrutiny of 
these components (Art. 7a4 of VEleS). On top of the VEleS regulations, the Swiss Fed-
eral Council required, as good practice, that complete verifiable systems should be 
exposed to a Public Intrusion Test before its deployment [1]. 
The new sVote voting system is designed to be used by 100% of the electorate, and 
therefore needs to be compliant with the complete verifiability requirements of VEleS 
and PIT. 
2.2 Complete verifiability requirements 
According to the VEleS, a system with complete verifiability must achieve the follow-
ing security requirements: 
• Individual verifiability (VEleS Art. 5 para. 3): It must provide a proof to the vot-
ers that allows them to check that the vote received by the voting system contains
their selected voting options (cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast)
• Universal verifiability (VEleS Art. 5 para. 4-5): the voting system needs to pro-
vide proofs that the voting system did not modify any vote that has been individ-
ually verified by the voter. These proofs should be public auditable by the audi-
tors or observers (universal) and should allow the verification of the voting (gen-
eration of the individual verifiable proofs) and counting (vote anonymization and
decryption) phases.
• Use of a trustworthy environment (control components) for the generation of the
individual and universal verifiable proofs (VEleS Art. 5 para. 6) under the trust
assumption that at least one component must be honest for detecting any manipu-
lation attempt (see Section 2.3.1 for more details).
The VEleS regulation comes with a technical annex (Tech. VEleS) [7] setting up the 
scope to evaluate voting systems that aim to be certified as individual and complete 
verifiable. The annex describes the trust model (abstract model) that is to be used for 
evaluation purposes. The abstract model defines the main components of the voting 
system, the trust assumptions made on these components, and the objectives that must 
be achieved under such trust assumptions. 
The abstract model is at the core of the compliance process. A voting system must 
be accompanied with cryptographic (computational) and formal proofs (Tech. VEleS 
Ref. 5.1.1). Below, we provide an overview of the abstract model required for com-
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plete verifiability. Also, the abstract model can be used to validate complete verifiabil-
ity compliance of online voting systems.  
2.3 Complete verifiability abstract model 
The complete abstract model is defined in section 4.3 of the Tech. VEleS. The main 
system components according to the ordinance are: 
• Voters: the actors that cast, verify and confirm their votes after previous authen-
tication to the System component.
• User platform: the technical component used by the voters to interact with the
System
• Voter’s technical aids: the technical aids independent from the User Platform
components used by the voters to authenticate and cast their votes.
• System (server-side): the technical component used to authenticate voters, and to
store, decrypt and count their votes.
• Print Office: the component used to print the authentication credentials and se-
cret data required by voters to individually verify their votes (e.g., Return Codes)
• Control Components: the technical components interacting between them and
the System component for proving the correct results.
• Auditors: the actors that check the proofs generated by the Control Components
and System for confirming the correct results.
• Auditor’s technical aids: the technical aids used by the Auditors to universally
verify the correctness of the proofs.
In addition to the above, the abstract model also defines the assumptions put on 
communication channels across system components to achieve the security require-
ments (see Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1. Complete verifiability trust model components and interactions 
2.3.1 Trust assumptions 
The trust assumptions for individual verifiability (that is, for systems to be used by up 
to 50% of the electorate) are specified in the so-called reduced abstract model de-
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scribed in section 4.1 of Tech. VEleS. The trust assumptions for complete verifiability 
(systems used by up to 100% of the electorate), extend the reduced model by removing 
the trustworthiness of the server System and trusting only one of the control compo-
nents (without knowing which component exactly is trusted). 
To ensure individual and universal verifiability, and as an exception to the above, 
the following components are considered trustworthy in the complete verifiability 
model: 
• The Print Office
• The Voter Technical Aids
• The One Control Component
• One auditor
• The Auditor’s technical aids
To ensure vote secrecy the trust assumption is also extended to Voters and User 
Platforms. The abstract model lies the assumptions made in the cryptographic and for-
mal proofs that must be provided to certify the system as completely verifiable. Table 
1 provides an example of how the new sVote voting system is aligned with the abstract 
model components and trust assumptions of VEleS [8]. 
VEleS sVote Trust assumption 
Voters Voters Significant proportion of voters are 
non-trustworthy 
User platform Voting Client Untrustworthy for individual and 
complete verifiability, trustworthy 
for privacy 
Voter’s technical aids Voting Card Trustworthy 
System (server-side) Voting Server Untrustworthy 
Print Office Print Office Trustworthy 
Control Components Return Codes and Mixing 
Control Components  
Trustworthy only as the whole. At 
least one is honest. 
Auditors Auditors At least one is trustworthy 
Auditor’s technical aids Verifier At least one honest auditor has a 
trustworthy aid 
Table 1. - Mapping between components in the protocol and in the VEleS Swiss regulation 
2.3.2 Objectives 
Finally, the security objectives defined in the abstract model under the trust assumption 
mentioned above can be summarized as follows: 
• To detect any attack against the votes processed by the system with a high proba-
bility (before, during or after being cast) through the verification proofs provided
to the voters and/or auditors.
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• To prevent attackers from compromising the secrecy of the votes cast by the sys-
tem (under the trust assumption that the user platform is not controlled by an at-
tacker).
Voting systems need to provide cryptographic and formal proofs for each of these 
objectives to demonstrate compliance with complete verifiability. 
2.4 Verifying complete verifiability compliance 
As already mentioned, the bases of the VEleS’ certification process is to prove that the 
design of the voting system is compliant with the complete security abstract model and 
that the system is properly implemented in the software. This necessarily implies that 
the design, deemed compliant with the security model, is not broken when the voting 
system is implemented in practice (source code). 
To this end, we can define a three-layer hierarchy, where each layer depends on the 
previous one. These layers are: 
• The regulatory layer: sets-up the abstract model requirements. In the case of the
Swiss regulation, we are talking about the VEleS regulation (an ordinance passed
by the Swiss Federal Chancellery). The nexus between this layer and the next one
(abstract layer) is the VEleS’ technical annex.
• The abstract layer: in this layer, voting systems need to prove, in a mathemati-
cal sense, that they are compliant with the abstract model defined in the regulato-
ry layer. The basis of this process is the VEleS’ technical annex, and the way to
certify compliance is by providing cryptographic and formal proofs compliant
with the abstract model. In the case of complete verifiability, proofs must be pro-
vided to guarantee verifiability and vote secrecy.
• The implementation layer: this final layer contains the software development of
a system based on the cryptographic protocol described in the abstract layer. The
implementation of this layer is mainly based on two deliverables: the protocol
specification (used for the development process) and the source code of the vot-
ing system and related documentation (deployment guides, audit documentation,
etc.).
Based on the information managed at each layer we can identify the following main 
documentation and relationships (See Fig. 2): 
• VEleS: Defines the security requirements and abstract model for achieving indi-
vidual and complete verifiability, and how compliance with these requirements
are to be verified.
• Security and formal Proofs
○  Security proof: Computational security proof of the proposed cryptographic
protocol implemented according to the VEleS abstract model.
○  Formal proof: Formal security proof of the protocol defined in the security
proof.
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• Protocol Specs: Defines how to implement the protocol proven by the security
formal proofs and how to deploy the system to ensure compliance with the secu-
rity assumptions.
• Source Code: Source code that implements the processes described in the proto-
col specification.
Fig. 2. Documentation relationship on the different compliance analysis layers 
 Ensuring that the documentation provided in the different layers is aligned is of 
paramount importance to guarantee that VEleS compliance covers the whole voting 
system design and implementation. As we will explain later, this has been the main 
cause of the findings notified during the PIT and source code publication. 
3 Preparing public scrutiny of voting system 
Federal Chancellery introduced the requirement of publication of the source code in a 
revision of the VEleS in August 2018. Article 7.b of the regulation details the require-
ments for publishing the source code. These requirements can be summarized as: 
• Quality: The source code and related documentation must follow best practices.
• Accessibility: The source code and related documentation must be publicly
available on the Internet and free of charge.
• Completeness: The published source code and documentation must cover all the
relevant security aspects of the voting system.
• Openness: The source code and documentation terms of use must allow to ana-
lyse, modify, compile and execute the source code for study purposes. These
terms will not ban the publication of the results of the analysis.
Therefore, the conduct of a PIT is not a requirement in the VEleS regulation. How-
ever, the internet voting Expert Group created by the Federal Council required it to be 
provided before first-time use of the system with a view to enhance transparency 
(Transparency section of [1]). This recommendation was considered relevant by Feder-
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al Chancellery and Cantons, and a PIT was organized in addition to the publication of 
the source code to enforce the transparency of the process [20]. 
3.1 Source code publication 
Considering the requirements from the VEleS, a public repository was configured to 
allow researchers to access the source code and related documentation, as well as a 
reporting environment to allow researchers to report their findings. 
From an accessibility point of view, the source code was published in a GitLab re-
pository [9], accessible upon request. Access to the repository requires a previous reg-
istration process where any interested party should provide basic contact information. 
The required information was name, surname, email address, reason for application 
and a github address [10]. The email and github address were the only ones verified 
(the first to ensure a valid contact and the second to ensure access to the source code). 
In this registration process, security researchers should accept the Conditions of Use 
[11] that include a Responsible Disclosure policy that ensures a grace period of up to
45 days since the last communication exchanged with the communication manager,
before any finding can be made public by the participants (see clause 9 of [11]1). The
45 days period was setup just in case a different period is not agreed between both
parts. Currently, all the findings reported under this responsible disclosure were pub-
lished in a shorter period. Despite responsible disclosure is a common accepted prac-
tice in software security testing, some potential participants did not accept its terms
(arguing that disclosure clauses could be interpreted in a way that could allow indefi-
nitely block any publication), or they just decided not to follow them. So, it was a mat-
ter of time until a replica of the official repository appeared on the Internet. Some of
the main findings were reported by researchers that used an unofficial repository for
making their research. However, these findings were accepted after researchers con-
tacted the Federal Chancellery.
 Another measure implemented for openness was the shared code license under 
which the source code was made public. Since the source code was not published as 
free open source software, it was important to publish it in a way that was compliant 
with the public scrutiny requirements of the regulation while keeping the IP rights from 
the authors. In this case, no issues were reported. 
Finally, some issues were reported regarding the quality of the source code. Quality 
in this context does not cover security aspects, but software complexity, presence of 
test code (containing hardcoded passwords), unused code, or missing references to 
third party software. Most of these issues are related to the fact that the voting system 
per se implemented a complex cryptographic protocol that includes the distribution of 
operations in several components (control components). However, the feedback given 
is used to improve the current voting system quality and to solve some of the issues. 
1 “No Vulnerability shall be published within a period of forty five (45) days since the last
communication exchanged with the Owners with regards to such potential Vulnerability, unless 
the Owners have agreed to a shorter period or defined a longer period.”
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3.2 Public intrusion testing 
The goal of the PIT was to identify vulnerabilities as early as possible and to correct 
them in order to strengthen and improve the security of the system. Furthermore, the 
PIT is a requirement of the Swiss government and the cantons and is therefore co-
organized and supervised by the Swiss government and a specific group of Swiss can-
tons.  
The scope of the PIT was based on the requirements from the Electronic Voting Ex-
perts Group [21] and focused on attacks from external actors with voter rights. Cam-
paigns for incentivizing the participation started in August 2018 at the DEF CON® 
Hacking Conference in Las Vegas (USA). The Public Intrusion Test (PIT) has been 
executed from February 25th and until March 24th, 2019. 
Category Vulnerabilities Compensation 
Undetectable 
vote 
manipulation 
- Manipulation of individual votes that is undetectable by
voters and trusted auditors;
-Scalable manipulation of votes that is undetectable by 
voters and trusted auditors;
Between 
30'000.- and 
50'000.- 
Vote 
manipulation 
Manipulation of individual votes while maintaining univer-
sal verifiability mechanism (manipulation detectable by a 
trusted auditor) - e.g. the vote is modified after being cast; 
20'000.- 
Vote privacy 
(server-side) 
- The privacy of a voter is broken (who voted) on the server;
- The privacy of a vote is broken (what did they vote) on the
server;
10'000.- 
Vote 
corruption 
- A vote is stored in the ballot box and that vote cannot be
decrypted;
- A vote is stored in the ballot box in a way that gives the
voter an unfair advantage;
- Destruction of the electronic ballot box;
5'000.- 
Intrusion - Intrusion into one of the servers (shell access);
- Ability to execute arbitrary code on one or multiple serv-
ers;
- Ability to execute arbitrary code on one or multiple control
components;
1'000.- 
Best Practices 
The configuration of a server or a service does not follow 
best practices of the security industry; 
100.- 
Table 2. - vulnerability categories and compensation (expressed in Swiss Francs CHF) 
The PIT event was set-up similar to a bug bounty program and, therefore, additional 
considerations were made for managing the findings reported through this event: de-
tected vulnerabilities were classified according to the impact of the finding with the 
prize that will be given to the researcher/team that reported it (see Table 2). 
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4 Statistics of the public intrusion testing 
4.1 Global statistics 
In total 3,186 people registered for the PIT. The total number of received findings on 
the PIT-Platform is 173. After careful inspection 16 were accepted and received a 
compensation. 
System findings Number 
Total submitted 173 
Of which confirmed by ChF, Cantons and Swiss Post 16 
Of which critical 0 
Non-critical optimization proposals 16 
Table 3. – PIT accepted findings classification 
4.2 Findings 
From all those 173 submitted findings, 16 were accepted belonging to the category 
“best-practice” (see Table 4). There were no accepted findings falling into a higher 
category. 
Vulnerability Category ID 
Crafted X-Forwarded-For HTTP header injection Best-practice 153 
Missing HTTP to HTTPS redirection on 'pit-admin.evoting-test.ch' Best-practice 166 
Outdated version of Bootstrap Web Framework Best-practice 168 
Vulnerable TLS cipher-suites (LUCKY13) Best-practice 175 
Missing 'Expect-CT' HTTP header Best-practice 179 
Missing 'base-uri' in Content Security Policy Best-practice 183 
Incorrect 'HTTP-Strict-Transport-Security' header on 'pit-admin.evoting-
test.ch' 
Best-practice 188 
Use of 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline' in Content Security Policy Best-practice 232 
Multiple occurrences of 'X-XSS-Protection' HTTP header Best-practice 234 
Use of outdated version of AngularJS Best-practice 257 
Strict Transport Security Misconfiguration Best-practice 272 
Use of cipher suites without forward secrecy support Best-practice 285 
Missing charset declaration in some response’s Content-Type header Best-practice 294 
Missing CSP header in redirect responses Best-practice 295 
Cross Origin Request possible on specific endpoint Best-practice 296 
Missing CSP header on http://pit-admin.evoting-test.ch/ Best-practice 318 
Table 4. – PIT accepted vulnerabilities 
Reported findings cover those that have been exploited in-scope of the PIT and 
those that constitute a misconfiguration according to industry best-practice. Findings 
which could not be exploited remotely, or which are only visible in the source code, 
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were rejected for the PIT but redirected to the source code program where they were 
evaluated again. 
5 Results of the source code publication 
5.1 Global statistics 
System findings Number 
Total submitted 84 
Of which accepted for revision 28 
Of which optimization proposals 25 
Critical findings 3 
Table 5. – Source code participation statistics (May 2019) 
Up to the moment of writing this paper (source code access is still open), there are 
about 1,600 registered users with access to the source code repository. Table 5 shows 
the participation statistics on the source code review. The first critical finding was re-
ported by 3 different sources, however we considered it as one unique finding. 
5.2 Findings 
As shown in Table 5 the statistics from the 28 submissions accepted for revision, 25 
were considered as improvements and only 3 reported as security findings. The im-
provements range from proposals of using larger key sizes to mechanisms for improv-
ing the verifiability of write-ins. All these improvements will be considered in the fu-
ture improvements of the new sVote voting system, but were not considered as critical 
for implementing them, since they do not imply any security vulnerability. Registered 
users could see the proposals of the others in the environment that had been setup for 
reporting them. 
The main critical findings where the three that affected the core cryptographic veri-
fiability features of the voting system: universal and individual verifiability. The first 
finding affected the universal verifiability of the Mixing process implemented in the 
first control component (the one that anonymizes the votes before decryption). The 
second affected the universal verifiability of the partial decryption process implement-
ed also in the first control component. Finally, the last one affected individual verifia-
bility of the Return Codes generated in the voter device. While all these findings were 
reported with examples of theoretical attacks, none of these attacks were carried out in 
practice in the PIT platform. It can be excluded that past votes or elections have been 
manipulated because of these findings, since the attack always generates invalid votes 
and such votes have never been reported in previous elections. 
A more detailed information of the three findings follows. 
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5.2.1 Universal verifiability – Mixing proof 
This finding was detected in the protocol implementation but was not present in the 
protocol design (i.e., it was not present in the cryptographic and formal proofs). The 
issue was related to a missing verification in the independent generation of the com-
mitment parameters of the Mixing proofs. The Mixing process is used to anonymize 
the votes before decryption, shuffling and re-encrypting the votes using the election 
public key. Since the process prevents to correlate the output shuffled and re-encrypted 
votes from the input ones, an attacker could use this property to substitute the output 
votes by other encrypted ones. To prevent this, the voting sVote system implemented a 
universal verifiable proof that shows that the Mixnet did not modify any content of the 
votes during the process. This proof is based on the proposal made by Bayer-Groth 
[18]. 
The issue was specifically related to the way that the commitment parameters used 
to generate the Bayer-Groth proofs were generated: these parameters were generated in 
a random way, but this generation cannot be verified as independent. This opens the 
door to an attacker controlling the Mixing node to generate these commitment parame-
ters in a specific way (mathematical relationship). This would allow them to modify 
the output of the mixing and generate a fake proof that would be accepted as valid and 
therefore, modify vote contents without being detected. 
To exploit this issue, it is necessary to perform some mathematical calculations 
based on the cyphertext and the internal structure of the vote. Therefore, the exploita-
tion is not straightforward (e.g., cannot use the sVote software but another one devel-
oped by the attacker). In fact, the main theoretical attack identified by the researchers 
requires the attacker to control also the vote casting process in the voter device to learn 
the randomness used to encrypt the vote. Therefore, the attacker needs to control the 
voter device used to cast each vote that they want to manipulate. Another constraint of 
the reported attack was that it requires to control the first control component, otherwise 
it is not feasible. A second theoretical attack was also proposed, but the internal struc-
ture of the vote made it not feasible. 
In any case, the importance of the detected finding was not related to the practical 
feasibility of the attacks proposed but the fact that the universal verifiability of the 
Mixing proof cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, it is necessary to correct the issue to 
restore universal verifiability property. In fact, the solution was easy to implement and 
already designed and present in the source code (the use of a FIPS 186-4 verifiable 
generation of a random group member), but it was not mentioned in the protocol speci-
fications to use this verifiable generation instead of the standard one. This remarks the 
importance of ensuring that the protocol design and implementation are properly 
aligned. 
This finding was independently reported by two individual researchers, Rolf Haenni 
(BfH) [13] and Thomas Haines (NTNU), through the official reporting environment, 
and a research team, composed by Sarah Jamie Lewis (Open Privacy Research Socie-
ty), Olivier Pereira (UCLouvain), and Vanessa Teague (University of Melbourne) [14], 
by other means. 
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5.2.2 Universal verifiability – Decryption proof 
This second finding was reported by the same research team of the first finding (Lewis-
Pereira-Teague) [15] and affected the universal verifiability of the decryption proof. In 
this case, the root of the issue was that the Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proof 
(NIZKP) of the decryption process was not using the statement proved for the genera-
tion of the non-interactive heuristic (Fiat-Shamir) [19]. This does not guarantee the 
soundness of the proof in an adaptative scenario (when the attacker can manipulate the 
information that needs to be proven) and therefore, the universal verifiability of the 
decryption process. In a non-adaptative scenario, information of the statement that is 
not under the control of the attacker (e.g., public information) is not needed to be used 
to generate the non-interactive heuristic (weak Fiat-Shamir). Otherwise, the statement 
needs to be used (strong Fiat-Shamir). 
In the new sVote voting system, control components implement a Mixing process 
and then a partial decryption of the mixed votes during the vote counting phase. There-
fore, this configuration opens the door to an adaptative scenario if the attacker is fully 
controlling a control component: the attacker can play with the re-encryption transfor-
mation made by the Mixing to generate a ciphertext that can help him to generate a 
fake proof that will pass any validation. The research team notified again about this 
issue and reported a theoretical attack. The attack requires also a similar scenario as in 
the first attack: full control of the first control component and each voter device used 
for each voter whose vote will be manipulated. However, this attack has a constraint 
since it can only substitute the vote by random data. Therefore, this attack will always 
be detected when the vote is decrypted in the last control component: the vote contains 
non-sense data and therefore, is excluded from the count and isolated as an auditable 
vote. This situation is not possible in the cryptographic protocol, because invalid votes 
cannot be accepted by the voting system: cannot generate a valid return code. 
Therefore, the main impact of the finding was that universal verifiability of the de-
cryption process cannot be guaranteed and therefore, it is not possible to prove that the 
decryption is correct. Therefore, despite the attack is detectable (generates a vote with 
non-sense data), it requires to make an investigation to find the source of the issue. 
Again, the issue was detected in the protocol implementation (protocol specifica-
tion) but not in the protocol design (cryptographic proof). 
5.2.3 Individual verifiability – Exponentiation proof 
This is the last flaw detected by the same research team [16], and this time the impact 
was larger than the impact of the issues mentioned above, since it also affected the 
individual verifiability property of the sVote voting system already used in previous 
elections (i.e., production). 
The finding was similar to the second one, since it was related to the information 
used in the non-interactive transform (Fiat-Shamir). However, this time it affected the 
exponentiation proof made in the voting client to prove that the information used to 
generate the Return Codes contains the same options than the vote cast by the voter. 
The issue did not happen because the statement was not used by the non-interactive 
transform, but since the transform only used part of the statement information: the 
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ElGamal encryption has two components (c0, c1) and in this case the protocol specifica-
tion failed to require that both be included in the statement. Once again, the crypto-
graphic proof (protocol design) was correct. Individual verifiability was based on the 
combination of two proof systems: exponentiation proof and a proof of plaintext 
equivalence. The plaintext equivalence was properly implemented in the design and 
implementation documents, so it was sound and not vulnerable to any attack. 
The research team reported the finding again and provided a theoretical attack. The 
attack shows how to generate the Return Codes expected by the voter while casting an 
encrypted vote with different contents. The main limitation of the attack is that the 
attacker only can mathematically find a vote with random data. Therefore, despite the 
possibility that the attack can cheat the voter, it will be always detected by the auditors 
when the votes are decrypted since the tampered vote will contain non-sense data. As 
mentioned in relation to the second finding, votes with non-sense data are not possible 
and are detected as an attack. This property has been used to demonstrate that, despite 
the vulnerability has been present in the sVote voting system in production, no election 
has been manipulated since votes with non-sense data were never reported (i.e., Can-
tons never notified in the official counting report the presence of auditable votes). 
In any case, the finding was critical since it impacts the individual property of the 
voting system and therefore, cannot provide guarantees to the voter that their votes are 
cast-as-intended. For this reason, it was decided to put the sVote voting system in pro-
duction on hold until the issue was solved, and further scrutiny is done to ensure that 
the issue has been properly tested and solved. 
5.3 Lessons learnt and future improvements 
One of the main lessons learnt of this experience is the benefits of opening the source 
code to public scrutiny. It allows to find issues that have been undetected by other re-
viewers but could have an impact on the cryptographic properties. In fact, all the issues 
detected were not related to an improper protocol design, but to a missing step or in-
formation when describing the protocol at implementation level (protocol specifica-
tions). Therefore, they were not detected by experts just reviewing cryptographic and 
formal proofs. This made us revisit and improve the processes and tools used to keep 
the protocol design and implementation documentation aligned. That way, if the proto-
col has been computationally and formally proven, this assurance can be also applied 
to the implementation. 
Another lesson learnt is that there is still room for improvement on how to manage 
the source code publication of voting systems. Specially, how to manage situations in 
which a vulnerability in the voting system is found near or in the middle of an election. 
One of the advantages of electronic voting systems is that issues can be corrected very 
fast, reducing the impact of availability. However, the main issue is the impact on the 
confidence of the voting system, that is usually more sensible to these issues than in 
other more traditional voting channels. 
From the point of view of participation in the source code review, it is still too early 
to make some analysis. However, based on Scytl participation in previous source code 
publication experiences (e.g., Norway 2011 and 2013), the amount of people that par-
ticipated in the source code review greatly exceeded expectations. Maybe this hap-
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pened in part because the proximity of the PIT experience, but it is important to follow 
up the activity during the next events (specially in periods near election processes). 
6 Conclusions2 
The first conclusion from the experience is that its contribution has been relevant for 
improving the security of internet voting systems. 
Another conclusion from the experience is the importance of having strong 
measures to ensure that what has been proven as secure from a design point of view 
(cryptographic and formal proofs), is then implemented following the same design 
principles. This is especially relevant considering the dynamic nature of the software 
and technology, since changes on the architecture can imply changes in the implemen-
tation that generate misalignments. In this case, in addition to better traceability 
measures between design and implementation, external reviews are important to detect 
issues that remained hidden to internal reviews. 
A third conclusion, that we also detected in other experiences in other countries, is 
the lack of a common consensus of which mechanism must be used for reporting issues 
to the election managers. This is especially relevant when opening the source code, 
since the probability of reporting findings is higher than when the voting system is 
only accessible during the election period. Responsible disclosure agreements are usu-
ally the way to manage this on the security industry, to provide a balance between the 
protection of the reporter before making their findings public and the time needed by 
the provider for solving the issue before it is made public. However, not all the partici-
pants agreed on the responsible disclosure terms or followed them. For this reason, we 
propose to make an open debate on this aspect for reaching a common way for manag-
ing public disclosure and reporting of findings. 
To conclude, it is crucial to identify and correct the issues raised by this experience 
(e.g., the terms and conditions required to researchers) in order to make it easier to 
replicate such experiences in the future (e.g., in any other countries). 
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Abstract. As paper ballots and post-election audits gain increased
adoption in the United States, election technology vendors are offering
products that allow jurisdictions to review ballot images—digital scans
produced by optical-scan voting machines—in their post-election audit
procedures. Jurisdictions including the state of Maryland rely on such
image audits as an alternative to inspecting the physical paper ballots.We
show that image audits can be reliably defeated by an attacker who
can run malicious code on the voting machines or election management
system. Using computer vision techniques, we develop an algorithm
that automatically and seamlessly manipulates ballot images, moving
voters’ marks so that they appear to be votes for the attacker’s preferred
candidate. Our implementation is compatible with many widely used
ballot styles, and we show that it is effective using a large corpus of
ballot images from a real election. We also show that the attack can be
delivered in the form of a malicious Windows scanner driver, which we
test with a scanner that has been certified for use in vote tabulation
by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. These results demonstrate
that post-election audits must inspect physical ballots, not merely ballot
images, if they are to strongly defend against computer-based attacks on
widely used voting systems.
Keywords: optical scan, paper ballots, image manipulation, drivers, image
processing
1 Introduction
Elections that cannot provide sufficient evidence of their results may fail to
adequately gain public confidence in their outcomes. Numerous solutions have
been posited to this problem [9], but none has been as elegant, efficient, and
immediately practical as post-election audits [21,25,39]. These audits—in par-
ticular, ones that seek to limit the risk of confirming an outcome that resulted
from undue manipulation—are one of the most important layers of defense for
election security [32].
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) rely on sampling robust, independent evidence
trails created by voter-verified paper ballots. However, other types of post-election
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Fig. 1. Attack overview — A voter’s paper ballot is scanned by a ballot tabulator,
producing a digital image. Malware in the tabulator—in our proof-of-concept, a micro-
driver that wraps the scanner device driver—alters the ballot image before it is counted
or stored. A digital audit shows only the manipulated image.
audits are gaining popularity in the marketplace. In particular, Clear Ballot,
an election technology vendor in the United States, pioneered audit software
designed to perform audits of images of ballots which have been scanned and
tabulated, which we shall refer to as “image audits”. Other vendors have adopted
support for this kind of audit, and one U.S. state, Maryland, relies on image
audits to provide assurances of its election results [33].
While image audits can help detect human error and aid in adjudicating
mismarked ballots, we show that they cannot provide the same level of security
assurance as audits of physical ballots. Since ballot images are disconnected from
the actual source of truth—physical paper ballots—they do not necessarily provide
reliable evidence of the outcome of an election under adversarial conditions.
In this paper, we present UnclearBallot, an attack that defeats image audits
by automatically manipulating ballot images as they are scanned. Our attack
leverages the same computer vision approaches used by ballot scanners to detect
voter selections, but adds the ability to move marks from one target area to
another. Our method is robust to inconsistent or invalid marks, and can be
adapted to many ballot styles.
We validate our attack against a corpus of over 180,000 ballot images from
the 2018 election in Clackamas County, Oregon, and find that UnclearBallot can
move marks on 34% of the ballots while leaving no visible anomalies. We also
test our attack’s flexibility using six widely used styles of paper ballots, and its
robustness to invalid votes using an established taxonomy of voter marks. As a
proof-of-concept, we implement the attack in the form of a malicious Windows
scanner driver, which we test using a commercial-off-the-shelf scanner certified
for use in elections by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
UnclearBallot illustrates that post-election audits in traditional voting systems
must involve rigorous examination of physial ballots, rather than ballot images,
if they are to provide a strong security guarantee. Without an examination
of the physical evidence, it will be difficult if not impossible to assure that
computer-based tampering has not occurred.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
background on image audits, ballot scanners, and image processing techniques
we use to implement our attack. Section 3 describes the attack scenarios against
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Fig. 2. Terms for parts of a marked ballot, following Jones [23].
optical scanners and image audits. Section 4 explains the methodology of our
attack. In Section 5 we present data indicating that our attack can be robust to
various ballot styles and voter marks. Section 6 contextualizes our attacks and
discusses mitigations. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
Our attack takes advantage of two aspects of optical scanner image audits: the
scanning and image processing techniques used by scanners, and the reliance on
scanned images by image audits. Here we provide a brief discussion of both.
2.1 Ballot Images
Jones [23] put forth an analysis of the way that ballot scanners work, particularly
the mark-sense variety that is most common today. All optical scanners currently
sold to jurisdictions, as well as the vast majority of scanners used in practice in the
U.S., rely on mark-sense technology [44]. Scanners first create a high-resolution
image of a ballot as it is fed past a scan head. Software then analyzes the image
to identify dark areas where marks have been made by the voter.1 Once marks
have been detected, systems may use template matching to translate marks into
votes for specific candidates, typically relying on a barcode or other identifier on
the ballot that specifies a ballot style to match to the scanned image.
Detecting and interpreting voter marks can be a difficult process, as voters
exhibit a wide range of marking and non-marking behavior, including not filling in
targets all the way, resting their pens inside targets, or marking outside the target.
The terms Jones developed to refer to the ballot and marks are illustrated in
Figure 2. Marks that adequately fill the target and are unambiguously interpreted
as votes by the scanner are called reliably sensed marks, and targets that are
unambiguously not filled and therefore not counted are reliably ignored marks.
1 The details of how marks are identified vary by hardware and scanning algorithm.
See [13] for an example.
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Fig. 3. Taxonomy of voter marks adapted from Bajcsy [2], including the five leftmost
marks that may be considered marginal marks.
Marks of other types are deemed marginal, as a scanner may read or ignore them.
Moreover, whether a mark should be counted as a vote is frequently governed by
local election statute, so some marginal marks may be unambiguously counted
or ignored under the law, even if not by the scanner.
Bajcsy et al. [2] further develops a systematization of marginal marks and
develops some improvements on mark-detection algorithms to better account
for them. An illustration of Bajcsy et al.’s taxonomy is shown in Figure 3. Ji
et al. [22] discuss different types of voter marks as applied to write-in votes, as
well as developing an automated process for detecting and tabulating write-in
selections.
2.2 Image Audits
Risk-limiting post-election audits rely on physical examination of a statistical
sample of voter-marked ballots [24, 26, 39, 40]. However, this can create logistical
challenges for election officials, which has prompted some to propose relaxations to
traditional audit requirements. To reduce workload, canvass audits and recounts
in many states rely on retabulation of ballots through optical scanners (see the
2016 Wisconsin recount, for example [31]).
Some election vendors take retabulation audits a step further: rather than
physically rescan the ballots, the voting system makes available images of all the
ballots for independent evaluation after the election [15, 16, 42].2 While the exact
properties of these kinds of image audits vary by vendor, they typically rely on
automatically retabulating all or some images of cast ballots, as well as electronic
adjudication for ballots with marginal marks. These “audits” never examine the
physical paper trail of ballots, which our attack exploits.
Several jurisdictions have relied on these image audits, including Cambridge,
Ontario, which used Dominion’s AuditMark [17], and the U.S. state of Maryland,
which uses Clear Ballot’s ClearAudit [28]. Maryland has also codified image
audits into its election code, requiring that an image audit be performed after
every election [27].
2 While the review is made available to the public, the actual images themselves are
seldom published in full out of concern for voter anonymity.
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3 Attack Scenarios
Elections in which voters make their selections on a physical ballot are frequently 
held as the gold standard for conducting a secure election [32]. However, the 
property that contributes most to their security, software independence [34], 
only exists if records computed by software are checked against records that 
cannot be altered by software without detection. Image audits enable election 
officials to view images of ballots and compare them with the election systems’ 
representation of the particular ballot they are viewing (called a cast vote record 
or CVR). While these two trails of evidence may be independent from each other 
(for example, Clear Ballot’s ClearAudit [15] technology can be used to audit a 
tabulation performed by a different election system altogether), they are not 
software independent. A clever attacker can exploit the reliance on software by 
both evidence trails to defeat detection.
To surreptitiously change the outcome of the election in the presence of an 
image audit, the attacker must alter both the tabulation result as well as the ballot 
images themselves. Researchers have documented numerous vulnerabilities that 
would allow an attacker to infect voting equipment and change tabulation results 
(see [10, 20, 30] among others), so we focus on the feasibility of manipulating 
ballot images once an attacker has successfully infected a machine where they 
are stored or processed.
The most straightforward attack scenario occurs when the ballot images are 
created by the same equipment that produces the CVR. In this case, the attacker 
can simply infect the scanner or tabulator with malware that corrupts both the 
CVR and the images at the same time. The attack could change the image before 
the tabulator processes it to generate the CVR, or directly alter both sets of 
records.
In some jurisdictions, the ballot images that are audited are collected in a 
separate process from tabulation—that is, by scanning the ballots again, as in 
Maryland’s use of ClearAudit from 2016 [28]. In this case, the adversary has to 
separately attack both processes, and has to coordinate the cheating to avoid 
mismatches between the initial tally and the altered ballot images.
Depending on the timing of the audit, manipulation of ballot images need 
not be done on the fly. For example, if the ballot images are created during 
tabulation but the image audit does not occur until well after the election, an 
attacker could modify the ballot images while they are in storage.
For ease of explication, the discussion that follows assumes that ballot images 
are created at the time of tabulation, in a single scan. The attack we develop 
targets a tabulation machine and manipulates each ballot online as it is scanned.
4 Methodology
To automatically modify ballot images, an attacker can take a few approaches. 
One approach would be to completely replace the ballot images with ballots 
filled in by the attacker. However, this risks being detected if many ballots have
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the same handwriting, and requires sneaking these relatively large data files into 
the election system without being detected. For these reasons, we investigate an 
alternative approach: automatically and selectively doctoring the ballot scans to 
change the vote selections they depict.
For the attack to work successfully, we need to move voter marks to other 
targets without creating visible artifacts or inconsistencies. We must be able to 
dynamically detect target areas and marks, alter marks in a way that is consistent 
with the voter’s other marks, and do so in a way that is undetectable to the 
human eye. However, there is a key insight that works in the adversary’s favor: 
an attacker seeking to alter election results does not have to be able to change 
all ballots undetectably, only sufficiently many to swing the result. This means 
that the attacker’s manipulation strategy is not required to be able to change 
every mark—it merely has to reliably detect which marks it can safely alter and 
change enough of them to decide the election result.
4.1 Reading the ballot
To interpret ballot information, we rely on the same techniques that ballot 
scanners use to convert paper ballots into digital representations. Attackers have 
access to the ballot templates, as jurisdictions publish sample ballots well ahead 
of scheduled elections. Using template matching, an attacker does not have to 
perform any kind of sophisticated character recognition, they simply have to find 
target areas and then detect which of the targets are filled.
Our procedure to read a ballot is illustrated in Figure 4. First, we perform 
template matching to extract each individual race within a ballot. Next, we 
use OpenCV’s [11] implementation of the Hough transform to detect straight 
lines that separate candidates and break the race into individual panes for each 
candidate. Notably, the first candidate in each race may have the race title and 
extra information in it (see Figure 4c), which is cropped out based on white 
space.
Target areas are typically printed on the ballot as either ovals or rectangles. 
To detect them, we construct a bounding box around the target by scanning 
horizontally from the left of the race and then vertically from the bottom up, 
and compute pixel density values. The bounds are set to the coordinates where 
the density values first increase and last decrease. Once we have detected all 
the target areas, we compute the average pixel density of the area within the 
bounding box to determine whether or not a target area is marked. We then use 
our template to convert marks into votes for candidates.
4.2 Changing marks
Once we have identified which candidate was marked by the voter, we can move 
the mark to one of the other target locations we identified. If the vote is for a 
candidate the attacker would like to receive fewer votes—or if it is not a vote for a 
candidate they would like to win—the attacker can simply swap the pixels within 
the bounding boxes of the voter’s marked candidate and an unmarked candidate.
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Fig. 4. Ballot manipulation algorithm — First, (a) we apply template matching to 
extract the race we intend to alter. Then, (b) we use Hough line transforms to separate 
each candidate. If the first candidate has a race title box, (c) we remove it by computing 
the pixel intensity differences across a straight line swept vertically from the bottom. 
For each candidate, (d) we identify the target and mark (if present) by doing four linear 
sweeps and taking pixel intensity. Finally, (e) we identify and move the mark. At each 
step we apply tests to detect and skip ballots where the algorithm might leave artifacts.
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Fig. 5. Automatically moving voter marks — UnclearBallot seamlessly moves 
marks to the attacker’s preferred candidate while preserving the voter’s marking style. 
It is effective for a wide variety of marks and ballot designs. In the examples above, 
original ballot scans are shown on the left and manipulated images on the right.
By moving marks on each ballot separately, we ensure that the voter’s particular 
style of filling in an oval is preserved and consistent across the ballot. Figure 5 
shows some marks swapped by our algorithm, and how the voters original mark 
is completely preserved in the process.
4.3 UnclearBallot
To illustrate the attack, we created UnclearBallot, a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation packaged as a malicious Windows scanner driver, which consists of 398 
lines of C++ and Python. We tested it with a Fujistu fi-7180 scanner (shown in 
Figure 6), which is federally certified for use in U.S. elections as part of Clear 
Ballot’s ClearVote system [43]. These scanners are typically used to handle small 
volumes of absentee ballots, and must be attached to a Windows workstation 
that runs the tabulation software.
The UnclearBallot driver wraps the stock scanner driver and alters images 
from the scanner before they reach the election management application. We 
chose this approach for simplicity, as the Windows driver stack is relatively easy
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Fig. 6. The Fujitsu fi-7180 scanner we
used to test our attack has been certified by
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for
use in voting systems. Our proof-of-concept
implementation is a malicious scanner driver
that alters ballots on the fly.
to work with, but the attack could also be implemented at other layers of the 
computing stack. For instance, it could be even harder to detect if implemented 
as a malicious change to the scanner’s embedded firmware. Alternatively, it could 
could be engineered as a modification to the tabulation software itself.
Once a ballot is scanned, the resulting bitmap is sent to our image processing 
software, which manipulates the ballot in the way described in Section 4.1. Prior 
to the election, the attacker specifies the ballot template, which race they would 
like to affect, and by how much. While ballots are being scanned, the software 
keeps a running tally of the actual ballot results, and changes ballot images on 
the fly to achieve the desired election outcome. To avoid detection, attackers can 
specify just enough manipulated images so that the race outcome is changed.
5 Evaluation
We evaluated the performance and effectiveness of UnclearBallot using two sets 
of experiments. In the first set of experiments, we marked different ballot styles 
by hand using types of marks taxonomized by Bajcsy et al. [2]. In the second set 
of experiments, we processed 181,541 ballots from the 2018 election in Clackamas 
County, Oregon.
5.1 Testing Across Ballot Styles
In order for our application to succeed at its goal (surreptitiously changing 
enough scanned ballots to achieve a chosen election outcome), it must be able 
to detect marks that constitute valid votes as well as distinguish marks which 
would be noticeable if moved. The marks in the latter case represent a larger set 
than just marginal marks, as they may indeed be completely valid votes, but 
considered invalid by our mark-moving algorithm. For example, if we were to 
swap the targets on a ballot where the user put a check through their target, we 
may leave a significant percentage of the check around the original target when 
swapping. The same applies for marked ballots where the filled in area extends 
into the candidate’s name, which could lead our algorithm to swap over parts of 
the candidate’s name when manipulating the image.
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Fig. 7. Ballots Styles — We tested ballot designs from five U.S. voting system vendors: 
Clear Ballot, Diebold, Dominion, ES&S, and Hart (two styles, eScan and Verity).
To detect anomalies for invalid ballots, we leverage the same intensity checking 
algorithm that first found the marked areas. The program checks if the width or 
height is abnormally large, which would indicate an overfilled target, as well as if 
there are too few or too many areas of high intensity, which would indicate no 
target or too many targets are filled out. If the program detects an invalid ballot, 
it will not be modified by the program.
To show our attack is replicable on a variety of different ballot styles, we 
modified our program to work on six different sample ballot styles, shown in 
Figure 7. The ballots we tested come from the four largest election vendors in 
the U.S. (ES&S, Hart InterCivic, Dominion, and Clear Ballot), as well as two 
older styles of ballots from Hart and Diebold.
Our first experiment was designed to characterize the technique’s effectiveness 
across a range of ballot styles and with both regular and marginal marks. We
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Ballot Style
Invalid Marks Valid Marks
Time/Success
Skipped Success Failure Skipped Success Failure
Clear Ballot 55 5 0 26 34 0 25 ms
Diebold 60 0 0 6 54 0 11 ms
Dominion 38 22 0 7 53 0 30 ms
ES&S 52 8 0 29 31 0 54 ms
Hart (eScan) 60 0 0 38 22 0 46 ms
Hart (Verity) 60 0 0 27 33 0 21 ms
Table 1. Performance of UnclearBallot — We tested how accurately our software 
could manipulate voter marks for a variety of ballot styles using equal numbers of invalid 
and valid marks. The table shows how often the system skipped a mark, successfully 
altered one, or erroneously created artifacts we deemed to be visible upon manual 
inspection. We also report the mean processing time for successfully manipulated races, 
excluding template matching.
prepared 720 marked contests, split evenly among the six ballot styles shown 
in Figure 7. For each style, we marked 60 contests with what Bajcsy [2] calls 
“Filled” marks, i.e. reliably detected marks that should be moved by our attack. 
We marked another 60 ballots in each ballot style with marginal marks, ten each 
for the five kinds of marginal marks shown in Figure 2 and ten empty marks.
Because the runtime of the template matching step of our algorithm is highly 
dependent on customization for the particular races on a ballot, we opted to 
skip it for this experiment. Rather than marking full ballots, we marked cropped 
races from each ballot style and then ran them through our program. We then 
manually checked to ensure that the races the program moved were not detectable 
by inspection. Results for these experiments are shown in Table 1.
Despite rejecting some valid ballots, our program is still able to confidently 
swap a majority of valid votes. In a real attack, only a small percentage of votes 
would need to actually be modified, a task easily accomplished by our program. 
Our program also correctly catches all votes that we have deemed invalid for 
swapping. This would make it unlikely to be detected in an image audit.
Dominion ballots saw a much higher rate of invalid mark moving, and Diebold 
and Dominion ballots saw a much higher rate of valid mark moving. This is 
likely due to the placement of targets: on the Dominion ballots, the mark is right 
justified, separating it significantly from candidate label information, as can be 
seen in Figure 7. Similarly, the Diebold ballot provides more space around the 
target and less candidate information that can be intercepted by marks, which 
would cause Unclear Ballot to skip moving the mark.
In an online attack scenario (such as if a human is waiting to see the output 
from the scanner), the attacker needs to be able to modify ballot scans quickly 
enough not to be noticed. Factors which might affect how quickly our program 
can process and manipulate ballots include ballot style, layout, and type of mark. 
During the accuracy experiment just described, we collected timing data for
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Fig. 8. Attacking Real Ballots — Using 181,541 images of voted ballots from Clacka-
mas County, Oregon, we attempted to change voters’ selections for the ballot measure
shown above. UnclearBallot determined that it could safely alter 34% of the ballots. For
reference, Measure 102 passed by a margin of 5%, well within range of manipulation [14].
We inspected 1,000 of them to verify that the manipulation left no obvious artifacts.
successfully manipulated ballot, and report the results in Table 1. The results
show that after the target race has been extracted, the algorithm completes
extremely quickly for all tested ballot styles. We present additional timing data
at the end of the following section.
5.2 Testing with Real Voted Ballots
To assess the effectiveness of UnclearBallot in a real election, we used a corpus
of scans of 181,541 real ballots from the November 6, 2018, General Election
in Clackamas County, Oregon, which were made available by Election Integrity
Oregon [18]. Like all of Oregon, Clackamas County uses vote-by-mail as its
primary voting method, and votes are centrally counted using optical scanners.
All images were Hart Verity-style ballots, as shown in Figure 7.
We selected a ballot measure that appeared on all the ballots (Figure 8) and
attempted to change each voter’s selection. UnclearBallot rejected 20,117 (11%)
of the ballots because it could not locate the target contest. We examined a
subset of the rejected ballots and found that they contained glitches introduced
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during scanning (such as vertical lines running the length of the ballot), which
interfered with the Hough transform.
To simulate a real attacker, we configured UnclearBallot with conservative
parameters, so that it would only modify marks when there was high confidence
that the alteration would not be noticeable. As a result, it would only manipulate
marks that were nearly perfectly filled in. In most cases, marks that were skipped
extended well beyond the target, but the program also skipped undervotes,
overvotes, or mislabeled scans. Under these parameters, the program altered the
target contest in 62,400 (34%) of the ballot images.
Two authors independently inspected a random sample of 1,000 altered ballots
to check whether any contained artifacts that would be noticeable to an attentive
observer. Such artifacts might include marks which were unnaturally cut off,
visible discontinuities in pixel darkness (i.e. dark lines around moved marks),
and so on. If these artifacts were seen during an audit, officials might recheck all
of the physical ballots and reverse the effects of the attack. None of the altered
ballots we inspected contained noticeable evidence of manipulation.
We also collected timing data while processing Clackamas County ballots.
Running on a system with a 4-core Intel E3-1230 CPU running at 3.40 GHz with
64 GB of RAM, UnclearBallot took an average of 279 ms to process each ballot.
For reference, Hart’s fastest central scanner’s maximum scan rate is one ballot
per 352 ms [37], well above the time needed to carry out our attack.
These results show that UnclearBallot can successfully and efficiently manip-
ulate ballot images to change real voters’ marks. Moreover, the alterations likely
would be undetectable to human auditors who examined only the ballot images.
6 Discussion and Mitigations
UnclearBallot demonstrates the need for a software-independent evidence trail
against which election results can be checked. It shows that audits based on
software which is independent from the rest of the election system is still not
software independent. To date, the only robust and secure election technology
that is widely used is optical-scan paper ballots with risk-limiting audits based
on a robust, well-maintained, physical audit trail. However, image audits are not
useless, and here we discuss uses for them as well as potential mitigations for our
attack.
Uses for image audits. So long as image audits are not the sole mechanism for
verifying election results, they do provide substantial benefits to election officials.
Using an image audit vastly simplifies some functions of election administration,
like ballot adjudication in cases where marks cannot be interpreted by scanners
or are otherwise ambiguous. Image audits can be used to efficiently identify and
document election discrepancies, as has occurred in Maryland where nearly 2,000
ballots were discovered missing from the audit trail in 2016 [28]. Image audits also
identified a flaw in the ES&S DS850 high speed scanner, where it was causeing
some ballots to stick together and feed two at a time [29].
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Another way to utilize image audits is a transitive audit. Methods like
SOBA [8] seek to construct an audit trail using all available means of election
evidence, rooting the audit in some verification of physical record. By using
physical records to verify other records, like CVRs or ballot images, confidence in
election outcomes can be transitively passed on to non-physical audit trails. The
drawback with this kind of audit is that it usually requires the same level of work
as an RLA, plus whatever work is needed to validate the other forms of evidence.
However, since ballot image audits already require a low amount of effort, they
may augment RLAs and provide better transparency into the auditing process.
Image audits are an augmentation and a convenience for election adminis-
tration, however, and should not be viewed as a security tool. Only physical
examination of paper ballots, as in a risk-limiting audit, can provide a necessary
level of mitigation to manipulated election results.
End-to-end (E2E) systems. Voting systems with rigorous integrity properties
and tamper resistance such as Scantegrity [12] and Preˆt a` Voter [35] provide a
defense to UnclearBallot. In Scantegrity, when individuals mark their ballots, a
confirmation code is revealed that is tied to the selected candidate. This enables
a voter to verify that their ballot collected-as-cast and counted-as-collected, as
they can look up their ballot on a public bulletin board. Since each mark reveals
a unique code, moving the mark would match the code with the wrong candidate,
so voters would be unable to verify their ballots. If enough voters complain, this
might result in our attack being detected.
Preˆt a` Voter randomizes the candidate order on each ballot, which creates a
slightly higher barrier for our attack, as an additional template matching step
would be needed to ascertain candidate order. More importantly, the candidate
list is physically separated from the voter’s marks upon casting the ballot, so
malware which could not keep track of the correct candidate order could not
successfully move marks to a predetermined candidate. Since the candidate order
is deciphered via a key-sharing scheme, malicious software would have to infect a
significant portion of the election system and act in a highly coordinated way to
reconstruct candidate ordering. Moreover, as with Scantegrity, votes are published
to a public bulletin board, so any voter could discover if their vote had not been
correctly recorded.
Other E2E systems which make use of optical scanning and a bulletin board,
like STAR-Vote [6], Scratch and Vote [1], and VeriScan [7], are similarly protected
from attacks like UnclearBallot.
Other mitigations. Outside of E2E, there may be other heuristic mitigations
that can be easily implemented even in deployed voting systems to make our
attack somewhat more difficult. As mentioned above, randomizing candidate
order on each ballot increases the computation required to perform our attack.
Voters drawing outside the bubbles can also defeat our attack, though this might
also result in their votes not counting and may be circumvented by replacing the
whole race on the ballot image with a substituted one. Collecting ballot images
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from a different source than the tabulator makes our attack more difficult, as
votes now have to be changed in two places. Other standard computer security
technologies, like secure file systems, could be used to force the attacker to alter
ballot images in a way that also circumvents protections like encryption and
permissions.
Detection. Technologies that detect image manipulation may also provide some
mitigation. Techniques like those discussed in [3–5, 38], among others, could be
adapted to try to automatically detect moved marks on ballots. However, as
noted by Farid [19], image manipulation detection is a kind of arms race: given a
fixed detection algorithm, adversaries can very likely find a way to defeat it. In
our context, an attacker with sufficient access to the voting system to implant a
manipulation algorithm would likely also be able to to steal the detector code.
The attacker could improve the manipulation algorithm or simply use the detector
as part of their mark-moving calculus: if moving a mark will trip the detector,
an attacker can simply opt not to move the mark.
While a fixed and automatic procedure for detecting manipulation can provide
little assurance, it remains possible that an adaptive approach to detection could
be a useful part of a post-election forensics investigation. However, staying one
step ahead of sophisticated adversaries would require an ongoing research program
to advance the state of the art in detection methods.
A less costly and more dependable way to detect ballot manipulation detection
would be to use a software independent audit trail to confirm election outcomes.
This can be accomplished with risk-limiting audits, and the software independence
enabled by RLAs provides other robust security properties to elections, including
defending against other potential attacks on tabulation equipment and servers.
Future work. We have only focused on simple-majority elections here, because
those are the kinds of elections used by jurisdictions that do image audits. Audits
of more complex election methods, like instant-runoff voting or D’Hondt, have
been examined to some extent [36, 41], but future work is needed into audits of
these kinds of elections altogether. Because the marks made in these elections are
different than the kind we’ve discussed here, manipulating these ballot images
may not be able to employ the same image processing techniques we have used.
Additionally it may be difficult for malware to know how many marks it needs
to move, since margins in complex elections are difficult to compute. We leave
exploration of image manipultion of these elections to future work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated an attack that defeats ballot image audits of
the type performed in some jurisdictions. We presented an implementation using
a real scanner, and evaluated our implementation against a set of real ballots
and a set of systematically marked ballots from a variety of ballot styles. Our
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attack shows that image audits cannot be relied upon to verify that elections are
free from computer-based interference. Indeed, the only currently known way to
verify an election outcome is with direct examination of physical ballots.
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Abstract. We consider the case of manipulating the results of Instant Runoff
Voting (IRV) elections. Previous work in this area looked at posthoc manipulation
with complete information, where the manipulator may alter ballots after reading
the whole election profile. In this paper we examine the much more realistic, but
challenging, problem of manipulating ballots during the election process, having
observed only some ballots. The aim of the manipulator is to modify as few bal-
lots as possible to ensure their candidate’s victory with high probability. We show
that this it quite feasible in practice to generate efficient manipulations with a high
probability of success. We also add some extra conditions on the manipulations
to it less likely they will be detected by naive methods.
1 Introduction
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), also known as Alternative Vote (AV), is a system of prefer-
ential voting in which voters rank candidates in order of preference. Tallying proceeds
by eliminating the least popular candidate and redistributing their votes to the next-
preferred candidate—see Section 2 for a precise algorithm. It is used in presidential,
parliamentary and local government elections in countries such as Australia, Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, Ireland, Bosnia/Herzogovinia, the UK and United States [6].
IRV elections can be complicated—an early alteration in the elimination order can
cascade into an entirely different election result. It is NP-hard even to compute the true
margin of victory [7]. But the hard examples are somewhat contrived, and real elections
follow patterns which make it relatively easy in practice to compute both margins [5, 3]
and successful manipulations [2]. However, prior work has required complete informa-
tion about all the votes cast in the election. In contrast, the related problem of manipu-
lating ones own vote to increase the likelihood of a desired outcome has been studied
in the context of both full and partial knowledge of the preferences of other voters [4] .
In this work, we examine for the first time whether an attacker with only partial
information can devise a successful manipulation with a high probability of success.
This models a realistic attacker (such as a corrupt scanner or voting machine) who must
generate manipulated electronic records on the fly after reading only a few of them.
The problem we consider is known as ‘election control by replacing voters’ in the com-
putational social choice literature. We find that it remains easy to generate successful
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manipulations, though of course success is not guaranteed. Our emphasis is on practical
attacks in a realistic setting. We do not prove optimality nor a bound on the probability
of success, but we demonstrate successful practical attacks by simulating the algorithm
on state election data from Australia. We also examine a number of ways the attacker
could refine the manipulation to be less likely to raise suspicion.
We assume the adversary has sufficient access to the election system to read ballots
as they are received, and to modify each ballot before it is recorded. Unlike in prior
work [2], our adversary cannot modify ballot recordings once made, but must perform
manipulations based on the partial sample seen so far. This models a man-in-the-middle
attack where ballots are intercepted between the voter and the final counting, and altered
by the adversary. It is precisely the attacker model of a corrupted scanning process in
which scanned ballots must be immediately output, but may be misrecorded on the
fly. It is also appropriate for an e-voting process with immutable logs, in which the
manipulated votes must be written immediately onto the log and cannot later be altered.
We look at an adversary that computes some manipulation rules to apply at periodic
intervals, after they have seen some ballots scanned through. The attacker succeeds if
their desired candidate wins. We compare a number of ways of generating the rules,
and how effective they are at actually achieving a desired winner change. We find that
if the adversary sees the first quarter or half of the votes then, with a few seconds of
computation, it can compute a manipulation close to the optimal, and then apply it to
the next 3/4 or half of the votes with a success probability usually higher than 90%.
Avoiding suspicion The last round margin (LRM) of an IRV election – the difference in
tallies of the final two remaining candidates, divided by two and rounded up – is com-
monly used as an indicator of how close the election was. Blom et al. [3] have shown
that the true margin of victory (MOV) of the election – the smallest number of votes
one would have to alter to change who won the election – is generally equal to the last
round margin, but not always. In some cases, the MOV can be much smaller than the
last round margin. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) use the “margin be-
tween the two leading candidates” after all remaining candidates have been eliminated,
and their preferences distributed, to determine whether an automatic recount of cast
votes should be automatically performed.1 In practice, the LRM plays a major role in
determining whether further scrutiny of the outcome is performed.
Our first suspicion-avoiding extension is for the adversary to generate manipula-
tions that result in a large last-round margin. The adversary wants to alter the smallest
number of electronic records so that their desire of changing the outcome is realised,
while at the same time ensuring that the last round margin of the manipulated election
is larger than a given threshold. Another important way of avoiding suspicion is to min-
imize changes in first preferences. This is significant because, in preferential elections,
first-preference tallies are often manually counted in a polling place independently of
the scanning process. Modifying first preferences is therefore much more likely to be
detected than other alterations. We find, surprisingly, that this constraint usually makes
an insignificant difference to the number of ballots that need to be changed. A clever
1 https://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/candidates/files/hor-recount-policy.pdf. The AEC definition
of a “margin” is the difference in tallies of two candidates (not divided by two).
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Initially, all candidates remain standing (are not eliminated)
While there is more than one candidate standing
For every candidate c standing
Tally (count) the votes in which c is the highest-ranked
candidate of those standing
Eliminate the candidate with the smallest tally
The winner is the one candidate not eliminated
Fig. 1: The IRV vote tallying process: the candidate with the smallest tally is repeatedly
eliminated, with the ballots in their tally redistributed according to their next preference.
surreptitious manipulation is almost as easy as an obvious one. These attacks would be
defeated if a rigorous risk-limiting audit was applied. The trick with LRMs would be
defeated by a careful computation of the true MOV [3]. The purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate that these rigorous methods are necessary, because an active adversary can
defeat heuristic methods of assessing when to re-examine an election result.
Our contributions Using the Australian New South Wales (NSW) 2015 Legislative As-
sembly election as a case study, we simulate the attack by randomly determining the
order in which ballots arrive at the scanner, computing a best-guess manipulation at pe-
riodic intervals, and then applying that manipulation to later ballots as they are scanned.
We then compare the outcome of the modified election to that of the unmodified election
to see whether the manipulation succeeded.
We report the number of ballots that this adversary needs to modify, and the num-
ber of first preferences on ballots they need to modify, in order to have a high chance
of altering the election outcome, assuming that the proportion of the ballots they saw
before computing the manipulation were a random sample of all ballots.
2 Preliminaries and prior work
Votes are tallied in an IRV election in a series of rounds (see Figure 1). In each round,
the candidate with the smallest number of votes (their tally) is eliminated, with the last
remaining candidate declared the winner. All votes in an eliminated candidate’s tally
are distributed to the next most-preferred (remaining) candidate in their ranking.
We denote an IRV election, with a set of candidates C, as B. A sequence of candi-
dates pi is represented in list notation (e.g., pi = [c1, c2, c3, c4], which means that c1 is
the highest preference, c2 the next-preferred, and so on). Such sequences represent both
votes and the order in which candidates are eliminated. An election B is defined as a
multiset2 of votes, each vote b ∈ B a sequence of candidates in C, with no duplicates,
listed in order of preference (most preferred to least). The first candidate appearing in a
sequence pi is denoted first(pi) (e.g., first([c2, c3]) = c2). In each round of vote count-
ing, there are a current set of eliminated candidates E and a current set of candidates
still standing S = C \ E . The winner cw of the election is the last standing candidate.
2 A multiset allows for the inclusion of duplicate items.
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Our definitions for a candidate’s tally, the margin of victory (MOV), and last round
margin (LRM) of an IRV election are replicated from [2].
Definition 1. Tally tS(c) Given candidates S ⊆ C are still standing in an election B,
the tally for candidate c ∈ C, denoted tS(c), is defined as the number of votes b ∈ B
for which c is the most-preferred candidate of those remaining.3 Let pS(b) denote the
sequence of candidates mentioned in b that are also in S.
tS(c) = | [b ∈ B | c = first(pS(b))] | (1)
Definition 2. Margin of Victory (MOV) The MOV in an election B with candidates
C and winner cw ∈ C, is the smallest number of votes in B whose ranking must be
modified (by an adversary) so that a candidate c′ ∈ C \ {cw} is elected.
Definition 3. Last Round Margin (LRM) The LRM of an election B, in which two
candidates S = {c, c′} remain with tS(c) and tS(c′) votes in their tallies, is equal to
half the difference between the tallies of c and c′ rounded up.
LRM =
⌈ |tS(c)− tS(c′)|
2
⌉
(2)
In the design of our adversary, we consider the concept of an elimination margin
(EM) – the margin by which a candidate is eliminated in a given round. We find that a
manipulator can be much more effective when controlling the elimination margin of the
two runner-ups (the candidate eliminated just prior to the runner-up, and the runner-up
themselves) rather than just the LRM of the runner-up and winner. In settings where
there is a genuine three candidate race for winner, successful manipulations typically
require the elimination of a specific candidate in third place whose preferences will
mostly flow to the desired winner. Consider a manipulation designed to elect a candidate
a with a certain margin, but where tallies of the candidates up for elimination in that
crucial third place position are similar. Given uncertainty in what types of ballots a
manipulator will see as it is changing votes on the fly, it is likely to be more successful it
aims to eliminate the required candidate in third place with a larger elimination margin.
Definition 4. Elimination Margin (EM) The EM in a round of counting i, in which
candidate ci is eliminated and candidates S \{ci} are still standing, is equal to half the
smallest difference in tallies between tS(ci) and tS(c′) for c′ ∈ S \ {ci} rounded up.
EMi = min
c′∈S\{ci}
⌈
tS(c′)− tS(ci)
2
⌉
(3)
Example 1. Consider the election with ballots shown in Table 1(a). The true election
result is shown in Table 1(b), with c the winner with a last round margin of 13. The
margin of victory is actually only 5. Changing five ballots from [c, a] to [b, c] results the
totals shown in Table 1(e). In this election a wins as shown in Table 1(f). In the true
election, b is eliminated with an EM of d9/2e = 5 votes, and a with an EM of 13. uunionsq
3 Square brackets have been used to denote a multiset.
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Table 1: IRV example, with (a) the number of votes cast with each listed ranking over
candidates a, b, c, and (b) tallies after each round of vote counting (c) the ballot count
25% into the election and the estimated complete election (d) the tallies of each round
of vote counting in the estimated election (e) the number of votes recorded after manip-
ulation, and (f) the tallies after each round of vote counting in the manipulated election
Ranking Count B
[a] 55
[c, a] 30
[b, c] 36
[c] 15
Candidate Round 1 Round 2
a 55 55
b 36 —
c 45 81
(a) (b)
Ranking Partial Count BT Estimated Completion Bˆ
[a] 11 44
[c, a] 9 36
[b, c] 10 40
[c] 4 16
Candidate Round 1 Round 2
a 44 44
b 36 —
c 52 88
(c) (d)
Ranking Manipulated Count
[a] 55
[c, a] 25
[b, c] 41
[c] 15
Candidate Round 1 Round 2
a 55 80
b 41 41
c 40 —
(e) (f)
2.1 Modifying an Election Outcome
In this paper we make use of algorithms for determining minimal manipulations of IRV
elections in order to change their outcome, developed by Blom et al [2]. They consider
the case where all recorded ballots can be manipulated after they have all been scanned.
This is clearly a necessary starting point for determining a more restricted manipulation.
These algorithms are based on the margin-irv algorithm for computing the true
MOV of an IRV election. A description of margin-irv can be found in Blom et al.
[3]. We summarise the algorithm in this section, and explain how it can be modified to
compute the smallest number of vote changes required to: (i) bring about a change in
the outcome of the election; (ii) produce a manipulated election with certain properties,
modelled as side constraints; and (iii) produce a manipulated election that minimises
discrepancies between a manual hand count of first preference tallies (based on non-
manipulated paper ballots) and the first preference tallies of the manipulated election.
The margin-irv algorithm Consider an IRV election B with candidates C and winner
w ∈ C. The margin-irv algorithm starts by adding |C| − 1 partial elimination sequences
to a search tree, one for each of alternate or desired winner c ∈ C \ {w}. These partial
sequences form a frontier F , with each sequence containing a single candidate – an
alternate winner. Note that a partial sequence [a, b, c] represents an election outcome
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in which a and b are the last two candidates eliminated, and c the winner. All other
candidates are assumed to have been eliminated in some prior round.
An adversary is likely to to have a desired winner a 6= w. We can modify margin-
irv by initializing the frontier F with the single sequence [a]. Then it only considers
election sequences where a wins. The same idea is used by Blom et al. [1].
For each partial sequence pi ∈ F , we compute a lower bound on the number of vote
changes required to realise an elimination sequence that ends in pi. These lower bounds
are used to guide construction of the search tree, and are computed by both solving an
Integer Linear Program (ILP), and applying several rules for lower bound computation.
These rules are described in Blom et al. [3]. The ILP, denoted DISTANCETO, computes
a lower bound on the smallest number of vote changes required to transform the elec-
tion B, with an elimination sequence pi′, to one with an elimination sequence that ends
in pi. When applied to a complete order pi, containing all candidates, DISTANCETO
exactly computes the smallest number of votes changes required to realise the out-
come pi. The largest of the lower bounds computed by the rules of Blom et al. [3] and
the DISTANCETO ILP is assigned to each partial sequence pi as it is added to F . The
DISTANCETO ILP is defined in Section 2.2. To enforce additional constraints on the
nature of any manipulated election, we add these constraints to each ILP solved.
The partial sequence pi ∈ F with the smallest assigned lower bound is selected and
expanded. For each c ∈ C that is not already present in pi, we create a new sequence
with c appended to the front. For example, given a set of candidates e, f, and g, with
winning candidate g, the partial sequence pi = [f ] will be expanded to create two new
sequences [e, f ] and [g, f ]. We evaluate each new sequence pi′ by assigning it a lower
bound on the number of votes required to realise any elimination order ending in pi′.
While exploring and building elimination sequences, margin-irv maintains a run-
ning upper bound on the value of the true margin. Without any side constraints designed
to inject desirable properties into a manipulated election, this upper bound is initialised
to the last round margin of the original election. To enforce additional constraints on
the properties of any manipulated election, we need to manipulate at least as many, and
often more, votes than required to simply change the original outcome. Consequently,
we must set the upper bound maintained by margin-irv to a higher value. In this context,
we set the initial upper bound to the total number of votes cast in the election. This is
clearly always a correct upper bound on any manipulation.
When a sequence pi containing all candidates is constructed, the DISTANCETO ILP
computes the exact number of vote manipulations required to realise it, while satisfying
all desired side constraints. If this number is lower than our current upper bound, the
upper bound is revised, and all orders in F with a lower bound greater than or equal to
it are pruned from consideration (removed from F ). This process continues until F is
empty (we have considered or pruned all possible alternate elimination sequences). The
final value of the running upper bound is the true electoral MOV (with side constraints).
2.2 DISTANCETO with Side Constraints
We now present the DISTANCETO Integer Linear Program (ILP) used to compute lower
bounds on the degree of manipulation required to realise an election outcome ending in
a given candidate sequence, and the (exact) smallest number of vote changes required
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to realise a given (complete) alternate elimination sequence. This ILP, without added
side constraints, was originally presented by Magrino et al. [5].
We consider additional side constraints to inject desirable properties into any ma-
nipulated election, and describe how we can minimise both the total number of vote
changes required to elect a desired winner, and the total changes made to first prefer-
ence tallies between the true and manipulated election profiles.
Let R denote the set of possible (partial and total) rankings R of candidates C that
could appear on a vote, NR the number of votes cast with ranking R ∈ R, and N the
total number of votes cast. LetRj,i denote the subset of rankings (Rj,i ⊂ R) in which
cj is the most preferred candidate still standing (i.e., that will count toward cj’s tally) at
the start of round i (in which ci is eliminated). For each R ∈ R, we define variables:
qR integer number of votes to be changed into R;
mR integer number of votes with ranking R in the unmodified
election to be changed into something other than R; and
yR number of votes in the modified election with ranking R.
Given a partial or complete order pi, the DISTANCETO ILP is:
min
∑
R∈R
qR (4)
NR + qR −mR = yR ∀R ∈ R (5)∑
R∈R
qR =
∑
R∈R
mR (6)∑
R∈Ri,i
yR ≤
∑
R∈Rj,i
yR ∀ci, cj ∈ pi . i < j (7)
n ≥ yR ≥ 0, NR ≥ mR ≥ 0, qR ≥ 0 ∀R ∈ R (8)
Constraint (5) states that the number of votes with ranking R ∈ R in the new
election is equal to the sum of those with this ranking in the unmodified election and
those whose ranking has changed to R, minus the number of votes whose ranking has
been changed from R. Constraint (7) defines a set of special elimination constraints
which force the candidates in pi to be eliminated in the stated order. Constraint (6)
ensures that the total number of votes cast in the election does not change as a result of
the manipulation. The objective minimises the total number of ballot changes required
to manipulate the election and enforce a desired elimination sequence.
The above ILP does not include any additional side constraints – properties that
we want the manipulated election to satisfy besides resulting in a different winner to
that of the original election. Manipulated elections found by margin-irv in this setting
are almost always evidently close, with a last round margin of 0 or 1 vote. This makes
sense as the algorithm is trying to manipulate as few votes as possible, breaking any ties
in favour of an alternate outcome. An adversary with the ability to modify electronic
records of cast votes, however, will want to create a manipulated election that is not
evidently close. An election with a tie in the final round of counting, or a difference of
several votes in the tallies of the final two remaining candidates, is likely to be closely
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scrutinised. Australian IRV elections in which the final tallies of the last two candidates
differ by less than 100 votes, for example, trigger an automatic recount.
Given the widespread use of the last round margin as the indicator of how close an
IRV election is, rather than the true MOV of the election, our adversary can use this
to their advantage. Consider a candidate elimination sequence pi, containing at least n
candidates from a set C. Let the last n candidates in the sequence pi be denoted by ck,
ck+1, . . ., ck+n, with ck+n denoting the winning candidate according to pi. Adding the
following side constraint to DISTANCETO ensures that margin by which each candidate
ci for k ≤ i ≤ k + n− 1 is eliminated (the EM, Definition 4) is at least ∆ votes. This
allows us to ensure that both the last round margin of the manipulated election, and the
elimination margin of any number of prior rounds, is at least a certain size.∑
R∈Ri,i
yR ≤
∑
R∈Rj,i
yR + 2∆ ∀i ∈ {k, . . . , k + n− 1} (9)
An important side constraint we will make use in the design of our manipulators
is limiting the manipulation. Since in our scenario the attacker will modify ballots in
the middle of the election its important that we calculate manipulations that do not
remove ballots already recorded. Suppose CR is the number of ballots already recorded
for ranking R. We must ensure that the modified election has at least CR ballots with
ranking R, since they cannot be changed. Adding the following constraint ensures this.
yR ≥ CR ∀R ∈ R (10)
2.3 Minimising Change to First Preference Counts
To both minimise discrepancies between any manual count of first preference tallies,
and that computed by counting software applied to a manipulated election, we solve the
DISTANCETO ILP of Section 2.2 twice for each complete elimination sequence pi.
For every such pi that margin-irv encounters (these are the leaves of the generated
search tree), we first solve the ILP with an objective to minimise first preference tally
discrepancies. Let tC(c) denote the first preference tallies of each candidate c ∈ C. The
first preference tally for candidate c ∈ C in any solution of our ILP, t′C(c), is given by:
t′C(c) =
∑
R∈R.c=first(R)
yR (11)
Let FPD denote the total number of first preference tally discrepancies between
any manipulated profile found by DISTANCETO ILP, and the true election profile of the
original election (Equation 12). For each complete candidate elimination sequence pi,
containing all candidates, we first solve the DISTANCETO ILP with the objective shown
in Equation 13. Let fpd denote the value of FPD in the optimal solution found when
solving DISTANCETO with this objective. We then constrain the ILP to ensure that any
subsequently found solutions must satisfy the constraint in Equation 14.
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FPD =
∑
c∈C
|tC(c)− t′C(c)| (12)
min FPD (13)
FPD ≤ fpd (14)
We re-solve our DISTANCETO ILP with the objective shown in Equation 4 – to
minimise total ballot changes given the constraint limiting permitted change to first
preference counts. The result is a manipulated election profile that first aims to minimise
the total number of discrepancies between the true and manipulated elections, as a first
priority, and the total number of ballot changes as a second.
3 Manipulation Algorithms
We consider a setting in which all ballots are assumed to be scanned at a central location,
and the resulting electronic records passed into counting software that computes the
result of the election. We assume the scanner has been compromised, and the attacker
is able to manipulate (change) the ranking on the electronic record of ballots at the
moment they are scanned. Alternatively, we can also consider a setting where votes
are scanned at disparate locations, but the attacker is able to intercept and modify the
scanned record before it is passed to the counting software. In both cases the attacker
manipulates the record of ballots before they are used for counting. In either case, first
preference counts may have been completed manually at polling booths and/or at the
central scanning location. We assume the attacker has some reasonable estimate of the
total number of ballotsE expected in the election. Note that in places like Australia with
compulsory voting the expected number of ballots E is known with high confidence,
in other jurisdictions there will be more variance. Across all experiments in which we
simulate our manipulators, we use E = |B| where B is the historical set of ballots.
The algorithm applied by our manipulators is as follows. The parameter α, deter-
mining how often the attacker computes a set of manipulation rules, and k, the number
of rounds on which to apply an elimination margin constraint, are given as input.
1. Let E be the expected number of ballots for the election. Let n = dαEe be a
proportion α of this expected number of votes.
2. Collect the first n ballots BT , passing them on to the counting software unmanipu-
lated. Let BM = BT , the current profile of the manipulated election.
3. Compute an approximate complete election profile Bˆ by extending the (manipu-
lated) ballots BM processed so far with ballots uniformly drawn from the set of
true (unmanipulated) ballots seen so far BT .
4. Use the methods of [2] to determine a minimal manipulationM of Bˆ in order to
achieve the desired winner with an EM of ∆ applied to the last k rounds. Note that
this manipulation may be null if the desired winner already win Bˆ by ∆.
5. Examining the minimal manipulation made inM and the assumed unseen ballots
U = Bˆ − BM, determine a set of manipulation rules R which will ensure that
applyingR to U will result in manipulationM.
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6. Intercept the next n ballots. If an incoming ballot bmatches one of the manipulation
rules, r ∈ R, replace b by r(b) before passing it on to the counting software.
7. Let BT be the true ballots seen so far. Let BM be the manipulated ballots processed
so far – the current state of the manipulated election profile. If all ballots have been
processed, the algorithm is complete, otherwise we return to step 3.
We now examine the individual steps in the approach in detail.
Completing an Election At any given point during the scanning of ballots, our ad-
versary has seen a proportion δ of the total number of expected ballots, E. The ma-
nipulated election profile at this point contains δE ballots. Some of these ballots have
been manipulated (altered from their true state), and others have been left unchanged.
To compute a set of manipulation rules to apply to future ballots, the adversary needs
to estimate what a complete election profile could look like (i.e., a profile containing
the current set of manipulated ballots, and an estimate of future ballots). Let Bˆ denote
this estimated profile. To compute Bˆ, we start with the current set of ballots in BM and
add E − |BM| further ballots. These additional ballots are drawn uniformly at random
(with replacement) from BT – the set of ballots, unmodified, that have been seen so far.
Each sampled ballot is added to Bˆ.
Example 2. Suppose the first quarter of ballots of the election in Table 1(a), BT , is as
shown in Table 1(c). Then an estimation of the complete election Bˆmight be determined
as shown in the same table. The result of the estimated election is shown in Table 1(d).
Candidate c remains the winner with a LRM of 22. uunionsq
Computing a Manipulation We consider two methods of computing a set of manip-
ulation rules to apply to future scanned ballots, given an estimate of what the eventual
election profile could look like, Bˆ, assuming the adversary makes no further changes.
Each method first simulates the outcome of Bˆ to determine whether any further manip-
ulation is needed. If the desired candidate wins, no manipulation rules are generated.
Otherwise, a set of rules indicating what kind of ballots to look for during the scanning
process, and what to replace them with when they are seen, are formed. When a rule is
followed by either of our manipulators, that rule is removed from their rule set.
Our first method for generating such rules uses margin-irv, as described in Section
2.1, to determine a minimal manipulation M of the election Bˆ so that the candidate
selected by the attacker wins. Note that we add the side constraints of Eq (10) where
CR = |{r | r ∈ BM, r = R}| is the current count of ballots of the form R.
We then translate this minimal manipulation into a set of rules for the attacker to
follow. Our second method does not compute a minimal manipulation of Bˆ, but simply
computes the difference between final tallies of the eventual winner w, and the desired
winner w′, ∆w,w′ . The adversary will seek to remove d∆w,w′/2e votes in which w is
preferenced first, and replace them with a vote in which w′ is preferenced first.
Example 3. Imagine the attacker wants candidate a to win with a last round margin of
20. One such manipulation (certainly not the minimal one) is to change the ballots to
sum to the counts in Table 1(e) which results in election shown in Table 1(f).
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The manipulation needs to remove one [c] vote and 11 [c, a] votes and add one [b, c]
vote and 11 [a] votes, to end with these tallies from the estimated completion Bˆ. uunionsq
MOV-based Manipulator A minimal manipulationM found by margin-irv specifies,
for each type of ballot R ∈ R, the number of ballots of that type that should be added
to or removed from the election profile to achieve a desired elimination sequence pi. The
manipulation M simply records for each ranking R of candidates: how many ballots
are modified qR to take on the new ranking R, and how many ballots with ranking R
are modified mR to show a different ranking. Its not possible that both qR and mR are
non-zero for the sameR, otherwise there is a smaller manipulation with the same effect.
In order for such a manipulation to be found in a reasonable time frame, the ILP of
Section 2.2 operates over equivalence classes of ballot rankings, R˜, rather than all pos-
sible rankings over a set of candidates C, R. Given an elimination sequence to achieve,
pi, each ranking in R is reduced to a ballot class in R˜. The original ranking is reduced
by removing all candidates that would be eliminated by the time that ballot could pos-
sibly be placed in their tally. All ballots in the same class will move between the tally
piles of the same set of candidates, at the same times. For example, consider an election
with candidates a, b, c, and d, and a desired elimination sequence pi = [a,c,d,b]. Ballots
with rankings [c,a,b,d], [c,b,a], and [c,a,b], are reduced to the equivalent class [c,b].
The minimal manipulationM found by margin-irv defines: a candidate elimination
sequence to be achieved, pi, in which the desired winner is victorious; a set of ballots
D, in equivalence class form, to remove from Bˆ; and a set of ballots A, in equivalence
class form, to add to Bˆ. For each ballot to add to the profile, there is a ballot to remove
– leaving the total number of cast ballots unchanged (i.e., |A| = |D|).
Our MOV-based manipulator creates a manipulation rule for every ballot in D. For
the ith ballot in D, di, a rule of the form:
reducepi(b) = di → ai
is formed, stating that if the manipulator sees a ballot b with a ranking that could be
reduced to the equivalence class di (assuming the eventual elimination sequence will
be pi), this ballot should be replaced with the ith ballot in A, ai.
Example 4. The elimination order desired by the attacker is pi = [c, b, a]. The equiva-
lence classes of the seen ballot types are [a], [c, a], [b] and [c] respectively. The manip-
ulation in terms of these equivalence classes is +11[a], −11[c, a], +1[b] and −1[c]. We
end up with 12 rules: 11 copies of [c, a]→ [a] and 1 copy of [c]→ [b].
If we perform the manipulation on the actual remaining ballots we will find enough
ballots to change resulting in a final manipulated count BM of [a] : 66, [c, a] : 19,
[b, c] : 37 and [c] : 14. The election will first eliminate c and then b with a winning with
an LRM of 24. Because the initial ballots were less favorable to the attackers candidate
than in the full election the manipulation is larger than required. uunionsq
First Preference Manipulator Recall that our first preference manipulator seeks to
take ∆w,w′ ballots (divided by two and rounded up) in which a candidate w is prefer-
enced first, and replace them with a ballot in which candidate w′ is preferenced first.
This manipulator creates d∆w,w′/2e rules of the form:
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[w, . . .]→ [w′]
The pattern on the left hand side of this rule matches all ballots in which candidate w is
preferenced first. Such ballots are replaced by the ballot [w′] containing a single prefer-
ence for w′. If the manipulator is seeking to achieve a last round margin of a given size,
∆, it creates d∆w,w′/2e+∆ rules of the above form. Note that this naive manipulator
is able to influence the last round margin of an election, but not the elimination margin
of losing candidates in prior rounds. The manipulation is also heuristic – there is no
guarantee that it will result in a desired winner, as it does not consider how preferences
might flow between candidates. For example, robbing the original winner of some of
their primary vote may result in their early elimination, distributing enough votes to
cause an alternate candidate c 6= w′ to win. The MOV-based manipulator has more
control over potential outcomes as it can alter the later preferences on each ballot.
Example 5. The difference in tallies between the actual winner c of the estimated elec-
tion Bˆ and the desired winner a is 44. The first preference manipulator then requires
moving 22 + 20 votes from c to a in order to attain a LRM of 20 for a. The manipula-
tion is then 42 copies of [c, . . .]→ [a].
When we apply this manipulation to the actual ballots we find there are only 21
[c, a] and 11 [c] votes arriving in the remainder of the election which are all converted
to [a] votes. The final manipulated count is [a] : 87, [c, a] : 9, [b, c] : 36, [c] : 4. The
winner is a with a LRM of 30 over b. These rather gross manipulations may bring the
election result into question, since the final tallies are far from the actual tallies. uunionsq
4 Results and Conclusions
We take the cast ballot data available for 5 seats of the Australian New South Wales
(NSW) 2015 Legislative Assembly election, and simulate the use of our first prefer-
ence and more intelligent MOV-based manipulators. The goal of each manipulator is
to bring about the election of a specific candidate. For each type of manipulator, we
simulate its application in each seat over 100 trials. In each trial, the order which the
cast ballots arrive at the scanner is randomised. We compute, over the 100 trials: the
average number of ballot changes made by the manipulator; the average total change
in first preference tallies resulting from the manipulations; the number of simulations
in which the manipulator achieved its desired winner, and achieved its desired winner
with a last round margin sufficient to avoid an automatic recount; and the average num-
ber of manipulation rules generated by the manipulator after the processing of each
αE batch of ballots. The latter statistic corresponds to the average number of intended
manipulations the adversary still expects to need at each stage of processing.
All experiments have been conducted on a machine with an Intel Xeon Platinum
8176 chip (2.1GHz), and 1TB of RAM. We have used α = 25% across each batch
of 100 simulations. Each batch of 100 simulations have been initialised with the same
random seed controlling the order in which ballots arrive at the scanner.
We first consider the relative performance of our first preference manipulator, and
a MOV-based manipulator that does not attempt to minimise change across first pref-
erence tallies in the true and altered election. We then consider the effectiveness of a
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Table 2: Performance of the first preference manipulator (aiming to enforce a LRM of
at least ∆) and MOV-based manipulator (enforcing an elimination margin of ∆ over
the last 2 rounds of counting). The MOV-based manipulator is not using first preference
discrepancy minimisation. We report the number of simulations (/100) in which the
manipulators are successful, the average number of ballot manipulations performed,
the average resulting change to first preference counts, and the number of manipulation
rules (int. ballot changes) generated after each 25% proportion of ballots has been seen.
First Preference Manipulator MOV-based Manipulator
2∆ 100 300 500 1000 100 300 500 1000
Ballina: MOV of 1,130; LRM of 1,267; 47,865 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 100 100 100 100 76 98 91 95
Avg ballot changes 3198 3198 3198 3198 1171 1265 1328 1407
Avg FP count changes 6397 6397 6397 6397 2059 2283 2408 2591
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 4699 4799 4899 5149 1218 1310 1396 1629
(2) 0 0 0 0 670 774 754 824
(3) 0 0 0 0 272 310 291 145
Balmain: MOV of 1,731; LRM of 1,731; 46,952 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 84 94 98 100 71 94 93 97
Avg ballot changes 1860 1935 2004 2203 1779 1865 1907 2023
Avg FP count changes 3720 3871 4008 4405 3215 3443 3556 3875
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 1747 1847 1947 2197 1776 1891 1968 2223
(2) 66 54 34 0 313 304 287 146
(3) 47 34 22 5 111 87 50 29
Campbelltown: MOV of 3,096; LRM of 3,096; 45,124 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 90 98 99 100 72 92 93 100
Avg ballot changes 3232 3313 3392 3590 3161 3237 3294 3512
Avg FP count changes 6464 6627 6784 7181 6166 6319 6452 6903
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 3130 3230 3330 3580 3151 3272 3357 3586
(2) 75 63 41 5 615 673 770 1023
(3) 27 20 21 5 130 91 61 12
Heffron: MOV of 5,824; LRM of 5,835; 46,367 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 85 96 97 100 71 95 99 100
Avg ballot changes 5928 6006 6087 6327 5878 5973 6068 6255
Avg FP count changes 11856 12013 12175 12656 11357 11450 11744 12346
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 5862 5962 6062 6312 5883 5979 6047 6320
(2) 744 844 944 1194 2680 2820 2746 3028
(3) 50 29 10 0 589 566 601 747
Lismore: MOV of 209; LRM of 1,173; 47,208 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 100 99 98 100 81 91 90 95
Avg ballot changes 4651 4696 4727 4742 339 396 434 510
Avg FP count changes 9304 9392 9455 9486 601 716 796 974
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 4371 4475 4572 4814 294 242 514 730
(2) 192 195 151 110 150 150 150 117
(3) 89 44 44 0 52 52 51 23
MOV-based manipulation that attempts to minimise such discrepancies. The computa-
tional requirements of each of our manipulators varies. The first preference manipulator
is able to compute a set of manipulation rules in less than a second, the MOV-based ma-
nipulators (without first preference tally change minimisation) several seconds, while
minimising first preference tally changes extends rule generation time by up to a minute.
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Table 2 reports the performance of our first preference and MOV-based manipula-
tors on the IRV elections held across our 5 case study seats: Ballina; Balmain; Camp-
belltown; Heffron; and Lismore. We report the true MOV, LRM, and number of ballots
cast in each election alongside the effectiveness of each manipulator across 100 simu-
lated trials. We have found that the MOV-based manipulator is more effective in achiev-
ing a change in winner when it seeks to enforce a reasonably sized elimination margin
(EM) on the last two rounds of counting, rather than a margin on just the last round.
In all our reported results, the MOV-based manipulators enforce an EM of ∆ between
the runner-up and winner, and the runner-up and their runner-up. The two settings –
enforcing an LRM vs an EM on the last two rounds – are similarly effective in certain
seats (Campbelltown, Heffron, and Lismore), with the latter more effective in Ballina.
Note that the detailed results of this comparison have been omitted for brevity.
Ballina is a seat where the identity of the candidate coming in third significantly
influenced which of the remaining two candidates won. The manipulator needed the
Greens candidate to place third so that their preferences flowed to the manipulator’s
desired candidate from the Country Labor Party. Simply enforcing a certain LRM in
this instance resulted in manipulated elections in which the tallies of the two runner-
ups were similar when determining third place. When forming a manipulation, there is
no guarantee that all generated manipulation rules will be applied, and no guarantee that
these rules will bring about the desired change in winner. The rules are computed based
on hypothetical completions of partially known election profiles. Forming manipulation
rules designed to ensure the Greens candidate was eliminated in this third-last position,
with a reasonably sized elimination margin, more reliably achieved the desired result.
Table 2 shows that in general, our MOV-based manipulator requires less ballot
changes on average to reliably (more than 90% of the time) bring about a desired change
in winner. The first preference manipulator is often more successful, as more of its ma-
nipulation rules are likely to be applied in practice. A rule that is looking for a ballot
with a certain candidate ranked first is more likely to be applied than one that looking
for a ballot with a specific ranking of candidates. While a manipulation based on first
preferences may, in some circumstances, underestimate the number of ballot changes
required to alter an election outcome, it generally overestimates the degree of manipula-
tion required. By focusing on preference flow in Lismore, the MOV-based manipulator
reliably achieves a desired outcome by changing orders of magnitude less ballots, on
average. In Balmain and Campbelltown, the first preference manipulator generates a
slightly smaller ‘intended manipulation’, forming less manipulation rules, on average,
after seeing the first 25% batch of ballots. The MOV-based manipulator applies fewer
of its generated rules, in these two contests, leading to fewer ballot changes on average.
It may be the case that ballots are manually examined to compute first preference
tallies for each candidate, while the full count is performed by a computer. In this set-
ting, a large discrepancy between the first preference tallies reported by the software,
and that of the manual count, is likely to arouse suspicion. Table 3 compares the aver-
age discrepancy in first preference counts (between the true, unmanipulated elections,
and those altered by our manipulators) when using a MOV-based manipulator that does
not focus on minimising these discrepancies, and one that does. Note that if a number
of ballots N is shifted from the first preference tally of one candidate to another, this
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Table 3: Number of trials (/100) in which two MOV-based manipulators achieve a de-
sired winner change. The first does not minimise first preference count discrepancies,
while the second does. We report the number of successful manipulations in which the
resulting election avoided an automatic recount (LRM ≥ 100/2 = 50 votes).
MOV-based Manipulator MOV-based Manipulator
No FP change minimisation Minimise FP count changes
2∆ 100 300 500 1000 100 300 500 1000
Ballina: MOV of 1,130; LRM of 1,267; 47,865 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 76 98 91 95 72 99 100 88
Avoid auto recount 76 98 91 95 72 99 100 88
Avg ballot changes 1171 1265 1328 1407 1185 1296 1463 1735
Avg FP count changes 2059 2283 2408 2591 230 324 512 714
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 1218 1310 1396 1629 1216 1368 1457 2042
(2) 670 774 754 824 789 870 998 1235
(3) 272 310 291 145 398 434 502 403
Balmain: MOV of 1,731; LRM of 1,731; 46,952 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 71 94 93 97 50 93 100 92
Avoid auto recount 48 82 83 94 26 75 100 87
Avg ballot changes 1779 1865 1907 2023 1784 1958 2147 2502
Avg FP count changes 3216 3443 3556 3875 849 970 1079 1136
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 1776 1891 1968 2223 1783 1954 2130 2585
(2) 313 304 287 146 1173 1241 1316 1429
(3) 112 87 50 29 577 612 637 545
Campbelltown: MOV of 3,096; LRM of 3,096; 45,124 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 72 92 93 100 59 93 100 95
Avoid auto recount 57 85 89 100 31 79 100 92
Avg ballot changes 3161 3237 3294 3512 4034 4115 4245 4366
Avg FP count changes 6166 6319 6452 6903 3051 3122 3329 3654
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 3151 3272 3357 3586 4213 4325 4380 4661
(2) 615 673 770 1023 2134 2108 2173 2116
(3) 130 91 61 12 875 901 906 758
Heffron: MOV of 5,824; LRM of 5,835; 46,367 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 71 95 99 100 45 93 100 100
Avoid auto recount 49 89 96 100 31 83 100 100
Avg ballot changes 5878 5973 6068 6255 6595 6719 6897 7651
Avg FP count changes 11357 11450 11744 12346 10607 10910 11414 12029
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 5883 5979 6047 6320 6635 6748 6904 7611
(2) 2680 2820 2746 3028 2976 3164 3291 3392
(3) 589 566 601 747 1402 1466 1568 1697
Lismore: MOV of 209; LRM of 1,173; 47,208 ballots cast
Desired winner achieved 81 91 90 95 72 91 96 95
Avoid auto recount 77 83 86 87 67 91 96 95
Avg ballot changes 339 396 434 510 339 438 521 621
Avg FP count changes 601 716 796 974 215 283 368 542
Avg int. ballot changes (1) 294 242 514 730 384 535 719 1140
(2) 150 150 150 117 206 293 354 240
(3) 52 52 51 23 97 86 64 77
is viewed as a discrepancy of 2N votes. The discrepancy minimising manipulator was
able to reduce change in first preference counts by 2.5 times, on average, between a fac-
tor of 1.1 and 9, while requiring only a small increase in total ballot changes. In Ballina,
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we are able to reliably realise a desired winner change while producing a first prefer-
ence count discrepancy that is significantly lower than the MOV or LRM of the election.
Heffron and Campbelltown, with their large margins of victory, are more challenging
to manipulate in a non-obvious manner.
Irrespective of whether first preference count changes are being minimised or not,
our MOV-based manipulator can successfully alter the outcomes of elections, while
avoiding an automatically triggered recount.
Minimising first preference count changes requires a more subtle manipulation, with
the later preferences on ballots being altered more often. The result is that the manipu-
lator must aim to achieve larger elimination margins in the last two eliminations to reli-
ably achieve a desired winner change. The manipulator can be too ambitious however,
and try to achieve elimination margins that are not realistically achievable. A limitation
of the MOV-based manipulators is that if they cannot find a manipulation of a given hy-
pothetical complete election profile that satisfies all desired side constraints, they give
up and fail to generate a set of manipulation rules. A more effective strategy would
relax these constraints – with smaller requirements on elimination margins – until the
algorithm of Section 2.1 is able to find a manipulation.
Conclusions The experiments show that it is quite feasible for an attacker to manipu-
late an election to change the winner with high confidence in the scenario we examine.
Using MOV-based manipulation and minimising first preference changes the attacker
can avoid an automatic recount, and often significantly reduce the number of first pref-
erence changes. Hence we can conclude that rigorous risk limiting audits of elections
is warranted, since simple counting based approaches to auditing can be defeated.
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Abstract. Coercive behaviour is hard to control in the remote electronic
voting setting. This is why a number of protocols have been proposed that
aim at mitigating this threat. However, these proposals have remained
largely academic. This paper takes the practical viewpoint and analyses
the most common assumptions that are required by the various schemes,
together with the exact level of coercion-resistance they provide.
1 Introduction
With introduction of Australian secret ballot into the voting process in mid-19th
century, the threat of voter coercion was significantly reduced. Voting in a pri-
vate booth surrounded by a controlled environment became the “gold standard”
which has served democratic societies around the world well for over a 100 years.
However, several developments in recent decades have undermined the effect
of Australian ballot as a coercion-resistance measure. First, technology of record-
ing the private events within the voting booth (both with the voter cooperation
and stealthily) has become readily available [3,17,18]. And second, human mo-
bility has increased to an extent where expecting all the voters to come to a
controlled environment on a particular day is less and less of an option [32].
These problems have motivated research and development in the field of
coercion-resistant (remote) voting solutions. However, only a few of these solu-
tions have actually been implemented in practice, leaving practical considera-
tions such as usability or technical complexity of satisfying necessary assump-
tions often out of scope.
Another issue with the notion of coercion resistance is that it does not have
a single clear interpretation. Thus it is not always immediately clear which levels
of coercion resistance are achieved by various proposals.
The current paper aims at narrowing these gaps. We have selected seven
different schemes from recent proposals and analyse them from two viewpoints.
First, we identify common technical and organisational assumptions that these
schemes rely on and assess their practical satisfiability. Second, we gather differ-
ent interpretations of coercion resistance and analyse to what extent each one
of the considered schemes achieves them.
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We do not claim full coverage of all coercion-resistant schemes that have ever
been proposed, but we have made an attempt to put together a representative
selection of different approaches used for remote voting. Also, voting schemes
often come in families. In this case we have selected members of such families for
which coercion resistance and/or usability issues have been addressed the most.
2 Notions of voting freedom
One of the fundamental requirements of democratic elections is that the voter
should be able to express her true preference freely, i.e. without being coerced.
This broad statement has several possible interpretations, leading to more fine-
grained requirements. E.g. following [4], we can identify the following properties.
– Basic ballot privacy guarantees that no one can learn how a voter voted (if
she is not coerced and is willing to keep her vote secret). All the voting
schemes studied in this paper satisfy this requirement.
– Receipt-freeness ensures that a malicious voter is unable to produce a proof
for the value of her vote, making coercion essentially inefficient.
– Coercion resistance means intuitively that the voter should be able to cast a
vote reflecting her true preference even if being monitored by the coercer for
(most of) the voting period. To distinguish this property from the generic
term, we will also call it over-the-shoulder coercion resistance in this paper.
Juels et al. [16] go even further and state three additional requirements that a
fully coercion-free voting system should correspond to.
– The coercer should not be able to force the voter to abstain from elections.
– The coercer should not be able to force the voter to cast an invalid vote.
– The coercer should not be able to cast a valid vote if he gets access to the
voter’s credentials.
3 Coercion-resistant schemes and their assumptions
The threat of coercion depends on many aspects: type of elections, properties of
the voting protocol, assumptions on the voting system and environment, aware-
ness and coercibility of the voters, capabilities of the attacker, etc.
Typically, voting protocols aiming at some form of coercion resistance must
make trade-offs between different goals. In the following, we describe and classify
existing coercion resistant voting protocol proposals according to their assump-
tions, usability and applicability for different types of elections.
3.1 Re-voting based schemes / Estonian scheme
Re-voting is a metatechnique that can be used on top of other voting systems
to provide voter with an option of changing her vote in case she was coerced
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during the first attempts(s). An example of a pure re-voting-based protocol is
the Estonian scheme, where this is the only anti-coercion measure in use [22].
The biggest problem with such schemes is that the coercer might stay with
the voter until the end of the voting period (either physically or virtually [3])
to make sure that she does not cast a re-vote. To mitigate this threat (and also
some other risks of remote voting), Estonia has chosen to end the Internet vote
submission two hours before the polling stations are closed on the last day of
advance voting period. The rationale is that if the voter feels coerced, she still
has some time to submit her vote on paper and the paper vote cancels the e-vote.
However, if the voter resides far from any of the polling stations (and enabling
this scenario is one motivation of Internet voting), she can not submit an un-
coerced vote. The whole system operates under the assumption that the share
of such events is insignificant.
In addition, the re-voting functionality can affect integrity of the cast vote
as an active attacker may use it to overwrite the previous vote.
On the positive side, enabling re-voting does not need extra setup on the
client side, and the process is easy to understand for an average voter.
Aside from that, the Estonian system relies on significant technical assump-
tions, most notably voter credential pre-distribution. This is implemented via
the national digital identity mechanisms (ID-card and mobile-ID), with the cor-
responding public keys being available via national PKI. Thus, even though the
Estonian scheme relies on special client-side hardware, these devices are already
very widely in use.
3.2 JCJ/Civitas family
Formal study of coercion resistance in voting systems was initiated in 2002 by
Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [15]. They gave a definition of coercion resistance
and proposed the first scheme satisfying it, later becoming known as the JCJ
scheme [16]. This research introduced fake credentials which the voter can use
under coercion, but the coercer is unable to distinguish from the genuine ones.
In 2008, the JCJ scheme was extended by Clarkson, Chong and Myers by
introducing distributed trust assumptions and improving the performance. The
resulting protocol was called Civitas [8].
Neither of the JCJ and Civitas proposals specified how exactly the voter
should select the appropriate credentials. Neumann and Volkamer noted in 2012
that this action is non-trivial, and may lead to both usability and security is-
sues when implemented carelessly. Improving the specification of Civitas, they
proposed an implementation based on smart cards and readers with PIN-pads
and trusted displays [28]. Selection between a fake and a real credential would
be accomplished by entering either a real or a fake PIN into the reader.
Essentially, Neumann-Volkamer proposal encapsulates all the critical voter-
side operations into special hardware, which has to be trusted. While in principle
such an approach can make credential handling more secure, it does not really
move us much closer to a practical implementation. Smart card readers with
364
trusted preview are not commonplace on the market, and the smart cards would
require a lot of non-standard functionality.
In a later research Neumann et al. have shown that, in principle, mod-
ern smart cards have sufficient performance required to implement such func-
tions [27]. However, performance is not the only bottleneck in the practical de-
ployment. The software implementing the protocol functionality needs to some-
how get onto the cards.
Roughly speaking, election organisers have two approaches to tackle this
problem. First, they can approach a large smart card vendor and convince it to
implement the required functionality as part of the card firmware. Our inter-
view with a representative of Gemalto (prevoius supplier of Estonian ID-cards)
revealed that smart card vendors are quite reluctant to include limited-use appli-
cations on their products, and prefer implementing only general-purpose crypto-
graphic primitives like standardised asymmetric signatures. One reason for this is
that in many applications (likely including voting as well) the customers require
certification, testing and validation of the security features of smart cards (for ex-
ample, according to Common Criteria standard or FIPS-140-2). Such processes
are expensive and time-consuming, and the vendor cannot earn this investment
back selling limited-use cards.
Another option would be using programmable cards and implementing the
functionality oneself in the spirit of [27]. The drawback of this approach is the
need to support the whole software development life cycle locally. While it may
give better control over the implementation, the risks are also higher. In case a
bug is discovered, updating applications on the cards that have been distributed
to numerous remote voters is a nightmare. Also, the whole expense of certification
(in case it is desired) needs to be carried locally.
We conclude that while special-purpose smart cards provide an appealing
option for a “poor man’s HSM”, their deployment has problems that are not
necessarily easier to solve than the original challenge they were designed to
meet.
As a part of the registration procedure, the Neumann-Volkamer protocol
also depends on availability of anonymous channels (e.g. Tor is suggested by the
authors). We refer to Section 3.4 for a more elaborate discussion on difficulties
of achieving anonymous channels (using Tor) in practice.
Another branch of JCJ was developed by Arau´jo et al. in 2010 [2]. They
introduced shorter credentials and provided a formal proof of coercion-resistance,
although their proof relied on a non-standard number-theoretic assumption. In
2018, Neto et al. conducted usability studies for the CIVIS system [26], which
is an implementation of the protocol proposed by Arau´jo et al. [2]. The study
revealed that more than 90% of the test participants did not understand the
functionality of casting fake votes. Also, they did not feel comfortable with the
result, being unable to distinguish whether their submitted vote was real or fake.
This brings the whole concept of using fake credentials under question.
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3.3 Helios family
The original proposal of Helios by Adida [1] was explicitly targeted towards
low-coercion environments. During later research, several extensions have been
developed to enhance its coercion resistance.
KTV-Helios Kulyk, Teague and Volkamer have extended the Helios voting
system to provide private eligibility verifiability, i.e. the property that anyone
can verify that only votes from eligible voters are included in the tally, without
revealing who actually submitted them [20,19]. As a by-product, they achieve
receipt-freeness in the sense that the voter can not prove how she voted as she can
undetectably re-vote. However, the authors stated that the protocol is susceptible
to forced abstention and randomisation attacks. Following the authors’ initials,
the scheme is known as KTV-Helios.
The core idea of Kulyk et al. is to hide the true votes among dummy ones.
Receipt-freeness is achieved allowing the voter to cast differential vote updates,
so that the final vote would be a combination (e.g. product) of the votes cast. A
similar approach was independently developed by Locher and Haenni [21].
Even though the dummy votes can be cast by any voter, most of them would
probably not bother to do so. Hence a specific party called posting proxy or
posting trustee is introduced by Kulyk et al., and its task is to submit the
dummy votes. In order to prevent timing side channels (see Section 3.4), posting
trustee must operate in a randomised fashion.
Regarding the practical implementation aspects, the authors of KTV-Helios
admit themselves that the understandability and usability issues remain largely
unsolved [20]. Seeing many votes submitted onto the bulletin board on her behalf
probably makes an average voter quite anxious. We add here a potential legal
problem of voter impersonation, even if there are cryptographic proofs certifying
that the extra votes do not change the final tally.
BeleniosRF In the original version of Helios, the voter can present encryp-
tion randomness as a receipt for the coercer. BeleniosRF uses re-randomisable
ciphertexts and signatures, with part of the randomness being out of the voter’s
control, making it impossible for a voter to produce such a receipt [4].
The ballot is signed by the voter and re-randomisation of the ballot by the
server does not invalidate the corresponding signature. Thus, the voter can ver-
ify the signature to make sure that the vote has not been changed. However,
this applies only when re-voting is not enabled. The authors of BeleniosRF state
that in case of re-voting the voters would not be able to check which of their
ballots were re-randomised by the server. Therefore, BeleniosRF does not allow
re-voting and thereby does not provide protection against over-the-shoulder coer-
cion. However, vulnerability to in-person coercion is one of the major objections
against remote electronic voting in the first place [10,11,25,24,13,14].
The authors of BeleniosRF argue that changing one’s vote is a legally grey
area anyway, and most of the countries would need to go through a complicated
legal process before they can support it.
While we agree that legislative changes are necessary to support re-voting, we
feel that the authors of BeleniosRF over-estimate the complexity of this process.
366
For example, extensive social and legal debate concerning constitutionality
of re-voting took place in Estonia when Internet voting was introduced there. A
few months before the first Internet-enabled elections, the President of Estonia
brought Internet voting provisions to the Supreme Court for constitutional re-
view, arguing that the possibility to change Internet votes gives advantages to
Internet voters in comparison with paper voters. The decision of the Supreme
Court did not support this point of view, reaching the conclusion that merely a
technical option of casting multiple votes does not put Internet voters into any
kind of advantage [23].
While the outcome of a similar legal discussion may be different in other ju-
risdictions, we feel that re-voting as an easy-to-implement and relatively efficient
anti-coercion measure is important enough to review some of the legislative prin-
ciples. Changing legislation in order to catch up with technological advancements
is an unavoidable process anyway.
3.4 Selene
The primary design goal of the Selene scheme proposed by Ryan et al. [31] is
achieving a user-friendly end-to-end vote verification protocol. As too strong of
a verification mechanism brings along a threat of coercion, the authors of Selene
have also paid a lot of attention to mitigating this threat. They propose using
cryptographic tracking numbers which are first committed to a bulletin board
using trapdoor commitments. After the end of the voting period, clear-text votes
with clear-text tracking numbers are displayed on the bulletin board as well. The
(voter-controlled) trapdoor can later be used to open the commitment to any
tracking number of coercer’s liking.
The voter, of course, still needs to somehow identify the real tracking num-
ber of her own vote. This is facilitated by sending her the correct decommitment
value α. In order to fool the coercer, the voter can produce an alternative decom-
mitment value α′ that is cryptographically indistinguishable from α and points
to any vote requested by the coercer.
However, cryptographic indistinguishability is not sufficient, as the attacker
potentially has a number of side channels available to separate the true α from
voter-generated α′-s. The authors of Selene acknowledge this problem and state
that α-terms should be transferred over an unauthenticated and private channel.
Unfortunately, implementing such a channel is non-trivial. Note first that in
order to mitigate the threat of coercion, it is not sufficient just to drop strong
authentication mechanisms like signatures. For example, if α (or its shares com-
ing from the trustees) is sent via regular, otherwise unauthenticated email, it
has to carry sender’s email address. There are both legal and usability issues
that suggest using a fixed official address rather some randomly generated ones.
Email is just an example here, similar problems would occur if other taggable
delivery channels like instant messaging or web bulletin board would be used.
In principle, the process of preparing a false α′ can also include sending it
from the official address. In this case there is still the timing side channel that
the coercer can use to distinguish the genuine α. In order to counter this, the
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genuine α-s would need to be sent at randomised moments, and the voter must
prepare α′ during this period. This is doable and is also proposed by the authors,
but it complicates the voter’s view of the protocol substantially.
We can also imagine genuine α-s being sent out via regular mail, printed
on standard office paper. The voter can print α′ out on her home printer, but
this assumes using exactly the same kind of paper, printing resolution, etc. In
addition, majority of modern colour laser printers mark the printed papers with
tracking dots which can be used to identify the printer [30]. We can see that it
could be possible to deliver α-s with the help of the postal service, but generating
the fake values is not as easy as the authors of Selene probably foresaw. Note
also that a vote buyer is typically after a number of votes and he can live with
some of the voters being able to fool him as long as their share is not too high.
One can also utilise stronger anonymisation techniques, e.g. mixing or onion
routing. These would only help if the full set of messages is larger than just the
official α-terms, as otherwise we would have no sender anonymity. One may con-
sider using an existing anonymisation network, say, Tor (as also recommended
by Neumann and Volkamer [28]). However, due to significant illegal activity hap-
pening over it, utilising Tor for legally binding elections would be questionable.
We argue that this dilemma is at least partially inherent and not specific to
Tor. On one hand, too small of an anonymisation set does not fulfil the goal,
but fighting doubtful traffic in a large network is practically impossible.
Furthermore, by relying on Tor (let’s still use it as a prime example) new
problems are introduced. Referring to the objectionable content and general un-
controllable nature, several countries have attempted to block/filter Tor traffic4.
This makes it hard for expatriates living in those countries to participate in the
elections remotely, but supporting expatriate participation is one of the main
reasons for introducing remote electronic voting in the first place.
Setting up private channels from the election organiser to all the voters is
not a trivial task either. As Selene already relies on a PKI for vote signing,
assuming additional access to an authentic public-private key pair for encryption
and decryption is probably not a big extra. However, even the α-term encrypted
with the voter’s public key has to be delivered to her somehow. We conclude
that channel privacy does not really help against the soft sender identification
problem described above.
In 2019, Distler et al. performed an e-voting usability study based on a Se-
lene protocol implementation [9]. Unfortunately, they left the steps related to
coercion resistance (including preparing the fake α′ and selecting it in the pres-
ence of the coercer) out of scope. We also note that their implementation relies
only on a mobile device for both vote casting and verification. This means that
verification is inefficient against the malicious device and does not thus fulfil the
purpose of verification. We feel that in order to get a more realistic understand-
4 It is hard to get reliable statistics on the extent of Tor filtering, but there exists
indirect evidence in the form of the share of users relying on Tor bridges (https://
metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-table.html) and observed irregular-
ities (https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-events.html).
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ing of usability of Selene protocol the authors of [9] should have implemented a
complete version, e.g. by using a second channel for verification. Adding extra
channels and steps would have likely changed the user perception and feedback.
3.5 Eos
Patachi and Schu¨rmann have proposed the Eos voting scheme based on a specific
flavour of ring signatures, namely conditional linkable ring signatures [29]. As
each voter can have multiple pseudo-identities in the scheme, conditional link-
ability allows the signer to choose if the signatures can be linked to the same
identity by the verifier.
There are two main anti-coercion measures in Eos. First, the voter can use
subliminal hinting (called selecting between “red” and “green” envelopes or alter-
native pseudo-identities in [29]) while preparing the encrypted vote. In practice,
such hinting would be implemented by presenting either a real or pseudo-PIN
to a special-hardware voting device or to the coercer who controls the device.
Second, if the actively coerced voter had to cast a vote using a valid PIN, she
may later re-vote to update the vote. However, in that case the public bulletin
board will contain multiple encrypted votes given by the same pseudo-identity,
which may be known to the coercer. In that case, the voter may have to lie to
the coercer that the coercer was the last one to cast the vote.
The protocol makes several non-trivial assumptions. First, to get rid of side-
channels during submitting the ring-signed votes, one would need to use anony-
mous channels, but achieving these is quite tricky in practice (see Section 3.4).
Second, special hardware tokens would be needed to implement the client-side
operations (key management, PIN validation, identity selection, and signature
computation). The paper [29] suggests that hardware wallets designed for storing
the keys for cryptocurrencies could be used in this role. It might be possible to
reprogram such hardware, but distributing the hardware or the private keys to
the voters is a non-trivial task.
As the selection between identities would happen by entering a real or pseudo-
PIN, we also have all the regular problems of pseudo-PIN management – if the
user enters a wrong PIN, the device can not give any feedback (as the coercer
might be watching), and would quietly submit a vote that the voter did not
intend to (e.g. in the scenario where the voter wanted to use a pseudo-PIN, but
accidentally used a real one).
3.6 Selections
A special form of fake credentials called panic passwords has been proposed by
Clark and Hengartner in 2008 [5]. The essence of panic passwords is what the
name says – the user can select a true password together with a set of alternative
ones that can be used to covertly alert the system that the user is under abnormal
circumstances, e.g. coercion.
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The latter is an important threat scenario in case of remote voting, so the
same authors have built a coercion-resistant voting scheme called Selections
around their core idea [6].
Unfortunately, making human-memorisable passwords to work as fake cre-
dentials is even more problematic than in case of cryptographic credentials.
First, a complex registration process is needed. Of course, it has to take place
in a controlled, coercion-free environment, but this is a standard assumption. The
registration procedure can even be implemented bare-handed (i.e. not requiring
the voter to perform computations by heart). An Internet-enabled computer
is still required inside the controlled registration booth to print out a voter
preparation sheet. This is meant as a countermeasure “. . . in the event that an
adversary ensured she entered the registration process without her sheet” [6].
The only way the coercer can achieve this is to search through the voter’s
belongings and walk together with her until the door of the registration booth.
But if the coercer is prepared to do this much, he can also request the voter to
record all her actions with a camera or even send a live stream [3]. As a result,
the effect of controlled registration environment will be significantly reduced.
During the registration process, the previously selected and encrypted panic
passwords are re-randomised. The voter selects one of the re-randomised en-
cryptions which is posted to a public roster. It is assumed in the protocol that
the voter deletes the randomness used for re-randomisation and does not record
it. Building security properties on the assumption that some value is deleted is
always questionable. There may exist side channels that the coercer forces the
voter to use to record or stream the value. If the coercer took part in creating
the voter preparation sheet and has access to it, then the re-encrypted panic
password on the public roster can be matched with the encrypted panic pass-
word on the preparation sheet. Thus, the randomness gives a way to prove the
validity of the password given to the coercer.
We also noticed that the registration protocol differs significantly when com-
paring the full paper (e-print) [7] to the conference paper [6]. In the e-print
version, the registration protocol allows the voter to rewind the process back to
the re-randomisation phase. In the conference paper, the registration protocol
allows the voter to rewind the process back to the beginning, i.e., to selecting new
panic passwords. However, the difference is important as some of the coercion
protections depend on the rewinding functionality.
Additionally, Selections suffers from the typical problems of password-based
systems. Even though [6] proposes measures to increase password memorability,
the scenario of voting stretches these boundaries. The idea of [6] was to go
through the complex registration process once and then use the credentials over
several events. However, elections typically only happen once in a few years, and
many voters are likely to forget their passwords over this time, no matter how
good of a mnemonic is used. To counter this problem, humans tend to write the
passwords down, increasing their coercibility as a result.
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4 Other coercion properties
In this section, we discuss the extra coercion properties (i.e. forced abstention,
casting an invalid vote, and forced surrender of credentials) of the schemes.
A voter can be forced to not take part in the elections if a coercer has
a way to check if the voter abstained from voting. As potential attackers, we
also consider corrupt election officials and democratically elected politicians who
decide to deviate from fair election practices. Such an attacker would be able to
to indirectly manipulate a large portion of the electorate.
Forcing the voter to cast an invalid vote can benefit the coercer in (at least)
two ways. First, in case the voter is supporting a party opposing the coercer’s
views, the invalid vote would have no effect and the voter would effectively
abstain from the elections. Second, if the invalid vote would be posted to a
bulletin board, the attacker could remotely check if the voter behaved according
to the instructions. Even if the invalid vote would not be published, it may still
be possible that election officials are able to see the value of the vote and thus
be able to play the role of a coercer.
In case another person would be able to use the voter’s credentials, it would
be possible to cast the vote on behalf of the voter. Juels et al. [16] refer to this
type of an attack as a simulation attack.
The rest of this Section is devoted to the discussion of these coercion prop-
erties. Table 1 summarises the main assumptions used by different coercion-
resistant protocols proposals together with their level of coercion-resistance in
respect to the requirements listed in Section 2. The only exception is the basic
ballot privacy that all the considered schemes trivially satisfy.
4.1 Re-voting based schemes / Estonian scheme
The Estonian voting system provides protection against standard versions of
these coercion attacks. More specifically, an outside third party is not able to
detect if a voter cast a vote online or abstained as there is no public proof of the
vote casting. There is a private bulletin board in the Estonian voting system,
which is only accessible to the election officials and auditors. The official voting
client software does not support casting an invalid vote. Finally, the signing key
of the voter is stored inside of a smart card, hence the coercer would need to
have physical access to use the credentials.
However, the situation gets more complicated in case of an attacker who
has insider information. The voting system has to verify the ballot signatures
to make sure that only the votes of eligible voters are accepted. Thus, insiders
could check if a certain voter abstained.
There is also an insider threat when an invalid vote is cast. To cast an invalid
vote, either the voter or the coercer would have to create a non-standard voting
client. In case the invalid vote would have a correct format and would correspond
to a non-existing candidate number of a suitable district, the vote would be
decrypted during the tallying process. Writing a voting client that would allow
casting such votes is possible as the voting protocol and the communication API
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Table 1. Cross-table of assumptions and achieved coercion resistance properties
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Special client hardware  1   # #  #
Anonymous channels #   #    
PKI / key distribution   2    2  2 #
Subliminal password/PIN hinting #  # # #   
Casting a re-vote    # H#3   
Non-trivial registration # H#4 # # # #  
Receipt-freeness #    G#5  G#6
Over-the-shoulder coercion resistance   G#7 # G#8   
Resistance to forced abstention G#9  G#10 # H#11  G#12
Resistance to casting an invalid vote G#9  G#13 H#14 H#15 H#16 H#17
Resistance to simulation attack G#18  G#19 # #20 H#21  22
 = is assumed / holds # = is not assumed / does not hold G# = may holdH# = depends on the implementation
1 Smart card based ID-cards are mandatory in Estonia and widely in use.
2 PKI is not explicitly mentioned, but its functionality is implicitly described.
3 Whether re-voting is allowed in Selene depends on the used policy [31].
4 Information about the registration process of NV-Civitas can be found in [28].
5 Selene’s receipt-freeness depends on the anonymous channel, see Section 3.4.
6 Whether Selections is receipt free depends on how the re-randomisation randomness
is handled during registration. For more information, see Section 3.6.
7 The property depends on how the coercer prevents re-voting, see Section 4.3.
8 The property depends on the re-voting policy in the implementation of Selene [31].
9 The attack can be implemented by an insider, see Section 4.1.
10 KTV-Helios is susceptible to forced abstention only in the case of an active attacker.
11 For information about the implementation of Selene, see Section 4.4.
12 It is not clear whether Selections is resistant to forced abstention, see Section 4.6.
13 In KTV-Helios invalid votes can be cast, but they will be removed by plaintext
equality tests before votes are published in the bulletin board.
14 See Section 4.3 for information about the coercion properties of BeleniosRF.
15 Vote casting procedure is not specified in Selene, see Section 4.4 for more details.
16 Whether it is possible to cast an invalid vote depends on the version of Eos. More
information can be found from Section 4.5.
17 It is not specified how vote is encoded and how votes are tallied in Selections [6].
18 The coercer might be able to get physical access to the smart card. However, it is
possible to re-vote as described in Section 4.1.
19 The coercer might be able to get physical access to the smart card. However, the
voter may be able to re-vote to cancel the coerced vote as described in Section 4.3.
20 It is not specified how keys are managed in Selene [31]. In case Selene is used as an
add-on, then key management may be specified by the underlying voting protocol.
21 The possibility of casting a valid vote with the voter’s HSM depends on the config-
uration of the HSM. For more information, see Section 4.5.
22 If the registration process and thus the credentials are remotely monitored then
the voter has the option to revoke the registration and vote in person. For more
information, see Section 4.6.
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is public. Now, if a voter would be able to cast such an invalid vote then either
the members of the election committee or the auditor who audits the election
result might be able to read the invalid value. Thus, the coercer would have to
cooperate with the election officials or the auditor to see the vote value.
In order to get a hold of the signing keys, the coercer would have to take the
possession of all of the digital ID-s of the voter along with the corresponding
PIN codes. Still, the voter could use a non-digital ID to cast a paper vote in
the polling station that overwrites the e-vote. Thus, all non-digital ID-s would
also have to be collected by a coercer in case the coercer would like the voter to
abstain from participating in the elections. Such an attack could be applied on
selected individuals, but this approach does scale.
4.2 NV-Civitas
NV-Civitas was the only one of the protocols that we analysed not susceptible
to the three aforementioned coercion attacks. Forced abstention is impossible
as the ballots are not signed and are delivered over an anonymous channel.
Invalid ballots are either rejected by the smart card or by the voting system
after checking the proof of vote well-formedness [28]. It is also impossible to
force the voter to surrender the credentials as the voter can give the coercer the
smart card with a fake PIN, which would create a ballot with invalid credentials.
4.3 Helios family
KTV-Helios While it is possible to cast invalid ballots in KTV-Helios, they
do not end up on the bulletin board. Invalid ballots are removed before tallying
with the help of plaintext equality tests. Thus, invalid votes are not decrypted.
The authors state that casting an invalid vote can cause the voter to abstain
from the elections. The attack would always work in an active scenario where
the attacker waits until the end of the voting period to force the voter to cast
an invalid vote. In this case the invalid vote would be discarded before the tally
and the voter would not have enough time to re-vote. However, if the value of
the invalid vote would be known to the voter and there would be time to re-vote,
the voter may be able to cancel the previous vote.
As the signing keys are stored on smart cards, it is in principle possible to
force the voters to give up the cards, but such an attack would not scale well.
BeleniosRF BeleniosRF uses a fixed message space for encoding the vote
and tallying is done homomorphically. Thus, the possibility of casting an invalid
vote depends on the implementation. In case the message space is not used up
to encode the candidates, it might be possible to cast an invalid vote that would
be published.
The other two coercion attacks could be applied in the case of BeleniosRF.
It is possible to force the voter to abstain from voting as there is public proof of
participation in the voting event. The signature of the randomised public ballot
can be verified by the voter. In case the voter’s public key is accessible to the
coercer, the latter is able to verify all the ballots on the bulletin board. Also, the
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voter ID is verified before a ballot is accepted and re-randomised by the bulletin
board. Thus, the election officials could coerce voters to abstain.
A coercer might also be able to force the voter to surrender her secret key as
no special hardware is used for storing the secret key. However, the voter is only
able to give one vote, so the coercer would have to get access to the signing key
before the voter casts her vote.
4.4 Selene
Whether Selene is safe from forced abstention attack depends on the implemen-
tation of the protocol. The basic scheme is vulnerable as the ballots signed by the
voters are published on the bulletin board. However, the optional enhancement of
using pseudonymous credentials enables giving signatures without revealing the
identity of the voter. Thus, the extended scheme is resistant to forced abstention
attack if the coercer can not access the voter’s pseudonymous credentials.
Similarly, the ability to cast an invalid vote depends on the implementation
of the vote casting procedure and is not fixed on the protocol level. Selene can
be used as an add-on on top of another voting system, which may remove invalid
votes. E.g., Selene combined with JCJ is resistant to casting an invalid vote [12].
Still, Selene is susceptible to forced surrender of credentials as no hardware
token is proposed for storing the secret key. Also, re-voting policy is not fully
specified, thus it is not clear if voter’s initial choice could be overwritten.
4.5 Eos
Eos is resistant to the forced abstention attack. It uses ring signatures to hide
voter identities from the election officials. Also, an anonymous channel is used
to cast the vote. Thus, it won’t be possible to detect if a specific voter has voted.
The authors of Eos acknowledge that in the basic version of the protocol
a coercer could force a voter to cast an invalid vote [29]. As a solution, they
propose using a disjunctive zero-knowledge proof protocol, such that the voter
could prove that her vote is in the set of valid votes. In that case, invalid votes
could be removed before they are tallied and published.
It would be difficult to force a voter to surrender the credentials as that would
require getting physical access to the voter HSM. However, the possibility can
not be excluded as it is not clear if the correct PIN code could be extracted from
the voter or HSM. It might be possible to try out all PIN code combinations in
order to give a valid vote. It is also not specified in [29] if the HSM would allow
to change the valid PIN codes. A successful change of the PIN would probably
reveal the real PIN code. If changing PIN codes is not possible, then the usability
aspect of the HSM would come under question. Even if the coercer could use the
HSM, the attack would not scale well.
4.6 Selections
It is not clear whether Selections is resistant to the forced abstention attack.
While the votes are cast over an anonymous channel and the passwords are re-
randomised, there are some questions that can not be answered based on the
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protocol description. First, the protocol allows to revoke voter registration before
pre-tallying, but it is not specified how it could be implemented. The authors of
Selections also state that the revocation process might not be covered by coercion
resistance. Second, during the registration, the randomised encryption of the
password is posted to the roster along with the VoterID. However, it is not stated
what the VoterID is or how it is assigned to the voters. Thus, the coercer might be
able to use the VoterID to check if the coerced voter registered to use Selections.
Third, it is assumed that during the registration process, the voter does not
copy or remember the randomisation of the selected password. However, modern
technology makes it quite easy to copy and broadcast information. Rewinding
some of the registration steps would not help in case the coercer forces the voter
to live broadcast the process.
The protocol does not specify the way how the vote is represented or how
the votes are tallied. Thus, the possibility of casting an invalid vote depends on
the specific implementation of the protocol.
If the coercer would like to get access to the valid credentials, the voter would
have to record or broadcast the registration process. However, in that case the
voter could revoke the registration before pre-tallying and thus invalidate the
credentials given to the coercer together with the vote. After revoking, the voter
could go to the polling station to vote in person.
5 Conclusions and further work
Developing a voting protocol to meet the requirements of a given jurisdiction is
a complex task. On one hand, we would like the protocol to be secure against all
critical attacks, but this security comes with a price of increased implementation
complexity and technical assumptions that need to be satisfied.
This paper focused on coercion-resistance properties of various voting proto-
cols proposed in academic literature from the practical system developer view-
point. As academic proposals are not required to include real-life deployments,
it is very easy to leave some of the implementation details out of consideration.
Unfortunately, there are many devils hidden in these details.
During our research we identified six main (groups of) popular technical
assumptions. Some of them (like existence of PKI or ability to cast a re-vote)
indeed have readily accessible practical instantiations. At the same time, the
requirements to set up anonymous channels or distribute special-purpose client
hardware are easy to write down on paper, but quite tricky to implement.
Subliminal hinting using fake credentials is one of the oldest methods to
achieve provable coercion-resistance properties, but a recent usability study by
Neto et al. [26] found that more than 90% of the test participants did not under-
stand this functionality. This questions the whole idea of using fake credentials.
In general, there is a lack of usability studies that focus on the coercion-
resistance aspects of voting protocols. We see this as an important open question
that requires further research.
Another general shortcoming of the current proposals is under-specification.
On several occasions, it was impossible to determine susceptibility to certain
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attacks as this would have depended on specific implementation aspects. Sure, a
16-page academic paper can not fit all the details, but we encourage future schol-
ars to accompany their proposals with deployed implementations. This would
help identifying potential problems in an earlier stage of academic discussion.
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1 Introduction 
In 2005, a test pilot of I-voting was introduced in the general elections for the Portu-
guese Parliament. The I-voting experiment was aimed at all citizens who were allowed 
to vote abroad using postal vote. From a total of 148,159 electors outside Portugal who 
were registered, only 4,367 voted through the Internet (12% of mailed votes) [4]. The 
experiment was voluntary and not valid for official elections results. Although the vot-
ers who used I-voting had a good experience (around 98%) [4], the Portuguese govern-
ment decided to stop the I-voting experiments. However, in the same year, Estonia be-
came the first country in the world to successfully introduce I-voting as an additional 
voting channel during Local Elections. In 2007, a new experience was made in Estonian 
Parliament Elections resulting in almost 30,000 voters used the I-voting method to cast 
their vote [5]. The Estonian I-voting system rests on two key elements: the transfor-
mation of the electoral law and the use in elections of the potential of its e-Governance 
ecosystem components and infrastructure – e-ID, Mobile-ID, Population Register and 
X-Road. The share of Internet voters grew from a mere 2% in 2005 to approximately
44% in 2019 [1], indicating the consolidation of the Estonian I-voting system.
Given this situation, the Estonian I-voting system seems to be a role model where other 
electoral systems can mirror, and it is relevant to determine which factors and aspects 
stemming from the Estonian case could be useful. In accordance with that, this research 
aims to build guidelines for the introduction of I-voting in Portuguese elections based 
on the experience of Estonia. For doing so, two dimensions will be considered: the legal 
and the digital administrative transformations implemented by the Estonian govern-
ment. And, to shape it as research questions:   
1. What adjustments would be necessary in the Portuguese electoral law to intro-
duce a system as the Estonian I-voting model?
2. Are the Portuguese e-Governance ecosystem components and infrastructure
enough to implement an I-voting system?
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2 Research Methodology and Implementation 
For the first question we will apply Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN1) 
to model the Portuguese and Estonian electoral law’s internal processes related to I-
voting. It will allow to understand both electoral systems, as well as analyzing potential 
connections between them [3]. BPMN will allow to identify points where changes 
could be introduced in the Portuguese electoral system and understand its impacts in 
adding an I-voting channel in Portuguese elections. Additionally, we will use Unified 
Modelling Language (UML2) to model (through use cases, activity and state diagrams) 
the processes of the Estonian I-voting system in order to analyze whether what is writ-
ten in the electoral law is what actually happens in practice. Both methods can provide 
detailed description and better understanding how the Estonian Internet voting activi-
ties proceeds in several aspects - technologically and administratively.   
The second question is focused on the analysis of whether the Portuguese ecosystem is 
able to implement an I-voting system as the Estonian. It will be addressed by develop-
ing a case study on Estonia and Portugal, comparing the current situation and develop-
ment of both e-Governance models paying attention to the technologic and administra-
tive ecosystems components and infrastructures. Secondly, the UML and BPMN mod-
els will allow to connect the I-voting system with the e-Governance frames and to com-
pare the Estonian and Portuguese cases. When the models will be done, we will conduct 
meetings and interviews with e-Governance experts connected to Estonian and Portu-
guese government and Academia in order to discuss the findings. The final outcome 
will be an analysis and model of the existing similarities and differences (strengths and 
weaknesses) between the Estonian and Portuguese e-Governance ecosystems, allowing 
to identify the necessary steps for the implementation of an I-voting system in Portugal. 
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1 Introduction 
With 2019 Parliamentary elections, Estonia celebrates 15 years of continuous usage 
of Internet voting in all binding elections and reaches a new record, both in relative and 
absolute numbers. However, while Estonia frequently serves as a benchmark in Internet 
voting for other countries, there is lack of research on how elections with Internet voting 
are administered. Hence, this research focuses on administration of complex elections 
where multiple voting channels are available, and one of them is Internet voting. The 
issue of election administration has both practical and theoretical implications. For the 
theoretical implications, election administration is one of the most under-researched 
fields of public administration [6], and on the example of Internet voting administration, 
a wide array of issues such as coordination problem and principal-agent problem can 
be studied. This research also adds to the literature on convenience voting and usage of 
new voting technologies. As for the practical implications, this research might help 
election administrations to organize elections more securely, efficiently and transpar-
ently.  
2 Methodology 
This study builds on the methodology developed in [4]. This methodology reflects 
the multidisciplinary approach as it embraces theories of election administration, busi-
ness process management and business process re-engineering. As for the case-study, 
the 2019 Parliamentary elections in Estonia are selected, for the reason defined in [4], 
as well as being the first case of elections where Internet voting has become the most 
used channel among the 10 available. The methods used for this case-study include 
electoral legislation analysis, supported by direct observation of electoral processes, 
interviews with stakeholders, electoral data analysis, procurement contracts analysis, 
and mapping of processes and actors (mostly with BPMN software).  
3 Preliminary findings 
 A trend for outsourcing electoral tasks to the private sector: besides well-docu-
mented involvement of Internet voting system vendors, we also mapped such actors
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as individual contractors, ICT companies, construction companies, supermarkets, 
and private post offices. While outsourcing electoral tasks to the private sector is a 
global trend, the implementation of this approach in Estonia results in decrease of 
transparency and accountability, as most of the contracts with private actors are clas-
sified, making the content of contracts, including price paid for a service, not acces-
sible. The contracts regarding Internet voting are sometimes classified even when 
concluded between public bodies. These findings go in contrast with the policy of 
“aggressive openness” [5] which Estonia presumably applies to delivery of Internet 
voting by publishing source code and allowing Internet voting public observation; 
 a multi-stakeholder approach is frequently applied to electoral activities: one elec-
toral activity is delivered by a wide range of actors. However, this approach results
in some resource-consuming and prone to mistake tasks being delegated to the low-
est level of election administration, without allocation of required resources to de-
liver the task properly. Overall, it increases the complexity of election administra-
tion, creating coordination problems;
 significant regional disparities in salaries, equipment and working tasks in local
election administrations, revealed through stakeholders’ interviews and observation
of electoral processes across the country. Such disparities might provoke security
threats.
Overall, the study of the 2019 Parliamentary elections in Estonia demonstrates: (1) 
the growing number of actors involved into delivery of elections, at least partially 
caused by a trend for outsourcing electoral tasks to the private sector; (2) a multi-
stakeholder approach combined with the delegation of electoral tasks to the lowest 
level of election administration; (3) regional disparities in financing elections.  
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1 Modelling Voting Protocols 
Verification of voting protocols is deep and interesting topic. A lot of work has been 
done in this field and a number of properties have been formalized, including ballot 
privacy and receipt freeness [2], coercion-resistance [4], and voter-verifiability [6]. 
Verifying strategic properties. When verifying a voting protocol, a standard ap-
proach is to assume that all the participants (voters, election authority, tellers) follows 
the protocol rules. The question answered in that process is "Is the protocol secure?". 
The question we want to ask, is "Does the voter has a strategy to...". For example, 
"Does the voter has a strategy to verify his vote". More than that, maybe coercer 
working together with the voter will have a strategy to change the results of the votes. 
To this end we want to use ATL [1] for modelling and specifying the desired proper-
ties. 
Modelling Voting Protocols. Tamarin is a theorem prover commonly used for verifi-
cation of security protocols. It is as tool one can use to model cryptography in the 
protocol. Voting protocols often involve a lot of cryptography, so does that mean we 
can easily use Tamarin for the verification of the voting protocols? While similar in 
some respects, security and voting protocols have some differences between them. 
The main difference lies in the agents actions. In the security protocol agents just 
follow the protocol rules. There is no place for choices. In the voting protocol howev-
er, voter can make many choices: which candidate to vote for, when to vote, to verify 
his vote or not. 
2 Pros and cons of using Tamarin 
The first question to ask would be is it a good decision to use Tamarin for the verifi-
cation of strategic properties in the voting protocol. While there exists some model-
checkers created exactly for that purpose, like MCMAS [5], it is problematic to model 
cryptography in the standard model-checking techniques. Of course, the cryptography 
in the model can be simplified or even omitted, but by doing this we may lose some 
important information. 
Modelling Voting Protocols. Depending on the protocol, it may involve many dif-
ferent cryptographic operations and have many stages, like ballot mixing, distribution, 
keys preparation and more. At the same time, interaction of the agents with the proto-
col is often simple: get your ballot, fill it with your vote, post it and then verify it on 
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public bulletin board. Compared to other ATL models, voting protocols have 
different structure, more like that of a security protocol. One of the pros of using 
Tamarin for modelling of the voting protocol is an easy to understand specification 
language and its compactness. Moreover, it is relatively simple to model 
cryptography in Tamarin, as well as coercer in the form of a built-in Dolev-Yao 
attacker. The issue here is to remember, that there are no explicit agents in Tamarin, 
although one could create the specification in such a way to simulate agents in the 
protocol. 
Observational Equivalence. When verifying properties like vote-privacy in tamarin, 
the standard approach would be to use observational equivalence, like in 
[3]. The problem here is that Tamarin uses much stronger notion of observational 
equivalence, than one commonly used in model-checking. Because of that, when using 
Tamarin observational equivalence, one should very carefully create the model of the 
verified protocol. Even potentially significant changes may have a great impact on the 
result. If possible, it would be better to use trace lemmas. 
Information flow and knowledge. In the Tamarin information passed in the protocol 
evolution plays crucial role. Any information send on the insecure channel can be 
intercepted by the intruder and added to his knowledgebase. Using this 
information intruder can compute new data and use it for encryption, decryption, or 
to send some messages. In Tamarin, when we say that intruder knows something, it 
means that he can learn or compute it. While working on ATL models, when we 
say that agents know some property p, it means that p is true in every state 
indistinguishable for that agent. Furthermore, in the voting protocol, we are often 
interested in asking if it is possible for the coercer to learn how the voter has 
voted. But how to specify some-thing like that in Tamarin? We can ask if coercer 
knows a pair consisting of the voter id and some candidate id, but unless voters ids 
and candidate ids are private, coercer can compute exactly that pair. That of course 
doesn't mean that he knows what that pair of data means, but he can compute it. 
One should be very careful when asking about knowledge in Tamarin.
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1 Introduction
One specificity of the Selene voting protocol is to propose a coercion mitigation
mechanism to allow any voter to fake the tracking number used to verify their
vote. This tracking number is kept secured until the end of the election, and is
leading to the plaintext vote of the voter. While the impact of the verification
phase has already been explored in a previous user study [1], we want to explore
the ability of a voter to fake his tracking number in case of coercion. Furthermore,
from the previous study, many participants have provided feedback regarding
the verification process and their lack of understanding. In particular, seeing the
entire bulletin board while they could just see their own vote was troubling.
By providing a complete experience to the voter, we want to evaluate again the
understanding and the usability of Selene.
2 Methodology
To evaluate the understanding and the usability of Selene, we design a user
game inspired by game theoretic experiment in a similar way than Llewellyn et
al. in [2]. The following steps are a first sketch of the possible methodology for
a user test study. We will run the study online using a crowd-sourcing website
to recruit participants. They will receive 3 tasks to perform described in the 3
phases below.
Preparation In order to have the participants understanding the next phases,
we need to start the study with an explanation of the Selene protocol. The
tracking number retrieval results from the combination of a public commitment,
a secret alpha-term, and a trapdoor key owned by the voter. The secret is sent
at the end of the election to the voter, who is able to combine and retrieve the
tracking number. To fake a tracking number, a new secret can be computed by
the participant, from the public commitment, the trapdoor key and a tracking
number of the participant’s choice. To achieve this, the provided application will
have a feature that will perform the computation automatically.
Phase I: Vote and Verify The participants vote for a favorite candidate using
a browser. The scenario explains that they are able to verify the vote after the
election is over1. Then, the participants connect to the Bulletin Board where the
pairs (tracking number, vote) have been published. They have the possibility to
1 All those steps are performed at once for convenience. Indeed, even if we can ask the
same participants again, we cannot ensure that they will continue the test.
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ask for a fake tracking number in case they are coerced. The provided application
has a feature helping the voter to fake the tracking number, by letting him/her
choose a new tracking number to be notified with. In the scenario, they are
invited to explore the features. Finally, the participants are invited to verify
their vote.
Phase II: User Experience Questionnaire Once the test of the application
is done, participants are redirected on a new page where the user experience
questionnaire (UEQ) [3] is displayed. It must take 3 to 5 minutes to fill out.
Phase III: Vote-buying Game Finally, after the UEQ, we redirect the partic-
ipant on a platform to play a vote-buying game. The participants will be given
randomly the role of buyer or voter. As a buyer, he can try to buy the vote of the
voter, knowing that the voter can fake his tracking number. As a voter, when the
buyer asks for the tracking number, the participant can choose between giving
a fake or her real tracker. A last question asking why the buyer/voter chose or
not to buy/fake the vote will be asked in order to evaluate their understanding.
3 Data analysis
Understanding of the Bulletin Board Unlike the previous study, the participants
will receive explanation on why they can see other tracking numbers. They will
also have the ability to choose a tracker to be notified with, instead of their real
tracking number, in case of coercion.
Understanding of/Trust in the security behind the tracking number Participants
will have to play a game where they can have either the role of the vote buyer,
or the role of the voter who fake his tracker. Then we ask them to explain their
choice in the game.
User experience The UEQ will help us to evaluate the users’ perceptions of the
voting system and verify the assumption that the voting system fits their needs.
4 Work in progress
This paper is a first user study design that needs to be detailed. The feature for
faking the tracker has to be designed and developed and the utility functions for
the game must be described.
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Abstract. Voting is the cornerstone of any democracy. Today the vast majority 
of voting is still done offline. Such a voting process is inefficient both for or-
ganizers and voters who have to contend with barriers to registration, long lines 
at the voting booth, difficulties in establishing proof of identity and flawed 
counting practices. And this is the case for elections at all levels, from universi-
ties and political parties to municipal and national governments. Blockchain 
technology has the potential to solve those problems and change the way people 
vote. Polys, a blockchain-based voting system, has emerged as a tool claiming 
to increase the efficiency, transparency, and trustworthiness of the voting pro-
cess. Here we will consider the technology at the core of Polys, its capabilities 
as well as real-life examples of its use 
Keywords: Blockchain, e-Voting, Online Election, Transparency, Polys. 
1 Introduction 
Online voting imposes stringent security requirements on the voting process because, 
in serious elections, the temptation of large-scale manipulation is too great and the 
risk simply too high. That’s why such elections cannot be carried out using black-box 
voting – the process must be clear and transparent for all participants. It should al-
ways be possible to monitor the process and easily verify its results. Blockchain tech-
nology offers features that can meet these requirements. 
What is Blockchain? 
A blockchain can be thought of as a distributed database. Unlike regular servers 
where data can be hacked or manipulated, data in a blockchain is stored in infor-
mation blocks on the computers of all the network participants. This means it’s im-
possible to hack because to do so you would have to hack all the machines in a net-
work. It is also impossible to steal the data because it’s encrypted. Transactions in a 
blockchain are immutable, so it’s impossible to change them once they are placed in a 
block. That’s what makes blockchains so transparent and trustworthy. 
What is Polys? 
Polys is the blockchain-based voting system. To maintain the anonymity of a vote and 
ensure it’s not possible to find out how people voted, Polys uses crypto algorithms to 
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encrypt preliminary results and voter identity. Imagine a black box where all the votes 
are collected. 
2 Definition 
Polys comprises an application for election deployment and a client application for 
casting votes. It’s flexible and scalable in terms of use cases and capable of conduct-
ing elections at all levels – from small community votes to countrywide elections. 
Voters can vote online via desktop computers or smartphones. Another key feature of 
the Polys system is the availability of voting machines. Obviously, the switch from 
paper to online voting cannot happen instantly, but to make the transition as smooth 
as possible, Polys has designed voting machines that are also based on blockchain 
technology. 
3 Implementation of Polys Voting 
In May 2019, 82,500 residents of the Volgograd region in southern Russia chose 
which projects would receive funding from the municipal budget via a blockchain-
based online voting platform. This was one of the largest votes ever conducted using 
blockchain technology (as of August 2019). This showed that people are much more 
willing to vote on important public issues if it doesn’t require going to a physical 
location. It’s far more convenient for them to contribute with the help of modern 
technologies. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented some of the main features of the Polys blockchain 
voting system. Of course, the introduction of blockchain platforms to public voting 
systems will require time and a well-thought-out approach. It’s necessary to study all 
the weaknesses and prepare a comprehensive legislative framework that determines 
the status of the new technology. Nevertheless, electronic voting on a blockchain has 
enormous potential and is capable of increasing the reliability, security, and transpar-
ency of elections, while simplifying the voting process itself. 
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These electronic voting machines and methods to be presented at the Fourth Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Electronic Voting 1 – 4 October 2019 come in two versions 
so as to address all possible needs of voters with or without disabilities. Specifically, 
version (A) also addresses the needs of voters visually impaired, while version (B) also 
addresses the needs of voters with hand impairments. Both versions address also the 
needs for voters with mobility issues and the needs of voters with reading disabilities 
such as dyslexia or voters with functional illiteracy. Both versions are intended for use 
remotely via internet or in kiosks in uncontrolled environments, not excluding con-
trolled environments like polling stations during a transitional period when moving 
from traditional ballot systems to uncontrolled electronic environments. 
In order to accommodate voters with disabilities mentioned above, each version uses 
different verifiability methods as described below. Both versions, however, employ 
also human body verifiability to safeguard voter privacy and voting secrecy and satisfy 
in every aspect the Secret Ballot (Australian Ballot) requirements Both versions are 
presently in the  fully working prototype stage and have been privately tested in uncon-
trolled environments involving close to 300 volunteer voters and beta testers. 
More information on both versions can be obtained at www.myevoter.com, via email 
request at info@myevoter.com.  
1 (A) Fingerprint authentication (touch ID) version 
Version (A) relates to a device and a method associated with the device. With respect 
to the device, it is an electronic mobile device which allows voters to vote in an election 
or poll or survey privately and secretly. This device can be used by voters to enter 
electronically their votes and submit them online to a central database. This can be done 
even in the presence of other persons without risk of breach of secrecy and voters will 
have no way of providing proof to any other person of how and what they voted. 
The core components of version (A) are an electronic device which can be used as 
desktop and/or mobile device comprising of a single board computer, a numbers key-
board, a fingerprint sensor, human body recognition sensors to safeguard from attempts 
to fraud the system, a monitor and a flash drive (USB stick) which stores the operating 
system required by the computer to function and required scripts for the device to op-
erate as a voting machine and which, generally speaking, are configured as follows: 
Voters have their own flash drive which stores securely the operating system and 
scripts, an ID number and their fingerprint images. By inserting their personal flash 
drive in the computer’s respective port and powering on the computer, voters can use 
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2 
fingerprint authentication (touch ID) to go through a voting process on an online form 
or forms hosted on a central server. 
With respect to the device it should be further noted that the numbers keyboard has 
essentially only 6 buttons which are numbers 1, 2 and 3, a delete button, a reset button 
and an enter/submit button. Essentially the 3 numbers button and the submit button are 
hidden from view inside a hood attached to the computer permanently. With respect to 
the associated method, in order to carry out the method the following core steps are 
followed: When voters successfully get access to the voting page after authentication 
they can vote following on-screen or voice instructions by means of the 3 numbers 
keyboard entering numbers which consist of any configuration that can be achieved 
using the said three numbers. Each of these number configurations will correspond to 
an election candidate, political party, coalition or individual or to specific answers in 
polls and surveys and are represented on screen by symbols such as dots or asterisks as 
in password fields.  
To safeguard voting secrecy, the embedded human body sensors will interrupt the 
voting process and ask for re-authentication if voters decide to withdraw their hand 
before pressing the submit key.  
Version (A) uses an environment very familiar to visually impaired voters who can 
vote unsupervised in an uncontrolled environment following voice instructions. 
2 (B) Iris authentication headset version 
The core components of t Version (B) are an electronic device housed in a headset 
which can be used as a mobile device comprising of a single board computer, a wireless 
computer trackball mouse, an iris recognition sensor, a human body temperature sensor 
to safeguard from attempts to fraud the system, a TFT screen, a magnifying lens, hear-
ing aid such as earphone and a USB flash drive (memory stick) which stores the oper-
ating system required by the computer to operate and required scripts for the device to 
operate as a voting machine and which, generally speaking, are configured as follows: 
Voters have their own USB flash drive which stores securely the operating system and 
scripts, their ID number and their iris images. 
I should be further noted that one of the two headset compartments, is reserved for 
the iris recognition camera sensor and the human body temperature sensor, while the 
other compartment points to a TFT screen observed by the voter via a 3X magnification 
lens. I order to carry out the method the following core steps are followed: When voters 
successfully get access to the online voting page after iris authentication, they can vote 
by means of navigating through the page or pages via the supplied wireless trackball 
mouse and make their selections onscreen from a list of names and/or images of candi-
dates. Subsequently they are asked to click on a submit button to register their vote. 
To safeguard voting secrecy, the embedded temperature sensor will shut down the 
computer if the voter decides to take off the headset before pressing the submit button. 
With the help of an assistant who will be operating only the trackball mouse, voters 
with impaired hands or other mobility issues can vote in secrecy simply by directing 
the assistant to navigate the mouse cursor over their preferences. 
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Verifiability and security of Scytl’s online voting system 
Scytl Secure Electronic Voting 
08008 Barcelona, Spain 
www.scytl.com 
Scytl’s online voting system helped several governments on the introduction of ver-
ifiability in online voting for political elections. Starting from 2004 in Switzerland 
(Neuchâtel) and continuing in France (2009) and Canada (2014), Scytl’s voting system 
included voter verifiability based on voting receipts1, allowing voters to check that their 
votes were present in the final tally. In Norway, in 2011 municipal elections, Scytl’s 
online voting system made major step by introducing individual verifiability for the 
first time in a national election. The Norwegian online voting system individual verifi-
ability was based on using return codes2. It also implemented counted-as-recorded ver-
ifiability based on using universal verifiable Mix-nets3,4. In 2015, Scytl’s voting system 
introduced a second verification mechanism designed for the State of New South Wales 
(Australia), based on a cast and decrypt approach (decryption of the vote in a trusted 
environment accessible by phone)5. Furthermore, in 2015, Scytl’s individual verifiabil-
ity based on return codes was adopted in Switzerland (Neuchâtel) and achieved in 2017 
the Swiss certification for individual verifiable systems6. Scytl online voting system is 
currently in the process of achieving the Swiss complete verifiability certification level. 
At the beginning of 2019, Scytl’s Swiss voting went through the last phase of the pro-
cess and went through a public scrutiny process7. After solving major found by re-
searchers during this process, it is expected that the voting system will be ready for 
achieving the complete verifiability certification. 
1 Puiggalí, J., Morales-Rocha, V.: Independent voter verifiability for remote electronic voting. 
In: Proceedings of International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT ’07), 
pp. 333–336, Barcelona (2007). 
2 Puiggalí, J., Guasch, S.: Universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet. In: Electronic 
Voting 2010 (EVOTE 2010), 4th International Conference, LNI, vol. 167, pp. 241–254, Aus-
tria (2010). 
3 Puiggalí, J., Guasch, S.: Cast-as-intended verification in Norway. In: 5th International Confer-
ence on Electronic Voting 2012, (EVOTE 2012), LNI, vol. 205, pp. 49–63, Austria (2012). 
4 Wikström, D.: A sender verifiable mix-net and a new proof of a shuffle. In: Proceedings of the 
11th International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Se-
curity. pp. 273–292. ASIACRYPT’05, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg (2005).  
5  Brightwell, I., Cucurull, J., Galindo, D., Guasch, S. An overview of the iVote 2015 voting 
system. Tech. rep. New South Wales Electoral Commission (2015). 
6 Swiss Post: Audit certificates and reports. Available at https://www.post.ch/en/business-solu-
tions/e-voting/publications-and-source-code#auditcertificatesandreports, last accessed 
2019/09/15 
7 Swiss Post: Swiss Post publishes the source code for its e-voting system. Press Release February 
7th, 2019. Available at https://www.evoting-blog.ch/en/pages/2019/swiss-post-publishes-the-
source-code-for-its-e-voting-system?.  
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 Finally, Australian Scytl’s online voting system has been used again in 2019 by the 
State of New South Wales. This time, the individual verifiability cast-and-decrypt 
scheme was improved allowing voters to verify their voter though a mobile phone ap-
plication (instead just a phone call) and included recorded as cast verifiability using a 
universal verifiable Mix-net8. 
In the demo session, Scytl will explain in the different verification mechanisms im-
plemented by its online voting systems and which additional functionalities are sup-
ported in addition to verifiability, like homomorphic tally or blockchain integration9. 
There will be also a demo system that will show the improved verification mechanism 
implemented this year in the Australian election held in New South Wales. 
8 New South Wales Electoral Commission: iVote® refresh project for  the 2019 NSW State elec-
tion. February 2019. 
9 Cucurull J., Puiggalí J.: Distributed Immutabilization of Secure Logs. In: Security and Trust 
Management. (STM 2016). LNCS, vol 9871. Springer, Cham. Greece (2016). 
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Call For Papers
E-Vote-ID 2020
General Chairs: Krimmer, Robert (Tallinn University of 
Technology, Ragnar Nurkse School, Estonia), Volkamer, 
Melanie (Karlsruhe Institut für Technologie, Germany)
Outreach Chairs: Rønne, Peter (University of Luxembourg, 
Luxembourg), Krivonosova, Iuliia (Tallinn University of 
Technology, Estonia)
Submission Deadline: 
15 May 2020
This is the fifth edition of one of the leading international 
events for e-voting experts from all over the world, 
taking place in Bregenz (Austria) in October 2020.
One of its major objectives is to provide a forum for 
interdisciplinary and open discussion of all issues relating to 
electronic voting. In the first 4 editions, up to 121 presentations 
had been discussed, gathering more than 400 participants. 
The aim of the conference is to bring together e-voting 
specialists working in academia, politics, government and 
industry in order to discuss various aspects of all forms of 
electronic voting (including, but not limited to, polling stations, 
kiosks, ballot scanners and remote voting by electronic means) 
in the four following tracks below and a PhD colloquium:
Track on Security, Usability 
and Technical Issues
Chairs: Beckert, Bernhard (Karlsruhe Institut für Technolo-
gie, Germany) Küsters, Ralf (University of Stuttgart, Germany) 
and Oksana Kulyk (IT University of Copenhague)
Design, analysis, formal modeling or research 
implementation of:
} Electronic voting protocols and systems;
} Voter identification and authentication;
} Ballot secrecy, receipt-freeness and coercion resistance;
} Election verification including end-to-end verifiability and 
risk limiting audits;
} Requirements;
} Evaluation and certification, including international 
security standards, e.g. Common Criteria or ITSEC;
} Human aspects of security mechanisms in electronic 
voting and in particular of verifiability mechanisms;
} Or any other security and HCI issues relevant to electronic 
voting.
Track on Administrative, Legal, 
Political and Social Issues
Chairs: Duenas-Cid, David (Tallinn University of Technology, 
Estonia / Kozminski University, Poland), open position
} Discuss legal, political and social issues of electronic 
voting implementations, ideally employing case study 
methodology;
} Analyze the interrelationship with, and the effects 
of electronic voting on democratic institutions and 
processes;
} Assess the cultural impact of electronic voting on 
institutions, behaviours and attitudes of the Digital Era;
} Discuss the administrative, legal, political and social risks 
of electronic voting;
} How to draft electronic voting legislations;
} Public administrations and the implementation of 
electronic voting;
} Understandability, transparency, and trust issues in 
electronic voting;
} Data protection issues;
} Public interests vs. PPP (public private partnerships).
Track on Election and Practical Experiences
Chairs: Oliver Spycher (Swiss Federal Chancellery, Swit-
zerland) and Beata Martin-Rozumilowicz (International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, USA)
} Review developments in the area of  
applied electronic voting;
} Report on experiences with electronic voting or the prepa-
ration thereof (including reports on development and im-
plementation, case law, court decisions, legislative steps, 
public and political debates, election outcomes, etc.);
Contributions in this track will be published in TUT press 
proceedings only. These experience and practical reports 
need not contain original research, but must be an accurate, 
complete and, where applicable, evidence-based account of 
the technology or system used. Submissions will be judged on 
quality of review and level of analysis, and the applicability of 
the results to other democracies.
Fourth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting 
6 – 9 October 2020 · Bregenz, Austria
E-Vote-ID 2020
Track on Posters and E-Voting System Demo 
Chairs: Rønne, Peter (University of Luxembourg, Luxem-
bourg)
We invite demonstrations of electronic voting systems, to be 
presented in an open session on Tuesday 1 October before the 
welcome reception. Participation is open to all conference 
participants, but we request a Short Paper (two pages) by 15 
September submittted via Easychair describing the system’s 
requirements and properties, such as:
} whether the system is intended for use in controlled (i.e. 
in polling stations) or uncontrolled environments (i.e. 
remo¬tely via the Internet or in kiosks); 
} which types of elections it accommodates; 
} whether it addresses the needs of voters with disabilities; 
} what sort of verifiability it provides; 
} the extent to which it guarantees vote privacy; 
} whether it has been deployed in a real election; 
} where to go for more information.  
PhD Colloquium 
Chairs: Driza Maurer, Ardita (Zentrum für Demokratie 
Aarau/Zurich University, Switzerland) and Iuliia Krivonosova 
(Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia) 
The goal of the colloquium is to foster understanding and 
collaboration between PhD students from various disciplines 
working on e-voting. To this end, the program allows plenty 
of space for discussion and initiating collaboration based on 
presentations by attendees. 
Each interested participant should submit his/her research 
proposal (or alternatively ideas for papers, open problems, or 
other issues where feedback from colleagues would be helpful 
etc.) on the shaper of a short paper (two pages length) using 
the conference platform. 
Format of the Conference
The format of the conference is a three-day meeting. The PhD 
Colloquium and Demo Session take places on the day before 
the formal conference begins. No parallel sessions will be held, 
and sufficient space will be given for informal communication. 
Paper Submission
Paper submissions can be in two formats—either as a full 
paper or an abstract. 
} Full paper submissions (max 16 pages in LNCS format all-in);
} Short Paper submissions (max 2 pages in LNCS format all-in).
All submissions will be subject to double-blind reviews. 
Submissions must be anonymous (with no reference 
to the authors). Submissions are to be made using the 
EasyChair conference system at https://www.easychair.
org/ conferences/?conf=evoteid2020, which serves as the 
online system for the review process. During submission, 
please select the appropriate track or the PhD colloquium. 
The track chairs reserve the right to re-assign papers to other 
tracks in case of better fit based on reviewer feedback and in 
coordination with other track chairs. LNCS style has to be used 
(see the Springer guidelines at http://www.springer.com/gp/
computer-science/lncs/ conference-proceedings-guidelines, 
including templates for LaTeX and Microsoft Word). 
If you think that one or more of the programme committee 
members could have a conflict of interest with your 
submission, please let the general chairs know at  
conference-chairs@e-vote-id.org. In turn, according settings 
in the EasyChair system will be set, so that the respective 
member/s is/are not involved in the review process.
Key Dates for Submissions
Deadline for submission of papers for the Track on 
Security, Usability and Technical Issues and the Track 
on Administrative, Legal, Political and Social Issues:  
(Hawaiian time, hard deadline, no extension)  
15 May 2020 – 23:59
Notification of Acceptance:  24 June 2020
Deadline for submission of papers for the  
Track on Election and Practical Experiences  
and the PhD Colloquium:  10 July 2020
Deadline for Camera-ready Paper Submissions: 24 July 2020
Deadline for Poster Submission and Short Papers  
for E-Voting System Demo Session: 15 September 2020
Publication
The conference proceedings will be available at the time of 
the conference. Full papers accepted for the tracks on security, 
usability, and technical issues, respective administrative, legal, 
political, and social issues will be published in Springer LNCS. 
All other accepted publications, including full papers in the 
election experience track, accepted abstracts in any of the 
tracks, and from the submissions in the PhD colloquium will be 
published in proceedings with TUT press. 
In case your academic host institution requires you to 
publish your research as open-access only, please contact the 
conference chairs for further information in which way it is 
intended to make accepted publications accessible. 
Venue
The conference will be held in the Renaissance castle of Hofen 
at Lochau/Bregenz on the shores of Lake Constance in Austria. 
On the evening of 6 October a welcome reception for all 
conference participants will be organized in castle Hofen, 
where also the conference dinner on 8 October will take place 
and feature the traditional “cheese road”.
WWW: https://www.e-vote-id.org · Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/EVoteID 
Twitter: @evotingcc · Hashtag: #EVoteID2020
